Rashid Khalidi
Author of The Hundred Years' War on Palestine
About the Author
Rashid Khalidi is the author of six books about the Middle East, including Palestinian Identity, Resurrecting Empire, The Iron Cage, and Sowing Crisis. His writing on Middle Eastern history and politics has appeared in the New York Times, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and many show more journals. He is the Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University in New York. show less
Image credit: 23 January 2009. Next Left Notes (Photo Credit: Thomas Good / NLN)
Works by Rashid Khalidi
Palestine: A Primer 1 copy
Palestine and the Gulf 1 copy
Associated Works
Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (1988) — Contributor — 238 copies, 2 reviews
The Goldstone Report: The Legacy of the Landmark Investigation of the Gaza Conflict (2011) — Contributor — 29 copies
Tagged
Common Knowledge
- Birthdate
- 1948
- Gender
- male
- Education
- University of Oxford (DPhil|1974)
Yale College (AB|1970) - Occupations
- historian
university professor - Organizations
- Columbia University (Edward Said Professor Modern Arab Studies)
Council on Foreign Relations
Journal of Palestine Studies (editor) - Nationality
- USA (birth)
- Birthplace
- New York, New York, USA
- Associated Place (for map)
- New York, USA
Members
Reviews
The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017 by Rashid Khalidi
In The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017, Rashid Khalidi argues, “The modern history of Palestine can best be understood in these terms: as a colonial war waged against the indigenous population, by a variety of parties, to force them to relinquish their homeland to another people against their will” (p. 9). He draws upon his own family’s history as well as historical and scholarly resources, demonstrating how the Palestinian show more people have always been aware of the forces of colonialism and have always wanted the independence that other Arabic and near-East nations achieved, albeit grudgingly from European nations with their imperialist ambitions in the region.
Discussing the Balfour Declaration, Khalidi writes, “Britain primarily desired control over Palestine for geopolitical strategic reasons that antedated World War I and that had only been reinforced by wartime events. However important the other motivations may have been, this was the central one: the British Empire was never motivated by altruism. Britain's strategic interests were perfectly served by its sponsorship of the Zionist project, just as they were served by a range of regional wartime undertakings” (p. 25). As the League of Nations formed the British Mandate, its text clearly implied “that only one people in Palestine is to be recognized with national rights: the Jewish people. This was in contradistinction to every other Middle Eastern mandated territory, where Article 22 of the covenant applied to the entire population and was ultimately meant to allow for some form of independence of these countries” (p. 34).
Khalidi summarizes the Nakba, writing, “By the summer of 1949, the Palestinian polity had been devastated and most of its society uprooted. Some 80 percent of the Arab population of the territory that at war's end became the new state of Israel had been forced from their homes and lost their lands and property. At least 720,000 of the 1.3 million Palestinians were made refugees. Thanks to this violent transformation, Israel controlled 78 percent of the territory of former Mandatory Palestine, and now ruled over the 160,000 Palestinian Arabs who had been able to remain, barely one-fifth of the prewar Arab population” (p. 58). From there, he describes turning points – each a declaration of war of sorts – in 1967, 1982, 1987-1995, and 2000-2014.
Khalidi concludes, “Over the decades, the United States has wavered, going back and forth between paying lip service to the existence of the Palestinians and trying to exclude them from the map of the Middle East. The provision for an Arab state in the 1947 partition resolution (albeit never implemented), Jimmy Carter's mention of a Palestinian "homeland" and nominal support for a Palestinian state from the Clinton to the Obama administrations were artifacts of that lip service” (p. 238). The role of religion in the conflict has appealed to a certain subset of American Christians, further compounding any effort to tackle the colonial issues at the heart of the conflict (p. 241). On the other hand, Khalidi cautions that “Palestinians, too, need weaning from a pernicious delusion-rooted in the colonial nature of their encounter with Zionism and in its denial of Palestinian peoplehood-that Jewish Israelis are not a ‘real’ people and that they do not have national rights” (p. 245). Khalidi concludes of Palestinians and Israelis, “The former are indigenous, the latter settlers or descendants of settlers, although many have been there for generations now, and have a deeply felt and ancient religious connection to the country, albeit one quite different from the ancient rootedness in the country of the indigenous Palestinians. Because this is a colonial conflict, this difference matters enormously” (p. 246). Khalidi’s work is particularly relevant in 2024. show less
Discussing the Balfour Declaration, Khalidi writes, “Britain primarily desired control over Palestine for geopolitical strategic reasons that antedated World War I and that had only been reinforced by wartime events. However important the other motivations may have been, this was the central one: the British Empire was never motivated by altruism. Britain's strategic interests were perfectly served by its sponsorship of the Zionist project, just as they were served by a range of regional wartime undertakings” (p. 25). As the League of Nations formed the British Mandate, its text clearly implied “that only one people in Palestine is to be recognized with national rights: the Jewish people. This was in contradistinction to every other Middle Eastern mandated territory, where Article 22 of the covenant applied to the entire population and was ultimately meant to allow for some form of independence of these countries” (p. 34).
Khalidi summarizes the Nakba, writing, “By the summer of 1949, the Palestinian polity had been devastated and most of its society uprooted. Some 80 percent of the Arab population of the territory that at war's end became the new state of Israel had been forced from their homes and lost their lands and property. At least 720,000 of the 1.3 million Palestinians were made refugees. Thanks to this violent transformation, Israel controlled 78 percent of the territory of former Mandatory Palestine, and now ruled over the 160,000 Palestinian Arabs who had been able to remain, barely one-fifth of the prewar Arab population” (p. 58). From there, he describes turning points – each a declaration of war of sorts – in 1967, 1982, 1987-1995, and 2000-2014.
Khalidi concludes, “Over the decades, the United States has wavered, going back and forth between paying lip service to the existence of the Palestinians and trying to exclude them from the map of the Middle East. The provision for an Arab state in the 1947 partition resolution (albeit never implemented), Jimmy Carter's mention of a Palestinian "homeland" and nominal support for a Palestinian state from the Clinton to the Obama administrations were artifacts of that lip service” (p. 238). The role of religion in the conflict has appealed to a certain subset of American Christians, further compounding any effort to tackle the colonial issues at the heart of the conflict (p. 241). On the other hand, Khalidi cautions that “Palestinians, too, need weaning from a pernicious delusion-rooted in the colonial nature of their encounter with Zionism and in its denial of Palestinian peoplehood-that Jewish Israelis are not a ‘real’ people and that they do not have national rights” (p. 245). Khalidi concludes of Palestinians and Israelis, “The former are indigenous, the latter settlers or descendants of settlers, although many have been there for generations now, and have a deeply felt and ancient religious connection to the country, albeit one quite different from the ancient rootedness in the country of the indigenous Palestinians. Because this is a colonial conflict, this difference matters enormously” (p. 246). Khalidi’s work is particularly relevant in 2024. show less
The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler-Colonial Conquest and Resistance, 1917-2017 by Rashid Khalidi
**
This is a very well written and well researched book, providing an unflinching detailed look at the plight of the Palestinians over the past century. So why the low rating? Because it's politically motivated deliberately misleading and inflammatory propaganda. I started to make a list of the most egregious misrepresentations and distortions, but it would be almost as long as the book itself. A lot of it is lies of omission, such as condemning Israel's [admittedly controversial] show more assassination of a prominent Palestinian but neglecting to mention that they were the mastermind of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, implying that it was completely unjustified. Throughout the text he downplays or obfuscates Palestinian crimes and terrorism, such as the infamous heinous 1929 Massacres, which he downplays as "…demonstrations, strikes, and riots, with violence flaring notably in 1920, 1921, and 1929…often provoked by Zionist groups flexing their muscle." This obfuscation isn't due to ignorance, either, as he lists the excellent book Year Zero of the Arab Israeli Conflict 1929 as a source. He knows better, and is cherry picking what to say, and very carefully choosing his words on how he says it.
Similarly, the deadly cross-border infiltrations and terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians during the 1950's are sanitized as "largely inchoate forms of clandestine armed action." Even airplane hijackings are described as being "seen as terrorist attacks by much of the world." But apparently not by the author. It goes on and on, even justifying the horrendous Fatah suicide attacks and bus bombings during the second intifada as "inevitable," as if the Palestinians have no agency and can't help but blow themselves in order to kill Israeli children.
In this twisted logic, the first intifada was a "declaration of war," but by Israel, not the Palestinians. As was the the entire peace process from 1978 with Egypt through the Oslo Accords, Camp David in 2000, and subsequent efforts under GW Bush and Obama. The deadly second intifada was also somehow a "declaration of war" by Israel, and even the complete Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005.
Hidden between the mendacious rhetoric, he does make some good points. In addition to castigating Israel at every turn, he also rightly points out that the Palestinian's self-professed Arab "brothers" have done next to nothing to help them, and more often than not have made things worse. He also has little nice to say about the PA or Hamas, and blames the Oslo negotiators for falling prey to what he portrays as Israel's traps. And he's not wrong that the US (especially under trump) isn't an impartial mediator.
I did find the conclusion interesting, even though I disagree with his entire approach. Here at least he stops lying and is straightforward in presenting what he thinks, stripped of any pretense of relating history. His vision is to abandon the 2-state solution, abolish Israel as the Jewish nation, and replace it with a unified Palestinian state "from the river to the sea" populated with millions of "refugees" currently living in other countries. He pays lip service to this being accomplished without violence and with equality for all citizens, but doesn't even provide a hint of how that may be accomplished.
Note: -1 star to combat the many overtly antisemitic 5 star reviews show less
This is a very well written and well researched book, providing an unflinching detailed look at the plight of the Palestinians over the past century. So why the low rating? Because it's politically motivated deliberately misleading and inflammatory propaganda. I started to make a list of the most egregious misrepresentations and distortions, but it would be almost as long as the book itself. A lot of it is lies of omission, such as condemning Israel's [admittedly controversial] show more assassination of a prominent Palestinian but neglecting to mention that they were the mastermind of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, implying that it was completely unjustified. Throughout the text he downplays or obfuscates Palestinian crimes and terrorism, such as the infamous heinous 1929 Massacres, which he downplays as "…demonstrations, strikes, and riots, with violence flaring notably in 1920, 1921, and 1929…often provoked by Zionist groups flexing their muscle." This obfuscation isn't due to ignorance, either, as he lists the excellent book Year Zero of the Arab Israeli Conflict 1929 as a source. He knows better, and is cherry picking what to say, and very carefully choosing his words on how he says it.
Similarly, the deadly cross-border infiltrations and terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians during the 1950's are sanitized as "largely inchoate forms of clandestine armed action." Even airplane hijackings are described as being "seen as terrorist attacks by much of the world." But apparently not by the author. It goes on and on, even justifying the horrendous Fatah suicide attacks and bus bombings during the second intifada as "inevitable," as if the Palestinians have no agency and can't help but blow themselves in order to kill Israeli children.
In this twisted logic, the first intifada was a "declaration of war," but by Israel, not the Palestinians. As was the the entire peace process from 1978 with Egypt through the Oslo Accords, Camp David in 2000, and subsequent efforts under GW Bush and Obama. The deadly second intifada was also somehow a "declaration of war" by Israel, and even the complete Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005.
Hidden between the mendacious rhetoric, he does make some good points. In addition to castigating Israel at every turn, he also rightly points out that the Palestinian's self-professed Arab "brothers" have done next to nothing to help them, and more often than not have made things worse. He also has little nice to say about the PA or Hamas, and blames the Oslo negotiators for falling prey to what he portrays as Israel's traps. And he's not wrong that the US (especially under trump) isn't an impartial mediator.
I did find the conclusion interesting, even though I disagree with his entire approach. Here at least he stops lying and is straightforward in presenting what he thinks, stripped of any pretense of relating history. His vision is to abandon the 2-state solution, abolish Israel as the Jewish nation, and replace it with a unified Palestinian state "from the river to the sea" populated with millions of "refugees" currently living in other countries. He pays lip service to this being accomplished without violence and with equality for all citizens, but doesn't even provide a hint of how that may be accomplished.
Note: -1 star to combat the many overtly antisemitic 5 star reviews show less
This is the first history of Palestine that I have read from the Palestinian perspective. It persuasively undercuts the dominant Anglo-American ideology of Israel as a besieged rampart in a hostile land. Instead, it lays out an argument about the history of Israel as a European colonial settler project to control the region and deliberately suppress the history of the indigenous people of Palestine.
Khalidi writes with authority as a historian who, with his family members, has lived through show more the history and taken part in policy making about Palestine. He makes his arguments with reference to the key documents of the history, but the most memorable points are from his family’s life. His grandfather’s letters explaining that the land had been occupied for generations and his father’s advice to committees of the United Nations proved ineffective. His own stories of escaping Israeli bombardment in Beirut and deliberate massacre in Lebanese refugee camps make those political positions clear.
He also describes the defeats and the failures of the Palestinian leadership, overwhelmed by superior military power and repression in the “Arab Revolt” of 1937 to ’39 and again after 1948. The increasing isolation and weakness of the leadership, shut out of negotiations by colonialist powers, led to the radical street revolts in the 1950s and later the first and second Intifadas. With the leadership excluded, it’s not a surprise that Palestinians would take more hands-on, violent, action. What is more surprising is that these actions drew attention to the repression and led to increasing support for Palestinian people. The increasingly violent repression by the Israeli state, both in the Palestinian lands and in neighbouring territories, has only increased knowledge and sympathy for the Palestinian movement. Given this response, it is not a surprise that the Palestinian resistance would take more extreme actions, even knowing that intense repression would follow. Whether this is the strategy of Hamas in its October 7 attacks is not known – my first thought on hearing of it was, “What are they thinking? Don’t they know what this will cost?” – but the history can easily lead toward more violence.
While Andreas Malm in The Destruction of Palestine takes the position that the destruction of the imperialist Israeli state is necessary for a just resolution in the region, Khalidi takes a more nuanced view. “There are now two peoples in Palestine, irrespective of how they came into being, and the conflict between them cannot be resolved as long as the national existence of each is denied by the other. Their mutual acceptance can only be based on complete equality of rights, including national rights, not withstanding the crucial historical differences between the two.” He thinks the positions of both Hamas and Fatah have been less successful than BDS and the student-lead oppositions and that a new long-term strategy should be based on education of US and other publics to oppose colonialism and inequality, and on build on Arab popular support instead of relying on compromised Arab governments.
Interestingly, Khalidi agrees with Malm that the root of the issue is not Zionist distortion of Anglo-American politics, but rather the self-interest of Britain and the USA. Both countries pursue their own interests when they occasionally conflict with Israeli desires. (Trump may be an exception, because his own self-interest is more prominent to him than the state’s self-interest.)
Khalidi’s position may be the more palatable, although I’m not sure it would be completely effective. Building support through education is essential, and the Arab street is likely more sympathetic than Arab governments. But forceful resistance – characterized as terrorism – is what brought about change in Algeria, Kenya, India, South Africa and other liberation movements. Colonialists do not readily give up what they control until it becomes too expensive to hold. (There are counter-examples – the Indigenous nations of Canada are slowly gaining economic and political power within a colonialist state through legal action, buttressed with occasional small-scale acts of resistance.)
Although the solution is not a clear or simple one, Khalidi’s book reveals a history of Palestine that helps understand a century of colonialism in the region and the impact of Zionist state-building and Anglo-American manipulation. It also offers a direction that is not based on more repression or violence. show less
Khalidi writes with authority as a historian who, with his family members, has lived through show more the history and taken part in policy making about Palestine. He makes his arguments with reference to the key documents of the history, but the most memorable points are from his family’s life. His grandfather’s letters explaining that the land had been occupied for generations and his father’s advice to committees of the United Nations proved ineffective. His own stories of escaping Israeli bombardment in Beirut and deliberate massacre in Lebanese refugee camps make those political positions clear.
He also describes the defeats and the failures of the Palestinian leadership, overwhelmed by superior military power and repression in the “Arab Revolt” of 1937 to ’39 and again after 1948. The increasing isolation and weakness of the leadership, shut out of negotiations by colonialist powers, led to the radical street revolts in the 1950s and later the first and second Intifadas. With the leadership excluded, it’s not a surprise that Palestinians would take more hands-on, violent, action. What is more surprising is that these actions drew attention to the repression and led to increasing support for Palestinian people. The increasingly violent repression by the Israeli state, both in the Palestinian lands and in neighbouring territories, has only increased knowledge and sympathy for the Palestinian movement. Given this response, it is not a surprise that the Palestinian resistance would take more extreme actions, even knowing that intense repression would follow. Whether this is the strategy of Hamas in its October 7 attacks is not known – my first thought on hearing of it was, “What are they thinking? Don’t they know what this will cost?” – but the history can easily lead toward more violence.
While Andreas Malm in The Destruction of Palestine takes the position that the destruction of the imperialist Israeli state is necessary for a just resolution in the region, Khalidi takes a more nuanced view. “There are now two peoples in Palestine, irrespective of how they came into being, and the conflict between them cannot be resolved as long as the national existence of each is denied by the other. Their mutual acceptance can only be based on complete equality of rights, including national rights, not withstanding the crucial historical differences between the two.” He thinks the positions of both Hamas and Fatah have been less successful than BDS and the student-lead oppositions and that a new long-term strategy should be based on education of US and other publics to oppose colonialism and inequality, and on build on Arab popular support instead of relying on compromised Arab governments.
Interestingly, Khalidi agrees with Malm that the root of the issue is not Zionist distortion of Anglo-American politics, but rather the self-interest of Britain and the USA. Both countries pursue their own interests when they occasionally conflict with Israeli desires. (Trump may be an exception, because his own self-interest is more prominent to him than the state’s self-interest.)
Khalidi’s position may be the more palatable, although I’m not sure it would be completely effective. Building support through education is essential, and the Arab street is likely more sympathetic than Arab governments. But forceful resistance – characterized as terrorism – is what brought about change in Algeria, Kenya, India, South Africa and other liberation movements. Colonialists do not readily give up what they control until it becomes too expensive to hold. (There are counter-examples – the Indigenous nations of Canada are slowly gaining economic and political power within a colonialist state through legal action, buttressed with occasional small-scale acts of resistance.)
Although the solution is not a clear or simple one, Khalidi’s book reveals a history of Palestine that helps understand a century of colonialism in the region and the impact of Zionist state-building and Anglo-American manipulation. It also offers a direction that is not based on more repression or violence. show less
This book may be one of the best modern books you will read on Palestine. While I have been up in arms about the recent genocidal behaviour of the Israelis, I had also a smattering of understanding of the apartheid regime of Israel.
It is easy to allow emotion to blind you. However, when you read this book, you realise the genuine horror of the situation. Rashid Khalidi lived through some of the bombing, yet wrote a balanced, well-researched book. He does not spare the Palestinian show more authorities for their incompetence, nor does he spare the Arabic countries for their almost useless approach to the problem.
However, it becomes clear that the Americans have allowed the Israelis free hand. It is also clear that Israel owns American political strategy in the Middle-East.
Excellent companion books to this one are "The General's Son," Orientalism, "Culture and Colonialism." When you read the latter three books, you will understand the cultural context of the Palestinian problem, the genocide and apartheid.
Meanwhile, read this book. The scholarly, readable book does not conceal his pain. show less
It is easy to allow emotion to blind you. However, when you read this book, you realise the genuine horror of the situation. Rashid Khalidi lived through some of the bombing, yet wrote a balanced, well-researched book. He does not spare the Palestinian show more authorities for their incompetence, nor does he spare the Arabic countries for their almost useless approach to the problem.
However, it becomes clear that the Americans have allowed the Israelis free hand. It is also clear that Israel owns American political strategy in the Middle-East.
Excellent companion books to this one are "The General's Son," Orientalism, "Culture and Colonialism." When you read the latter three books, you will understand the cultural context of the Palestinian problem, the genocide and apartheid.
Meanwhile, read this book. The scholarly, readable book does not conceal his pain. show less
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