John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)

I didn't expect to like this very much. To my surprise, following on from Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, I am liking Victorian philosophy. And while I admired Bentham's work, I loved Mill's. Is the Victorian period the last point where philosophers write things they expect laymen to read and enjoy reading? I don't know enough to answer that question, actually, but Mill certainly writes in such a way. I found myself fairly well-convinced by show more utilitarianism as an ethical and moral approach.

Much of Utilitarianism is an attempt to justify and execute a "scientific" approach to morals. From reading A System of Logic later, I would learn that this is about induction and deduction for Mill, but though he mentions them here, I don't think they're a key part of his argument. Rather, he clarifies what utilitarianism actually is, and attempt to reclaim it against charges of being centered on immediate physical pleasures, proposing that the quality of pleasure is more important to the greatest-happiness principle than the quantity. I don't know how true it is, but I want it to be true, and I think that this observation is even more true now than in 1863: "In a world in which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, every one who has this moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable..."

Of course the supposed danger of "rational" systems of morality is coldness, as Mill points out: "It is often affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and unsympathizing; that it chills their moral feelings towards individuals; that it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideration of the consequences of actions, not taking into their moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate." But as always, he's got a comeback at the ready: "this is a complaint not against utilitarianism, but against having any standard of morality at all"! And when you might complain that he's breaking happiness down into a bunch of smaller things that aren't happiness (the Victorians were really into the idea that science was about breaking things into smaller things), he shoots back, "Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole." Oh yeah, I guess it is. Let's all try to increase everyone's happiness!

What's less convincing is the last chapter, which is almost 40% of the book. Mill works really hard to show that utilitarianism doesn't have to be unjust, and though I want him to be right, I'm not sure that he's right for these reasons. show less

After finishing this book, I'm of the opinion it should be required reading in high school. It is not that I agree with Mill on all points—I certainly don't—it's that he's asking the right questions. Essentially, he starts a discussion on what it means to be a citizen of a community and what it means to be a just government. He highlights the often-overlooked distinction between the premise that, in a democracy, power should be in the hands of the majority and the very different premise show more that the majority, having that power, should be free to do as it chooses.

Of course, he reaches certain conclusions: "…the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." These conclusions can be attacked from both directions. From a more conservative position, one can question what appears to be his assumption that a society is nothing more than a collection of individuals, that no concept of shared values has a place in it. One might also question his delineations of "harm to others"…they seem somewhat shallow and limited to direct causality. From a more liberal position, one might take issue with his statements that backward societies should not enjoy full privileges because they are not "capable". One might question whether he is really trying to protect individuality or whether he is trying to protect the intellectual elite from the "despotism of collective mediocrity."

It does not matter. These questions are certainly as relevant today as they were just before the Civil War, and the attempt to answer them seems important to me. show less

The trouble with Mill is that you if read a few of his then-contemporary critics, and then you think you have his measure with all your modern day access to knowledge, but all along he was throwing "mind grenades" set on "delay" and they sit in your head while you go on thinking you are rather smart. So Mill mentions the Stoics and how virtue is only a means to happiness and that there are other things, too. He mentions the Sophists and how Socrates (allegedly) challenged their ancient show more equivalent of what is happening in higher education today. But in mentioning the development of utilitarianism from Epicurus to Bentham (and unfortunately I have not read Bentham cover-to-cover as I will do in the future), so just when I think to myself: "Mill, you really are 'drawing a long bow here' [a favourite saying of one of my favourite professors]", the mind grenade goes off and my hubris is dashed and I am glad I didn't say it out loud but there you have it - it was certainly there. There is no mention of Aristotle and the "golden mean" and how achieving a mean across the spectrum of virtues achieves happiness, but, as Mill says, there are many things that amount to happiness in addition to leading a virtuous life, so bringing up Aristotle doesn't make a good deal of sense. One interesting aspect of the essay is the long note in the last few pages where Mill extends a good deal of courtesy to Herbert Spencer, someone I have read more about in Jack London's Martin Eden than I ever did in all the other secondary sources I have read put together. While Mill does not quite agree with Spencer, Spencer claims (according to Mill) that he was never against the doctrine of utilitarianism. So the Greatest Happiness Principle it is but if we do not also take into account Mill's ideas of liberty (in On Liberty), then the present-day situation where we are told what to like and what will make us happy and many of us go along with that and eat our smashed avocado, living in our high density housing, and paying for cups of coffee that we could make at home for a fraction of the price, which are not only much better, but we could also be happier because we were actually doing something for ourselves, while, as Tolstoy or even my mother would say, "in reality", we are succumbing to the biggest scam ever and then wondering why we are not happy at all. And J.S. Mill says all this in just under 122 pages of thick paper dating from 1895, which is nice, but with each cover-to-cover completion of classic works I edge ever-closer to the abyss of what I don't know and it scares me. show less

Livro simpático do século XIX sobre a liberdade, defendendo os direitos do indivíduo, e um individualismo esclarecido - focado na acessibilidade de informação, multiplicidade de costumes, necessidade de um ambiente acolhedor da diferença para o florescimento da criatividade. Acima de tudo, é preciso que os regimes sociais admitam liberdade de expressão, permitindo argumentos diversos que, confrontados uns com os outros, promovem a instituição da verdade, na circulação pública do show more conhecimento aliada ao incentivo a expor opiniões eventualmente contrárias à massa do comum ou dos costumes. Pois a verdade é fruto da constante revisão das posições, frente aos argumentos e fatos. Mill nisso não diz que não há costumes sociais culturais que moldam, mas já adianta a posição multiculturalista cosmopolita, em que, se não se pratica, nem por isso deixamos de tolerar os costumes dos outros. O livro combate portanto os moralistas de plantão, que se acham por direito interferir no que é próprio da vida individual dos outros, enquanto não se preocupam com a liberdade que possuem para cuidar de suas próprias e viver bem. Daí, discute que a liberdade só existe na prática, e essa envolve não impedir a liberdade dos outros, sendo essa primeira cláusula, do compartilhamento igual das liberdades, justamente primeira, no sentido de que é um contrasenso manter uma liberdade de oprimir o outro, ainda mais quando justificada por argumentos do tipo "pq se não oprimo então eu me considero oprimido por não poder oprimir". Então, não é um individualismo bobo, embora simples: o estado e as instituições devem garantir e trabalhar para esse estado social em que o indivíduo floresce e ideias variadas circulam. show less