What you may not know about true religion (3), or, what is real?

Carry on.

(I believe we were ensconced in a debate of the distinction between reality and our neurological perception thereof, and whether there is a distinction, and whether we can even know if there is a distinction. With apologies to Descartes.)

"Science thought begins in the brain of man; science provings end all things with the end of the material brain of man. Beware of your own brain." --I Am the Man, in Etidorhpa (1895)

> 1. the distinction between reality and our neurological perception thereof

The only reason I carry on about this distinction is because I'm wary of the seductive nature of our "neurological perceptions", which give us the illusion that we're experiencing the reality itself. It's the old story of Plato in his cave, just updated with the ever increasing evidence that the cave is between our ears.

3
I'm wary of the seductive nature of our "neurological perceptions", which give us the illusion that we're experiencing the reality itself

I find it hard to believe that you live your life constantly questioning whether your perceptions are illusions. If I told you two things about myself, say, "My doctor is Richard Brown" and "I have a pet unicorn" would believe either statement? Why or why not? Do you find one of these statements more likely to be the case than the other?

3, 4

I now think, after musing from this discussion, that "the truth" is between the two extremes. Our life experiences and peculiar individual slant on the world is indeed unique. But then, so is every fingerprint. Yet we all know a fingerprint when we see one. So our individuality operates within a fairly narrow band of perceptual consensus we all participate in.

Except for the wildly insane of course, though that might spark another debate about what constitutes true insanity...

I'm not concerned about how jburlinson lives his life. I don't think one can tell the professional beliefs of most philosophers of epistemology from their non-academic life. What I am concerned about, is that those philosophers do their best to be consistent in their academic life. Dismissing an external reality has surprising consequences, and real philosophers who do don't tell people that unicorns are real and then go running to external reality to dismiss less cute claims.

It is impossible to believe that abstractions are as real as material things, and actually live, so I'm still refusing to think jburlinson is pursuing that train of thought seriously.

I don't know the man, but I bet he wouldn't tell a hungry person to imagine eating--a unicorn steak perhaps--and seriously think it would appease their hunger.

6
I think a philosophy that is intended to cause people to be "wary of the seductive nature of our "neurological perceptions", which give us the illusion that we're experiencing the reality itself" has at least some implications for how we live our lives. But I agree with you, if someone asserts that unicorns are real and at the same time dismisses, as ridiculous, the claim that I own one as a pet, they ought to more clear about what flavor of "real" they're talking about.

Another thing I don't understand is why Jesus comes into it all. Granted that our perception is, well, human-type, a certain kind of perception, that our idea about reality is necessarily qualified by a myriad considerations... so what? The bee sees a bee-world, we see the bee in our fashion, we play with cats and cats play with us--there is one reality, but appearing differently through different filters (species, knowledge, approach, tools etc.)

Why is this a problem, and what's Jesus got to do with it?

>9 LolaWalser:: Perhaps because many of us recognize in Jesus a particularly good example of a human whose perception was particularly keen, particularly intuitive, particularly wise and perspicacious?

Perhaps because many of us find that, through the person of Jesus, we perceive our own nature and the world around us better?

Well, jb will have to chime in on that, but I have a hunch that's not quite right.

Not sure about Jesus being so very perspicacious after all. What was that business with the poor fig tree? Had a moment on the cross, too, when it looked like he'd lost track of the story.

As for perception of the world through Jesus--let's say Jesus-filter--that would still be a point of view, an interpretation. One of many.

Unless we're equating Jesus=God, and supposing a godly consciousness that grasps reality in all its innumerable views and interpretations? I don't mind it as a thought, but I still don't see what's the relevance for humanity.

Yeah, the particularly nice guy thing reminds me of Lewis' trilemma...

I was trying to offer at least some type of answer that didn't use theological language, to which I know Lola has a violent allergy.

But then, I'm having a hard time seeing why it's not self-evident why the figure of Jesus, in whatever guise he takes--from enlightened guru to Son of God--is so pivotal in the lives of so many people.

Why isn't Lola asking what's Buddha got to do with it? What's Confucius got to do with it? What's Lao Tzu have to do with it? What's Muhammad got to do with it?

None of those figures may seem particularly interesting to Lola in her personal search to understand what it means to be a human being. But for billions of people around the world today and for millennia gone by, they have seemed immensely interesting in the search to understand what it means to be a human being.

Probably because there aren't a bunch of Confucians sitting around the website at the moment telling her what a lousy person she is and that Confucius insists that homosexuality is intrinsically disordered sexuality.

That would be my guess at least.

If I remember correctly it was she who used donkey language.

#16

You can stop braying for attention as far as I'm concerned.

#13

The context to my post is the question of what jburlinson, specifically, who is a Christian but not your type, thinks about reality, unicorns and the Saviour.

> 6. philosophers do their best to be consistent in their academic life. Dismissing an external reality has surprising consequences, and real philosophers who do don't tell people that unicorns are real and then go running to external reality to dismiss less cute claims.

Are you still on about the blood libel? Is that the "less cute claim"? Let me try to explain my understanding of the "reality" of this. Whether you choose to agree with me or not is entirely your affair.

The blood libel is real insofar as it consists of a complex interaction of electrochemical actions within the nervous systems of particular individuals. On the parent thread, Tid indicated that she was unaware of it completely until it was brought up in this group. Chances are she might have heard of it before, but had just not taken much notice of it or interpreted to herself it in terms that didn't relate to the preoccupations of these threads. But it's also entirely possible that she had never encountered it at all and therefore it wasn't "real" to her, in the sense that she had never "processed" this notion in her nervous system. Once she became aware of it, it became real to her. However, part of its reality, to her, is very likely her perception that (1) it is loathsome, (2) it is inaccurate, in the sense of "not corresponding to historical fact." It just so happens that these two aspects of its reality exist for me and likely for you, as well. But here's what I consider an important point: both cases (1) and (2) exist within our minds, which means, speaking "scientifically", they are "neurological processes". The sense that we have of loathsomeness and inaccuracy is supplied by us, for whatever reason, because something physical (i.e. electrochemical) happens in our brains that manifests as loathsomeness and inaccuracy. For some other individuals, the sense of inaccuracy is not present in their minds. They may very well have a sense of the loathsomeness, but they also have a sense of accuracy -- in other words, they "believe" the blood libel to be "true." This sense they have is the result of a certain very specific and not-well understood electrochemical action that is different in substance from the electrochemical action that results in a sense of inaccuracy in the rest of us. No doubt there are other, unfortunate, individuals who share this sense of accuracy but who do not share the sense of loathsomeness. And then it's entirely possible there are some wretched people who might have a sense that the blood libel is inaccurate but not loathsome.

So I am far from dismissing the "less cute claims". The "less cute claims" constitute the vast record of what Borges called The Universal History of Infamy.

BTW -- I do not have an "academic life" (unless you count taking Photoshop classes through community education) nor am I a "real philosopher". And I certainly don't dismiss "external reality". It's just that I'm humble enough to say that I don't fully grasp external reality. In fact, because of how I'm constituted physically, I may have a very skewed and distorted understanding of external reality. I pride myself on that.

17

Most people that know me will tell you that braying is an improvement over my singing, so I will take the compliment!

If I remember correctly it was she who used donkey language.

Gee. And it only took 5 years (though if we simply want to limit that to this topic, we could say three threads and 11-1200 posts or something).

Simply shocking how condescending she is.

18

"But it's also entirely possible that she had never encountered it at all"

Correct

" and therefore it wasn't "real" to her"

Correct - I'd not heard of it before.

", in the sense that she had never "processed" this notion in her nervous system. Once she became aware of it, it became real to her."

Hmm. This is where I have a difficulty with your use of the word "real". It certainly became a conceptual reality, in that it was an idea. That of course didn't tell me if it was something you'd made up here (I'm not saying you did of course), or was a persisting myth, or a historical fact.

" However, part of its reality, to her, is very likely her perception that (1) it is loathsome, (2) it is inaccurate, in the sense of "not corresponding to historical fact.""

1) yes 2) yes. But suppose I'd never heard of the Holocaust, and I found out about it in this thread, I'd probably respond exactly the same way. Of course, there is the difference that I do know something about the historical persecution of the Jews, so the concept of a 'blood libel' sounds like a convenient justification for that historical abomination.

"It just so happens that these two aspects of its reality exist for me and likely for you, as well. But here's what I consider an important point: both cases (1) and (2) exist within our minds, which means, speaking "scientifically", they are "neurological processes". The sense that we have of loathsomeness and inaccuracy is supplied by us, for whatever reason, because something physical (i.e. electrochemical) happens in our brains that manifests as loathsomeness and inaccuracy. For some other individuals, the sense of inaccuracy is not present in their minds. They may very well have a sense of the loathsomeness, but they also have a sense of accuracy -- in other words, they "believe" the blood libel to be "true.""

What you're talking about is a subjective reality, and this is so. Scientifically, it can't be denied. However, this doesn't invalidate the external objective reality (unless you're a solipsist). Returning to my 'fingerprint' analogy : every fingerprint is unique, but we all agree on what a fingerprint looks like, i.e. we can all recognise one when we see it.

What I'm saying is that our subjective perception of reality is unique to ourselves (like a fingerprint) but it operates within the narrow band that is part of our biology (all fingerprints look alike). Most of the time, we agree on the nature of reality. But when it comes to belief, that's outside the range of perception - it's purely "neurological", there's no sense impression behind it. So when you start considering belief or imagination or creativity, the range widens and moves beyond the consensus on what external reality is. Obviously the 'blood libel' belongs in that sphere as there isn't a historical factual basis for it.

> 17. what jburlinson, specifically, who is a Christian but not your type, thinks about reality, unicorns and the Saviour.

Thanks for asking, and I apologize in advance if the following turns out to be long, rambling and incoherent. You certainly have my permission to stop whenever it gets too unbearable, along with my condolences.

Just like everything else in my world, Jesus is a somewhat stable, although paradoxically evanescent, "neurological process." (As I've mentioned before, this term is total shorthand for an incredibly complicated and not well understood complex of very specific electrochemical actions occurring within a very specific nervous system (i.e. my nervous system), which, unfortunately, due to age and wear & tear, is probably not in the most tip top condition.)

In my case, "Jesus" (I'll use parentheses to imply that this is "my Jesus" and very likely not anyone else's) is a particularly high-density process, because I was introduced to him when I was very young and I heard an awful lot about him for long period of time; so I have a lot of associations and emotions connected with Him. He's "real" to me, therefore, in a way I can't undo and that likely cannot be replicated exactly by anyone else. (Of course, the same is true of everyone else in the world.) Just one little example: I can remember sitting under a tree as a child and memorizing the beatitudes, repeating them over and over to myself, trying to understand them, to the point where I could visualize very exactly the mountain, the landscape, the persons being addressed ("those who mourn" etc.). I drilled these words into my head so thoroughly that they became "my" words. From then on, I couldn't get them out of my head, even if I wanted to. All I've been able to do since then is tweak them, mostly by adding a little bit of extra spices of the emotional variety. I still don't understand them.

"Jesus" was likely a historic personage, but maybe not; that's not particularly significant. Regardless, he's the protagonist of a remarkable collection of writings (the Gospels, including the Gnostic gospels). Very briefly, "Jesus" was a person who had the most perfect set of "neurological processes" imaginable. By "perfection", I mean neurological processes that operate in such a way as to manifest subjectively in enlightenment, wisdom, compassion, and charity, all those good things. This state of neurological perfection goes by the word "love". "Jesus" was an exemplar, holding out the hope and the prospect that all can achieve some measure of this perfection. The great paradox or mystery is that somehow, someway, we have some sense that through a certain physical action ("perfect neurological processing?", "love?") we can and do touch the ultimate reality that (who?) is denied to us because of the kind of physical organism we are. "Jesus" is the demonstration that such an experience is accessible to, and accessed by, us all, to greater or lesser degrees, throughout our lifetimes, whether or not we've ever heard the name Jesus, or whether or not we believe in Jesus or bow down to him, or revile him. He saves us from ourselves.

> 11. Had a moment on the cross, too, when it looked like he'd lost track of the story.

This part of the story doesn't subtract a bit from the story. If he had been so perfect as to have never been changeable (fluctuations in "neurological processing"?), he wouldn't have been perfect, for our purposes.

> 21. It certainly became a conceptual reality, in that it was an idea.

But that's my point, I think. An idea, or "conceptual reality", is also a part of "real" reality, in that it is a very specific electrochemical action within a very specific nervous system.

What else could an idea be? It's not some non-physical, free-floating "airy nothing" is it?

When I have the idea of "blood libel" it's probably pretty close to your idea of "blood libel", in that the same kinds of electrochemical actions are taking place within somewhat similar nervous systems. But there are other nervous systems that, apparently, are different enough from ours that the idea becomes something much different. For instance, it becomes "real" in a sense that it is not to you and me.

But in all cases, it's reality is that of a "neurological process."

this doesn't invalidate the external objective reality

The external objective reality is always translated, to us, into neurological processes. Vision is a good example, I think. Light (external objective reality) hits the eye, activating the optic nerve to send electrochemical signals representing color, light and dark to the brain -- external reality is converted into a neurological process. This is only one way to activate a neurological process, though. Many of these processes are "self generated", so to speak, in the form of dreams, memories, etc., with no direct external reality involvement.

The external objective reality isn't invalidated, it's just altered.

#18: Once she became aware of it, it became real to her. However, part of its reality, to her, is very likely her perception that (1) it is loathsome, (2) it is inaccurate, in the sense of "not corresponding to historical fact." It just so happens that these two aspects of its reality exist for me and likely for you, as well.

In other words, you can't say that it's inaccurate and not corresponding to historical fact. You've particularized those; you can merely say that it is inaccurate and not corresponding to historical fact for you. You've given up the absolute position to argue that it is inaccurate and not corresponding to historical fact period.

> 24. You've given up the absolute position to argue that it is inaccurate and not corresponding to historical fact period.

No, I haven't given it up. I never had it. I frankly don't know very much about it. It's so distasteful to me that I haven't spent a lot of time researching claims or denials regarding its historicity; and I have a strong bias against it, so it would be unlikely that I could be convinced to change my estimate of the nature of its reality. It's possible someone might hit me over the head with a lead pipe, though, thus changing the nature of its reality for me.

So, let's see if can move on--thoughts, cognition in general are (simplifying) neurochemical processes in our brains. Without wishing to sound blasée, I don't quite understand why this is dwelt on at such length and frequency--it's not controversial in any way.

And yes, we can have thoughts about, well, whatever we imagine, including unicorns. Still--and this is where I think some people might get angry or feel put on--there's a difference between saying "I have thought about climbing Fujiyama" and climbing Fujiyama. Or, riding a unicorn in one's dreams and actually getting on a horse in aptly called "real life".

And here's the thing--if we agree, then I've no idea what the previous fuss was about; if we don't, then I'm clearly still not getting what it is that's being proposed.

And that's before getting to Jesus, but I'll leave that for another day.

> 26. thoughts, cognition in general are (simplifying) neurochemical processes in our brains. Without wishing to sound blasée, I don't quite understand why this is dwelt on at such length and frequency--it's not controversial in any way.

I don't think there is anything controversial about that. What seems to be controversial is whether or not what is "aptly called 'real life'" is different in kind than "thoughts or cognition in general." It's my proposition, I suppose, that there is no difference in kind -- they're all neurochemical processes in our brains (simplifying, as you say). The differences are only in the specifics of the processes.

At any rate, I have no problem whatsoever with moving on.

> 27. that's before getting to Jesus, but I'll leave that for another day.

There's no need, unless you'd like to. I have a feeling that our neurochemical processes are not in sync on that One. And I have no reason to believe that mine are any better than yours. Very likely, it's just the opposite.

What seems to be controversial is whether or not what is "aptly called 'real life'" is different in kind than "thoughts or cognition in general."

Rocks, pigs, combs, ships, chemical elements, any number of things aren't neurochemical processes.

You seem to think exchanging perception of something for something makes no difference.

Which brings me back to the hungry person upthread. Do you make them a sandwich or tell them to just think about a sandwich?

> 30. You seem to think exchanging perception of something for something makes no difference.

No, I think there is a difference. It's just that we don't know what the difference is. All we know is what we perceive. To me, this doesn't seem controversial. If there's something about something that we don't perceive, how would we know what it is?

ETA Rocks, pigs, combs, ships, chemical elements, any number of things aren't neurochemical processes.

Perhaps they start out as something different, but by the time they get to us they've become neurochemical processes. What they start out as, that's something that's not fully accessible to us.

#25: You're missing the forest for the trees here. Given any statement, how could you argue that it is "inaccurate" or "not corresponding to historical fact"? I don't see where your philosophy allows for that at all. I don't get where "historical fact" can enter into your philosophy at all.

31

"ETA Rocks, pigs, combs, ships, chemical elements, any number of things aren't neurochemical processes.

Perhaps they start out as something different, but by the time they get to us they've become neurochemical processes. What they start out as, that's something that's not fully accessible to us."

I'm not sure I'm with you at all on this. Science is what it is (what it has become) by virtue of trying to eliminate this kind of subjective uncertainty. When a chemist discovered that a Helium atom has 2 electrons, that was 'perceived' (not necessarily visually or directly) by a single individual using some form of equipment. Having written up that discovery in terms that other chemists could understand, those other chemists could repeat whatever experiment was described, and would all come to the same conclusion : Helium atoms have 2 electrons.

To put it in your terms, their "neurological processes" would have converged and agreed about this aspect of external reality. And so with rocks, pigs, etc.

I believe, as is uncontroversial, that there is a reality out there, and that that belief and the belief that our perceptions are approximations of that reality are the only things that let us talk about neurochemical processes anyway. (I can certainly imagine that our minds are processes running on silicon or something much more alien. It may well be that we are software that abstracts away the physical brain as much as possible, or maybe all of medicine is a large story for the sake of the few or one of us that's real and we have no insides at all in a meaningful sense.)

If there's something about something that we don't perceive, how would we know what it is?

Because we fill in the blanks. Because we pile on huge amounts of information, and even if we have never perceived what it would be like to fly a plane on Titan, we can still figure out what it must be like. (http://what-if.xkcd.com/30/ ) Certainly, we must have some perceptual data, but if you start with the assumption there is a reality we're interrogating, you can get quite far. And unless someone is actively faking us out, it seems that science and other studies based on that assumption have gone quite far.

And under no circumstances are rocks neurochemical processes. We may encompass in our minds an idea or concept of a rock as part of a neurochemical process, but there's a big difference between the thing and the idea of the thing, even or especially if you don't think the thing exists.

> 34 I believe, as is uncontroversial, that there is a reality out there, and that that belief and the belief that our perceptions are approximations of that reality are the only things that let us talk about neurochemical processes anyway.

Just so. To say that "neurochemical processes" are the beginning and end of what we know is painfully bad phenomenology.

> 34. there is a reality out there, and that that belief and the belief that our perceptions are approximations of that reality

I really haven't said anything much different than that. Our perceptions are approximations, for sure. As approximations, they are not in one to one correspondence with what they approximate. I don't see that as controversial.

All I'm saying is that our perceptions are neurochemical processes. Where is the disagreement?

even if we have never perceived what it would be like to fly a plane on Titan, we can still figure out what it must be like.

ETA -- But what is this "figuring out"? What actually is happening when we figure something out? Are you claiming that there's no physical process that takes place as we do this figuring?

...and my sandwich?

> 35. To say that "neurochemical processes" are the beginning and end of what we know is painfully bad phenomenology.

I haven't said that they are the beginning of what we know. I suppose I might say they are what we know, in the most literal sense.

> 33. Science is what it is (what it has become) by virtue of trying to eliminate this kind of subjective uncertainty.

And science has done a heroic job as it tries to do this. But it's fighting a losing battle, I'm afraid, since we are subjects and cannot eliminate subjective certainty or uncertainty. I think it's an illusion to imagine that we have done so or that we ever will do so.

> 37. ...and my sandwich?

OMG, I forgot all about it and left it out on the counter all night. Don't eat it now. I'll have to make a new one and get back to you.

#40

So, the idea is that you WOULD make a--dare I say it--REAL sandwich and not just advise the starveling to think up a banquet?

So, there IS a difference between a concept of a sandwich in one's mind and the object you put together in the kitchen and then into someone's hand?

WHAT WOULD JESUS DO

> 32. Given any statement, how could you argue that it is "inaccurate" or "not corresponding to historical fact"?

There's a term called "derealization" that's used to describe a sense of unreality, or inaccuracy if you will. In Wikipedia terms it's: "an alteration in the perception or experience of the external world so that it seems unreal."

An interesting article, among many, is in the Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry,
Separating depersonalisation and derealisation: the relevance of the "lesion method"

It's likely that our normal sense of whether something is accurate or inaccurate is predicated on something along these lines: not so drastic, of course, more subtle in effect.

> 41. WHAT WOULD JESUS DO

“Everyone who drinks of this water will thirst again; but whoever drinks of the water that I will give him shall never thirst; but the water that I will give him will become in him a well of water springing up to eternal life.”

Dear jb, just promise never to go into catering.

This is almost as good as watching rrp arguing for trivialism in support of intelligent design and then chucking it out the window for atheism.

> 41. So, there IS a difference between a concept of a sandwich in one's mind and the object you put together in the kitchen and then into someone's hand?

Sure there's a difference. There are differences in the neurochemical processes involved. Not to get too far into the weeds (not that I'd enjoy a sandwich of weeds very much), eating the object in the kitchen gets the enteric nervous system involved in a much more intensive way than eating an imaginary sandwich.

However, even eating an imaginary sandwich activates elements of the enteric nervous system, and the enteric nervous system cannot be extricated from action of the central nervous system. For example, this is why a full stomach is only part of what causes someone to feel satisfied after a meal; the brain must also receive a series of signals from digestive hormones secreted by the gastrointestinal tract.

A couple of interesting articles:

From the New York Times --
Complex and Hidden Brain in Gut Makes Stomachaches and Butterflies

For a review article on neurogastroenterology in general --
The enteric nervous system and neurogastroenterology.

46

I haven't read your links, but I know what area you're coming from. The power of the mind to affect the physical body (though yes, they are both 'physical' in a sense) is well known. The Indian Yogis often use the example of "the snake and the rope", where people react to life phenomena as though they have seen a snake, whereas in fact it's just a rope. The physical effect is the same 'fight or flight' adrenal reaction.

However, none of this affects the 'ropeness' of a real rope, or the 'snakeness' of a real snake.

> 47. none of this affects the 'ropeness' of a real rope, or the 'snakeness' of a real snake.

Probably not, or at least maybe not. However, my idea of a rope and your idea of a rope is probably different, at least to a certain extent, wouldn't you agree? The same is likely even more true of our differing ideas of a snake. Which of our ideas is closer to the real rope or the real snake? Perhaps more to the point, what can you or I do to get our ideas closer to the real rope or the real snake? What is the likelihood that we will succeed?

Your mentioning of ropeness and snakeness reminds me a little of Duns Scotus, who was very interested in the "thisness" of a substance or thing, as opposed to the "whatness" of that thing.

#46

That's pretty shameless.

Are you ready to propose your solution to famine to the FAO?

#36: All I'm saying is that our perceptions are neurochemical processes. Where is the disagreement?

I'm still uncomfortable with that statement; I'm not sure that "neurochemical processes" and "perceptions" are the same order of thing. (I am certain you don't understand my discomfort, given that you continue to claim that a rock is a neurochemical process.)

More importantly, you put way too much weight on our perceptions to get to say that they are something never directly observed like neurochemical processes. You're implicitly accepting way too much to deny as much as you do.

But it's fighting a losing battle, I'm afraid, since we are subjects and cannot eliminate subjective certainty or uncertainty. I think it's an illusion to imagine that we have done so or that we ever will do so.

That's silly. Everything in life is a losing battle. We do our best, nonetheless.

> 50. I am certain you don't understand my discomfort, given that you continue to claim that a rock is a neurochemical process.

No, I believe I understand your discomfort. You're taking a rock and saying that it's a piece of geology not a piece of neurology. Is that right?

Who says it has to be all one or the other...?

Are you saying it's both? Please explain.

No, thanks. I really don't have the time nor the inclination.

I kinda figured as much.

> 50. something never directly observed like neurochemical processes

I don't follow you there. The actions of the central nervous system and the peripheral nervous system are pretty well defined, in a general sort of way. You know, neurons, axons, synapses, all those good things. Are you questioning all this?

I'd suggest checking out the Metzinger linked above.

Does it bother you that no one else finds your perceptions of this discussion to be nearly as profound as you do?

#51: You're taking a rock and saying that it's a piece of geology not a piece of neurology.

No, I'm saying a rock is a thing, not an idea or a process.

#56: I don't follow you there. The actions of the central nervous system and the peripheral nervous system are pretty well defined, in a general sort of way. You know, neurons, axons, synapses, all those good things. Are you questioning all this?

All those good things are on top a huge stack of science, a huge stack that makes it quite clear that unicorns aren't real. Nor have I come close to perceiving any of that; I don't think I've directly perceived a human brain, and certainly not any of those little things. Even neurologists do a lot of handwaving; they're far from explaining exactly how everything fits together. You're making a statement about the base nature of reality and tying it to the top of the stack of theory based on a wildly different base nature of reality.

To put it another way, phrased your way: "neurology" is just a neurological process. Just because it is real doesn't mean that "the heart as the center of thought" isn't just as real.

It seems to me that there are several points of view about reality being expressed.

1. Subjective reality : where everything is filtered through our neurology, giving it a uniquely subjective perceptual slant that is so untransmittable that it can lead - in extremis - to solipsism.

2. External reality : again, as defined by or agreed upon by humanity. And therefore still subjective, but not by an individual, only by the definitions that govern the perceptual abilities and neurology of homo sapiens. (See my 'fingerprint analogy' above).

3. Absolute reality : to quote John Lennon, "nothing is real". It may turn out that what we perceive and experience as "out there" and "enduring" (like a rock), is in fact nothing but a collection of sub-sub-atomic strings vibrating endlessly in 11 dimensions.

So what exactly are we arguing? Subjective, external, or absolute reality? Or are those divisions themselves inaccurate or incomplete or artificial?

> 50. Sounds good to me. Once John Lennon gets quoted, I'm convinced. It makes me think of his great line, "I Should'a Known Better."

ETA touchstone for John Lennon

“Reality is silly putty.” Paul Krassner

This passage by Hans Kung on the early Catholic Church calls several apologetic assumptions into question.

“… a wide-ranging assimilation to Hellenistic-Roman society. Once the freedom of religion which had been so long desired was granted, the religious tensions within Christianity, which had already been present for so long, clearly came to light. They had to do above all with a christology interpreted in Hellenistic terms. For the more Jesus as the Son—in contrast to the Jewish-Christian paradigm—was elevated to the same level of being as God the Father, and the relationship between Son and Father came to be described with naturalistic Hellenistic categories and notions, the more difficult it became to reconcile divine sonship with monotheism. There seemed to be two Gods. The Alexandrian presbyter Arius now asserted that as Son, Christ was indeed created before all time, but was still a creature. He provoked a tremendous controversy, which initially shook the Eastern church. When the emperor Constantine saw a spiritual split threatening the unity of the empire which had just been united politically under his sole rule, in 325 he convened the council in Nicaea. All the bishops of the empire could and did use the imperial postal service to attend. But it was the emperor who had the say at the council; the bishop of Rome was not even invited. The emperor convened the imperial synod; he guided it through a bishop whom he appointed and through imperial commissars; he made the resolutions of the council state laws by endorsing them. At the same time he took the opportunity of assimilating the organization of the church to the organization of the state: the church provinces were to correspond to the imperial provinces (dioceses), each with a metropolitan and a provincial synod (especially for the election of bishops). Ideologically the emperor was supported by the political theology of his court bishop Eusebius of Caesarea. All of this meant that the empire now had its imperial church. And already at the First Ecumenical Council this imperial church was given its ecumenical creed. This creed became the law of the church and the empire—everything was now increasingly dominated by the slogan “One God, one emperor, one empire, one church, one faith.” According to this faith, Jesus Christ was not created before all time (the view of Arius, who was condemned at the council). Rather, as Son (this more natural term replaced the term Logos, which appears in the gospel of John and features in Greek philosophy), he is “God of God, light of light, true God of true God, begotten not created, from the substance of the Father.” Constantine himself had the unbiblical word “of the same substance” (Greek homoousios, Latin consubstantialis ) inserted; later it was to cause a great controversy. The subordination of the Son to the one God and Father (“the” God), as was generally taught by Origen and the theologians of the previous period, was now replaced by an essential, substantial equality of the Son with the Father, so that in the future it was possible to speak of God the Son and God the Father. “Con-substantial,” with its background in Greek philosophy, was incomprehensible not only to Jews but also to Jewish Christians.”

Kung, Hans (2007-12-18). The Catholic Church: A Short History (Modern Library Chronicles) (Kindle Locations 692-707). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Kung is a decent theologian, but a rotten historian. Constantine was essentially an Arian, and had Arius not died tragically in the outhouse, Constantine would have overruled the Council's decision, and made Arius's version the "official Christian version." It was much easier to understand than what the council came up with, and you could dance to it. (Seriously, Arius was a decent tunesmith, as evidenced by that famous Top Ten Tune, "There Was A Time When He Was Not."

63, 64

Arianism was outlawed as a dogma from Nicea, but am I right that it displaced Athanasius later, and Athanasius was then exiled? Only for Arianism to be displaced again?

If I remember correctly Athanansius was exiled as a bishop, not once, not twice, not three times, not four times, but five different times, under four different Emperors. (Constantinius exiled him twice.)

Kung is giving a (highly coloured) version of what was probably still orthodox historiography in his youth. There was (and is?) an argument to be made for almost everything he writes, it just looks somewhat implausible through the spectacles of more recent scholarship.

For instance,

• Constantine's "court bishop Eusebius of Caesarea" (Kung) certainly cultivates in his writings the impression he was particularly close to the Emperor; but he lived far from the court and Timothy Barnes (Constantine and Eusebius, p.266) calculates that he probably met and conversed with the emperor on no more than four occasions.
• Sharp dichotomies between Judaism and Hellenism look a little more forced after Hengel.
• The contemporary importance of the creed of Nicaea which "became the law of the church and the empire" (Kung) has long been viewed in hindsight and with the help of Athanasius' polemic; yet up until the 350's (long after Constantine's death) though the council itself was highly respected its creed "was not seen as the authoritative statement of faith by anyone whose writing survives" (Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, p. 431).
• Most intriguing to me is the analogy between the one God in heaven and the one King on earth, an analogy whose pre-history stretches back to Aristotle, and which is invoked in Constantine's own (if genuine) Oration to the Saints; the landmark treatment of this was Erik Peterson's 1935 essay 'Monotheism as a Political Problem' (Theological Tractates, pp.68-105) which discharged safely erudite cannon-fire at the Führerprinzip and concluded by arguing that orthodox trinitarian dogma was a fundamental break which "liberated {the Christian faith} from bondage to the Roman Empire". (The jury is probably still out on this conclusion.)

> 67

Great post. Thanks!

And the fact remains that Arian Christianity continued to be widespread well into the sixth century (i.e. more than 200 years after First Nicaea). That is, there's a reason that Theodoric's late-fifth century palace church in Ravenna (now known as Sant' Apollinare in Classe) was decorated with mosaics expressing Arian beliefs: Theodoric was an Arian Christian!

It's also why the traditional list of French kings begins with Clovis and his baptism in 496, as his choice of orthodoxy over the Arianism that was actually the majority view of the Gothic Christians in Gaul at that time period was consequential for the development of western medieval Christianity.

69

Is that the basilica which has Arian mosaics all down one side, and Athanasian ones down the other, from a later date?

>70 Tid:: That's one conjecture. The baptistry is the one place where we know that the Arian mosaics are preserved. In the basilica itself, we're not sure how much the extant mosaics were changed by the 6th-century imperial artisans after Justinian reconquered the area, and how much they reflect the original designs.

71

There was a TV documentary which explored the so-called Dark Ages, showing they were anything but. One example was the sophisticated Christianity of the Visigoths, whose basilica was taken over by ?Justinian. The presenter showed how one (upper) side of the basilica comprised of mosaics unmistakeably Arian in nature, while the opposite side showed mosaics that were Roman (i.e. Athanasian) in nature.

I think one way they could tell this, was the crude attempt to partly re-tessellate parts of the Arian mosaic, without complete success.

This is the part of Kung's History that I found most interesting:
"Constantine himself had the unbiblical word 'of the same substance' (Greek homoousios, Latin consubstantialis ) inserted; later it was to cause a great controversy. The subordination of the Son to the one God and Father (“the” God), as was generally taught by Origen and the theologians of the previous period, was now replaced by an essential, substantial equality of the Son with the Father, so that in the future it was possible to speak of God the Son and God the Father. “Con-substantial,” with its background in Greek philosophy, was incomprehensible not only to Jews but also to Jewish Christians.” Kung, Hans (2007-12-18). The Catholic Church: A Short History

As far as we know, Constantine made this major addition to the Christian belief system while still a pagan.

Actually the more controversial insertion was the word "person" in relation to the Trinity. That was non-biblical, and a pretty major theological innovation. But it stuck.

>73 quicksiva:: You're giving Constantine way more credit for this than he actually deserves. Your treating this formative period in Christianity's history as if it was a one-man show, when in reality, you had bishop-theologians (they were the same thing back then) wrangling this out on both sides for decades before the Council and for centuries thereafter.

I'm suspicious of anyone who writes that "Constantine himself" did anything so monumental. It betrays a facile lack of nuance and complexity.

We have to reconstruct the course of events during the Council from pretty fragmentary evidence. You could slant it several different ways to tell a good story.

You can certainly argue for Kung's account - it's not far from Kelly's account of Loofs and Schwartz: "The explanation which formerly attracted most support was that the responsibility rested exclusively with Constantine. The theory could appeal to the witness of Eusebius, who in his letter represented the emperor as taking the initiative in proposing the word, and it harmonized well with current interpretation of his ecclesiastical policy." (Early Christian Creeds, p.250).

• Eusebius, in his famous letter home after the Council, recounts that, when he presented his own formula of faith, "our most pious emperor, before any one else, testified that it was most orthodox... and he advised all present to agree to it, and to subscribe its articles and to assent to them, with the insertion of the single word homoousios", before giving Constantine's interpretation of the word and then quoting the final formula which included it.
  
• The word is unbiblical, in the sense that it doesn't occur in the bible. This had already been held against it by Dionysius of Alexandria in the 360's, and was to be held against it many times in the decades which followed.
  
• The word could very well have been incomprehensible to Jews and Jewish Christians. It has been found incomprehensible by enough Gentiles!
• The post-biblical phrase 'God the Son' isn't terribly common in patristic writings. Many early writers have subordinationist tendencies.
  

On the other hand,

• You wouldn't know it from his letter, but Eusebius presented his own creed to the council to rehabilitate his own Orthodoxy - he had been excommunicated by the (local) Council of Antioch for holding "the same views as Arius". Although the final creed bears a family resemblance, there are sufficient differences (of no dogmatic significance) that his creed is generally no longer believed to have been a source for the final Creed of Nicaea as the sequence of his letter might have implied. The discourse of Constantine which he reports was not directly in relation to the new Creed, but highlighting the shortcoming in Eusebius' confession. We don't know if homoousios had already become a shibboleth earlier in proceedings.
  
• Ambrose records a fragment of a letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia (a supporter of Arius) which was read to the council (and received badly - another account says it was torn up after reading) in which he rejects the term homoousios. According to Ambrose's story (De Fide) "when his letter had been read out, the fathers inserted this word into their definition of faith because they observed that it struck terror into their adversaries' hearts. They thought it an excellent idea to sever the head of the foul heresy with the very sword which they had themselves unsheathed." The term had also been rejected in at least two of Arius' own writings.
  
• The 'Arian' historian Philostorgius claimed that Ossius of Coduba (who chaired the Council) and Alexander of Alexandria had agreed before the Council began that the word homoousios should be the touchstone of orthodoxy.
  
• I can be confident of little more than that those who steered the council, whoever they were, wanted to condemn Arius' theology, and probably chose homoousios because he was known to reject it. The fateful word predates him, but arguably he, not Constantine, put it on the Council's agenda.
  
• 'God the Son' may not be common, but it can probably be found long before Nicaea. Athenagoras writes in the c2nd of God the Father and God the Son - 'Theon Patera kai Huion Theon' (Legatio 10) - I wouldn't build too much on this though as 'Huion Theou' ('Son of God') would be a very plausible emendment.
  
• That the Son is 'God' was not under debate by the time of Nicaea (Kung's Ebionites possibly excepted); even Arius cheerfully refers (in 'Thalia') to the Son as 'God the only-begotten'.
  
• I'd prefer to describe Constantine as 'proselyte' rather than 'pagan'.

>69 nathanielcampbell:-72: A teaching friend just passed along this fantastic resource: the tourism folks in Ravenna have put together interactive panoramas of the major Late Antique mosaics, including the Arian baptistry and the various basilicas: http://www.turismo.ra.it/eng/Links/Virtual-tour/Panorama

These really help you get a feel for what the space is like in which the mosaics appear.

>76 rwb24:,77
Thanks for sharing.

77

From what I remember, it was the Basilica of Sant'Apollinare Nuovo that was the one featured - it looks familiar. Thanks for the link, it's very impressive.

>77 nathanielcampbell:

My thanks for the link too. I've seen several of these mosaics reprinted (often as book-covers!), and it is great to see them now in context.