Williamson Murray (1941–2023)

This is a disappointing book. The military analysts James Lacey and Willaimson Murray set out to write a corrective for all those stuffy academic historians who don't understand that battles are really important. While battles are important, wars and the peace made after them are more important, a fact that Lacey and Murray seem to forget.
We can argue endlessly over why the authors included some battles but not others. They don't include Cannae, Hannibal's greatest victory, because it show more wasn't decisive--a very sound point. Instead they discuss Zama, where Scipio Africanus defeated Hannibal and put an end to the Second Punic War. Yet the battles matter ONLY because the Romans were able to hold their confederation of allies together over many years and under intense pressure. Without that social/political/cultural/military ability, Zama never happens. But that diplomatic/political/social stuff isn't really important in the authors' eyes.
We see the same shortcoming in the discussion of Trafalgar. What allowed the British navy to maintain itself over the years of the continental blockade? What forms of public finance, of press-ganging, of leadership enabled Nelson to do what he did? Who were the poor men press-ganged into service and how did the navy transform them into the dauntless sailors who beat the Spanish? Yes, yes, the manuevers are so fascinating, if your view of history starts and stops with toy soldiers on a map.
The authors do a better job on the battle of Hastings, which surely deserves to be in a volume like this. But again, we find them narrowly concentrating on formations and tactics, rather than on the underlying "sinews of war." And they believe that the Normans faked retreats in order to lure the English out from behind their shield wall, although most historians doubt that the Normans could intentionally feint even once, let alone several times.
Finally, the authors' narrow view of history is fully revealed in the chapter on Objective Peach, the drive on Baghdad during the second Gulf War. Really? This is one of the twenty most decisive battles in the history of mankind?
I cannot recommend this book. show less

“Moment of Battle” is a tour de force of military history. Covering 2500 years of history, it singles out 20 major battles that the authors consider to have most significantly changed the world. It offers a useful corrective to a bizarre and naïve perspective voiced by US defense analysts in the 1990s, that the US military was about to create capabilities that would leave it unchallenged for the forseeable future. After two lost wars, a crippled economy, and a failing infrastructure, show more such a view can be seen as yet the latest example of the hubris of many a previous empire.

Each of the 20 battles is examined in terms of its historical backdrop, the goals of the warring parties, the military tactics, the factors that determined the outcome, and the lasting significance. For many of the battles, the placement and movement of troops are illustrated with diagrams that (despite their simplicity) usefully supplement the text.

The book begins with “Marathon”, the astonishing victory of Athens against the might of the Persian Empire, a battle with great consequence for the historical legacy of democratic traditions and ancient Greek thought. Next comes “Gaugamela”, key to Alexander the Great’s establishment of empire, which in turn set the stage for the later spread of Christianity among Greek- influenced Jews. Another early chapter focuses on the Roman Empire’s failure to conquer the Germanic tribes, which prefigured the East- West divide of Europe that contributed in the 20th century to two world wars. Yet another momentous battle is that of Yarmuk (630 CE), in which the followers of Mohammed established an Arab – Islamic civilization that dominates northern Africa and Arab territories.

Likewise there is Francis Drake’s destruction of the Spanish Armada (1588), without which the English would likely have never been able to colonize North America. Yet another explored episode (represented by three battles) by the authors is the Annus Mirabilis (the “year of miracles”) of 1759, in which the British established supremacy over Canada and made inroads towards success in the West Indies and in India. A lasting consequence is that English is the dominant global language when it comes to trade and intellectual exchange, not to mention the lasting legacy of a democratic (and secular) India. Other battles explored are taken from the American Revolution, Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, the US Civil War, the first World War, World War II (represented in three battles). The choice of several of the battles reflects the authors’ American (US) perspective and particular expertise. Thus, there are no battles in South America, Africa, or Asia (outside of World War II).

Naturally, one can quarrel with particular choices of battles. For my part, I was surprised at the inclusion of Dien Bien Phu, which signaled the withdrawal of the French from Indochina. However, far more momentous, one would think, was the US debacle in Southeast Asia, the last attempt by Western powers to dominate in east Asia. However, understandably, neither the Tet Offensive nor the fall of Saigon constitutes a momentous battle in the sense that this book explores. An even more peculiar choice is the 2003 US attack on Baghdad, a battle arguably of no lasting significance in light of everything that has happened since. In an interview on Book TV, author James Lacey explained that they included the attack on Baghdad because they wanted some recent military action; he further argued that we can never predict what might turn out to be significant in the future. (The latter point undermines, rather than justifies, the authors’ choice to include it).

Lacey and Murray make no secret of their strong opinions on issues of controversy. In fact, they clearly enjoy presenting themselves as iconoclasts against the views of professional historians and other military analysts. Thus, in opposition to other historian’s views, they make statements like “nothing could be further from the truth” (p. 230 and once again on p. 265), and “the experts could not have been more wrong” (p 266). In a particular show of contempt, they assert “Only academics who have spent their entire lives sequestered in school and with scant knowledge of the real world could gin up such nonsense” (p 85). A prospective reader should be prepared to take such tendentious statements in stride.

I recommend this book for aficionados of military history – they will find much here to think about and most likely, much to argue over. This book also is ideal for readers who enjoy the “What Ifs” of counterfactual history – the key episodes which, had they come out differently, would have led to a very different sort of world today. show less

“Moment of Battle” is a tour de force of military history. Covering 2500 years of history, it singles out 20 major battles that the authors consider to have most significantly changed the world. It offers a useful corrective to a bizarre and naïve perspective voiced by US defense analysts in the 1990s, that the US military was about to create capabilities that would leave it unchallenged for the forseeable future. After two lost wars, a crippled economy, and a failing infrastructure, show more such a view can be seen as yet the latest example of the hubris of many a previous empire.

Each of the 20 battles is examined in terms of its historical backdrop, the goals of the warring parties, the military tactics, the factors that determined the outcome, and the lasting significance. For many of the battles, the placement and movement of troops are illustrated with diagrams that (despite their simplicity) usefully supplement the text.

The book begins with “Marathon”, the astonishing victory of Athens against the might of the Persian Empire, a battle with great consequence for the historical legacy of democratic traditions and ancient Greek thought. Next comes “Gaugamela”, key to Alexander the Great’s establishment of empire, which in turn set the stage for the later spread of Christianity among Greek- influenced Jews. Another early chapter focuses on the Roman Empire’s failure to conquer the Germanic tribes, which prefigured the East- West divide of Europe that contributed in the 20th century to two world wars. Yet another momentous battle is that of Yarmuk (630 CE), in which the followers of Mohammed established an Arab – Islamic civilization that dominates northern Africa and Arab territories.

Likewise there is Francis Drake’s destruction of the Spanish Armada (1588), without which the English would likely have never been able to colonize North America. Yet another explored episode (represented by three battles) by the authors is the Annus Mirabilis (the “year of miracles”) of 1759, in which the British established supremacy over Canada and made inroads towards success in the West Indies and in India. A lasting consequence is that English is the dominant global language when it comes to trade and intellectual exchange, not to mention the lasting legacy of a democratic (and secular) India. Other battles explored are taken from the American Revolution, Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, the US Civil War, the first World War, World War II (represented in three battles). The choice of several of the battles reflects the authors’ American (US) perspective and particular expertise. Thus, there are no battles in South America, Africa, or Asia (outside of World War II).

Naturally, one can quarrel with particular choices of battles. For my part, I was surprised at the inclusion of Dien Bien Phu, which signaled the withdrawal of the French from Indochina. However, far more momentous, one would think, was the US debacle in Southeast Asia, the last attempt by Western powers to dominate in east Asia. However, understandably, neither the Tet Offensive nor the fall of Saigon constitutes a momentous battle in the sense that this book explores. An even more peculiar choice is the 2003 US attack on Baghdad, a battle arguably of no lasting significance in light of everything that has happened since. In an interview on Book TV, author James Lacey explained that they included the attack on Baghdad because they wanted some recent military action; he further argued that we can never predict what might turn out to be significant in the future. (The latter point undermines, rather than justifies, the authors’ choice to include it).

Lacey and Murray make no secret of their strong opinions on issues of controversy. In fact, they clearly enjoy presenting themselves as iconoclasts against the views of professional historians and other military analysts. Thus, in opposition to other historian’s views, they make statements like “nothing could be further from the truth” (p. 230 and once again on p. 265), and “the experts could not have been more wrong” (p 266). In a particular show of contempt, they assert “Only academics who have spent their entire lives sequestered in school and with scant knowledge of the real world could gin up such nonsense” (p 85). A prospective reader should be prepared to take such tendentious statements in stride.

I recommend this book for aficionados of military history – they will find much here to think about and most likely, much to argue over. This book also is ideal for readers who enjoy the “What Ifs” of counterfactual history – the key episodes which, had they come out differently, would have led to a very different sort of world today. show less

This is a book that should be in every military history buff’s library; not as a replacement for other works on the same subject but to augment them and, in many cases, present alternative points of view. Many may argue about which twenty battles should be considered as crucial in determining the course of world events but the authors have chosen these twenty as representative and they do a plausible job defending their selection except—most notably—the final battle, Objective Peach, show more from the conflict in Iraq.
The pattern of their description of each battle is the same. They first set the stage to put the conflict into the broader historical context. They then analyze the battle to include tactics, technology, personalities and key decisions. They end each chapter with an assessment of what effect the outcome had on ensuing events. For the most part, their style is fresh with a smattering of modern idioms. When they disagree with other historian’s conclusions, they define the differences and clearly state their reasons to disagree.
The book has some significant defects. Their use of maps is woefully inferior. First, they are misplaced or, at best, inconsistently used. Mostly they are located within the first two or three pages when the run up to the battle is discussed and, when the crux of the battle is finally discussed, it is necessary to leaf back to the map. In some cases the maps seem to be intended to augment the preliminary discussion in which case the location is proper but it is not always clear what the maps are intended to support. Also, the notations on the maps do not always gibe with the text. For example, sites on the map that look significant often go without mention in the battle description. In short, the maps and text are poorly integrated and detract rather than augment.
Many of the conclusions are painful as if forced to be included simply to conform to a predetermined format. Without question, it is difficult to assess the course of history had the outcome of each battle been different but the author’s anglophile biases bubble to the surface all too frequently. The rise and predominance of the British Empire did not ensure the continuance of the industrial revolution let alone spark the “Age of Reason”. Many of the great centers of learning in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were in mainland Europe and they seem to have thrived in the face of French military ineptitude. A particular case in point is the analysis of the Battle for Quebec in Annus Mirabilis. Wolfe’s success is gleefully recorded as signaling the pending demise of French imperialism but that it probably adversely affected the course of American history is ignored. If the Colonies had had a French ally on their Northern border, the War of Independence might have been averted or, at least, not put so perilously at risk. Burgoyne would not have had a base to assemble; the diversion of Continental forces to central New York would not have been necessary and the Battle of Saratoga might not have been fought. We won that battle but expended resources (including the ego of Benedict Arnold) that might have been effectively used elsewhere. In all probability, the Revolutionary War would have been fought differently had Canada been in French hands.
I also disagree with some analyses but respect the author’s opinions. I disagree with the harsh assessment of Omar Bradley’s performance at Normandy, for example. And, based on Bernard Fall’s informed opinion (as an agent of the French government as has been alleged?) and other reading, I lay some of the blame for the Dien Bien Phu debacle on the U.S. I believe the French relied on a tacit, if not declared, promise of air support that was denied after Giap’s forces were ‘found’ and ‘fixed’. Maybe I’m sounding like a Francophile which I am not but that may counter Lacey’s and Murray’s anti-Francophile biases .
Let us turn lastly to the post-Viet Nam era. The authors contend that we learned nothing from that era. That is naïve and reflects ignorance of the profound cultural adjustments made in the military since then. The most salient change was the elimination of the draft. The conduct of the Army, in particular, in that conflict depended on the conduct of amateur draftees. We have depended on professionals since then with drastically different results. Another profound adjustment made in South-East Asia was Nixon’s incursion into Cambodia. That was a game changer which future historians must surely acknowledge. A basic precept enunciated by Mao in his Little Red Book was that irregular forces must always have a refuge where they might be revitalized, rearmed, and rested. Our cross-border incursion negated the future use of international boundaries for that use; a lesson yet to sink in but effectively relied on with, for example, our use of drones in Pakistan and Yemen. The precedent was set by Nixon’s unpopular Cambodian incursion. Who cannot recognize that as a clash that changed the world? James Lacey and Williamson Murray come to mind.
For all its faults, I believe the book to be a creditable work but it could have been better. Buy it but keep an open mind. show less