G. E. Moore (1873–1958)

These are papers written by Moore between 1897 and 1903, beginning when he was in his mid-twenties. They strongly reflect the Cambridge of his time, especially the influence of Kantian idealism and J. M. E. McTaggart's interpretation of Hegelian idealism.

I think it would be an exaggeration to say that these papers represent a distinctive "early Moore" analogous to the "early Wittgenstein" -- they are very much early flexings, I think, for his more mature thought in Principia Ethica (1903, show more actually at the same time as some of the later papers here) and the "common sense philosophy" (1925 and later) he is better known for. Unlike in those later works, Moore doesn't so much stake out strong positions of his own here as criticize and defend those of others.

The philosophical structures and vocabulary he works within here are drawn from Kantian and Hegelian influences. It's a little odd, for someone who has read Moore's well-known works, to read his discussions of McTaggart, Lotze, and others who stand solidly in that tradition of German idealism. To read Moore discuss "the Absolute" or what "in and for itself" might mean has a surreal feel.

But it's not hard to find continuities between these writings and Moore's later thought. In particular, Moore's style and method -- his thorough analytic approach -- are on full display. The combination of that approach with the idealism of McTaggart (especially in his paper on "McTaggart's `Studies in Hegelian Cosmology'") is exactly the kind of monumental collision you might think it would be -- Moore's unwavering insistence on conceptual clarity bashing up against McTaggart's embracing of broken distinctions and apparent contradictions.

Moore also presages a theme from Principia Ethica with an attack on moral naturalism in his essay on "The Value of Religion". And he scathingly and even sarcastically attacks McTaggart's idealism, including a very Moore-like remark:

"The history of philosophy exhibits a uniform inability to distinguish between that of which I am conscious and my consciousness of it -- an inability which has found a monument in the word `idea' which regularly stands for both."

All in all, as a fan of Moore's better known works, I found my impression of Moore as a philosopher more completely filled out by these papers. I certainly wouldn't begin reading Moore by starting here -- the papers don't really stand on their own -- what makes them interesting is exactly in supplying a more complete picture of Moore's development. show less

Moore provided the some of the Bloomsbury set with the appropriate philosophical leverage (ethical non-naturalism) to spring themselves from the Victorian-cum-Edwardian ethos. Quite striking during its time for those of a certain aesthetic cast of mind. Not as tough a slog as Whitehead, but not light reading, either. I have a grasp of the naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument, but Moore's paradox? Wittgenstein kept chewing on it like a dog worrying a bone. Caveat lector!

Asking ethical questions is very difficult because clarity is required for clear answers, and clarifying the questions one posed is an extremely difficult task. This observation is true also for other philosophical fields where one retreats to the college dictum: "The answer to the question is conditioned by the terms of the question." While that may seem self-evident upon reflection, a surprising number of well-educated moderns working in critical ethical areas seem to stumble clumsily over show more these simple caveats. show less

I don't have the proper context in philosophical reading to know where the ideas in Moore's book fit into the larger philosophy canon, but I found this book to be worthwhile from a dabbler's perspective. Moore discusses the purpose of ethics, the naturalistic fallacy, hedonism, and the ideal. He states that good "does denote a simple and indefinable notion" and explains the problems that occur when we identify good with something other than good. It seems that this concept would be important show more to remember. Elements of both hedonism and the naturalistic fallacy seem to be included in many works of literary fiction, but I haven't particularly labeled the naturalistic fallacy in past reading. Moore is definitely recommended but not easy. show less