War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism

Feith as a high-placed aide in Rumsfeld's Dept. of Defense had an insider's view on the birth and execution of the War on Terror. Overtly, he claims a balanced view: Bush and company made mistakes, even enormous once yet the approach was basically sound. I get it; a woodchuck destroys my garden, I wage war on all woodchucks that could possibly wreak such havoc, I don't go on a personal vendetta against a single, criminal chucker. However, Feith fails to convince that the war on Saddam was a natural step in the War on Terror following laid out foreign policy (why not the rest of the Axis of Evil, or other nation-states?) and not Bush's misguided vendetta at a time when the resources and focus should have been on Al Qaeda and The Taliban show more in Afghanistan. show less

I'm certainly not an apologist for the Bush Administration. Nor am I one of the rabid Bush-haters. I remember very clearly what the debate was on going to war against Iraq. Feith does too and retells it in detail. And in the process he reveals the hypocrisy of those who now oppose the war, but at the time of decision didn't, and demonstrates how the Bush Administration let its critics frame the debate.

The old saw is, "He who wins the war, writes the history." Well, maybe not. Because President Bush has won this war, but he's still letting others write the history.

Doug Feith's book​, "​War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism" is slightly dated now, having been written at the end of George W. Bush's presidency, but it provides an interesting look back at what the insiders of the Afghanistan & Iraq war planning were thinking​ at that time​, and how ​those ​plans were formulated. Over the past ten years, many have criticized the ​the Bush Administration's war ​planning (or lack thereof) efforts, especially for Iraq, and the Administration​'s​ blind desire to remove Saddam Hu​s​sain from power​,​ regardless of evidence of ​weapons of ​m​ass ​destruction​ (WMD's)​. The likelihood of success ​for a subsequent stable Iraq, and show more the like​ly ​resultant change​s​ to the balance of power in the Middle East​were not clearly foreseen. But Feith stand​s​ up ​to ​th​is ​criticism, and ​tries to ​correct some of the misunderstandings common among the public.

​Feith is not necessarily defensive in his writing, but he is presenting HIS view and rationalizing them through his eyes. Clearly there was tension between ​the ​State ​Department ​and ​the ​Defense​ Department​, and between CIA and Defense, and ​that ​reinforces the idea that the wars in Afghanistan, and especially Iraq, were not as well thought out and needed, nor necessarily based on the best information available. If ​Feith didn't use cherry-picked data in support of his views, ​he ​certainly ​used ​data which supported the ​position of the ​Administration​,​ and especially the Dept of Defense​.​ ​He maintains that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were well thought out, although admitting that plans could have been better and not everything worked out as hoped. ​Nonetheless, after several years, it's good to hear from one of the key men behind the scenes​,​ and get an answer to the question "What Were They Thinking?" show less

Having just gotten this book, I haven't had time to read it but can already see that, unlike the typical "insider" memoir, it backs up its arguments with contemporary documents. (The author has posted all of the unclassified and declassified ones on-line to help readers evaluate his analyses.) The reviews in the Wall Street Journal and National Review make it clear that Mr. Feith has written an account that everyone who wants to think seriously about the war in Iraq and, more broadly, the War on Terror will have to read and digest.

Update: Reading the book confirmed my favorable impression. For some comments, and a contrast with a lesser "insider's account", see http://stromata.typepad.com/stromata_blog/2008/05/feith-vs-mcclel.html