Mark Galeotti

I’ve read several histories of Russia, but the best education I received was a game of Axis & Allies in which I drew the role of the Soviet Union. With German armor driving on Moscow, I urged my Western allies with increasing desperation to do something — anything — to take the pressure off me. I felt, irrationally, as if the British and American players secretly wanted me knocked out of the game.

Russia is a blood-soaked story drenched in the paranoia that someone, somewhere, is out to show more get you. This is crucial to understanding a state that habitually destabilizes the globe in its quest for stability. British author Mark Galeotti, writing from more than thirty years of experience with his subject, captures that paradox with a quote from a Russian veteran: “Yes, Russians can do terrible things to protect their Motherland, but it's because we know the price of war that we understand the value of peace.”

Galeotti translates this paradox into a language Westerners can understand using the lexicon of Russia’s wars. Not all of them, of course: he admits in his introduction that “it quickly became clear what a foolish ambition” that would be. Instead, he frames his narrative around twenty-four key conflicts in as many chapters, progressing chronologically from the raid on Constantinople in 860 to the drive on Kyiv in 2022, which he covers in a final chapter provocatively entitled “Putin’s Hubris.” Unsurprisingly, Russia banned Galeotti from its borders within months of that invasion.

If you already know your Russian history, Galeotti offers little that’s new. He follows well-established lines of Russian historiography; for example, attributing the nation’s martial culture partly to its lack of natural borders and a consequent felt need to push the limits of state security ever outward. You won’t find any fresh or revisionist takes here. On the other hand, if you aren’t well versed in the subject, then “Forged in War” is a solid starting point. Galeotti provides a strong narrative thread that’s clear and easy to follow, which is good given the number of Vladimirs and Ivans and Alexanders he has to juggle.

What you won’t get is a fully-fledged history of Russia. Galeotti sets his goalpost early, offering to help the reader “understand the ways that war and military security have shaped not just Russia's past, but its own sense of its present - and the ways that there is real debate about its future.” In other words, this book is all war, all the time. The evolution of Russian Orthodoxy, the enslavement and emancipation of the serfs, the challenge of incorporating Islamic realms into an Orthodox Empire, the experience of Russia’s Jews, and other such topics come into glancing focus if or when the thesis demands it — with the exception of a slightly more involved discussion of Cossack culture in order to contextualize the origins of Ukrainian nationalism and Putin’s determination to exterminate the same.

This isn’t a bad goalpost given the vastness of Russian history and Galeotti’s specialized interest in explaining how we got from Rus raiders cutting through the Black Sea to T-72s burning on the road to Kyiv. “Forged in War” provides a competent understanding of Russia’s militarized and messianic psychology, and I recommend the book as a readable explainer of Russia’s tendency to defend itself in other people’s countries; but it lacks the sociological and cultural context to explain fully this enigmatic holdover from the age of empire. To balance this, each chapter provides a shortlist not only of recommended additional reading, but also of movies, television series, and even tabletop wargames that give texture and flavor to the various epochs in Russia’s past.

Something else to note is that we history addicts are always tempted to overinterpret the present in terms of the past. The shadow of Putin’s war in Ukraine projects backward throughout Galeotti’s book, such as in his criticism of the “old men in the Kremlin” whose invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 sprang from a delusion that Kabul represented a “desperate zero-sum struggle for global supremacy” even though America barely knew or cared about it. Anyone tracking the war in Ukraine has seen this complaint before.

For another example, Galeotti’s summary of Tsar Nicholas II could not be aimed more obviously at Vladimir Putin: “He was weak enough to be dangerous for the regime, foolish enough not to understand the threats facing Russia, stubborn enough not to listen to those who did, and credulous enough to listen to people whom he really shouldn't have paid attention to. This includes those who assured him that...'a nice, victorious little war' would unite and cheer the nation.” Galeotti doesn’t need to come right out and say that Putin risks the disintegration of Russia and a bullet in a basement, and it’s up to the reader to decide whether the author is seeing repetition where there is only rhyme.

For all that, the past does rhyme. Whether tsar, secretary, or president, Russian autocrats all seem to fall into the same patterns of dysfunction, paranoia, repression, and war. Galeotti’s narrative makes it difficult to imagine a Russia that integrates well into a peaceful global order unless its national mythology undergoes a dramatic (and likely traumatic) change. At least since Muscovy’s emergence from its submission to the Mongols, Russia’s elite have cast themselves as the saviors of mankind and last defense against barbarism. This quasi-mystical sense of destiny warps all perceived security threats into demons to be exorcised, whether those supposed demons are steppe nomads, Caucasian hilltop raiders, blitzkrieging Nazis, or libertine Western democracies. Russia will always fight to save first the Motherland and then the rest of the world, whether the rest of the world wants to be saved or not. show less

Interesting book about a special mission that was the initial step in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Books by Mr. Galeotti are always interesting but he usually seems split between saying anything on Soviet/Russian army without following it with some wording that would be rather demeaning, because I guess the Russians, right?

In this book though he is concentrated on the topic and shows situation as it developed, from the violent power struggle and takeover in Afghanistan in 1979 show more and Byzantine methods used by Soviets to execute what they saw as stabilizing action (which proved to be everything but).

Large color panels with dramatic presentation of events and main player biographies truly flesh out the operation and events. Book provides insight into Soviet clandestine services (Zenit, Kaskada) and the way they fought this very dirty and prolonged war at the very start and at later periods.

Highly recommended, very informative book for military history buffs. show less

Very good book on Soviet special operations forces. Author is especially well informed regarding Russian security forces and gives a very concise history of the Spetsnaz, from the days of the Bolshevik's revolution to the modern times.

Especially interesting was information on how Spetsnaz always acts as motorized/mechanized infantry unit [unlike light infantry Western counterparts]. I guess that lessons from WW2 and engagements of light infantry against German armored and mechanized forces show more were never forgotten.

Author gives a lot of information but just cannot do without some remarks here and there for which I just don't see reason (i.e. "weird" obsession of Soviets/Russians with Pyrrhic victories like Afghanistan Krer operation (Arnhem anybody, Point du Hoc or Operation Anaconda - every army that saw combat has one not-a-victory-not-a-defeat that shows how their forces are tough and resourceful; its the way things go, present dumbest move that cost lives as something that "just happened" but "we persevere") and constant [demeaning] comparison with 75th Ranger regiment or 2 REP which I do not understand since both formations are crack units on the world level - if majority of Spetsnaz is on level with these units and not cloak-and-dagger Tier One operators I think this is more reason to be very careful around general Spetsnaz).

But even with these occasional remarks it is very informative book. I just hope somebody publishes larger (>64 pages) paperback about these Eastern Europe units.

Highly recommended. show less

Very good overview of the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, with very good comments on qualities and errors that were found on both sides during this short conflict.

As is case with this author and contemporary Russian military, bias is so strong that I can envision the author with clenched teeth and shaking hand while trying to write down that this was actually provoked by Georgian side. That being said, I can commend that basics are given. Again, those pesky South Ossetian's are baddies because show more they feel more politically linked to Russia than to Georgia (how dare they!) and Abkhazians are also rebellious holdout for the same reason- but actual explanations of inter-ethnic relations is of course missing, except in form of all that inter ethnic tension is just product of Russian interference, its not like Georgian's were so aggressive in the early 1990s, no, never! Of course this makes author's comment in the very beginning that Adjarans were easily subdued by Georgians sound a little bit off, but I put this to author's very strange (but again, when talking about contemporary Russia, also very consistent) way of thinking where anyone who even looks at Russia for help is outcast. And maybe in author's home country subduing means inviting for tea and biscuits, not use of force. Who knows, you know, different cultures.

Georgia turned to the West very early and received a lots of training from Western armies (UK, US and if one looks at some of the information, Israelis) and armament (US, UK, Greece, Turkey and again Israel). This brought back old hatred for the north of the country and decision was made to finally return the territories of these two breakaway republics. I have to say author manages to walk a straight line and explains how Georgian government's decision was foolish but he cannot resist the temptation to say how, you know, it was not even decision of Georgia to attack, they were pushed because Russians provoked them (I mean, of course!). It is not that in 15 years after last great conflict there were no border skirmishes, attacks on civilian settlements from all sides and exchange of artillery fire. No, according to the author this entire area was as peaceful as Biblical Paradise until tensions got heated up in 2007/2008 and Georgian authorities decided to finally end this sudden (and I guess unexpected) violence outbreak!

Now, author constantly makes clear how Georgia in 2008 was a country that aimed for Western block acceptance by doing things that are on acceptance list of Western block apparently - restructuring military in a way that western only weapons are procured (can you be an ally of West without HK MP5 and M4 carbines or Barrett rifles - if you ask the author no, you cannot, without these you are not even a modern army!) and joining US led military campaigns in far away countries like Iraq and Afghanistan (after being trained by NATO instructors to be able to fight in these countries under Western command structures). This is what makes progressive country it seems.

So, as said above, as a side effect rapid militarization, Georgia's government decided to take the country on the path to militarily retake northern republics. Taking into account that army commander in chief was trained in US, army was trained by various US/NATO programs (and Israelis) it is very likely that same structures were involved in planning and execution of the attack, especially considering that everyone though Georgian army would run over the rebels in a matter of days.

What happened is that Russians intervened and in a series of short but intensive battles (and long range strikes into the Georgian territory) Georgian army was pushed back, losing infrastructure, combat equipment and giving Russians excuse to deploy their troops to stay in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions for years to come.

Day by day descriptions of battles, very good analysis and identifications of errors on both sides (especially Russian since in this war they were the heavy hitters) are truly good (comments from the Russian military side that author quotes truly showed the functional gaps in the Russian military at the time). For this book would be 4 stars.

What takes one star is Russians-did-it (although they were taken by complete surprise at the beginning - again author's reasoning is very interesting) and constant, unnecessary and really disappointing jabs at rebel republics (I mean imagine situation where Ossetian professional Alania battalion, part of peace keeping forces in South Ossetia, decided to take arms when Georgian troops came to the South Ossetia capital! I mean can you imagine that type of behavior - they threw off their pose of neutrality as author says :) I mean, you gotta laugh).

For military analysis and profiling of the parties involved this is excellent read. For political information, as is case with any author's book about contemporary Russia, this is not a source to learn anything from. show less