Karl Jaspers (1883–1969)

Modernity was a troubling thing for those who had to live through it. Pure, objective, unassailable science was quickly supplanting religious ideas, and paring those ideas down to what they were - mere myths perpetrated on us by those who wanted to exert social and cultural control. Or at least this was the conclusion reached by many who, with the advent of a new way of approaching universal truth, now wanted nothing to do with that old-time religion. But not everyone felt the same way. This show more very short book introduces the thought of Rudolph Bultmann, one of the leading German theologians of the early twentieth century and proponent of "demythologization," and Karl Jaspers, the well-known German existentialist and philosopher. First, there is a very capable introduction by R. Joseph Hoffmann, followed by an opening statement by Jaspers, a reply by Bultmann, and then a closing reply by Jaspers. Jaspers and Bultmann both being dyed-in-the-wool Heideggerians, it is interesting to read about their intellectual justifications regarding the respective virtues and weaknesses of hermeneutics as applied to religious myth.

As I mentioned earlier, toward the latter part of Bultmann's career, he started to talk about something called demythologization, in which he attempts to divest religious meaning and intent from the original myths in which they are couched. For Bultmann, the Ascension and the Virgin Birth (just to name two highly representative religious myths) mean something, but the fact that the religious content is ensconced in the language of the miraculous is a serious stumbling block for the modern man whose mind has come to see the miracle as ridiculous and impossible. Therefore, these myths need to be reconfigured - divested - of their Biblical form and given a structure which is makes getting at their meaning and significance possible for someone living in the twentieth century.

Jaspers, however, sees the element of myth as indispensable from the content of religious belief itself. Jaspers claims that "reading" these myths without their mythical structures is impossible. He rejects the idea that any religion can be understood apart from its mythical origins. The topology of the origins themselves, he argues, is essential to our understanding. Religious myths are not there to provide us with a decoding project; their cutting away cannot happen without the simultaneous disappearance of any possibility of a religious message. Myth is, for Jaspers, das Umgreifende (the Great Encompassing) by and through which we can escape the worn dualities of subjectivity and objectivity, and achieve a sort of transcendence.

Jaspers saw Bultmann's project of demythologization as a sanitizing one, one that failed to understand myth as an essential vehicle for apprehending and describing the transcendent. Jaspers comes close to the one that Northrop Frye constructs in "The Great Code: The Bible and Literature," in which he suggests that modern attempts to read the Bible are often foiled because we no longer read and write in the mythical; rather, he thinks, following Vico's tripartite theory of language, that our system of writing has since taken on empirical, positivistic concerns. While Frye thinks that one cannot read the Bible without myth since it is written in myth, Jaspers respects the mythic, and asserts that the religious person must come to terms with it. Jaspers accuses Bultmann of a scientism which sees itself as being responsible for not be accused of foolish mythologies.

I would like to include a word about the construction and editing of the book itself. It has a wonderful introduction by R. Joseph Hoffmann which provides one of the greatest contexts and explanations of the rise of liberal theology in the nineteenth century. However, Jaspers' first parry in the conversation includes a lot of material from his Existenzphilosophie which is completely unnecessarily for the overall understanding of the text and the content of the argument at hand. This part of the text includes explanation the reader could have done without, like "We cannot think unless something becomes an object for us. To be conscious means to live in that clarity which is made possible by the split between I and the object. But it also means to live within the walls constituted by the split between the I and something known to be an object." And so on. If this language had been excised, the book would have made its argument in tighter, more cogent terms. Also, of the 88 pages devoted to the back-and-forth of Bultmann and Jaspers, Bultmann is allotted a grand total of 12 pages, which makes me think the editor may have had a slight bias. In any case, the substance of the debate is fascinating, but these weak points to detract from the overall rating. I would recommend a close examination of these ideas for anyone interested in the shapes and trends of liberal theology in the twentieth century, but one can probably find another publication whose editor is less clumsy in communicating them. show less

When the investigation muddies the subject.

The pressing question, "What is to be done with the Germans," is a rephrasing of that other notorious German Question. Note that in 1945 history has not yet settled out so smoothly. The German Solution is still on the table, and it is with a sense of this adrenaline-dread moment that Jaspers' work on Guilt should be understood. That is, if we are to come into an understanding of its primary function as an exculpatory project.

The four categories put show more forth by Jaspers are particularly muddled. In contrast with what appears to be the impression of many readers, they are not a very useful scaffold for the discussion of guilt. If we are more attentive, we find that in Jaspers' work there are, in fact, only two categories: the Guilty and the Not-Guilty, and Jaspers is interested in delimiting these categories as strongly as possible.

On the Guilty Category (Criminal Guilt)
If we acknowledge that the Reich's apparatus made such acts non-criminal and instead judge on the basis of, "natural law and international law, if not the positive law in force at the time in one’s own country," then we can easily condemn those who operated the killing fields and everyone up the chain. Though Jaspers appears to be begging the question with his assumption that criminal acts can be straightforwardly delimited and tried, such that he has already separated the guilty from the not-guilty before the discussion has begun. ("What about the auxiliary units without which the function of the death squads would not have been possible, and those who made denouncements with knowledge of what would happen, and those who appropriated property and still possess it..." "What about those Einsatzgruppen members and camp guards who only carried out orders due to compulsion on penalty of death and those officers who did the same, and those commanders who did the same...") (Within a year of the publication of this text, the Nuremburg trials will already have shown Jaspers' approach to be outdated.) The omission of so-called "marginal cases" would be striking if we did not understand that the objective is the delimitation of the Einsatzgruppen from the German. Jaspers is also aware his definition of "natural law" implicates the Allied bombing of Dresden and other acts of Total War, and we might notice that he subsequently pardons these acts with the implication that neither side is in the position to be inquiring after skeletons in closets.

On the Not-Guilty Categories
The remaining categories are for those who "have already been punished enough." Political guilt: for victims of circumstance. Moral guilt: a self-condemnation which is already its own punishment. Metaphysical guilt: the only necessary deutero-category: an explicitly exculpatory category which exists to explain the suspicions of guilt which persist despite, in Jaspers' opinion, not being guilty in the strict sense. That the Holocaust requires an unprecedented framework for the judgment of those, such as Eichmann, who could not even do violence to another body, yet arranged the deaths of millions, remains an open question. In a sense, the text appears to be an artifact of pre-war ideology. Hannah Arendt would remark, in her comments on the Eichmann trial, the paradoxical fact that as responsibility for mass-killings increased, one became by degrees more abstracted from the violence of the killing fields.

(I will remark here, in passing, the framework for a slightly more robust scheme for the discussion of guilt based on Jaspers' priors. It seems he would like to categorize guilt according to two dipoles: first, that of 'accomplished' actions which have occurred versus 'speculative' actions which have not occurred but could have, and, second, that of 'definite' processes which are the (almost) certain consequences of actions versus 'aleatory' processes which are not guaranteed consequences. If we imagine a 2x2 grid, Jaspers would consider guilty all 'accomplished' and 'definite' actions, such as executing someone with a firearm and signing paperwork authorizing the execution. All 'accomplished' and 'aleatory' actions, such as cooking food for the executioner, are 'not guilty.' All 'speculative' and 'definite' actions, such as not having intervened to fire upon the executioner, are 'not guilty.' All 'speculative' and 'aleatory' actions, such as not having been more politically active against the executioner's party, are 'not guilty.' This clarifies the discussion without as many redundant categories, but also highlights the problemata involved in the judgment of marginal cases (Is the camp guard performing a 'definite' or 'aleatory' action when, although he does nothing, by his presence prevents the escape attempt of a would-be victim...).) (The concept of 'speculative'-'aleatory' action as a viable criterion for guilt is the basis of an interesting discussion to be had regarding the quality of guilt/sin as "luxury dissolved into the atmosphere," now with particular reference to the climate emergency as tragedy of the commons and the doctrine of original sin with respect to consumption and desire. Either way, it is clear those who so readily condemn 'speculative' actions for others are not quite aware of the portentous weight of opening this category up to the guilt-judgment.)


What is to be done with the German People
The text has a response for readers, both the Non-German and the German. For the Non-German, the text is meant to address the (not uncommon) sentiment that the German people, as a whole, are guilty (mostly as aggressors and initiators of the world war). Though perhaps correct that the German people are not much worse than any other, the urgency of this proof produces some contortions. The ready employment of the "master-slave dialectic" demonstrates that, in confronting and disarming the Germans, we are actually making them nobler, stronger: "The decision to stay alive in impotence and servitude is an act of life-building sincerity." The, ironic, implication being that you would really punish the Germans by allowing re-unification and re-armament, which would therefore make them worse. The consideration of the possibility that the United States could become a fascist autarchy, which some readers have remarked as prescient, is merely the logically necessary argument for German re-armament to "disrupt the emerging US-USSR dipole," which does not appear to be an uncommon sentiment, even at the time.

For the German, the message is one of upbuilding. First, by exculpating the German from the guilt of the war, Jaspers permits a recognition of the past, which the German, aware of his likely guilt, does not even begin to recognize. This is probably a good thing. For those who are able to at least get that far, Jaspers would like them to made into productive, liberal citizens, acting to better the world in cognizance of sublimation of the guilt associated with living under the Reich.

But perhaps he goes a bit too far in the practice of sage burning, because we can sense an opening of Jaspers up into a reading of Deleuze, with consequences Jaspers might shrink from. If we are not to punish the fulminant anti-Semite simply because he hasn't killed anyone, why should we proceed with the punishment of the so-called "criminally guilty" who are now disarmed and unlikely to become recidivists. If punishment does not prevent a future crime, nor act as a form of restitution, should we not also refrain here as well (especially in light of the consequences of the Nuremburg trials in which many in Jaspers' "criminally guilty" category were also found to be not-guilty), and with recognition of the carceral punishment as actually never justified, per Deleuze, "The guilty party escapes in the moment punishment is applied to the body and reifies a different person." show less

Etikatörténeti szempontból lenyűgöző és (remélhetőleg) megismételhetetlen pillanat lehetett, amikor Jaspers ’46 januárjában a heidelbergi egyetemen fellépett a katedrára, hogy filozófiai értelemben megvizsgálja a német bűnösség kérdését. Talán az első ilyen irányú törekvés volt – elképesztő ez a felelősség, nem is csoda, hogy nem tudott tökéletesen megfelelni neki. (Persze egy ilyen feladatba alighanem mindenkinek beletört volna a bicskája.) Jaspers show more kezdésnek elkülönít négy bűnfogalmat: büntetőjogit, politikait, morálisat és metafizikait, az elsőben és a harmadikban felmenti a németeket, mint nemzetet, a másodikban meg a negyedikben pedig elmarasztalja. Szóval salamoni döntést hoz. Itt elsősorban az nem tetszett, ahogy a németek morális ártatlanságát bizonyítja: arra hivatkozik, hogy morálisan nem ítélhető el azért valaki, mert nem áldozza fel az életét egy reménytelen ügyért. Na ja, de ha nem próbálja meg feláldozni az életét, akkor honnan tudja, hogy reménytelen? Na jó, talán máshogy beszélnék, ha ezeket a kérdéseket nekem kéne élesben megválaszolnom egy kemény diktatúrán belül*… Úgyhogy ugorjunk inkább.

Ennél jobban zavar, hogy Jaspers arra hivatkozik, a szövetségesek is részesek a bűnben, hisz nem akadályozták meg idejekorán Hitler gonosztetteit. Ezzel csak az a baj, hogy bár racionális értelemben valóban okosabb lett volna (talán) már ’38-ban odacsördíteni a náciknak, de az már korántsem egyértelmű, hogy morális értelemben is. Hiszen megfékezni a nácikat valószínűleg csak fegyveres erővel lehetett volna – vagyis minden bizonnyal (és többek között) olyan németek élete árán, akik (mint Jaspers leszögezi, és helyesen) kollektíve nem bűnösek Hitler tetteiben. Persze később erre úgy is sor került, de ha a háborút a szövetségesek kezdik – erkölcsi értelemben nem veszítenek többet, mint így? Mindenesetre nem könnyen megválaszolható kérdés.

Mindezzel együtt nagyon fontos könyv a kollektív bűnösség fogalmáról. Egy kísérlet, hogy egy nemzet újradefiniálja önmagát. Meg aztán Jaspers, ahogy azt az elején is leszögezi, nem tesz mást, mint párbeszédet indít. Nem kinyilatkoztat, hanem várja a reakciókat. És ebben az esetben aligha tehet többet**. Ezt a párbeszédet innentől kezdve másoknak kell folytatnia – nemcsak Németországban, de másutt is. „Hisz bűnösök vagyunk mi, akár a többi nép” – írta Radnóti ’44-ben a kollektív felelősségről, és amikor azt mondta: mi, nem azzal a csoporttal azonosította magát, akiknek „bűnei” miatt később lakolnia kellett. Ha egy nemzet meg akarja határozni magát, erényeit és eredményeit, gyarlóságait és hibáit egyként kell vizsgálnia. A torz, féloldalas önértékelésű nemzetek másokban keresik meg azokat a bűnöket, amiket önmagukban eltagadnak, és ez a történelmi álmoskönyv szerint semmi jót nem jelent.

(A kötet tartalmazza Hannah Arendt egy nagyon fontos cikkét a témában, valamint Csejtei Dezső és Juhász Anikó korrekt, értelmező tanulmányát.)

* Hannah Arendt erre jegyzi meg, hogy a XX. század nagy bűnözője a családapa, aki létbiztonság és a család érdekében megköti a maga kompromisszumait, és nem száll szembe a totális állammal, mi több: legitimálja azt.
** Más kérdés, hogy később elhagyta Németországot, és ezzel valamilyen szinten maga szakította meg a párbeszéd lehetőségét. show less

Karl Jaspers has some harsh words for Marxism and the psychoanalysis fashions of the time in which he wrote Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time, these words presented in the first of three parts of the book. Those three parts, The Challenge of the Scientific Method, Reason, and Reason in its Struggle, are based on three lectures he gave in series. He waxes a bit purple and poetic in parts of the second of these lectures, but cogent analysis of the challenges pop culture sets in the path of show more rationality, the nature of the human act of reasoning, and the value it brings us as the only honest (and, consequently, perhaps asymptotic) approach to truth, all pervade the text. Along with the brilliance of his characterization of the matters relevant to his theses, it makes for a fascinating read.

Jaspers sets the always-outnumbered champions of reason in their proper place, outnumbered but not outgunned as he reveals the remarkable tendency of reason to arise anew after every effort to put it down, a phenomenon he describes as not emerging from the nature of the human condition but rather consciously pursued (and often at great cost) by leverage of the condition of freedom and exercise of the faculty of choice. A nearly pocket-sized, largely featureless red hardcover, my copy of Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time came into my possession by some now-forgotten happenstance with (intellectually rather unimpressive) notes handwritten in the margins of the book's yellowing pages by someone using dismayingly poor penmanship, lending it a well-loved charm and warm sense of inspirational authority that other copies will probably lack. The content itself, however, is a stellar work of philosophical rationalism that must benefit anyone with the wit and will to understand it, regardless of the form and condition of the published book, and my only possible regret is that I had not plucked it from my to-read shelf sooner. It is getting a place of honor on another shelf tonight, among books that have special significance for me. As I have with the Tao Te Ching, I rather suspect I will return to it from time to time in my life.

The term "philosophy" in literal translation yields the meaning "love of wisdom". This is a book for authentic philosophers, who exercise Reason in search of the wisdom they love. show less