Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)
Author of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
About the Author
Born in Vienna, Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was educated at Linz and Berlin University. In 1908 he went to England, registering as a research student in engineering at the University of Manchester. There he studied Bertrand Russell's (see also Vol. 5) Principles of Mathematics by chance and show more decided to study with Russell at Cambridge University. From 1912 to 1913, he studied under Russell's supervision and began to develop the ideas that crystallized in his Tractatus. With the outbreak of World War I, he returned home and volunteered for the Austrian Army. During his military service, he prepared the book published in 1921 as the Tractatus, first translated into English in 1922 by C. K. Ogden. Wittgenstein emerged as a philosopher whose influence spread from Austria to the English-speaking world. Perhaps the most eminent philosopher during the second half of the twentieth century, Wittgenstein had an early impact on the members of the Vienna Circle, with which he was associated. The logical atomism of the Tractatus, with its claims that propositions of logic and mathematics are tautologous and that the cognitive meaning of other sorts of scientific statements is empirical, became the fundamental source of logical positivism, or logical empiricism. Bertrand Russell adopted it as his position, and A. J. Ayer was to accept and profess it 15 years later. From the end of World War I until 1926, Wittgenstein was a schoolteacher in Austria. In 1929 his interest in philosophy renewed, and he returned to Cambridge, where even G. E. Moore came under his spell. At Cambridge Wittgenstein began a new wave in philosophical analysis distinct from the Tractatus, which had inspired the rise of logical positivism. Whereas the earlier Wittgenstein had concentrated on the formal structures of logic and mathematics, the later Wittgenstein attended to the fluidities of ordinary language. His lectures, remarks, conversations, and letters made lasting imprints on the minds of his most brilliant students, who have long since initiated the unending process of publishing them. During his lifetime Wittgenstein himself never published another book after the Tractatus. However, he was explicit that the work disclosing the methods and topics of his later years be published. This work, Philosophical Investigations (1953), is esteemed to be his most mature expression of his philosophical method and thought. (Bowker Author Biography) show less
Image credit: Photo by Moritz Nähr / Ludwig Wittgenstein circa 1930 / Photo © ÖNB/Wien
Series
Works by Ludwig Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations) (1958) 1,460 copies, 5 reviews
Lectures & conversations on aesthetics, psychology and religious belief (1966) 573 copies, 3 reviews
Wittgenstein's Lectures on the foundations of mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 : from the notes of R.G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies (1976) 120 copies, 1 review
Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Tagebücher 1914 - 1916. Philosophische Untersuchungen. (1984) 115 copies
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 1 (1982) 68 copies
Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932: From the notes of John King and Desmond Lee (Phoenix Series) (1980) 54 copies
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: The Inner and the Outer, 1949 - 1951, Volume 2 (1993) 42 copies
Letters to C.K. Ogden With Comments on the English Translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1973) 37 copies, 1 review
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Cambridge Letters: Correspondence With Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa (1995) 12 copies
Movements of Thought: Ludwig Wittgenstein's Diary, 1930–1932 and 1936–1937 (2022) 9 copies, 1 review
Wittgenstein 5 copies
Wiener Ausgabe Studien Texte: Band 2: Philosophische Betrachtungen. Philosophische Bemerkungen. (1999) 3 copies
Wiener Ausgabe Studien Texte: Band 4: Bemerkungen Zur Philosophie. Bemerkungen Zur Philosophischen Grammatik (1999) 3 copies
Last Writings on the Phiosophy Pt 2 V 1 (Last Writings of the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. 2) 3 copies
Briefwechsel mit B. Russell, G. E. Moore, J. M. Keynes, F. P. Ramsey, W. Eccles, P. Engelmann, L. v. Ficker (1980) 2 copies
Bd. 2. Philosophische Bemerkungen 2 copies
Últimos escritos sobre filosofía de la psicología: Vol I y II (Clásicos - Clásicos Del Pensamiento) (2008) 2 copies
Rules and Private Language 1 copy
Wittgenstein in Cambridge 1 copy
色彩について 1 copy
Φιλοσοφικές παρατηρήσεις 1 copy
Φιλοσοφική γραμματική 1 copy
Revue Europe 906, Octobre 2004 : Wittgenstein — Contributor — 1 copy
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Briefe und Begegnungen — Author — 1 copy
Beiheft 1 copy
Wittgenstein [Opere di] 1 copy
Wittgenstein Os Pensadores 1 copy
درباره اخلاق و دین 1 copy
Obras Wittegenstein I 1 copy
Isomorfismo 1 copy
Annotazioni filosofiche 1 copy
Wittgenstein (Volume terzo) 1 copy
Wittgenstein Ludwig 1 copy
Scritti scelti 1 copy
Nachlass 1 copy
Lectures, Cambridge 1 copy
Ricerche filosofiche [in I grandi filosofi. Vita, pensiero, opere scelte : 29 - Wittgenstein] 1 copy
Una conferencia sobre ética 1 copy
Zettelsammlung Aus Den Synopsen Der Manuskriptbande I Bis X (2) (Wittgenstein Wiener Ausgabe, 10) (German Edition) (2023) 1 copy
Du 586: Weiss 1 copy
Some Remarks on Logical Form 1 copy
Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Network Version, Text and Facsimiles (Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition) (2000) 1 copy
Wittgenstein (Volume quarto) 1 copy
Associated Works
The Philosopher's Handbook: Essential Readings from Plato to Kant (2000) — Contributor — 234 copies, 1 review
Tagged
Common Knowledge
- Canonical name
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig
- Legal name
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann
- Birthdate
- 1889-04-26
- Date of death
- 1951-04-29
- Gender
- male
- Education
- University of Cambridge (PhD|Philosophy|1929)
Technical University of Berlin (Dipl.|1908)
Victoria University of Manchester - Occupations
- philosopher
professor
logician
mathematician - Organizations
- University of Cambridge
Austro-Hungarian Army (WWI) - Awards and honors
- Band of the Military Service Medal with Swords (1918)
Silver Medal for Valour, First Class (1917)
Military Merit Medal with Swords on the Ribbon (1916) - Relationships
- Russell, Bertrand (teacher)
Moore, G. E. (teacher)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (student)
Black, Max (student)
Geach, Peter (student)
Malcolm, Norman (student) (show all 9)
Wright, Georg Henrik von (student)
Engelmann, Paul (friend)
Ambrose, Alice (student) - Short biography
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, born in Vienna, Austria to a wealthy family, is considered by some to have been the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. He continues to influence philosophical thought in topics as varied as logic and language, perception and intention, ethics and religion, aesthetics and culture. As a soldier in the Austrian army in World War I, he was captured in 1918 and spent the remaining months of the war in a prison camp, where he wrote the notes and drafts of his first book, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It was published in 1921 in German and then translated into English the following year. In the 1930s and 1940s, he conducted seminars at Cambridge University, his alma mater, and wrote his second book, Philosophical Investigations, which was published posthumously. His conversations, lecture notes, and letters, have since been published in several volumes, including Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, The Blue and Brown Books, and Philosophical Grammar.
- Cause of death
- prostate cancer
- Nationality
- Austria (birth)
UK (naturalized 1939) - Birthplace
- Vienna, Austria-Hungary
- Places of residence
- Vienna, Austria
Linz, Austria
Berlin, Germany
Manchester, England, UK
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, England, UK
Skjolden, Norway (show all 7)
Trattenbach, Austria - Place of death
- Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, England, UK
- Burial location
- Ascension Parish Burial Ground, Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, England, UK
- Map Location
- Austria
Members
Discussions
Arion Press On Certainty? in Fine Press Forum (November 2021)
Reviews
“Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about” (203).
Although this book is considered illustrative of the “late Wittgenstein,” in contrast to the “early Wittgenstein” of the Tractatus, I see a persistent concern with the use of language as a medium through which one acquires and understanding of the world. Whereas in the Tractatus it seems that Wittgenstein show more detailed the limits of language to express pictorial truths about the world, in Philosophical Investigations I see him talking about the potential of language to mean a great many things but that the truth conditions for meaning are there, to be established by the rules of use, expectation, and intention that we recognize as parts of common and specialized language-games. A critique of the premise of analytic logic is still here but without the frustration and futility. Instead, I see Wittgenstein embracing a kind of pragmatic sense of truth.
Although saying that we engage in language-games does suggest the possibility of back-sliding into a kind of relativistic “it’s all just language” view of reality, I find it more productive to think of Wittgenstein saying that language-games are reflecting a reality that is present regardless of our belief in it. Language guides our interactions with the world and with each other, allowing the expression and fulfillment of our intentions within the conditions of satisfaction that the world allows. The language is not a reflection of that reality but an instrument for dealing with it (141). And the more we try to isolate language and study it in isolation for use, the more confusing it becomes and with that also comes greater risk of deluding ourselves into thinking that we can reach a true understanding of reality through a study of language. “The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work” (132).
The notion of language-games, situated uses of language, and the guiding functions of language are valuable concepts that we would do well to remember in an age when we can now use generative AI to mimic functional and transactional language use. Just think about how vacant AI-generated arguments are of either actual intention or motive. Or rather think of what remixed intention and motive is captured in the LLMs from which AI outputs are derived. Does AI really know what language-game it’s playing when it generates its content? Does that matter?
I do think that W’s use of numbers and number series sometimes confuses the point that language-games are interactive and that clarity and the ability to go on is worked out in the moment and with the guidance of other players. This interactivity is certainly implied in the treatment of language but it is often not apparent through the examples given. show less
Although this book is considered illustrative of the “late Wittgenstein,” in contrast to the “early Wittgenstein” of the Tractatus, I see a persistent concern with the use of language as a medium through which one acquires and understanding of the world. Whereas in the Tractatus it seems that Wittgenstein show more detailed the limits of language to express pictorial truths about the world, in Philosophical Investigations I see him talking about the potential of language to mean a great many things but that the truth conditions for meaning are there, to be established by the rules of use, expectation, and intention that we recognize as parts of common and specialized language-games. A critique of the premise of analytic logic is still here but without the frustration and futility. Instead, I see Wittgenstein embracing a kind of pragmatic sense of truth.
Although saying that we engage in language-games does suggest the possibility of back-sliding into a kind of relativistic “it’s all just language” view of reality, I find it more productive to think of Wittgenstein saying that language-games are reflecting a reality that is present regardless of our belief in it. Language guides our interactions with the world and with each other, allowing the expression and fulfillment of our intentions within the conditions of satisfaction that the world allows. The language is not a reflection of that reality but an instrument for dealing with it (141). And the more we try to isolate language and study it in isolation for use, the more confusing it becomes and with that also comes greater risk of deluding ourselves into thinking that we can reach a true understanding of reality through a study of language. “The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work” (132).
The notion of language-games, situated uses of language, and the guiding functions of language are valuable concepts that we would do well to remember in an age when we can now use generative AI to mimic functional and transactional language use. Just think about how vacant AI-generated arguments are of either actual intention or motive. Or rather think of what remixed intention and motive is captured in the LLMs from which AI outputs are derived. Does AI really know what language-game it’s playing when it generates its content? Does that matter?
I do think that W’s use of numbers and number series sometimes confuses the point that language-games are interactive and that clarity and the ability to go on is worked out in the moment and with the guidance of other players. This interactivity is certainly implied in the treatment of language but it is often not apparent through the examples given. show less
This compilation of notes regarding Wittgenstein's views on the nature of propositions in our "language game" is both digestible and provocative in its overall exploration of the topic. Perhaps because these are notes, the book is written is a very direct manner without convolution or wordiness, leaving little room for excess. What space remains is well employed. A number of times, Wittgenstein immediately reflects on the competency of his own assertions, throws in a bit of humor, and even show more the quickest flashes of poetic phrasing. This is a brief work, and a readable one at that, but it is by no means shallow. You are at the deep end of the pool here, but you're in with a very good swimmer. show less
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein
I took medialunas and a corto doble at Las Juventus off the Plaza del Congreso every morning on my way to work. A pretty girl had the table set and the coffee poured before I could unfold the Clarín early edition. One morning I read an article about Wittgenstein, how he carried a copy of the Tractatus in his knapsack along the frontlines during WWI, about his rejection and subsequent return to academia, and his show more checkered career as a village headmaster. Ever since, when I think of Wittgenstein, I think of breakfast in Buenos Aires, and the face of that girl.
It is difficult, at this far remove from its initial publication, to read the Tractatus pure, straight, and so some passages read like a prose poem—“the way a picture touches reality”—and some bits sound like fortune cookie wisdom:
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of an unhappy man;
It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized.
'Wittgenstein was preoccupied with the scope and limits of language, and in the Tractatus he was concerned primarily with language as a representing medium, a means of conveying how things are in the world' (Antony Flew). He also wanted to correct some mistakes in the logics of Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein thought that fundamental confusions could be avoided by constructing a sign-language that was governed by logical grammar and syntax, so he wrote what he thought would, nay, must be true if language was to accurately represent the world. Of course, since he himself deployed a language of signs and symbols in the presentation of his thoughts, all kinds of ‘meta’ possibilities and interpretations pop up in the Tractatus. Some parts are aphoristic, like Zen koans:
Language disguises thought;
The world and life are one;
Eternal life belongs to those who live in the present;
When no questions are left, that itself is the answer.
Other bits are seemingly nonsensical—
A picture contains the possibility of the situation it represents;
The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing—
others vaguely profound—
The limits of my language are the limits of my world;
Whatever we see could be other than it is;
The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world—
and some are all of the above:
The riddle does not exist;
Outside logic everything is accidental.
There are sketches illustrating the rules of logical syntax that resemble the pincers of Triassic crustaceans.
In Wittgenstein’s version of a world precisely represented by language, propositions were their own proofs, and “inevitable” signs spoke for themselves. His model of a perfectly logical system, as it was for Frege and Russell, was mathematics. This set him off in search of invariant functions and operations and applications, the pursuit of which (ironically) revealed the limits of formal logic. Wittgenstein’s perfectly logical reality was paradoxically unreal, impossible, and disconnected from actual lived experience—which is more ambiguous, complex and uncertain than formal logic can abide.
For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, a proposition of perfect logic restricted reality to two alternatives: yes or no. Logic precluded surprise or doubt. Whatever was ineffable was unreal. There was no place for wonder. Too much, finally, was left unaccounted for by cold, austere logic. To his credit, Wittgenstein in his later work undertook an analysis of how language actually functioned, signs and symbols still failing us. Thus was the Tractatus part of the activity that was Wittgenstein’s philosophy, less a conclusive, fully realized credo than a springboard to further reflection. As it would be for its readers. show less
—Ludwig Wittgenstein
I took medialunas and a corto doble at Las Juventus off the Plaza del Congreso every morning on my way to work. A pretty girl had the table set and the coffee poured before I could unfold the Clarín early edition. One morning I read an article about Wittgenstein, how he carried a copy of the Tractatus in his knapsack along the frontlines during WWI, about his rejection and subsequent return to academia, and his show more checkered career as a village headmaster. Ever since, when I think of Wittgenstein, I think of breakfast in Buenos Aires, and the face of that girl.
It is difficult, at this far remove from its initial publication, to read the Tractatus pure, straight, and so some passages read like a prose poem—“the way a picture touches reality”—and some bits sound like fortune cookie wisdom:
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of an unhappy man;
It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be realized.
'Wittgenstein was preoccupied with the scope and limits of language, and in the Tractatus he was concerned primarily with language as a representing medium, a means of conveying how things are in the world' (Antony Flew). He also wanted to correct some mistakes in the logics of Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein thought that fundamental confusions could be avoided by constructing a sign-language that was governed by logical grammar and syntax, so he wrote what he thought would, nay, must be true if language was to accurately represent the world. Of course, since he himself deployed a language of signs and symbols in the presentation of his thoughts, all kinds of ‘meta’ possibilities and interpretations pop up in the Tractatus. Some parts are aphoristic, like Zen koans:
Language disguises thought;
The world and life are one;
Eternal life belongs to those who live in the present;
When no questions are left, that itself is the answer.
Other bits are seemingly nonsensical—
A picture contains the possibility of the situation it represents;
The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing—
others vaguely profound—
The limits of my language are the limits of my world;
Whatever we see could be other than it is;
The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world—
and some are all of the above:
The riddle does not exist;
Outside logic everything is accidental.
There are sketches illustrating the rules of logical syntax that resemble the pincers of Triassic crustaceans.
In Wittgenstein’s version of a world precisely represented by language, propositions were their own proofs, and “inevitable” signs spoke for themselves. His model of a perfectly logical system, as it was for Frege and Russell, was mathematics. This set him off in search of invariant functions and operations and applications, the pursuit of which (ironically) revealed the limits of formal logic. Wittgenstein’s perfectly logical reality was paradoxically unreal, impossible, and disconnected from actual lived experience—which is more ambiguous, complex and uncertain than formal logic can abide.
For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, a proposition of perfect logic restricted reality to two alternatives: yes or no. Logic precluded surprise or doubt. Whatever was ineffable was unreal. There was no place for wonder. Too much, finally, was left unaccounted for by cold, austere logic. To his credit, Wittgenstein in his later work undertook an analysis of how language actually functioned, signs and symbols still failing us. Thus was the Tractatus part of the activity that was Wittgenstein’s philosophy, less a conclusive, fully realized credo than a springboard to further reflection. As it would be for its readers. show less
Get your P's and Q's ready, folks, because we're in for the ride of our lives.
Or not.
Wittgenstein was living proof that androids were around and functioning during WWI. That at least this single android had a sense of humor dry enough to turn the Mariana Trench into the Mojave Desert, too.
Or was this a joke at all? Let's see.
Most of the numbered propositions were imminently clear and devoted to a single purpose: describing reality.
Language is the big limiter, which should never be a big show more surprise, but he insists that all reality that is, can be explained clearly.
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein, the big brilliant man that he is, was fundamentally incapable of describing or CLEARLY STATING his philosophy. Or using any object in his philosophy for the purposes of further elucidation.
The resulting numbered tracts and use of Formal Logic were used to numb the biological minds reading it... but there is good news! It did help out with the translation problems for future AIs reviewing this work!
Difficult to read? You have no idea. Really. Or perhaps you do if you use chalkboards. But THIS work of philosophy is the target for that old joke:
"What's the difference between a mathematician and a philosopher?
Mathematicians know how to use an eraser."
The logical problem of describing only physics in any positive way while never coming down hard on absolute statements -- like the way we only hypothesize that the sun will come up tomorrow -- eventually curled around itself in very strange ways, like the problem of including your own description in with the description itself.
It keeps adding to the problem of description, mathematically, until the recursion explodes your head or makes you divide by zero. (Same difference, really.)
It presages, at least in part, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Also, P=NP. As in, is it possible to include the index to your library in with the library itself, or do you need to make a brand new card catalog system every time to include the original index? The time it takes to prove a thing is disproportionately large (or impossible) compared to the FACT OF THE SOLUTION.
This goes beyond logical fallacy. It's a real thing we still deal with. And yet, Wittgenstein throws out the baby with the bathwater at the very end. He makes a beautiful house of cards and claps his hands, making us wake up after the long novel with a classic, "and it was only a dream."
Am I kinda pissed? First by having been bored to tears and misunderstanding a handful of DENSE and OBLIQUE propositions that refer to undefined and objectless other works, unlike the careful analysis he made at the start? Yeah. I am.
And like his reference to covering your right hand with your left while also covering your left with your right, this text attempts to disprove everything -- firmly.
It makes me believe, once again, that formal logic, while glorious in one way, is an absolute horseradish in another.
I recommend this for anyone in love with highly complicated logical mazes and other computer science majors. YOU MUST HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR OR YOU WILL DIE. Or kill someone. One, or the other. show less
Or not.
Wittgenstein was living proof that androids were around and functioning during WWI. That at least this single android had a sense of humor dry enough to turn the Mariana Trench into the Mojave Desert, too.
Or was this a joke at all? Let's see.
Most of the numbered propositions were imminently clear and devoted to a single purpose: describing reality.
Language is the big limiter, which should never be a big show more surprise, but he insists that all reality that is, can be explained clearly.
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein, the big brilliant man that he is, was fundamentally incapable of describing or CLEARLY STATING his philosophy. Or using any object in his philosophy for the purposes of further elucidation.
The resulting numbered tracts and use of Formal Logic were used to numb the biological minds reading it... but there is good news! It did help out with the translation problems for future AIs reviewing this work!
Difficult to read? You have no idea. Really. Or perhaps you do if you use chalkboards. But THIS work of philosophy is the target for that old joke:
"What's the difference between a mathematician and a philosopher?
Mathematicians know how to use an eraser."
The logical problem of describing only physics in any positive way while never coming down hard on absolute statements -- like the way we only hypothesize that the sun will come up tomorrow -- eventually curled around itself in very strange ways, like the problem of including your own description in with the description itself.
It keeps adding to the problem of description, mathematically, until the recursion explodes your head or makes you divide by zero. (Same difference, really.)
It presages, at least in part, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Also, P=NP. As in, is it possible to include the index to your library in with the library itself, or do you need to make a brand new card catalog system every time to include the original index? The time it takes to prove a thing is disproportionately large (or impossible) compared to the FACT OF THE SOLUTION.
This goes beyond logical fallacy. It's a real thing we still deal with. And yet, Wittgenstein throws out the baby with the bathwater at the very end. He makes a beautiful house of cards and claps his hands, making us wake up after the long novel with a classic, "and it was only a dream."
Am I kinda pissed? First by having been bored to tears and misunderstanding a handful of DENSE and OBLIQUE propositions that refer to undefined and objectless other works, unlike the careful analysis he made at the start? Yeah. I am.
And like his reference to covering your right hand with your left while also covering your left with your right, this text attempts to disprove everything -- firmly.
It makes me believe, once again, that formal logic, while glorious in one way, is an absolute horseradish in another.
I recommend this for anyone in love with highly complicated logical mazes and other computer science majors. YOU MUST HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR OR YOU WILL DIE. Or kill someone. One, or the other. show less
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