David E. Murphy (1921–2014)

By using those documents that escaped the secret archives before access was again closed, Murphy focuses on how Stalinist Russia went about the business of collecting military intelligence, and leaves no doubt that sufficient information had been collected so as that Stalin and his immediate circle should have been alert about the impending disaster. As for why a supreme cynic and paranoid such as Stalin allowed himself to be so duped, Murphy makes clear that he does not accept the show more revisionist attempts to treat Stalin in the mold of a 19th-century style power politician, and sees a committed Bolshevik who could not rise above his ideological preconceptions; that general war would be good for the spread of Marxism-Leninism.

Most poignant are the stories of men such as Ivan Proskurov (erstwhile head of Military Intelligence in the Red Army). Soviet soldiers who attempted to do their duty in defending the Russian state, and who were punished with death for having embarrassed the "Boss." Stalin having no desire to be reminded of his mistakes. show less

After the wall fell, intelligence historians from both sides wrote this book of what happened and what was known. Fascinating.

On se demande encore pourquoi Staline est resté aussi aveugle, devant tant d'informations lui indiquant l'imminence de l'invasion allemande.