Steven J. Zaloga

Another typically good "New Vanguard" booklet from Steve Zaloga, as he takes one through the baroque history of the T-64; a machine that the Red Army's civilian leadership hoped would steal a march on the tanks of Western armies, but which generated frustration in an almost an inverse proportion to the expectations. Frankly, what the T-64 mostly seemed to be good for was generating the sort of factional bureaucratic politics that led to Soviet Russia deploying three main battle tanks in show more parallel; not the Soviet stereotype of ruthless simplification and mass production.

Be that as it may, the T-64 was eventually made to work, but one gets the impression that the rump Russian military was just as happy to let the Ukrainians be stuck with most of these vehicles. This is another way of saying that while Zaloga takes you up to the beginnings of the Russo-Ukrainian war, there is a lot more to say about this vehicle that is going to have to wait until those hostilities are resolved. show less

Steven Zaloga is almost always worth reading, but he's particularly interesting when he's dealing with his professional area of expertise, the analysis of air defense systems. This booklet is packed with everything you might want to know about the first guided-missile campaign, a matter that has lost no relevance in the light of the conduct of drone warfare in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.

The most salient matter is that Zaloga uses this as a jumping-off point to consider the Allied versus show more the German conduct of war. As while the German "Vengeance Weapon" offensive was late in starting, expensive, and accomplished little of operational value, the combined Anglo-American bomber offensive was a mixed bag once the large built-up installations had been destroyed. Frankly, the Allied ground war in Northwest Europe, which put the German missile launchers out of range, was the most effective response, though the recalcitrance of the Anglo-American air commanders to demonstrate some operational flexibility was not a good look.

Zaloga ends this study with some contemplation of the German "death-camp" industry that was building most of the German weapons. Though not noted by Zaloga, it is said that the "Dora" Works probably killed more prisoners in the course of the production process than victims of the actual use of the weapons. show less

When I first started reading military history as a kid in the mid-1960s, the cult of air power and the United States Air Force was still in full swing, but even then, the 1943 raid on Ploesti seemed to inspire reservations, if only for the heavy casualties incurred. Flash forward to the mid-21st century, and this whole exercise seems even more dubious, as one now has access to intelligence information that was denied to the first generation of authors who wrote about this raid.

What it mostly show more comes down to is radio, as the commanders of the raid mandated radio silence as a means of gaining surprise, thus forfeiting hands-on control, not realizing that the German air defense system was aware that the American force was on its way basically the moment Operation "Tidal Wave" crossed into the Balkans from North Africa. The result being that a third of the force was lost, everyone was decorated for their gallantry, and the commander of IX Bomber Command was made a scapegoat and sent back to the United States. Whatever else was learned from this action, it's that the Axis oil industry could only be shut down with sustained effort; not a big one-time raid. Apart from that this is another excellent number in one of the best series that Osprey has come up in recent years. show less

By this point in time, I suspect that Steve Zaloga can write these booklets in his sleep, though I personally appreciate the time he takes to explain his archival research and sources; more of Osprey's authors should take this step. As for the topic itself, the overarching question is how essential were the AFV's Washington and London supplied Moscow, as opposed to the fleets of trucks that helped motorize the Red Army. Short answer: Anything that Stalin could get for the defense of Moscow show more was valued. Once domestic production ramped up again, American and British tanks fell in the category of nice to have but not essential. From there, Zaloga digs deeper in what the Soviet assessment of each type they received, and how the vehicles were distributed. Most interesting to me was that the single Allied type that was most appreciated by the Soviets was the Valentine, which was actually used as a scout. This was closely followed by the diesel-powered M4A2 Sherman, most valued for its automotive reliability, and a commentary on the lack of durability of Soviet wartime production tanks. show less