Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45

The deconstructionists do have a point; every historian is influenced by the times they live in, as well as the times they are writing about. Stilwell and the American Experience in China is copyright 1970. Barbara Tuchman’s book seemed to confirm the mood of the times; historical inevitability dictated that the East would be Red, and eventually everywhere else would be Red too, and we might as well get used to the idea and try to make accommodations with the winning side.


As it happens, it didn’t turn out that way. In fact, Stilwell doesn’t really have that much to say about the Chinese communists. I suspect some of the laudatory reviews from the contemporary Left came from people who just used the index to see what Tuchman had to show more say about Chiang Kai-Shek, Chou En-Lai, and Mao Tse-Tung (that was the way they were spelled then) and based their comments accordingly. In fact Tuchman is pretty circumspect, at worst viewing the Reds through glasses that have only the slightest rose tint. Conventional wisdom on the Left is that the communists instituted agrarian reform, set up schools and hospitals for the peasants, banished landlords, fought the Japanese, and generally ushered in the Golden Age in the parts of China they controlled; in fact, all they really did was the same thing the Kuomintang did – take foreign military aid and stash it away waiting for the dramatic showdown with the real enemy. (Tuchman doesn’t come out and say so bluntly, but does mention that Soviet advisers to the Chinese communists were just as frustrated as the American advisers to the KMT over their inability to get their clients to fight the Japanese rather than each other).


On the surface, Joseph Stilwell must have seemed the ideal choice for command in the CBI – old China hand, fluent in Mandarin, imbued with sympathy for ordinary Chinese. In fact, he wasn’t; what little tact he had quickly evaporated in the jungles. He followed orders, went where he was told, and did his level best at doing what he was supposed to do, but one of the spit-and-polish generals he disdained might have been a better choice. One of Tuchman’s themes is that it couldn’t have come out differently no matter who was in command – the CBI was the WWII equivalent of the La Brea Tar Pits and anyone sent there was doomed to be engulfed – but it might have been better to send someone less militarily talented.


That, of course, raises another question – just how militarily talented was Stilwell? His WWI experience was mostly staff work – again he was doomed to the rear by language fluency. He’d performed well in maneuvers during the buildup to WWII, and received praise from George Marshall. His big combat accomplishments, though, were the retreat from Burma in 1942 and the recapture Myitkyina in 1944. Both of these get mixed reviews. During the retreat, he led his staff and various hangers-on out through some of the most unpleasant country in the world without losing anybody, even though he could have flown out much earlier. Stunt or heroic leadership? Hard to say; critics argued that no matter how dramatic it is, a theater commander is not supposed to be out of contact on a cross-country march; the flip side is a demonstration of a commander’s willingness to share burdens with the troops – Stilwell was 59 at the time, and lost 25 pounds from an already spare frame. I’m inclined to side with Stilwell; he never intended an overland march but kept trying to get to an airfield or railhead until there were no other choices. It’s interesting – and amusing – to speculate on what Douglas MacArthur would have done in similar circumstances.


The battle for Myitkyina is a little more troubling, and Tuchman is less laudatory. Stilwell pounded his only American troops, the 5307th Composite Unit (aka Merrill’s Marauders) into the ground. The Marauders did smash up a Japanese division pretty thoroughly, and they did take Myitkyina airstrip (they pretty much had to, because that was the only way to get resupplied) but at a horrendous cost. Even here Tuchman apologizes for Stilwell; his tight-fisted policy on decorations is explained by saying that he felt that American troops should be motivated by military honor, not by reward (every surviving Marauder did eventually get a Bronze Star, unique for an American unit), and Tuchman goes so far as to disrespect the Marauders a little, suggesting that they were recruited from disgruntled soldiers whose commanders were anxious to get rid of them and that’s why they complained about Stilwell so much. This time I’m a little less sympathetic; I think Tuchman does analyze Stilwell’s overall problem correctly. No matter how much evidence he received to the contrary, he always thought there was some magic formula to make Chiang Kai-Shek fight the Japanese and kept searching for it; maybe if he diddled with Lend-Lease, maybe if he threatened, maybe if he cajoled, maybe if he gave Chennault the supply priority he demanded, maybe if he opened the Ledo Road. Maybe if he took Myitkyina. If, of course, the capture of Myitkyina had convinced CKS to cooperate fully – or even slightly – the Marauder’s sacrifice might have been worth it – but Stilwell should have known by now it wouldn’t.


Eventually it all became anticlimactic. Stilwell was relieved on Chiang’s insistence. After some bouncing around he eventually received command of 10th Army, scheduled to go into Kyushu – other events intervened. He then more or less just faded away after that – and without making any speeches about it or getting any parades, either – dying of metastatic stomach cancer in 1946, still on active duty. His last decoration, and as far as Tuchman knows the only one he personally requested, was the Combat Infantry Badge, one of only three officers who ever received it while a general.


Stilwell’s star dimmed a little after the war; he was one of many blamed for having “lost” China, apparently because of his hostility to Chiang rather than any displayed fondness for Mao. While the McCarthy Era has been oversold as the American equivalent of the rise of the Third Reich, it is well to remember that there were people just as crazy as any Birthers or Truthers; General Claire Chennault testified before Congress in 1952 that Stilwell had planned to seize control of the 10th Army while on the way to invade Japan, divert it south to the China coast, distribute arms and equipment to waiting communists, and march on Shanghai. Nobody seems to have told Chennault he had no sense of decency, either.


Tuchman is definitely warm to her subject, despite the fact that their political views were probably opposite. She plays with “what if” a little, but only by suggestion (and, in fact, all the possibilities were explored, at least cursorily, during the war). What if the US had let the Japanese have a free hand in China in 1937? What if the US had just abandoned China during the war? What if the US had shifted support to the Communists rather than the KMT? I can see problems and possibilities with all these courses; it’s disappointing that Tuchman doesn’t speculate more.


All of Tuchman’s books are well worth reading. Stilwell does get bogged down in the middle when there’s a lot of politics and not much action; of course, that’s sort of the story of the CBI theater. There are maps; unfortunately my edition is a mass-market paperback and they’re hard to read; I’m sure they would have been better in a larger format and on coated paper. The reform of official Chinese romanization means that none of the personal or geographic names used by Tuchman are still spelled that way; this is a handicap, since there are necessarily a lot of them. The index is excellent, and the bibliography is extensive; there are endnotes, but they are not numbered in the text. There are more recent works on the CBI but nothing that I’ve read fundamentally changes anything Tuchman says; thus this is still an excellent history. show less

One of my favourite Tuchman books. I have a prejudice against "Vinegar Joe", caused by an early read of "Defeat into Victory", by William Slim, who rose to being the commander of the British XIV Army on the Burma Front. Stilwell's operatic style, and the real failure to obtain any useful result from goading the Nationalist Chinese Army seem to bear this out. The Indian army had its considerable success in defending India arising from a long relationship and interweaving of British culture into the Indian Army. Stilwell got very little mileage out of his missionary from the top down methods. Tuchman does come to see this, and how little the efforts of American foreign relations were having on the unfolding of Chinese history in the first show more half of the twentieth century.
The Chinese were not galvanized into action, and didn't share America's goals for them anyway. show less

This is a classic work that has become definitive about the experience of Joseph Stilwell in China during World War II. Tuchman uses his experience as a window to view US-China relations. For Tuchman, Stilwell is a tragic hero. He was a rising star with the War Department, and particularly George Marshall, but was denied command in North Africa at the start of the war because he was the best man to serve as Chiang Kai-shek's Chief of Staff. He went reluctantly but with determination to help China in the fight. He slowly became disillusioned with both Chiang Kai-shek and the War Department. Chiang was completely unwilling to fight the Japanese and the War Department continually withdrew supplies promised to China to other theaters of show more war. So Stilwell got nothing but moral support from Washington and not even that from Chiang.

His main goal was to reopen the Burma Road to give a land supply route to China. Towards the end of the war, he began a campaign to do that. He was successful in his offensive, but was recalled to Washington, at Chiang's insistence, before finishing the job. His success to that point allowed the air supply of China a much easier route than directly over "the Hump".

Tuchman's view of Stilwell is extremely sympathetic. She acknowledges that he lacked tact, but gives him the benefit of the doubt in all other areas. She puts his sense of duty and honor above all else. For example, when he performs poorly in a meeting with Roosevelt, she suggests that he refused to self-promote. She routinely comments on how he accomplished so much with so little, particularly in regards to the Burma campaign. She also credits him with understanding the situation in China better than most at the time. His predictions of Chiang's collapse would soon be proven out, although he would not live to see it.

She concludes that Stilwell was fighting a war to modernize the Chinese military when the Chinese didn't want it. Much like the US attempt to modernize China was doomed to failure without strong Chinese support, Stilwell's agenda could gain no traction if it was imposed from the outside.

This is a great book. It is easy to read and you won't find more information on Stilwell and China anywhere. Take her depiction of Stilwell with a grain of salt, but otherwise this is a must read for US-China historians or historians of the Pacific War. Tuchman's writing style is to smooth that it will appeal to a lot of non-historians as well. show less

Barbara Tuchman deservedly won a Pulitzer for this biography of an outspoken US WWII general fighting in, for and against Kuomintang China. As an officer of the China-based 15th US infantry and later as military attaché and US military pointman on China, Stilwell was an eyewitness of the end of the Chinese empire up to the Chinese Civil War.

The biography is especially valuable regarding the management and subtle power plays of client rulers. Stilwell as US emissary was flatterred, challenged, ignored, played and frustrated by China's homegrown dictator Chiang Kai-Shek (codenamed "peanut" by Stilwell). The negative influence of US domestic politics on a consistent foreign policy is also highlighted by Tuchman who is a master in writing show more history books (here: WWII) as a commentary on current affairs (here: the Vietnam War). show less

Joseph Stilwell was a talented American soldier whose life experiences doomed him to labor in an unending task. From his birth, he was clever and curious. This drove him to discover and to explore and to even learn new languages. When he joined the American Army, it provided an outlet for his boundless energy even though it was rather unofficial. Through hard work and natural skill, he was able to travel the world on America's dime. He explored South American and East Asia, all in the service of his country. Eventually, he found his way back to West Point, this time as a teacher. Here he continued to hone his absolute disgust of ceremony over efficiency and his absolute love of teaching men to be effective soldiers. Great as Stilwell's show more teaching talents were, his tactical skills were his more recognizable gifts. During World War 1, he spent time with the Allies and eventually was part of the first All-American staff. This brought him into contact with a wide range of ideas and with the next generation of leaders. In between the wars, he was recognized as a gifted field general and often acted the part of the opposing leader in war games. This both sharpened his opponents and brought his prodigious skills to light. When World War 2 broke out, Stilwell should have been a natural to command a corps or even an army. Instead, he was chosen to that most thankless task, keep China fighting. Stilwell could never say no to his country. He had spent years in China and was well acquainted with the problems. Stilwell did his best but his cantankerous nature made things almost impossible. Though he maintained the theater as well as anyone could possibly hope in the circumstances, the utter incompetence of Chiang Kai-Shek and the vain stupidity of Claire Chennault turned the situation into a mess. Chiang hoped for one thing: to get as much free material from the Americans so that he could maintain power. He did not want to fight Japan; he wanted America to do that. He simply wanted war supplies so that he could destroy the communists and maintain power. His wife shared this dream. They were willing to allow any number of their people to suffer and die in this pursuit. Like other dictators, Chiang surrounded himself with yes men which furthered his innate incompetence. Chennault saw China as an opportunity to cover himself with glory. He was determined to try out his theory that air power alone could win. Stilwell saw the obvious flaw that armies would need to protect supply routes and airfields and pushed against Chennault who frequently ran to the press and fawning politicians. Through it all, Stilwell tried. He had in his corner George Marshall, the one man who oversaw the efforts of the world. Marshall was a model soldier and statesman who often shielded the world from the foolishness of FDR. In the end, Chiang was able to push Stilwell out. Like Stilwell foretold, China's contribution to the war were non existent, and the communists were able to seize power. China was doomed to the savagery of Chairman Mao, and America gained nothing for all of its efforts. Stilwell passed away before he could see this.

Tuchman's brilliant work artfully combines a deft introduction to Chinese history and culture with an honest understanding of the simple man who did his best to serve his country. America was crushed by its horrible misunderstanding of the Orient brought on by generations of journalists who altered between outright deceit and plain incompetence. Though Stilwell saw the truth, he was unable to completely cut through the hubris. Neither the leadership of China nor America understood the situation the way that he did. He fought his best. Certainly, he was deeply flawed. His unwillingness to exercise even basic manners limited his effectiveness. But he deserved better. Stilwell was a gifted and loyal soldier who served in an impossible situation. Tuchman was skillfully developed the portrait that he deserved. show less

An excellent book! Long and very interesting. As you get into it, you suffer along with the amazing Joe Stillwell. Dealing with the completely dysfunctional Chinese Nationalist was more trying than fighting in the jungles of Burma.

This provides great insight to understand China, its history, and our history with them.

Learning about the communists and the nationalists in China in that era, I have to wonder if I had been a young man then, if I would have been prosecuted by McCarthy for being a communist sympathizer.

This is another great book by Tuchman, author of the famed 'Guns of August'. Although lengthy, it gives wonderfully deep yet easy reading coverage of the history of the US and Chinese involvement in the China--Burma-India theater during WWII. In style and concept it is very similar to Bright Shining Lie by Sheehan about JP Vann in Vietnam.

With reference to Vietnam, I was staggered by the similarities between US involvement with Chaing KS and Diem 20 years later and would love this to have been discussed in this book.

The writing style is engaging and often very humorous owing to the cantankerous nature of the main protagonist. I particularly enjoyed Stillwell's constant references to CKS as 'the Peanut'. Good as it is, it does not touch show more on the ensuing civil war and the Kuomintang exile to Formosa - Mao is barely mentioned at all.

I wish I had read this before trying to understand US involvement in Korea, the debacle of McCarthyism and the ultimate disaster of Vietnam - all of which can be seen as a continuum from US involvement with the Peanut. show less