The View From Nowhere

Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular." At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one aspect of the whole. How do we reconcile these two standpoints--intellectually, morally, and practically? To what extent are they irreconcilable and to what extent can they be integrated? Thomas Nagel's ambitious and lively book tackles this fundamental issue, arguing that our divided nature is the root of a whole range of show more philosophical problems, touching, as it does, every aspect of human life. He deals with its manifestations in such fields of philosophy as: the mind-body problem, personal identity, knowledge and skepticism, thought and reality, free will, ethics, the relation between moral and other values, the meaning of life, and death. Excessive objectification has been a malady of recent analytic philosophy, claims Nagel, it has led to implausible forms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind and elsewhere. The solution is not to inhibit the objectifying impulse, but to insist that it learn to live alongside the internal perspectives that cannot be either discarded or objectified. Reconciliation between the two standpoints, in the end, is not always possible. show less

It's weird, I like his writing, and I'm very interested in the subject matter, and he doesn't use complex language... but I just don't understand what he's talking about frequently. I don't mind skimming over some stuff if I don't get it, but after about 50 pages I realized I was 'skimming' over entire chapters.

Within the philosophy/history of science criticism I have read, it is very rare to find works that view epistemology or detachment without some examination of the gendering of those concepts. Thomas Nagel’s The View from Nowhere (1986) is a rare example of such a work, but this is because Nagel’s project is defining objectivity and showing some uses of it in very abstract contexts; unlike Thomas Kuhn, Donna Haraway, Stephen Jay Gould, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Amanda Anderson, Mary Poovey, or other critics, Nagel does not look at actual examples of practices of science or objectivity.

Nagel defines objectivity by saying, “A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the show more individual’s makeup and position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of creature he is. The wider the range of subjective types to which a form of understanding is accessible—the less it depends on specific subjective capacities—the more objective it is” (5). The View from Nowhere, however, contains little discussion of any aspect of an “individual’s makeup and position”; the text does not mention sex, or gender, or class. The end result of this, though, is that Nagel’s monograph is not very useful to my own project, for it is not a discussion of how objectivity has been understood, but of how one particular person thinks it ought to be defined and practiced. Nagel’s discussion does not seem particularly illuminating, except as a very general rationale for objectivity. show less

This collection of essays covers issues including: philosophy of mind, mind and body, epitemology, thought and reality, freedom, value, and ethics. Two valuable sections cover issues surrounding living right and living well, birth, death, and the meaning of life.

Read "Freedom" chapter
Also read "What Is It Like To Be A Bat" by the author

SUMÁRIO:

[ XI ] - Agradecimentos;

[001] - I. Introdução.
(.)
[017] - II. MENTE:
[017] - 02.01 Objetividade física;
[023] - 02.02 Objetividade Mental;
[027] - 02.03 Outras Mentes;
[032] - 02.04 A consciência em geral;
[037] - 02.05 A incompletude da realidade objetiva.
(.)
[043] - III. MENTE E CORPO:
[043] - 03.01 Teoria do Aspecto dual;
[050] - 03.02 O eu como objeto privado;
[058] - 03.03 Identidade e referência pessoal;
[068] - 03.04 Parfit;
[073] - 03.05 Kripke;
[078] - 03.06 Pan-psiquismo e unidade mental;
[082] - 03.07 A possibilidade de progresso.
(.)
[087] - IV. O EU OBJETIVO:
[087] - 04.01 Ser alguém;
[093] - 04.02 Um diagnóstico semântico;
[098] - 04.03 A visão sem centro.
(.)
[109] - V. O CONHECIMENTO:
[109] - 05.01 Ceticismo;
[116] - 05.02 show more Anticeticismo;
[121] - 05.03 Autotransferência;
[127] - 05.04 Epistemologia evolucionista;
[134] - 05.05 Racionalismo;
[140] - 05.06 Visão dupla.
(.)
[149] - VI. PENSAMENTO E REALIDADE:
[149] - 06.01 Realismo;
[153] - 06.02 Idealismo;
[164] - 06.03 Kant e Strawson;
[174] - 06.04 Wittgenstein.
(.)
[183] - VII. LIBERDADE:
[183] - 07.01 Dois problemas;
[188] - 07.02 Autonomia;
[199] - 07.03 Responsabilidade;
[206] - 07.04 A Liberdade segundo Strawson;
[210] - 07.05 O ponto cego;
[216] - 07.06 O envolvimento objetivo;
[223] - 07.07 A moral como liberdade.
(.)
[229] - VIII. VALOR:
[229] - 08.01 Realismo e objetividade;
[237] - 08.02 Anti-realismo;
[247] - 08.03 Desejos e razões;
[252] - 08.04 Tipos de generalidade;
[259] - 08.05 Prazer e dor;
[270] - 08.06 O excesso de objetivação.
(.)
[273] - IX. ÉTICA:
[273] - 09.01 Três tipos de relatividade quanto ao agente;
[277] - 09.02 Razões de autonomia;
[284] - 09.03 Valores pessoais e imparcialidade;
[292] - 09.04 Deontologia;
[299] - 09.05 Agentes e vítimas;
[308] - 09.06 Progresso Moral.
(.)
[315] - IX. VIVER MORAL E VIVER BEM:
[315] - 10.01 A questão de Williams;
[322] - 10.02 Antecedentes;
[325] - 10.03 Cinco alternativas;
[333] - 10.04 O moral, o raciocínio e o supererrogatório;
[341] - 10.05 Política e conversão.
(.)
[347] - XI. NASCIMENTO, MORTE E O SENTIDO DA VIDA:
[347] - 11.01 A vida;
[358] - 11.02 Sentido;
[373] - 11.03 Morte.
(.)
[387] - Bibliografia;
[397] - Índice Remissivo. show less