Edwin B. Coddington (1905–1967)

This is an excellent book. It is a good narrative history combined with insightful analysis. The author focuses on the command structures of the Federal and Confederate armies and how they functioned. A good example is his discussion of the artillery command structure of the two armies. The Union army had one general in overall command of all of the artillery. The Confederate army had the same position on the official roster but that officer did not have the same authority the actual command show more of the batteries was done at the division level. After the cannonade preceding Pickett's charge there were only a handful of guns on the Confederate side with enough ammunition to support the infantry. The Union artillery commander recognized the cannonade as a prelude to a charge. He had conserved ammunition which was then used to good effect on the Confederates. The author describes and analyzes the action of the battle at this level all through the book.
Coddington uses a vast array primary sources woven together skilfully to tell the story of the battle. The the words and actions of those who lived through the battle are given center stage. This gives the narration of events the moment to moment immediacy experienced by the men involved in the action.
The extensive use of primary sources and the 200 pages of footnotes show the depth and extent of the author's research. The footnotes are not just citations to sources. They add details and facts to the narration which make them an integral part of the book. A good example of the author's research is his discussion of the number of men in each army. He starts with the numbers from the War Office Study of 1886 which showed a significant advantage for the Union forces. Many authors stop there, accepting those figures without question. Coddington looks at several other factors and concludes that the armies were about equal size at the time of the battle. This type of work gave me confidence that he did his best to provide an accurate portrayal of the battle.
The author starts the book at the point the armies started to move north. When Lee started North Hooker wanted to attack Richmond. This started an argument with Halleck that led to Hooker's resignation. On June 28 George Meade found himself in command of the army. Coddington shows that Meade functioned as a more than competent general in his description of his actions. He gathered his forces and kept his army between Lee and Washington. During the battles Meade was regularly on his horse patrolling the lines and moving units to the point of attack.
Coddington spends more time on Meade's command activities than most other authors. In the three day battle it was Meade who had the interior lines and was able to move troops to the point of Lee's attacks. Lee had difficulty getting his troops to coordinate their actions according to his orders. There has always been some controversy about whether or not Meade wanted to retreat after the first day of the battle. Coddington shows that Daniel Butterfield who had been Hooker's Chief of Staff and continued with Meade manufactured this idea long after the war was over. Lincoln always felt that Meade should have been more aggressive in his pursuit of Lee after the battle. The author looks at the relevant factors and shows that given what the Union army had been through any massive coordinated effort on their part was not realistic.
Throughout the war there were several occasions that seemed to provide opportunities for the decisive battle that would destroy the enemy army. The author of How The North Won The War points out that this was never a real possibility. The military technology greatly increased the defensive power of the armies in the Civil War. The only army that was ever wiped out was the army defending Vicksburg which allowed itself to get surrounded and then surrendered after a lengthy siege. The strategy that won the war was Grant's massive raids that destroyed the ability of the South to continue the war.
This was an excellent book. I enjoyed it and learned a lot. It is good history and good literature. Being good history it takes a bit of work to read but it is well worth it. show less

This is an excellent book that in my opinion ranks right up there with Shelby Foote's 3 volume history of the Civil War.

Coddington opens with an assessment of the reasons for Lee's PA campaign. He stresses more than others the military situation in the West, specifically Vicksburg. By April, 1863 Grant's armies were on the eastern side of the Mississippi and in May he was laying siege to Vicksburg. Because so much attention and romanticism has been attached to the fighting in the East, too show more little appreciation is given to the danger the fall of Vicksburg posed for the South. Stretched too thin to send any help, one of Lee's aims was to so frighten the Lincoln government that it would withdraw forces from the Vicksburg campaign to defend Washington.

Coddington's style of writing is dynamic and immediately interesting. Of all the books I've read so far on the Civil War, Coddington seems to have made the most extensive use of original sources. His research was truly impressive. In order to make a reasoned speculation about different accounts of the movements of one Union unit, Coddington and a friend (Gettysburg resident) drove and personally explored the area to see if connecting roads actually existed that would help clarify the issue. They do and their existence adds weight to his views on the controversy.

Political consderations on both sides are extensively assessed.

Since the book is a study of the Gettysburg campaign, Coddington does a very detailed study of Lee's and Hooker's movements from the beginning--June 2 when Lee started to withdraw his army from Fredericksburg. Most books summarize this aspect but Coddington is pretty thorough.

Most importantly, the books is what it set out to be--a study in command. Some major figures come to life: Buford, Reynolds, Longstreet and in particular, Meade.

Meade has always had a bad press. Coddington, who clearly favors Meade, makes convincing arguments that it was undeserved--that Meade was an excellent commander who has been wrongfully blamed for Lee's escape after Gettysburg.

Most Civil War accounts of Gettysburg focus on the obviously dramatic; this has been especially true of the film "Gettysburg". Everybody "knows" about Little Round top and especially Pickett's Charge. More now undoubtedly have an idea of Buford's stand west of Gettysburg until the arrival of Reynolds and the First Corps.

What Coddington does is go into the 2nd day battle for Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill, for example. I had no idea of the seriousness of that particular engagement until I read Coddington. Most books treat it sort of as an afterthought, which it most certainly wasn't.

Unlike most books on the Civil War, the maps are almost adequate. I particularly dislike maps that have these little dots, dashes and otherwise near-identical symbols showing routes of armies, and several of the maps are so cursed. However, their usefulness is immensely enhance by being so detailed that one can follow, through the text, the actaul course of the armies. I scan maps and reproduce them in order to be able to refer to them easily while reading the text. Coddington's maps of upper VA, MD, and southern PA are excellent--detailed locations of towns, gaps, rivers, runs, etc.

Another joy of Coddington's maps, those of the actual battle. To my delight, the three critical ones are topographical maps, that actually show the layout of the land especially at the Round Tops. One, however, is maddening in that the text talks about the movements of some units that simply are not listed on the map or may be subsumed under a particular command. When I reread this book, I intend to go over carefully the Order of Battle and see if that indeed is the case.

Coddington has the complete Order of Battle for both armies, which I found indispensible.

Finally, the chapter notes are excellent. I'm one of those who reads them until they interfere too much in the narrative. But they are well worth reading, since many times they include information as to why Coddington has come down on one side of speculation about movements, for example, rather than another. The tidbit about he and his friend reconnoitering Wolf's Hill is one such example.

One of the best books I have ever read. show less

As other reviewers have noted, this is the single best "Bible" of the battle of Gettysburg. It is heavily documented and is well-written. Its focus is upon the command and control successes and failures of the campaign. He also addresses the many controversies and legends that Gettysburg spawned. It begins with the battles of Frederiksburg and Chancellorville and the reasons for the Lee's decision to move into Pennsylvania. One can easily get lost among all the names of commanders and units. show more I highly recommend that one have a detailed map of the battlefield (e.g., the Civil War Atlas by McPheason) and use markers to move units around. Even if you don't, you'll get a clear picture of the general issues faced by the commanders of the opposing armies. I read this book in preparation for my second visiit to Gettysburg. As I toured the battlefield snippets of Coddington's narrative would come back to me, vastly enriching the experience. show less

This has to be the most detailed and researched book on Gettysburg. He gives both sides of the story. He does evaluate the actions of the different generals but always provides the reasoning behind his opinions. He compliments where due the actions of both Confederate and Union general's actions. He supports and defends Meade's actions.
The only want the book leaves is the ending which doesn't pursue the action as Lee returns to Virginia.