John Toland (1) (1912–2004)
Author of Adolf Hitler
For other authors named John Toland, see the disambiguation page.
John Toland (1) has been aliased into John Willard Toland.
About the Author
Image credit: NNDB
Series
Works by John Toland
Works have been aliased into John Willard Toland.
The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (1970) 1,235 copies, 21 reviews
The Last 100 Days: The Tumultuous and Controversial Story of the Final Days of World War II in Europe (1965) 652 copies, 7 reviews
The Rising Sun, Volume 1 of 2: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (2011) 125 copies, 2 reviews
The Rising Sun, Volume 2 of 2: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (1971) 113 copies, 1 review
Tankların Hücumu 1 copy
Banzai Após Pearl Harbor 1 copy
Associated Works
Works have been aliased into John Willard Toland.
Hitler: The Memoir of the Nazi Insider Who Turned Against the Fuhrer (1957) — Translator, some editions — 148 copies, 3 reviews
Great Tours and Detours: The Sophisticated Traveler Series (1985) — Contributor — 35 copies, 1 review
Tagged
Common Knowledge
- Canonical name
- Toland, John
- Legal name
- Toland, John Willard
- Birthdate
- 1912-06-29
- Date of death
- 2004-01-04
- Gender
- male
- Education
- Williams College (BA)
- Occupations
- Scénariste
Journaliste - Organizations
- US Army Air Force
CPUSA (1940-1945) - Nationality
- USA
- Map Location
- USA
Members
Reviews
The Rising Sun: Tthe Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (Modern Library War): The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 by John Toland
The Rising Sun is a deserved classic, one of the first popular accounts of Japan's side of the Second World War. Toland takes us from the highest levels of Toyko policy-making to the frontlines of the deadly island battles of the Pacific campaign, humanizing an enemy that was derided in racist terms during the war.
Japan in the run-up to the war was beset with problems. As an island nation, they imported almost everything and were vulnerable to blockades and sanctions. They were stuck in a show more grinding counter-insurgency war in China. And a cult of reconstructed bushido emphasized glorious battle as the solution to all problems. Ambitious junior officers, or fear of ambitious junior officers, pushed Japan to the brink of war against America and Britain. In 1941, with Nazi power at its height, the militarists decided that if they did not act now they would be unable to share in the spoils of a fascist victory, and as American industrial power grew this was the only chance to knock America out of the war.
Toland builds the tension leading up to Pearl Harbor masterfully. The attack achieved total tactical surprise, though strategically America expected an attack somewhere. But it was a sneak attack trough a bleak comedy of errors in decryption and translation the declaration of war, which was supposed to arrive just before the first wave of bombers. The attack killed thousands, lead to Roosevelt's famous 'Day of Infamy' speech, and turned American public opinion decisively against Japan. It would be a hard war.
Following victories in the Singapore and Philippines has Allied fortresses falling like dominoes, and 1942 saw Japan in charge of furthest extent of what would be the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But Imperial Japan had two cults, the first that of bushido and the Emperor, and the second that of the Decisive Battle. In 1905, at the Battle of Tsushima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian fleet and caused their collapse. Both the Navy and the Army would seek one great battle, where exceptional bravery would carry them forwards.
But America was not Tsarist Russia. At Midway, American carriers dealt a mortal blow to the Kido Butai. At Guadalcanal, a war of attrition ripped the guts out of the elite forces the Navy and Army. From there on out, it was a terrible war of attrition. On island after island, starving under-supplied Japanese forces died almost the last man.
By 1945, defeat was evident. Nazi Germany was being ground to dust. Iwo Jima and Okinawa had fallen. General LeMay's XXI bomber command was destroying a city a night. The desperate tactics of kamikaze attacks could not turn back American invasion fleets. Yet fear of a military uprising prevented serious peace-feelers. Even after two atomic bombs, junior officers staged a coup to prevent the Emperor's statement of surrender from being broadcast.
I'm sure that in the subsequent decades, better archival work has changed the historical argument. But Toland had access to the subjects themselves, and the voices from the front are stark and terrifying. This is a long book, and even so I wish it had more on China and Army-Navy rivalries, but for anyone interested in the Pacific Front it is the first stop. show less
Japan in the run-up to the war was beset with problems. As an island nation, they imported almost everything and were vulnerable to blockades and sanctions. They were stuck in a show more grinding counter-insurgency war in China. And a cult of reconstructed bushido emphasized glorious battle as the solution to all problems. Ambitious junior officers, or fear of ambitious junior officers, pushed Japan to the brink of war against America and Britain. In 1941, with Nazi power at its height, the militarists decided that if they did not act now they would be unable to share in the spoils of a fascist victory, and as American industrial power grew this was the only chance to knock America out of the war.
Toland builds the tension leading up to Pearl Harbor masterfully. The attack achieved total tactical surprise, though strategically America expected an attack somewhere. But it was a sneak attack trough a bleak comedy of errors in decryption and translation the declaration of war, which was supposed to arrive just before the first wave of bombers. The attack killed thousands, lead to Roosevelt's famous 'Day of Infamy' speech, and turned American public opinion decisively against Japan. It would be a hard war.
Following victories in the Singapore and Philippines has Allied fortresses falling like dominoes, and 1942 saw Japan in charge of furthest extent of what would be the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But Imperial Japan had two cults, the first that of bushido and the Emperor, and the second that of the Decisive Battle. In 1905, at the Battle of Tsushima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian fleet and caused their collapse. Both the Navy and the Army would seek one great battle, where exceptional bravery would carry them forwards.
But America was not Tsarist Russia. At Midway, American carriers dealt a mortal blow to the Kido Butai. At Guadalcanal, a war of attrition ripped the guts out of the elite forces the Navy and Army. From there on out, it was a terrible war of attrition. On island after island, starving under-supplied Japanese forces died almost the last man.
By 1945, defeat was evident. Nazi Germany was being ground to dust. Iwo Jima and Okinawa had fallen. General LeMay's XXI bomber command was destroying a city a night. The desperate tactics of kamikaze attacks could not turn back American invasion fleets. Yet fear of a military uprising prevented serious peace-feelers. Even after two atomic bombs, junior officers staged a coup to prevent the Emperor's statement of surrender from being broadcast.
I'm sure that in the subsequent decades, better archival work has changed the historical argument. But Toland had access to the subjects themselves, and the voices from the front are stark and terrifying. This is a long book, and even so I wish it had more on China and Army-Navy rivalries, but for anyone interested in the Pacific Front it is the first stop. show less
Toland is an excellent writer who uses people on the scene to personalize what would otherwise be mundane details or lists. I was more interested in what was going on with the Nazis than I was in the allied advances, but Toland would catch me up in some event and I'd find myself reading hundreds of pages I hadn't intended to. This book covers not only the military history, but also diplomatic history, the political problems of Roosevelt's illness and death, and the personal histories of show more prisoners of war and refugees. I can highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the details of the end of World War II or who wants a better appreciation of how the Cold War got started. show less
Thoughts:
Many primary sources and interviews with quite a few highly placed individuals from President Truman to Clement Atlee, Allen Dulles, Nimitz, Spruance, Stark, Professor Hiraizumi, Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, survivors and leaders of both sides of every major (and many minor) Pacific engagements, Japanese Cabinet officials, Japanese Imperial household staff, most immediate relatives and staff of the Japanese Prime Ministers, Chinese Nationalist leaders, and many more.The list of show more primary interviews is 9 pages long. His list of acknowledgements reads like a Who's Who of the Pacific War.
My impression is that he was a bit soft on Hirohito, Konoye and Tojo. The book does not mention the biological warfare in China which killed around half a million Chinese. It also completely misses Hirohito's personal authorization of chemical warfare in China nor his specific signature denying dignity to and relieving the Army of the responsibility to treat POWs humanely. Every war crime the book mentions is laid at the feet of the radical midlevel officers - Nanking, Bataan, the Philippines, Singapore, and the execution of U.S. airmen.
The book provided a much fuller picture of the Japanese actions and decision making that I sought. One can see that, while the American mind lumps Nazis,fascists, and the Japanese into one hostile power-mad conquering group, each stood on completely different terms. This is quite evident in the number of wartime prime ministers in Japan - 4 during the US portion and 15 from the invasion of Manchuria. I was surprised to read that Japan's leaders, esp Tojo, were serious about the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. I had known that the Indonesians looked on Japanese occupation favorably and ex-Japanese soldiers assisted the Viet Minh fight the French, but I also learned that Burma and Indian nationalists looked on them favorably. It's hard to reconcile their treatment in these nations with their wartime behavior in the Philippines, Vietnam, and especially China. show less
Many primary sources and interviews with quite a few highly placed individuals from President Truman to Clement Atlee, Allen Dulles, Nimitz, Spruance, Stark, Professor Hiraizumi, Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, survivors and leaders of both sides of every major (and many minor) Pacific engagements, Japanese Cabinet officials, Japanese Imperial household staff, most immediate relatives and staff of the Japanese Prime Ministers, Chinese Nationalist leaders, and many more.The list of show more primary interviews is 9 pages long. His list of acknowledgements reads like a Who's Who of the Pacific War.
My impression is that he was a bit soft on Hirohito, Konoye and Tojo. The book does not mention the biological warfare in China which killed around half a million Chinese. It also completely misses Hirohito's personal authorization of chemical warfare in China nor his specific signature denying dignity to and relieving the Army of the responsibility to treat POWs humanely. Every war crime the book mentions is laid at the feet of the radical midlevel officers - Nanking, Bataan, the Philippines, Singapore, and the execution of U.S. airmen.
The book provided a much fuller picture of the Japanese actions and decision making that I sought. One can see that, while the American mind lumps Nazis,fascists, and the Japanese into one hostile power-mad conquering group, each stood on completely different terms. This is quite evident in the number of wartime prime ministers in Japan - 4 during the US portion and 15 from the invasion of Manchuria. I was surprised to read that Japan's leaders, esp Tojo, were serious about the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. I had known that the Indonesians looked on Japanese occupation favorably and ex-Japanese soldiers assisted the Viet Minh fight the French, but I also learned that Burma and Indian nationalists looked on them favorably. It's hard to reconcile their treatment in these nations with their wartime behavior in the Philippines, Vietnam, and especially China. show less
A pleasantly racy account of the collapse of German resistance in Europe. I think his book about Japan is a sounder work, but this was a popular theme at the time.
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Statistics
- Works
- 30
- Also by
- 3
- Members
- 6,536
- Popularity
- #3,757
- Rating
- 3.9
- Reviews
- 78
- ISBNs
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