Richard H. Popkin (1923–2005)

Popkin’s book is a classic for those studying skepticism, in either its ancient or modern forms. I wish I’d read this book decades ago.

Popkin’s history is a bit of a time slice, but a well chosen one. He begins at the end of the fifteenth century, with the re-emergence of ancient Greek skepticism. Pyrrhonism, particularly the writings of Sextus Empiricus, spread through the intellectual world of the Reformation and the birth of modern science. Pyrrhonism, or “la crise pyrrhonienne” show more became a core element in the broad disputes among Protestant movements, the Catholic church, alleged heresies, and the foundations of modern scientific knowledge.

The close of Popkin’s history comes with the end of the seventeenth century, the seemingly all-encompassing skepticism of Pierre Bayle, on the eve of David Hume’s own classical treatments of skepticism and epistemology.

Sextus Empiricus’ skeptical arguments hit the sixteenth century like an intellectual and cultural grenade. Those arguments attacked knowledge and authority in all directions. Lutherans and other reformers questioned the authority of the Catholic church. The church itself questioned the foundations of unsanctioned interpretations of scripture. Secular figures, or those whose allegiance was to empirical knowledge, questioned all foundations of religious belief and interpretations of scripture. Religious believers questioned the foundations of empirical knowledge. All on the basis of, or at the very least inspired by the Pyrrhonist arguments.

The skeptical arguments themselves are treated fairly briefly by Popkin. You won’t get detailed analyses of the arguments here. For the most part, he only refers to arguments grounded in the unreliability of the senses, the “problem of the criterion”, and then later developments of skepticism, particularly by Montaigne, Charron, and then Descartes.

The problem of the criterion may have been the most compelling and devastating skeptical argument of the Pyrrhonist revival. In order to establish that some claim to truth or knowledge is valid, we need a criterion of validity. But in order to claim that our criterion of validity is valid, we need another criterion by which to judge our criterion of validity. And so on in at least seemingly infinite regress.

What’s especially striking about the problem of the criterion is that unlike, for example, the argument from the unreliability of the senses, it has no bounds. Anything — religious beliefs, empirical knowledge, mathematics, even logic itself — fall into its maw. Not until Descartes’ “evil demon” argument, which itself might be interpreted as an instantiation of the problem of the criterion, do we get so all-encompassing grounds for doubt.

The problem that runs through the entire history that Popkin recounts is this uncontrollable scope of doubt. This scale of skepticism resists any attempts to aim it at selected targets. It destroys everything, including itself. The church may point it against secular knowledge, but it will get out of control and consume theological knowledge and authority along with it. It applies universally. The reformers may apply it to church authority, but it will ricochet against any reformist theology as well. .

As Popkin writes, “The new ‘machine of war’ appeared to have a peculiar recoil mechanism that had the odd effect of engulfing the target and the gunner in a common catastrophe.”

What about fideism, faith or religious belief that is independent of, even opposed to, reason? But is fideism itself sustainable? How do we know that this or that is the word of God? Do we “just believe”? But what do we “just believe” and what do we “just not believe”? How do we know the difference?

As the various parties scramble for shelter, some positions emerge:

- Absolute Skepticism: concerning knowledge or belief based on any foundations at all — our senses, reason alone, or on grounds of simple indubitability or faith.
- Contained or Limited Skepticism: allowing for knowledge based on our senses (when properly employed, as argued by Aristotle and others during the time) but limited metaphysically within the perceived world, holding out the possibility that a “real” world differs from our perceptions. A foreshadowing of nineteenth and twentieth century positivism.
- Fideism: belief in religious truths based on faith, unaided by reason or sense perceptions. Think in medieval times of Tertullian, or of Kierkegaard in more modern times.
- Absolute Certainty: based on infallible reasoning and/or perceptions (Descartes held such a position after resolving the doubts of his first meditation)
- Revealed Knowledge: either of religious truths, or based on our senses as validated by a perfect (and beneficent) God.
- Dogmatism: a term that is used a bit loosely, or at least contrary to my understanding of the term. I would use the term to categorize those who hold to a position without argument or reason. Popkin (and others contemporary to Descartes) labels Descartes a dogmatist.

But none find secure cover from the skeptical arguments retrieved from Sextus Empiricus.

Pierre Bayle serves as a fitting finale to Popkin’s history. Bayle seems almost a performance artist, attacking without mercy any claims to knowledge, certainty, or justified belief. Firing in all directions at once.

What started, with Pyrrho himself, as a positive vision for a way of life, “ataraxia” or a kind of humble quietism and withdrawal from opinion and claims to know anything with certainty, becomes with Bayle a nihilistic force, an intellectual doomsday machine.

We are still here trying to pick up the pieces. show less

This 836-page volume is a bit dense, and necessarily so, as there's quite a bit of material to cover if you desire an academic treatment rather than a general reader's skim. Many expert contributors share their expertise, and each signed article is followed by a helpful bibliography. The book is decently indexed for ready reference, and while unashamedly academic, a reader with some notion of philosophical terminology will not be completely lost on reading. That said, I wouldn't try to read show more it cover to cover even if you like the subject; it's a bit dry to say the least. The scope is quite good, all the major names are covered. I'd not had a background in the Islamic influences on Western philosophy prior to reading this work, and I found that section particularly interesting. I'm very happy to have this work on my shelf, even if I haven't quite finished it yet. show less

This book had a big impact on me, being what really got me into philosophy

Popkin was an amazing teacher, whose courses influenced my life from then on.