Holger H. Herwig

A readable, Germano-centric account of the how the great 1914 campaign in the West failed to yield victory for the Germans, and created the military stalemate that was the crucible for social and political conflict in the 20th century. Of particular value is how the German army commanders are illuminated as players, as opposed to their usual status in English-language works as cyphers, as their inability to cooperate, and Moltke the Younger's unwillingness to take the reins, empowered the show more French struggle to stave off disaster. show less

In The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2009), Holger H. Herwig wrote, "The Marne was the most significant battle of the twentieth century." (p. xi) It really wasn't a single battle, but a collection of bloody engagements that marked the opening two months of the war in the west and set the tone of the conflict to come. Herwig covers the French offensive into Lorraine, known as the Battle of the Frontiers (which, like the show more Marne, was made up of many engagements), as well as the German attacks to the north through Belgium and in the center towards Nancy. The casualties were enormous, and the German drive on Paris was stopped. The soldiers dug in and settled into their trenches, and there would be no appreciable move in the front lines until 1918. This is an exciting read, well argued and sourced. To me, Herwig's account depicts the campaigns as a series of errors and missteps. None of the commanders come off well, with Helmuth von Moltke coming off the worst. Herwig gives attention to the German fascination with the Battle of Cannae, Hannibal's crushing victory over the Romans in 216 BCE. This fixation with a decisive knock out punch made it difficult for the Germans officers to play the kind of small ball warfare that developed. They let opportunities slip away so that they the could try to set the stage for the next attempt at a Cannae-like victory. One other thing I learned in this: I did not know that the original Schlieffen Plan called for Italians to man the Lorraine front against the French, while more German soldiers would be put in the main attack force through Belgium. Of course, the Italians opted out of their alliance with the Central Powers, and the Germans had to guard their own frontiers.

From my blog: http://gregshistoryblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/world-war-i-recent-reads-decisive.h... show less

The title is a bit misleading, as this basically covers the same ground as hundreds of other books, but at least it does cover the Battle of the Marne (unlike, say, Tuchman). Herwig's a reasonably good writer and he tells this story reasonably well. I don't know that there's any special insight here, though. And for a general reader, there's a bit too much of "the 43rd Reserve Infantry Brigade moved to the left of Sordet's CD". Overall, a solid 4-star history, though.

I have to knock off half show more a star for some bad editing/proofreading (I found multiple typos without really trying) and for the insufficient (in number and quality) maps. show less

I've re-read this today, which is the 70th anniversary of the sinking of the Bismarck by the Royal Navy, in which over 2,000 of its crew lost their lives. This book is a fine account not just of the battleship's one and only sortie, but also the background against which it took place, and the personalities involved which produced a result very different to what it might have been. The book interestingly shows that Hitler, although no sailor on his own admission, had a much clearer and show more correct view of the future of naval strategy and fleet formation than his own admirals. The book is based on extensive research but wears its learning lightly and is suitable for a wide variety of readers. show less