Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals

A dense but relatively short piece on moral action. Notably, it is the source of the "categorical imperative," which in its base formulation states: "act only on a maxim that you can also will to become a universal law” (G 421). This is a deceptively simple formulation that appears to resonate with the "golden rule" except that "universal law" does not imply reciprocity of action. The universality of the law means that moral actions ought to be based on laws that rational creatures can arrive at a priori (i.e., prior to or outside of experience) that establishes an obligation for action that, no matter the circumstances of application, never contradicts itself. The most illustrative example is about telling small lies for one's show more benefit. As a universal, the maxim does not hold because if everyone acted on the premise that it is okay to tell small lies then we can never know when/if people are telling the truth and so the expectation of truth telling breaks down.

One of the most interesting parts of the book for me was Kant's linkage between freedom, autonomy, and morality. I am, for sure, missing some nuance here, but I read this argument saying that we need to be free to make true choices about our aims, actions, and consequently, the ends to which we orient ourselves. And as long as the maxims by which we act could be willed universal they are the basis for moral action. This idea does seem to create a bit of friction around the imposition of civil law (lowercase "l") with the aim of imposing morality. When it is an external determinant on our actions, can it ever really result in moral action or just morally cognate acts that are motivated by self-interest? Or are just laws those that curtail actions that cannot be universalized? Also, what does this formulation say about moral transgression? Should we or even can we do anything about moral transgression? Maybe I'm just getting caught up in the normativity of this system.

I also really liked the discussion of ends and means. This is the practical formulation of the categorical imperative to "act in such a way that you treat humanity whether in your own person or anyone else’s, never merely as a means, but also as an end” (G 430). I like that and see strong resonance with Simone Weil's discussion of human dignity and the need for us to be able to pursue our ends. It's all related to freedom as well, as I see it: when a person is treated as a means to an end, they are robbed of some of their autonomy and their ability to choose to act toward their ends. However, it's not that we should never treat people as means to ends, just not merely as means to ends.

On the whole, I found Kant's to be quite readable. There is a fair bit of terminology and specialized meanings and a fair bit of ambiguity, but reading this work alongside some secondary work really helped. Section III on the will seemed … inconclusive? Maybe that’s what he resolves in the Critique of Practical Reason. show less

So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case at the same time as an end, never as a means only.

A virtuosic display of intellect as is typical of Kant. He teeters on the verge of mysticism sometimes in his adulation of reason and desire to strip inclination and the empirical world from morality. The problem is that it results in a pure morality that rests on an assumption both of free will and unknowable noumena (and yet somehow it affects the sensible world?). I don't dare say I understand the Groundwork enough to truly address its plausibility, but I urge anyone interested in moral realism and ethical theory to take the time to process his ideas. This is the second translation I've show more dealt with, and its impeccable. I can't vouch for the consistency of the terminology because my Kantian German is zero, but it's highly readable and has a number of helpful appendices. show less

Kant desenvolve a indicação ao final da crítica da razão pura (sua obra prima) de que a liberdade diferenciaria o humano quanto à sua redutibilidade ao mundo natural, colocando o também sob a égide de um mundo inteligível, onde o que vale são a esfera das razões. Aqui na fundamentação são exploradas as consequências dessa colocação, de modo a fundar a racionalidade prática na sua ligação com a moralidade e a liberdade, no estabelecimento firme da vontade como autônoma e assim legisladora. Com um texto muito mais envolvente do que a crítica da razão prática (que corrige e desenvolve alguns pontos daqui, mas perde-se em aspectos técnicos e não invoca a emoção das máximas e imperativos categóricos), desenvolve show more argumentos analíticos da boa vontade à moralidade e depois da moralidade popular a esta última, que se mostra destituída do empírico (no qual não apenas os humanos, mas todos os possíveis sapientes são irmãos), para terminar com um desenvolvimento dito "sintético" da liberdade (negativa da não determinação pela causalidade mecânica) e positiva (envolvendo a autonomia da vontade) até a defensibilidade da pressuposição desta em sua ligação com o reino dos fins e o respeito à razão e aos outros sapientes. Grande livro! show less

I shamefully do not have the time to write an elaborate review, since I have to do an exam and essay on this very book, but let my quickly put down some thoughts:

On the edition - This edition is handsdown the best one around. The German-English lay out is perfect for scholars who are not satisfied with accepting the interpretation of the translator. Especially in Groundwork III there are some mistakes in the English translation, and the German version helps clarify what Kant means.

On the book - Kant's moral system is impressive. Though I think it has been fairly successfully undermined by later philosophers, it is still worth plunging into its depths. However, the first two parts of the Groundwork are pretty weak. Kant begins building show more his system by following what he thinks are moral intuitions beyond doubt. It all starts with examples and arguments based on common-sense. It is only in the Groundwork III (and the end of II) that Kant starts building his system and giving it its place within Reason. For those interested in Kantian ethics: this book is a good intro due to its common-sense method. However, in the Second Critique, Kant answers questions of a deeper nature in a more thorough way. show less

Inasmuch as we can praise Kant's brilliance and analytical rigour, the Metaphysics of Morals falls patently flat if only because he is overextending the gains he has made in the first Critique to apply to the domain of ethics. Any movement from "is" to "ought" (i.e., the shift from ontology to ethics) is going to be fraught with perils. I would say that, from the standpoint of Kant's entire oeuvre, this is his lowest point. That being said, no serious reader in philosophy can bypass this text as it is essential reading in the development of ethics in the transition from the Enlightenment to subsequent Romanticism.

It's a shame that this is the most famous of Kant's works, since its central argument is probably the weakest and wishy-washiest. It's less systematic and well argued and hence more confusing than the (albeit initially more difficult) Critique of Practical Reason.

As Kant points out in the Critique of Pure Reason, "if the size of a book were measured not by the number of its pages but by the time required to understand it [and the reasoning behind it], then we could say about many books that they would be much shorter if they were not so short." (A xix) Hear hear!

In "The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," Immanuel Kant argues that the foundation of morality lies in the "good will," which means acting solely out of respect for a universal moral law, known as the Categorical Imperative, rather than based on the potential consequences of an action; essentially, the rightness of an action is determined by the principle guiding it, not the outcome, and this principle must be applicable to all rational beings in all situations.