According to the Frankfurt School, Marx's theory of society and Freud's theory of psychoanalysis are both "critical theories." What is said to distinguish a critical theory from an ordinary theory in the natural sciences is that it is "reflective" rather than merely "objectifying." What makes a theory reflective is that it can function as a guide to action for the agents who hold it, helping them to realize their true interests; in this way critical theories are said to be both enlightening and emancipatory.

The bogeyman of critical theorists is the positivist of the Vienna Circle. In the positivist's view critical theories are at best a mix of empirical claims and moral judgments, exceeding the bounds of science proper. The Frankfurt School wants to combat the positivist's view and vindicate critical theory as a distinctive and legitimate form of knowledge, showing up the too-narrow epistemology of the positivist.

Geuss reviews different ways this vindication could be pulled off, and it's not easy. He focuses on the centerpiece of Marxist critical theory, its criticism of ideology (Ideologiekritik). A successful criticism of ideology is one that frees agents from the grip of their society's false ideology -- making it both emancipatory and enlightening, as good critical theories must be.

What makes this tricky is that positivism could, in principle, be quite accommodating, making space for objectifying theories that would show an ideology to be false for many interesting senses of "false": false because illegitimately presenting as objective what is in fact socially contingent; false because self-fulfilling in a way that depends on agents not appreciating its nature; etc. Geuss considers what a critical theory *must* be if it can show up positivism with a distinctive kind of knowledge.

He argues that Juergen Habermas's criticism of ideology has what it takes to be a critical theory imparting a kind of knowledge that positivists would deny is possible: it can condemn an ideology as "false" in a sense that positivism could not, and it can do so in a way that enlightens and emancipates agents who hold it. In abbreviated form, Geuss summarizes Habermas's criticism of ideology like this: "For Habermas, ideology is fundamentally false conscious­ness [...], but the 'falsity' in ques­tion is 'reflective unacceptability,' and to say of a form of consciousness that it is reflectively unacceptable is to [say] that it could only have been acquired under conditions of coercion."

For an hour or so this morning I felt I was tracking how criticism of ideology like this could be a valid form of knowledge that, like a butterfly, manages to elude the positivist's empirical net. Just as I write this, I'm unsure again. The maneuver that saves it from restatement in purely empirical terms may be the deduction from "could only have been acquired under conditions of coercion" to "reflectively unacceptable" and then to "false"--? There is a transcendental argument vibe, and Geuss points out this is distinctive to Habermas; other critical theorists do not formulate their criticism of ideology quite that way.

For me this was a valuable short book. My encounters with critical theory in the past have been frustrating, but Geuss is a very clear writer if you like the analytical style -- and of course not everyone does. ( )

Certainly, this is not an introduction to the Frankfurt School, although some seem to believe as much. It should be read alongside Horkheimer's essay, 'Traditional and Critical Theory,' Habermas' essay 'Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique,' and Adorno's 'Why Still Philosophy?'
Like those essays, this book is programmatic: what *would* a critical theory do? And is it possible? So there is not a lot in here about the actual substance of any given critical theory. Nothing much about 'communicative rationality,' not much about 'negative dialectics,' not much about the 'one-dimensional society.' Rather, this book tries to explain what those projects are meant to achieve.
Given this aim, Geuss succeeds admirably. The book is clear and precise. It doesn't have that kick of rebellion that you can find in Zizek or Badiou's popular works, or the slightly mystifying air of Adorno's worst work, or the hipness of Marcuse's. Some people will say this is a bad thing, and criticize Geuss for putting these ideas in clear, precise prose. Each to their own. But if you want to understand what all that rebellion and mystification and hipness is actually about, you could do worse than begin here.
The one downside is that the focus here is on individuals, which is necessary for analytical ethical philosophy. 'Society,' which is really the object of critique, doesn't get much of a look in. This is a shame, but on the other hand, the book mainly deals with Habermas, and he too uses this language. It's also odd that Geuss prefers Adorno's project, but focuses on Habermas. I guess the latter's just easier to write about. ( )

You've heard the term 'critical theory' and wondered how the Frankfurt School and Jurgen Habermas are part of neo-Marxism. ( )