Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)
Author of Philosophical Essays
About the Author
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, one of the last real polymaths, was born in Leipzig. Educated there and at the Universities at Jena and Altdorf, he then served as a diplomat for the Elector of Mainz and was sent to Paris, where he lived for a few years and came into contact with leading scientists, show more philosophers, and theologians. During a trip to England, he was elected to the Royal Society; he made a visit to Holland to meet Spinoza. Back in Germany he became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, whose library was the largest in Europe outside the Vatican. From there he became involved in government affairs in Hanover and later settled in Berlin at the court of Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia. Leibniz was involved in the diplomatic negotiations that led to the Hanoverian succession to the English throne. From his university days he showed an interest in mathematics, logic, physics, law, linguistics, and history, as well as theology and practical political affairs. He discovered calculus independently of Newton and had a protracted squabble about which of them should be given credit for the achievement. The developer of much of what is now modern logic, he discovered some important physical laws and offered a physical theory that is close to some twentieth-century conceptions. Leibniz was interested in developing a universal language and tried to master the elements of all languages. Leibniz corresponded widely with scholars all over Europe and with some Jesuit missionaries in China. His philosophy was largely worked out in answer to those of other thinkers, such as Locke, Malebranche, Bayle, and Arnauld. Although he published comparatively little during his lifetime, Leibniz left an enormous mass of unpublished papers, drafts of works, and notes on topics of interest. His library, which has been preserved, contains annotations, analyses, and often refutations of works he read. The project of publishing all of his writings, undertaken in the 1920s by the Prussian Academy, was delayed by World War II but was resumed thereafter. It is not likely that the project will be completed in the twentieth century. (Bowker Author Biography) show less
Image credit: Painting by Bernhard Christoph Francke (ca. 1700)
Works by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
The Rationalists: Descartes: Discourse on Method & Meditations; Spinoza: Ethics; Leibniz: Monadology & Discourse on Metaphysics (1960) 355 copies, 1 review
Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil (1709) 349 copies, 2 reviews
The Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence : with selections from the correspondence with Ernst, Landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels (1967) 22 copies, 1 review
Monadologie und andere metaphysische Schriften Discours de métaphysique, La monadologie, Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison (2002) 19 copies
Escritos metodológicos y epistemológicos ; Escritos filosóficos ; Escritos lógico-matemáticos ; Escritos sobre máquinas y ciencias físico-naturales ; Escrítos jurídicos,… (2015) 17 copies, 1 review
Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances et autres textes, 1690-1703 (1994) 12 copies
Leibniz and the Two Sophies: The Philosophical Correspondence (The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe: The Toronto Series, Volume 10) (2011) 6 copies
Sistema nuevo de la naturaleza y de la comunicación de las sustancias, así como también de la unión entre el alma y el cuerpo (1981) 5 copies
Sistema nuevo de la naturaleza 4 copies
Briefe über China (1694-1716) : Die Korrespondenz mit Barthelemy Des Bosses S. J. und anderen Mitgliedern des Ordens (2017) 4 copies
Opúsculos filosóficos 4 copies
G.W. Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics and Related Writings (Classics of Philosophy and Science Series) (1989) 4 copies
The Leibniz-De Volder correspondence : with selections from the correspondence between Leibniz and Johann Bernoulli (2013) 4 copies
De quadratura arithmetica circuli ellipseos et hyperbolae cujus corollarium est trigonometria sine tabulis (2016) 3 copies
Saggi di teodicea sulla bontà di Dio, sulla libertà dell'uomo, sull'origine del male (1994) 3 copies
Mathematische Schriften. Bd. 1. Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Oldenburg, Collins Newton, Galloys, Vitale Giordano (2017) 3 copies
Os Pensadores: Leibniz II 3 copies
Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausübung und Verbesserung der deutschen Sprache (1983) 3 copies
A Collection of Papers, Which Passed between the Late Learned Mr. Leibnitz, and Dr. Clarke, in the Years 1715 and 1716: (1999) 3 copies
Suhrkamp Taschenbücher Wissenschaft, Philosophische Schriften, 4 Bde. in 6 Tl.-Bdn.: Kleine Schriften zur Metaphysik / (1996) 3 copies
Protogaea: De l'aspect primitif de la terre et des traces d'une histoire très ancienne que renferment les monuments mêmes de la nature (1993) 3 copies
Allgemeiner Politischer Und Historischer Briefwechsel. Vierundzwanzigster Band, Oktober 1704- Juli 1705 (2015) 2 copies
Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel. Dreiundzwanzigster Band, Januar - September 1704 (2014) 2 copies
Sämtliche schriften und briefe. sechste reihe : philosophische schriften. vierter band, 1677-Juni 1690 : Teil A (2015) 2 copies
Teodicea: Ensayos sobre la bondad de Dios, la libertad del hombre y el origen del mal (2022) 2 copies
Œuvres choisies 2 copies
Philosophische Schriften: Band 5. Zweite Hälfte. Die Briefe der zweiten Schaffensperiode. Briefe von besonderem philosophischen Interesse (1990) 2 copies
Discours de métaphysique ; Sur la liberté, le destin, la grâce de Dieu ; Correspondance avec Arnauld (1993) 2 copies
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Erste Reihe, Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel (2017) 2 copies
G.-W. Leibniz. Oeuvres choisies : . Avec préface, notes, table par questions et table des noms propres par L. Prenant (1940) 2 copies
Monadologie: Deutsch mit einer Abhandlung über Leibniz' und Herbarts Theorien des wirklichen Geschehens von Dr. Robert Zimmermann (2017) 2 copies
Saggi filosofici e lettere 2 copies
Mathematischer, naturwissenschaftlicher und technischer briefwechsel. Achter band, 1699-1701 (2015) 2 copies
Scritti filosofici 2 copies
Philosophical Writings. Selected and translated by Mary Morris, with an Introduction by C.R. Morris. [Everyman's Library, no. 905]. Dent. 1934. (1934) 2 copies
Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie — Author — 2 copies
Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie, Bd. 2 — Author — 2 copies
L' estime des apparences : 21 manuscrits de Leibniz sur les probabilités, la théorie des jeux, l'espérance de vie (1995) 2 copies
Ricerche generali sull'analisi delle nozioni e delle verita e altri scritti di logica (2008) 2 copies
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Mathematischer, naturwissenschaftlicher und technischer Briefwechsel: 3. Reihe. Band 2: 1676–1679 (1987) 2 copies
Opuscula philosophica selecta 2 copies
Mathematische Schriften. Bd. 4. Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz, Wallis, Varignon, Guido Grandi, Zendrini, Hermann und Freiherrn von Tschirnhaus (2013) 2 copies
Mathematische Schriften. Bd. 3,2. Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz, Jacob Bernoulli, Johann Bernoulli und Nicolaus Bernoulli (2018) 2 copies
Les Deux labyrinthes 1 copy
Leibniz [Opere di] 1 copy
Esprit de Leibnitz 1 copy
Leibniz' Dynamica : Symposion der Leibniz-Gesellschaft in der Evangelischen Akademie Loccum, 2. bis 4. Juli 1982 (1984) 1 copy
Origines Guelfacae 1 copy
discorso sulla metafisica 1 copy
Discursos de metafísica 1 copy
DiscourseonMetaphysics 1 copy
Essay on Dynamics 1 copy
Izabrani filozofski spisi 1 copy
Essais de theodicée : sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine de mal Tome Second 1 copy
Monadologio 1 copy
Opúsculos filosóficos 1 copy
Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, suivi de La Monadologie (1962) 1 copy
Monadología. Principios de filosofía (Clásicos del Pensamiento nº 14) (Spanish Edition) (2011) 1 copy
Allgemeiner Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel. Einundzwanzigster Band, April - Dezember 1702 (2015) 1 copy
Discourse on Metaphysics 1 copy
Discurso de metafísica 1 copy
Discourse on Metaphysics. A Translation from the French Based on the Diplomatic Edition By Peter G. Lucas and Leslie Grint (1961) 1 copy
Ensayos de Teodicea sobre la bondad de Dios, la libertad del hombre y el origen del mal (2013) 1 copy
Selections 1 copy
Obras escolhidas 1 copy
Leibniz 1 copy
Metafizik Üzerine Konuşma 1 copy
Η μοναδολογία 1 copy
Scritti filosofici, volume secondo. Nuovi saggi sull'intelletto umano e saggi preparatori; Scritti vari; Lettere (1988) 1 copy
Scritti filosofici 7-10-1 1 copy
Leibniz. August 1696-April 1697 / Dreizehnter Band, Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel (2014) 1 copy
Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel. Zwanzigster Band, Juni 1701 - März 1702 (2014) 1 copy
Mathematischer naturwissenschaftlicher und technischer Briefwechsel. Zweiter Band, 1676-1679 (2014) 1 copy
Allgemeiner Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel. Zweiundzwanzigster Band, Januar - Dezember 1703 (2015) 1 copy
Mathematisher Naturwissennschaftcher und Technisher Briefwechsel. Siebenter Band, Juli 1696 - Dezember 1698 (2015) 1 copy
Opere filozofice vol. 1 1 copy
Ett uppslag till nytta och nöje rörande ett nytt slags förevisningar ; ingår i Fenix 12:1 (1996) 1 copy
Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain - Textes choisis - Edition établie par L. Guillermit (1961) 1 copy
Lettres et opuscules inédits de Leibniz: Précédés d/'une introduction par A. Foucher de Careil (1999) 1 copy
Pensées de Leibniz, sur la religion et la morale — Author — 1 copy
L' être et la relation [Texte imprimé] : avec trente-cinq lettres de Leibniz au R. P. Des Bosses 1 copy
Skrifter i utvalg 1 copy
Saemtliche Schriften Und Briefe. Erste Reihe. ZweiterBand: 1676-1679 (German, Latin, French and English Edition) (1990) 1 copy
Wzorzec dowodów politycznych 1 copy
Politische Schriften — Author — 1 copy
Die Hauptwerke; zusammengefasst und übertragen von Gerhard Krüger; mit einem Vorwort von Dietrich Mahnte — Author — 1 copy
Monadologie a jiné práce 1 copy
Die Philosophischen Schriften Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Volume 5 (German Edition) (2022) 1 copy
Μεταφυσική Πραγματεία 1 copy
Discourse on Metaphysics 1 copy
Theodicy Essays: On the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and The Origin of Evil (Hardcover) (2018) 1 copy
Monadology: Easy Read 1 copy
A Philosopher's Creed 1 copy
Die Philosophischen Schriften Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Volume 4 (German Edition) (2022) 1 copy
Die Philosophischen Schriften Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Volume 3 (German Edition) (2022) 1 copy
Die Philosophischen Schriften Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Volume 1 (German Edition) (2022) 1 copy
Saemtliche Schriften Und Briefe: Politische Schriften, 3: 1687-1690 4 (German, Latin, French and English Edition) (1986) 1 copy
La profession de foi du philosophe et autres textes sur le mal et la liberté (1671-1677) (2019) 1 copy
Die Hauptwerke 1 copy
Philosophische Schriften. Band III.1: Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand. Buch I - II (2013) 1 copy
Metaphysische Abhandlung 1 copy
Primae veritates 1 copy
Izabrani filozofski spisi 1 copy
Monadología - Discurso de metafísica - La profesión de fe del filósofo. Prólogo y traducción de Manuel Fuentes Benot. (1999) 1 copy
Discours de métaphysique 1 copy
Sa mtliche Schriften und Briefe. 12, Reihe 1. Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel. November 1695 - Juli 1696 (1990) 1 copy
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. R. 1, Bd 20, Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel, Juni 1701 - März 1702 (2006) 1 copy
Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand = Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain Bd. 2 1 copy
Associated Works
The Philosopher's Handbook: Essential Readings from Plato to Kant (2000) — Contributor — 234 copies, 1 review
Tagged
Common Knowledge
- Legal name
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von
- Birthdate
- 1646-07-01
- Date of death
- 1716-11-14
- Gender
- male
- Education
- University of Leipzig
University of Altdorf - Occupations
- mathematician
philosopher - Awards and honors
- Royal Society (Fellow, 1673)
- Relationships
- Pufendorf, Samuel (intellectual adversary)
- Short biography
- Leibniz, one of the great contributors to the Age of Enlightenment, wanted to collate all human knowledge -- but was unable to do so. However, among his many accomplishments, he developed the present day notation for differential and integral calculus, and the binary number system at the basis of digital computers. He was one of the 17th century's great advocates of rationalism along with Descartes and Spinoza. A prolific writer on a vast array of subjects, Leibnitz left behind at his death tens of thousands of letters and unpublished manuscripts.
- Nationality
- Germany
- Birthplace
- Leipzig, Germany
- Places of residence
- Hanover, Germany
Paris, Île-de-France, France
Nuremberg, Germany - Place of death
- Hanover, Germany
- Burial location
- Neustädter Hof- und Stadtkirche St. Johannis, Hanover, Germany
- Associated Place (for map)
- Germany
Members
Reviews
Düşünce tarihinde, arkasında bıraktığı yazılı çalışmalar bakımından Leibniz kadar üretken bir başka zihne nadiren tesadüf edilir. İlginçtir ki, ömrünü düşünmeye ve yazmaya vakfetmiş bu büyük dehanın hayattayken yayınlattığı çalışmaların adedi, ardında bıraktığı devasa külliyatla mukayese kabul etmez. Söz konusu yayınları, birkaç risalesiyle, Tanrı’nın bir deyimle “avukatlığı”nı yaptığı Essais de Théodicée [İlâhî Adalet show more Üzerine Denemeler] başlıklı eserinden ibarettir. Geride bıraktıklarının yayınlanması ise, günümüzde bile sürmekte olan uzun soluklu bir çalışmaya konudur. Kendisinin de hoşlandığı adlandırmayla “önceden tesis edilmiş âhenk sisteminin müellifi” Leibniz, insan aklını kurcalayan onlarca farklı ve büyük meseleye cesaretle el atmış, çağının önde gelen âlimleriyle durmaksızın mektuplaşmış, teorik meşguliyetleri yanında pratik çalışmalara, gözlemlere ve -hesap makinesi gibi- icatlara da mesai harcamıştır.
Leibniz’in matematik ve mantık gibi aksiyomatik disiplinlerle, fizik ve psikoloji gibi bilimlerdeki geleceğe ışık tutan başarıları bir yana bırakıldığında, onun felsefe ve ilâhiyat alanındaki en büyük başarısının, dünyada “kötülüğün” varlığının Tanrı’nın mevcudiyetine antitez olarak kullanılmasına karşı rasyonel bir savunma yapmak olduğu söylenebilir. Mümkün dünyaları temaşa edip, onlar arasında bir-arada-mümkün azamî miktarda varlık içeren dünyayı tercih etmesi bakımından, Tanrı mümkün dünyaların en iyisini yaratmıştır. İşte Monadoloji ve Metafizik Üzerine Konuşma, Leibniz’in bu minvaldeki metafizik düşüncelerini ana çizgileriyle göz önüne seren iki temel metnidir. show less
Leibniz’in matematik ve mantık gibi aksiyomatik disiplinlerle, fizik ve psikoloji gibi bilimlerdeki geleceğe ışık tutan başarıları bir yana bırakıldığında, onun felsefe ve ilâhiyat alanındaki en büyük başarısının, dünyada “kötülüğün” varlığının Tanrı’nın mevcudiyetine antitez olarak kullanılmasına karşı rasyonel bir savunma yapmak olduğu söylenebilir. Mümkün dünyaları temaşa edip, onlar arasında bir-arada-mümkün azamî miktarda varlık içeren dünyayı tercih etmesi bakımından, Tanrı mümkün dünyaların en iyisini yaratmıştır. İşte Monadoloji ve Metafizik Üzerine Konuşma, Leibniz’in bu minvaldeki metafizik düşüncelerini ana çizgileriyle göz önüne seren iki temel metnidir. show less
[S]ince something rather nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence.
Leibniz is alternately brilliant and bizarre in his line of thought. As you're reading, it's clear that you're in the presence of a masterful intellect, but many of his arguments hinge on some less than intuitive assumptions. One of his most startling show more conclusions is his solution to the problem of evil in The Monadology: the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. Essentially, since God is all good and possesses perfect reason, all that appears evil to us is a constituent of a larger "best possible world"—we just can't see the big picture. Needless to say, if you think God does not exist or that God is not all good, then there's a clear problem here. show less
Leibniz is alternately brilliant and bizarre in his line of thought. As you're reading, it's clear that you're in the presence of a masterful intellect, but many of his arguments hinge on some less than intuitive assumptions. One of his most startling show more conclusions is his solution to the problem of evil in The Monadology: the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. Essentially, since God is all good and possesses perfect reason, all that appears evil to us is a constituent of a larger "best possible world"—we just can't see the big picture. Needless to say, if you think God does not exist or that God is not all good, then there's a clear problem here. show less
Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) by G. W. Leibniz
I have never seen anything quite like this book. It is almost a line-by-line refutation of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding which I had previously only read in part. By the end of this volume, however, I feel that I have a good understanding of both Locke’s and Leibniz’s arguments. The heart of their disagreement concerns how humans develop an understanding about the world. For Locke, humans are born blank slates and on their minds are printed, via the senses, ideas show more about the world that they manage to put into words and arrange propositionally to create testable claims about the world. For Leibniz, humans are born with an innate sense of the world and the “pre-established harmony” of its contents, constructed by God’s design. In this pre-harmonized world all things have a way of fitting together and we are gradually building our understanding of it. Knowing becomes a way of understanding the synthesis of ideas that resolve into a fuller picture of the harmony. Within the limits of our inherent capabilities, guided by the historical accumulation of knowledge, and guided by the universal language of pure logic (a priori reasoning) we can achieve provisional understanding of the world.
Compared to Locke, Leibniz puts a different emphasis on reasoning. Locke believes reason is the faculty by which we form propositional knowledge from ideas that are created by the senses and translated into words. Leibniz believes reason is a recognition or “awareness” of harmony with nature, the way that contingent truths align with necessary truths which are a reflection of the way things can be and are already. Reason is not construction but discovery. To Locke understanding is systematically perceiving. To Leibniz understanding is the formation of distinct ideas accompanied by the power to reflect and recognize truths in those observations (173). It is similar to the model of “knowledge as recollection” that Platos voices through Socrates in Meno As Leibniz presents it, mind is a process of understanding that unfolds in time and is not expanded upon by adding ideas, end to end, to form a fuller mind capable of understanding. There must be a synthesis of the truth that the facts belong to, which happens in time rather than in space (203).
The trouble that I have with Leibniz's notion of understanding is that it is only accountable to experience. He is careful to say that it must accord with our experience, but presumably all experiences, to the extent that these can be known. Of course, there are plenty of times that our experience about things is wrong but sensible in light of previous and concurrent experiences (e.g., spontaneous generation). Leibniz’s reason seems to rely too much on paradigms rather than empiricism; although the latter is acknowledged as playing a role in reasoning. And I think he is aware of this precarity, but like pragmatists, he seems to have faith that the way the world is can only be one way: the way it is. And whatever we get wrong now will, given enough time, resolve in what is right. However, when power is aligned to create truths it can subvert the process and will can cause convenient truths to hold sway longer than you would think.
More Details and Thoughts Than You May Want
Leibniz elaborates on why the senses are insufficient as a basis for reasoning: “Although the senses are necessary for all our actual knowledge, they are not sufficient to provide it all, since they never give us anything but instances, that is particular or singular truths (49). The senses are fallible and only capable by themselves of giving us “truths of fact” (i.e., things true in our world) but not “necessary truths” (things true in all worlds) (73). The necessary truths within us are there in potential and they provide us with means of acting in the absence of clear and distinct ideas (86) meaning that they are innate and put there by God. Our capacity for understanding those truths has everything to do with our inherent capabilities to be open to illumination and to apply reason to discover that innate knowledge (95)
Ideas do not add up to truths via accretion and through concatenation (146). Each idea expands the wholeness of the idea it becomes more intricate in its operation. If we were to take a proposition and break it open, it cannot be decomposed into smaller propositions and then into discrete ideas because knowledge is not a collection of things so much as more and more complex machinery. Challenges the notion of distinct and clear ideas because of all the minutia that come along with sensory information, all of the stimuli that are inconsequential to the point of knowledge (133).
I very much like that this notion of knowing involves diversifying experience. Any kind of exposure to the world, whether scientific, religious, or via art adds to our experience of it and to the range of conceptions that we test against experience. The totality of what a thing is and is not counts as knowledge (355). Limited experience then makes one a poor judge of likelihood because you lack a sense of what is possible and not possible (375).
And this brings Leibniz’s argument up to his concept of the monad, which I have not read enough to understand fully, but the outline is that a monad is like an atom, a singular thing with capacities and possibilities for what it becomes. Some of what is possible for a monad to become are shared with other things (e.g., in the humans have similarities to them) but each, growing and becoming in light of its unique capabilities becomes something unique, for no matter how alike two monads are, they are never the same thing. “In so far as you conceive of the similarities amongst things, you are conceiving something in addition [to the things themselves], and that is all that universality is” (486).
Knowing this totality or universality is surely an impossibility (443) but it is clear that the attempt necessitates the formation of a diversity of experience that must, at some point, consolidate into axioms of what is generally possible to be and to cast doubt on that version of nature is “insanity” (445). But what things in the world can be is always bounded by what is necessary or possible as part of the universal pre-established harmony (440). Assuming harmony, it is possible to engage in reasoning via enthymeme (i.e., reasoning from missing premises) because those missing premises can be inferred from what must be possible given the nature of other things and the way that they are (i.e., given our emerging knowledge of the broader harmonized tapestry, what 1) explains the phenomenon under investigation and 2) is consistent with what is possible given all the other things we take as possible and true) (455). From these positions we form “judgements” about what is provisionally true (457). show less
Compared to Locke, Leibniz puts a different emphasis on reasoning. Locke believes reason is the faculty by which we form propositional knowledge from ideas that are created by the senses and translated into words. Leibniz believes reason is a recognition or “awareness” of harmony with nature, the way that contingent truths align with necessary truths which are a reflection of the way things can be and are already. Reason is not construction but discovery. To Locke understanding is systematically perceiving. To Leibniz understanding is the formation of distinct ideas accompanied by the power to reflect and recognize truths in those observations (173). It is similar to the model of “knowledge as recollection” that Platos voices through Socrates in Meno As Leibniz presents it, mind is a process of understanding that unfolds in time and is not expanded upon by adding ideas, end to end, to form a fuller mind capable of understanding. There must be a synthesis of the truth that the facts belong to, which happens in time rather than in space (203).
The trouble that I have with Leibniz's notion of understanding is that it is only accountable to experience. He is careful to say that it must accord with our experience, but presumably all experiences, to the extent that these can be known. Of course, there are plenty of times that our experience about things is wrong but sensible in light of previous and concurrent experiences (e.g., spontaneous generation). Leibniz’s reason seems to rely too much on paradigms rather than empiricism; although the latter is acknowledged as playing a role in reasoning. And I think he is aware of this precarity, but like pragmatists, he seems to have faith that the way the world is can only be one way: the way it is. And whatever we get wrong now will, given enough time, resolve in what is right. However, when power is aligned to create truths it can subvert the process and will can cause convenient truths to hold sway longer than you would think.
More Details and Thoughts Than You May Want
Leibniz elaborates on why the senses are insufficient as a basis for reasoning: “Although the senses are necessary for all our actual knowledge, they are not sufficient to provide it all, since they never give us anything but instances, that is particular or singular truths (49). The senses are fallible and only capable by themselves of giving us “truths of fact” (i.e., things true in our world) but not “necessary truths” (things true in all worlds) (73). The necessary truths within us are there in potential and they provide us with means of acting in the absence of clear and distinct ideas (86) meaning that they are innate and put there by God. Our capacity for understanding those truths has everything to do with our inherent capabilities to be open to illumination and to apply reason to discover that innate knowledge (95)
Ideas do not add up to truths via accretion and through concatenation (146). Each idea expands the wholeness of the idea it becomes more intricate in its operation. If we were to take a proposition and break it open, it cannot be decomposed into smaller propositions and then into discrete ideas because knowledge is not a collection of things so much as more and more complex machinery. Challenges the notion of distinct and clear ideas because of all the minutia that come along with sensory information, all of the stimuli that are inconsequential to the point of knowledge (133).
I very much like that this notion of knowing involves diversifying experience. Any kind of exposure to the world, whether scientific, religious, or via art adds to our experience of it and to the range of conceptions that we test against experience. The totality of what a thing is and is not counts as knowledge (355). Limited experience then makes one a poor judge of likelihood because you lack a sense of what is possible and not possible (375).
And this brings Leibniz’s argument up to his concept of the monad, which I have not read enough to understand fully, but the outline is that a monad is like an atom, a singular thing with capacities and possibilities for what it becomes. Some of what is possible for a monad to become are shared with other things (e.g., in the humans have similarities to them) but each, growing and becoming in light of its unique capabilities becomes something unique, for no matter how alike two monads are, they are never the same thing. “In so far as you conceive of the similarities amongst things, you are conceiving something in addition [to the things themselves], and that is all that universality is” (486).
Knowing this totality or universality is surely an impossibility (443) but it is clear that the attempt necessitates the formation of a diversity of experience that must, at some point, consolidate into axioms of what is generally possible to be and to cast doubt on that version of nature is “insanity” (445). But what things in the world can be is always bounded by what is necessary or possible as part of the universal pre-established harmony (440). Assuming harmony, it is possible to engage in reasoning via enthymeme (i.e., reasoning from missing premises) because those missing premises can be inferred from what must be possible given the nature of other things and the way that they are (i.e., given our emerging knowledge of the broader harmonized tapestry, what 1) explains the phenomenon under investigation and 2) is consistent with what is possible given all the other things we take as possible and true) (455). From these positions we form “judgements” about what is provisionally true (457). show less
(o Goodreads simplesmente apagou minha resenha anterior, reescrevo-a meio sem paciência). Leibniz e Clarke trocam cartas, mas é um diálogo de surdos que, embora com bons argumentos e complicando suas respostas a cada vez, retrucam um ao outro, sem possível entendimento onde nenhum quer arredar o pé. Em geral, embora mais dogmático e pitoresco (pensem na doutrina da harmonia pré-estabelecida), simpatizo mais com Leibniz e o considero mais arguto. Exceto nas questões físicas show more (especialmente quanto à gravidade), em que ele realmente parece errado e Clarke o corrige copiosamente.
De modo que Leibniz introduz o princípio de razão suficiente (PRS - há razão para tudo), que Clarke aceita, mas o lê de modo forte, derivando o princípio do melhor (Deus sempre escolhe o melhor) e dele a identidade dos indiscerníveis. Essa identidade é interessante: não há a possibilidade de que duas coisas sejam exatamente iguais, porque daí não haveria motivo para preferir uma à outra na ordem da criação divina. E como Leibniz tem uma concepção cartesiana da liberdade, não é possível agir sem motivos, pois a indiferença se confundiria com o caos epicurista, com o destino do irracional. Assim, o melhor dos mundos envolve que noções abstratas de espaço e tempo sejam abstrações e não realidades (como Clarke e Newton querem, de um Deus que constitui espaço-tempo como quantidades subjacentes às coisas), pois se existissem, seriam uniformes, e não permitiriam o melhor motivo quanto à colocação de algo na posição absoluta deste. De mesmo modo, átomos não existem, porque coisas idênticas levam à mesma indiferença, e Deus se atêm no melhor mesmo nos literalmente infinitos detalhes. (Curiosamente a teoria de Newton, mais próxima ao nosso senso comum atual, enfrenta dificuldades ao admitir que é impraticável pensar em movimentos absolutos; e no apêndice sugere que as estrelas fixas são seguradas no lugar contra a gravitação por milagres divinos...)
Quando na quinta resposta Clarke perde de vez a compostura e declara que Leibniz faz petições de princípio, tipicamente não-filosóficas, o filósofo alemão não retruca surdamente mais uma vez, pois falece logo em seguida. show less
De modo que Leibniz introduz o princípio de razão suficiente (PRS - há razão para tudo), que Clarke aceita, mas o lê de modo forte, derivando o princípio do melhor (Deus sempre escolhe o melhor) e dele a identidade dos indiscerníveis. Essa identidade é interessante: não há a possibilidade de que duas coisas sejam exatamente iguais, porque daí não haveria motivo para preferir uma à outra na ordem da criação divina. E como Leibniz tem uma concepção cartesiana da liberdade, não é possível agir sem motivos, pois a indiferença se confundiria com o caos epicurista, com o destino do irracional. Assim, o melhor dos mundos envolve que noções abstratas de espaço e tempo sejam abstrações e não realidades (como Clarke e Newton querem, de um Deus que constitui espaço-tempo como quantidades subjacentes às coisas), pois se existissem, seriam uniformes, e não permitiriam o melhor motivo quanto à colocação de algo na posição absoluta deste. De mesmo modo, átomos não existem, porque coisas idênticas levam à mesma indiferença, e Deus se atêm no melhor mesmo nos literalmente infinitos detalhes. (Curiosamente a teoria de Newton, mais próxima ao nosso senso comum atual, enfrenta dificuldades ao admitir que é impraticável pensar em movimentos absolutos; e no apêndice sugere que as estrelas fixas são seguradas no lugar contra a gravitação por milagres divinos...)
Quando na quinta resposta Clarke perde de vez a compostura e declara que Leibniz faz petições de princípio, tipicamente não-filosóficas, o filósofo alemão não retruca surdamente mais uma vez, pois falece logo em seguida. show less
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