Capital in the Twenty-First Century
by Thomas Piketty (Author, Auteur), Emmanuel Saez (Author)
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What are the grand dynamics that drive the accumulation and distribution of capital? Questions about the long-term evolution of inequality, the concentration of wealth, and the prospects for economic growth lie at the heart of political economy. But satisfactory answers have been hard to find for lack of adequate data and clear guiding theories. In this work the author analyzes a unique collection of data from twenty countries, ranging as far back as the eighteenth century, to uncover key show more economic and social patterns. His findings transform debate and set the agenda for the next generation of thought about wealth and inequality. He shows that modern economic growth and the diffusion of knowledge have allowed us to avoid inequalities on the apocalyptic scale predicted by Karl Marx. But we have not modified the deep structures of capital and inequality as much as we thought in the optimistic decades following World War II. The main driver of inequality--the tendency of returns on capital to exceed the rate of economic growth--today threatens to generate extreme inequalities that stir discontent and undermine democratic values if political action is not taken. But economic trends are not acts of God. Political action has curbed dangerous inequalities in the past, the author says, and may do so again. This original work reorients our understanding of economic history and confronts us with sobering lessons for today. show lessTags
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I remember being in a book shop in San Francisco when “Capital in the 21st Century” was first published in 2014. It couldn’t have been more timely, following on the heels of Occupy Wall Street and the proposed Buffet Rule. Wealth inequality was the talk of the town.
Written by French economist Thomas Picketty, it’s a book that maps wealth inequality over the past few centuries. Some have said that these early decades of the 21st century feel like the return of the Gilded Age of the Robber Barons, and the numbers support these claims.
One of the core aspects of Picketty’s exploration surrounds a study of wealth inequality in contrast to the growth rate. The growth rate of the economy for much of history has hovered near zero. It show more picked up during the Industrial Revolution, and maxed out somewhere around 1.6% in the 20th century. This growth rate has been unsustainable, resulting in likely-irreparable social and ecological harm, and it would be foolish to expect anything of the sort for growth in the 21st century.
To my surprise, I learned that the highest known wealth inequality thus far could be found in Europe around 1910, where the top 10% had 90% of the capital, and the top 1% had 50%. Even in the United States today, the numbers stand somewhere around 70% for the top 10%, and 35% for the top 1%. That said, Picketty predicts that, if things don’t change, we’ll be seeing record-setting highs as soon as 2030.
Why is this happening? There are numerous factors—from the ratio of the rate of return on capital to the growth rate, to population growth, to taxation.
One interesting factor demonstrated by college endowments: the more capital you have, the faster it grows. These differences quickly expand, as growth is logarithmic. College endowments managing less than a $100m see annualized returns around 6%. Colleges managing endowments over $10b see returns of 10% per year—almost twice as much! This pattern carries over to other sorts of private wealth as well.
Another fallacy the book dispells: that inflation hurts the wealthy. The vast majority of wealth is held in assets other than cash, which means that inflation is built in to their price. Who holds the most cash as a percentage of their wealth? The working and middle classes. These are the groups hurt most by inflation.
The most striking piece of history I learned was about tax rates. Did you know that, between 1930 and 1980, the average top tax rate in the US was 80%! By comparison, it is 37% today—less than half of what it had been. Even more strikingly, it reached 98% in the UK for extended periods of time (which was a factor in the Beatles’ move to the US).
Inheritance taxes were also much higher than they are today, as well as capital gains. What’s especially notable about this period of high taxes was the it’s also the highest growth period in history. Some small government hawks argue that low taxes encourage economic growth, but these data don’t support such a claim.
The more I learn about taxes, the more I realize that they’re like sleep; it’s about a balance rather than extremes. Some private-property fundamentalists would argue that taxes represent unfair seizure. Those whom are more socially-minded might recognize that money is a commons, and has no value from the perspective of the individual; it’s a collectively held believe. Taxes are necessary for the maintenance of the health of a currency, just as sleep is necessary to maintain the health of a person. Mary Mellor further explores this concept of public money in her 2015 title, Debt or Democracy.
In the United States today we actually have a regressive (as opposed to progressive) tax; the wealthiest citizens don’t pay the highest tax.
All of Picketty’s research leads up to the conclusion that, even if income, property, capital gains, sales, and inheritance taxes were raised, it still wouldn’t be enough; we need a tax on capital.
This is a brilliant idea, and leaves me wondering what kind of activism has sprung up to pursue this aim. I fear that, in the current political climate, such a goal will be exceedingly challenging to achieve. The actual implementation of this tax would take a lot of care—as much capital is of limited liquidity—and would replace the property tax.
This book does not explore the social and environmental dynamics of this subject, which are important and extensive. Even if it doesn’t bring about a tax revolution, this book reminds us of the bizarre nature of our times, and that the financial returns of the 20th century are the outlier rather than the norm. show less
Written by French economist Thomas Picketty, it’s a book that maps wealth inequality over the past few centuries. Some have said that these early decades of the 21st century feel like the return of the Gilded Age of the Robber Barons, and the numbers support these claims.
One of the core aspects of Picketty’s exploration surrounds a study of wealth inequality in contrast to the growth rate. The growth rate of the economy for much of history has hovered near zero. It show more picked up during the Industrial Revolution, and maxed out somewhere around 1.6% in the 20th century. This growth rate has been unsustainable, resulting in likely-irreparable social and ecological harm, and it would be foolish to expect anything of the sort for growth in the 21st century.
To my surprise, I learned that the highest known wealth inequality thus far could be found in Europe around 1910, where the top 10% had 90% of the capital, and the top 1% had 50%. Even in the United States today, the numbers stand somewhere around 70% for the top 10%, and 35% for the top 1%. That said, Picketty predicts that, if things don’t change, we’ll be seeing record-setting highs as soon as 2030.
Why is this happening? There are numerous factors—from the ratio of the rate of return on capital to the growth rate, to population growth, to taxation.
One interesting factor demonstrated by college endowments: the more capital you have, the faster it grows. These differences quickly expand, as growth is logarithmic. College endowments managing less than a $100m see annualized returns around 6%. Colleges managing endowments over $10b see returns of 10% per year—almost twice as much! This pattern carries over to other sorts of private wealth as well.
Another fallacy the book dispells: that inflation hurts the wealthy. The vast majority of wealth is held in assets other than cash, which means that inflation is built in to their price. Who holds the most cash as a percentage of their wealth? The working and middle classes. These are the groups hurt most by inflation.
The most striking piece of history I learned was about tax rates. Did you know that, between 1930 and 1980, the average top tax rate in the US was 80%! By comparison, it is 37% today—less than half of what it had been. Even more strikingly, it reached 98% in the UK for extended periods of time (which was a factor in the Beatles’ move to the US).
Inheritance taxes were also much higher than they are today, as well as capital gains. What’s especially notable about this period of high taxes was the it’s also the highest growth period in history. Some small government hawks argue that low taxes encourage economic growth, but these data don’t support such a claim.
The more I learn about taxes, the more I realize that they’re like sleep; it’s about a balance rather than extremes. Some private-property fundamentalists would argue that taxes represent unfair seizure. Those whom are more socially-minded might recognize that money is a commons, and has no value from the perspective of the individual; it’s a collectively held believe. Taxes are necessary for the maintenance of the health of a currency, just as sleep is necessary to maintain the health of a person. Mary Mellor further explores this concept of public money in her 2015 title, Debt or Democracy.
In the United States today we actually have a regressive (as opposed to progressive) tax; the wealthiest citizens don’t pay the highest tax.
All of Picketty’s research leads up to the conclusion that, even if income, property, capital gains, sales, and inheritance taxes were raised, it still wouldn’t be enough; we need a tax on capital.
This is a brilliant idea, and leaves me wondering what kind of activism has sprung up to pursue this aim. I fear that, in the current political climate, such a goal will be exceedingly challenging to achieve. The actual implementation of this tax would take a lot of care—as much capital is of limited liquidity—and would replace the property tax.
This book does not explore the social and environmental dynamics of this subject, which are important and extensive. Even if it doesn’t bring about a tax revolution, this book reminds us of the bizarre nature of our times, and that the financial returns of the 20th century are the outlier rather than the norm. show less
This book deserves all the attention it has received, and also deserves the time and mental energy that a careful reading entails. First, the book deals a massive blow to the theory of free-market capitalism that has become a core belief of the capitalist elite, and of much of the economics profession. Secondly, it provides a straightforward theory of how capitalism really works. And thirdly, it proposes solutions to the rising inequality that stems from that process. Those solutions don't look politically possible now, but as the author emphasizes, economic developments have political consequences. Moreover, the point isn't really the precise remedies that Piketty proposes, but the fact that he opens the discussion.
The idea of free show more market capitalism, over the past half century, has grown from a collection of theories espoused by Adam Smith et al into an economic and political ideology, reinforced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and supported by the economic elite whose interests it has served. The idea that capitalism ultimately benefits all participants -- that "a rising tide lifts all boats" -- is a powerful one that has been accepted by many people whose boats remain unlifted. Much of that reflects that, in the US and Europe, almost everyone between 50 and 70 did grow up in a world where the tide did rise, and most boats rose with it, with income inequality falling drastically compared to pre-war levels. That improvement is very widely assumed to be the result of a capitalist economic system. This is the central "fact" that Piketty demolishes, showing that the 1945-75 period (the thirty glorious years, for the French) reflected economic recovery from the war and political decisions that levelled income distribution.
Rather than the thirty glorious years being the base state, Piketty argues, they were an aberration from the underlying pattern of capitalism, which is that income inequality -- and far more important, wealth inequality -- tends to grow strongly over time. Most of the book is about the data that he uses to arrive at this conclusion, data that were NOT easy to obtain. Indeed, Piketty's achievement in constructing his data base is just as important as his conclusion. Heretofore, we have been discussing inequality almost exclusively as an income phenomenon: what Piketty brings into the discussion is the question of wealth. Not only does he bring it in, he makes it possible to measure it. (Note: most of the reasonable criticism of Piketty so far -- I don't think that yelling Markist! is reasonable criticism -- has focussed on the data. Piketty, in the book, warns over and over of possible data weaknesses, and has made his data available on line. There will be problems, there are always problems with data. But disagreeing with a few data assumptions does not invalidate the argument).
Based on this data, Piketty arrives at his central argument -- that when the rate of return on capital (very broadly defined) exceeds the growth of national income, when r is greater than g, wealth will become more concentrated. In the 50's and 60's, when economies were speeding ahead at 3-5% based on recovery from the war (and from the Depression) and when inflation was low, r was not necessarily greater than g. Since then, however, growth in the advanced countries has slowed sharply, while the return on capital has remained at 5% or better. The result is an increasing concentration of wealth, and Piketty sees no reason why this should change (The US has a special aspect which Piketty examines -- the dramatic increase in income inequality, as high-end wages have soared relative to average wages. This is of interest, but the key point remain r>g
To deal with this, Piketty proposes an international, progressive tax on wealth. That looks improbable at present, but, as he notes, a meaningful income tax looked pretty improbable a century ago. I don't think, however, that Piketty's proposed solution is critical -- what matters is the discussion he has brought to the fore. The essential point is that the state (really a group of states( is the only entity that can offset the concentration of wealth implicit in modern capitalism. Destroying capitalism doesn't work: consider the Soviet Union. But its benefits can be spread more widely by political means (taxes) while leaving the economic motor in place. Ultrahigh taxes, remember, do not seem to have deadened entrepreneurship from 1950 to 1975.
This is not light reading, though it is remarkably free of economic jargon (as a former economist, I am an expert on that topic). But it is well worth the time and effort it demands. It is already playing a major role in the discussion on inequality and its political ramifications, and has certainly changed my thinking on the subject. This is a very major work. show less
The idea of free show more market capitalism, over the past half century, has grown from a collection of theories espoused by Adam Smith et al into an economic and political ideology, reinforced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and supported by the economic elite whose interests it has served. The idea that capitalism ultimately benefits all participants -- that "a rising tide lifts all boats" -- is a powerful one that has been accepted by many people whose boats remain unlifted. Much of that reflects that, in the US and Europe, almost everyone between 50 and 70 did grow up in a world where the tide did rise, and most boats rose with it, with income inequality falling drastically compared to pre-war levels. That improvement is very widely assumed to be the result of a capitalist economic system. This is the central "fact" that Piketty demolishes, showing that the 1945-75 period (the thirty glorious years, for the French) reflected economic recovery from the war and political decisions that levelled income distribution.
Rather than the thirty glorious years being the base state, Piketty argues, they were an aberration from the underlying pattern of capitalism, which is that income inequality -- and far more important, wealth inequality -- tends to grow strongly over time. Most of the book is about the data that he uses to arrive at this conclusion, data that were NOT easy to obtain. Indeed, Piketty's achievement in constructing his data base is just as important as his conclusion. Heretofore, we have been discussing inequality almost exclusively as an income phenomenon: what Piketty brings into the discussion is the question of wealth. Not only does he bring it in, he makes it possible to measure it. (Note: most of the reasonable criticism of Piketty so far -- I don't think that yelling Markist! is reasonable criticism -- has focussed on the data. Piketty, in the book, warns over and over of possible data weaknesses, and has made his data available on line. There will be problems, there are always problems with data. But disagreeing with a few data assumptions does not invalidate the argument).
Based on this data, Piketty arrives at his central argument -- that when the rate of return on capital (very broadly defined) exceeds the growth of national income, when r is greater than g, wealth will become more concentrated. In the 50's and 60's, when economies were speeding ahead at 3-5% based on recovery from the war (and from the Depression) and when inflation was low, r was not necessarily greater than g. Since then, however, growth in the advanced countries has slowed sharply, while the return on capital has remained at 5% or better. The result is an increasing concentration of wealth, and Piketty sees no reason why this should change (The US has a special aspect which Piketty examines -- the dramatic increase in income inequality, as high-end wages have soared relative to average wages. This is of interest, but the key point remain r>g
To deal with this, Piketty proposes an international, progressive tax on wealth. That looks improbable at present, but, as he notes, a meaningful income tax looked pretty improbable a century ago. I don't think, however, that Piketty's proposed solution is critical -- what matters is the discussion he has brought to the fore. The essential point is that the state (really a group of states( is the only entity that can offset the concentration of wealth implicit in modern capitalism. Destroying capitalism doesn't work: consider the Soviet Union. But its benefits can be spread more widely by political means (taxes) while leaving the economic motor in place. Ultrahigh taxes, remember, do not seem to have deadened entrepreneurship from 1950 to 1975.
This is not light reading, though it is remarkably free of economic jargon (as a former economist, I am an expert on that topic). But it is well worth the time and effort it demands. It is already playing a major role in the discussion on inequality and its political ramifications, and has certainly changed my thinking on the subject. This is a very major work. show less
I picked up Capital in the Twenty-First Century knowing full well that it might become a doorstop. And in many ways, it lived up to that expectation. The book is dense—overstuffed with data tables, historical references, and long-winded explanations that repeat the same central points in slightly different wording, just in case the reader didn't get it the first time. Then, just when you think he’s about to move on, he loops back to reinforce his conclusions yet again. It’s a masterclass in academic redundancy, and while the research is impressive, the delivery is exhausting. That said, beneath the slog, there is an argument worth engaging with.
Piketty’s thesis is straightforward: capitalism, left unchecked, leads to increasing show more wealth inequality. He argues that when the return on capital (r) exceeds economic growth (g), wealth concentrates in the hands of those who already own assets, while everyone else falls further behind. This benefits the “rentier” class (those who derive income from ownership rather than labor, i.e., landlords, shareholders, and trust fund heirs). Meanwhile, economic growth—which, in this context, primarily refers to GDP expansion but could also include broader national income measures—fails to keep pace, meaning wages stagnate while capital owners multiply their fortunes. Historically, Piketty claims, only war, taxation, and economic shocks have been able to reverse this trend.
To fix this, he proposes a global progressive wealth tax, a solution so unworkable that it reads more like an academic exercise than a serious proposal.
What He Gets Right
Historical Patterns of Wealth Accumulation – His data is impressive. He traces wealth inequality over centuries and shows how policy choices shape economic outcomes.
The Role of Taxation – The post-WWII decline in inequality was largely due to high progressive tax rates and economic policies that favored redistribution. The Reagan-Thatcher era reversed much of this.
Capital Mobility and Globalization – The rich don’t just accumulate wealth; they move it. The ability to shift capital across borders undermines national efforts to tax and regulate it. This is obvious—I didn't need ~800 pages to tell me that the wealthy will try to protect their money. Heck, I try to do that, and I'm far from wealthy.
Where He Misses the Mark
r > g is Not a Law of Nature – Piketty presents r > g as an inevitability, but is that really true? We've seen periods of growth exceeding capital returns, particularly in the post-war economic boom. What determines when g outpaces r? Piketty seems uninterested in this question, focusing instead on long-term averages that obscure more dynamic economic forces.
Ignores Market Dynamism – The notion that wealth simply accumulates and entrenches itself ignores the churn of creative destruction. Today’s richest individuals—Musk, Bezos, Altman—didn’t inherit their wealth; they built it by disrupting entrenched industries.
A Global Wealth Tax is Unworkable – Even if such a tax were desirable, it’s unworkable. Capital is fluid, political will is fragmented, and enforcement would be a nightmare.
The AI Revolution: Piketty’s Blind Spot
To be fair, Capital was written in 2013, before the current explosion of AI. But even in his later work, Piketty remains out to lunch on the forces that will define the next century. If he’s right about r > g, then AI will supercharge the problem—automation will suppress wage growth while concentrating wealth among those who own the AI-driven infrastructure. But what he doesn’t address is the potential for economic restructuring in response to this shift. Does automation-driven inequality lead to a permanent underclass, or does it force new economic models like universal basic income (UBI) or AI-driven state subsidies? Capitalism has survived radical technological change before, but Piketty’s framework assumes a static system rather than one that adapts.
Bitcoin: Another Blind Spot
Piketty largely ignores Bitcoin which is surprising given his focus on capital, taxation, and financial systems. This isn't a call to lump Bitcoin in with the broader crypto space—most of which is speculative noise—but rather to recognize its potential as a decentralized counterweight to state-controlled monetary policy. If capital is as mobile as Piketty suggests, then Bitcoin represents the logical next step: an asset class that exists outside traditional banking and taxation systems, offering a way for wealth to evade the very redistributive policies he champions. His failure to address this suggests a blind spot in his thinking—he envisions a world where states can still assert control over wealth, but what if they can’t?
My Conclusion
Piketty’s work is valuable but incomplete. His historical analysis appears to be solid, but his economic vision assumes the future will mirror the past. He underestimates the disruptive forces of innovation and overestimates the feasibility of sweeping global reforms. For those interested in wealth inequality, give it a go. For those looking for answers about the future, use it as a doorstop.
Post Script – Reflections on the Financial Doomsday Series
I began what I later called my "Financial Doomsday" review series in the wake of COVID-19’s economic shock. After witnessing a 37% drop in the market in early 2020 and questioning the impact of unprecedented stimulus on the dollar’s value, I set out to understand what might come next. Over four and a half years, I read a dozen books warning of collapse, reform, or radical monetary reset. My goal wasn’t panic—it was preparation. I wanted to understand the problem, how we got here, and how to navigate whatever lies ahead.
What became unmistakably clear is that the system is broken—and it’s our own doing. Every book—whether shouting from a libertarian soapbox, preaching progressive reform, or whispering warnings of monetary collapse—echoes the same refrain. We’ve overspent, overpromised, and overextended. The future will not be fixed by half-measures or temporary stimulus.
And yet, I’ve found clarity, not despair. This reading journey wasn’t about hoarding gold or retreating into cynicism. It was about understanding how we got here—and where I stand. My answer is simple: stay invested. Broadly. Globally. Across asset classes. Fiat currencies may weaken, regimes may change, but human ingenuity and markets adapt. That’s the core insight I carry forward—not just from any single book, but from the collective warning they offer.
If you found this review helpful, check out my other reviews in the Financial Doomsday series, grouped below by theme:
Monetary Collapse & Inflation Risk
Free Market Solutions & Libertarian Reform
Global Governance & Centralized Planning
Wealth Inequality & Progressive Redistribution
Piketty’s thesis is straightforward: capitalism, left unchecked, leads to increasing show more wealth inequality. He argues that when the return on capital (r) exceeds economic growth (g), wealth concentrates in the hands of those who already own assets, while everyone else falls further behind. This benefits the “rentier” class (those who derive income from ownership rather than labor, i.e., landlords, shareholders, and trust fund heirs). Meanwhile, economic growth—which, in this context, primarily refers to GDP expansion but could also include broader national income measures—fails to keep pace, meaning wages stagnate while capital owners multiply their fortunes. Historically, Piketty claims, only war, taxation, and economic shocks have been able to reverse this trend.
To fix this, he proposes a global progressive wealth tax, a solution so unworkable that it reads more like an academic exercise than a serious proposal.
What He Gets Right
Where He Misses the Mark
The AI Revolution: Piketty’s Blind Spot
To be fair, Capital was written in 2013, before the current explosion of AI. But even in his later work, Piketty remains out to lunch on the forces that will define the next century. If he’s right about r > g, then AI will supercharge the problem—automation will suppress wage growth while concentrating wealth among those who own the AI-driven infrastructure. But what he doesn’t address is the potential for economic restructuring in response to this shift. Does automation-driven inequality lead to a permanent underclass, or does it force new economic models like universal basic income (UBI) or AI-driven state subsidies? Capitalism has survived radical technological change before, but Piketty’s framework assumes a static system rather than one that adapts.
Bitcoin: Another Blind Spot
Piketty largely ignores Bitcoin which is surprising given his focus on capital, taxation, and financial systems. This isn't a call to lump Bitcoin in with the broader crypto space—most of which is speculative noise—but rather to recognize its potential as a decentralized counterweight to state-controlled monetary policy. If capital is as mobile as Piketty suggests, then Bitcoin represents the logical next step: an asset class that exists outside traditional banking and taxation systems, offering a way for wealth to evade the very redistributive policies he champions. His failure to address this suggests a blind spot in his thinking—he envisions a world where states can still assert control over wealth, but what if they can’t?
My Conclusion
Piketty’s work is valuable but incomplete. His historical analysis appears to be solid, but his economic vision assumes the future will mirror the past. He underestimates the disruptive forces of innovation and overestimates the feasibility of sweeping global reforms. For those interested in wealth inequality, give it a go. For those looking for answers about the future, use it as a doorstop.
Post Script – Reflections on the Financial Doomsday Series
I began what I later called my "Financial Doomsday" review series in the wake of COVID-19’s economic shock. After witnessing a 37% drop in the market in early 2020 and questioning the impact of unprecedented stimulus on the dollar’s value, I set out to understand what might come next. Over four and a half years, I read a dozen books warning of collapse, reform, or radical monetary reset. My goal wasn’t panic—it was preparation. I wanted to understand the problem, how we got here, and how to navigate whatever lies ahead.
What became unmistakably clear is that the system is broken—and it’s our own doing. Every book—whether shouting from a libertarian soapbox, preaching progressive reform, or whispering warnings of monetary collapse—echoes the same refrain. We’ve overspent, overpromised, and overextended. The future will not be fixed by half-measures or temporary stimulus.
And yet, I’ve found clarity, not despair. This reading journey wasn’t about hoarding gold or retreating into cynicism. It was about understanding how we got here—and where I stand. My answer is simple: stay invested. Broadly. Globally. Across asset classes. Fiat currencies may weaken, regimes may change, but human ingenuity and markets adapt. That’s the core insight I carry forward—not just from any single book, but from the collective warning they offer.
If you found this review helpful, check out my other reviews in the Financial Doomsday series, grouped below by theme:
Monetary Collapse & Inflation Risk
- The Great Devaluation by Adam Baratta
- The Coming Economic Earthquake by Larry Burkett
Free Market Solutions & Libertarian Reform
- The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure by John A. Allison
- End the IRS Before It Ends Us by Grover Norquist
- How Capitalism Will Save Us by Steve Forbes
Global Governance & Centralized Planning
- The Great Narrative by Klaus Schwab
Wealth Inequality & Progressive Redistribution
- Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty
What was it Bilbo Baggins said about economics books? "I understand less than half of them less than half as well as I'd like, and I like less than half of the ones I understand less than half as well as they deserve." That hobbit spoke a deep truth, and while I wait in vain for the economics book that helps me understand it better by carefully restructuring all the parts where concepts like "national capital stock" and "individual average capital" both get reduced to "capital" in different ratios and then further to mathematical expressions (you have to be so gentle with the conceptual jargon and with the math when trying to reach people like me) and/or helps me like it better by revealing that something about our present economic show more system actually makes sense and things are gonna get better, or that there's a feasible alternative, let me dig into the econ book I got rather than the one I'd wish for: this celebrated volume, perhaps the most-read book of original economics research written in my lifetime.
Probably you're familiar with the basic argument. First, 1) the period from WWI to the 1970s, where capital stock was greatly decreased by shocks like the wars and the depression, as well as the relatively egalitarian policies that followed, and where economic growth and wage income increased faster than invested wealth or property values, was a historical outlier, and that we are now returning to something more like the nineteenth century in terms of the concentration of wealth and its impact on society. (This book's central topic, to be clear, is "Inequality," which easily could have been the title.)
With reams of data, magnificently processed, packaged, and summarized, Piketty makes this case, leaving us with his theoretical contribution: 2) the central inequality r > g, or rate of return on capital is greater than economic growth. It certainly is not empirically demonstrated that this is feature of capitalism per se, as Piketty purports, rather than a historical accident, but I do not see this as a flaw; seemingly the only way we could demonstrate it, especially in light of Piketty's laudable commitment to empirical evidence and not just conceptual or mathematical theory, would be to have a whole lot more centuries under capitalism to see what kinds of things happen (spare us that!). And what we do know is that it is happening, regardless of whether it must happen, and that rules that protect large fortunes and the fact that the more you have to invest, the better your return are the cause. Piketty demonstrates all this with data and arguments that seem cogent to a bilbo like me, and spices it up with the constant references to the novels of Balzac, Austen, Henry James and others that he uses to depict the kinds of socioeconomic structures he's talking about. Citing Balzac of course proves nothing, but it certainly helps us envision the kind of situation--a return, since all things being equal slower growth increases the power of wealth in a society--to oligarchy and "patrimonial capitalism"--that he's projecting, and it's one of the joys of this book.
Said joy makes Capital (let's call it Le Capital, please, though Piketty doesn't create or work within a parallel set of assumptions about how economics works as Marx did--one cool thing about this book is how--as far as this B.B. can see--it makes sense entirely within the assumptions of classical economics) as much a work of economic history as a theoretical contribution or a comment on policy; and as such, of course, can inform the way we understand the past and even read its literature--did you know inflation was essentially zero throughout the nineteenth century? That's how they could get away with shillings and ha'pennies. And guineas were 1.05 pounds, and were a kind of parallel unit of pay that you used at fancy restaurants and to pay for certain professional services in order to say "I'm a rich asshole"--a kind of tipping, in a sense, though also a rich asshole tax. But speaking of rich asshole taxes..., he does make one central policy recommendation, to avoid the mild dystopia r > g takes us to: 3) a progressive annual global tax on capital (starting at perhaps 0.1% on capital of $100,000 and moving to say 10% on the largest fortunes of over $1 billion, though the precise numbers are obviously secondary to the concept), combined with greatly increased income taxes at the high end. The intent would be to keep inequality under control and stop it increasing (without necessarily touching social mobility, though I know for me a society where I know my place and it's making 5/7 of what the doctor or lawyer or CEO makes is far preferable to the one where the doctor makes 15 times what I do and the CEO 300 times and increasing all the time, and my main concern is how to rocket up the social ladder and join them and sneer downward), not to remove it entirely.
This is the game-changer, and as such it is the part that has come in for controversy and criticism. But looking at the criticisms (conveniently summarized in many places online), sorry, they're a poor lot: there are critiques of the assumption that inequality matters and assertions that what's important is that absolute wealth keeps growing (without even getting into the large literature on the socially and psychologically corrosive effects of inequality, we've seen the material effects of growing inequality based on r > g in places like the real estate bubbles that are popping up all over these days: what does it matter if my dollar income keeps increasing if the price of necessities like shelter increases multiple times faster? (This also leaves aside the fact that absolute incomes are not increasing, so how much inequality would matter if they were is a moot point and the argument a red herring). Then there are basic libertarian critiques of government and redistribution, which have little to do with Piketty specifically, and you probably already know where you stand on those (yes, if you think the free market distributes income fairly and rewards people according to their deserts, you will probably not be in favour of redistribution downward, no surprise there). Then there is the major countervailing force that Piketty acknowledges, the decreasing rate of return on capital, but as long as it still remains higher than economic growth all this means is that an upper limit on equality will be set--and if you like the way society is now, that limit might be low enough for you, but it isn't for me. Then there are the tech bros who say innovation will spur growth that will overcome either a) inequality, by spurring economic growth (but we've seen how that has worked so far) or b) the deleterious social effects of inequality, by freeing us from labour robots singularity something something, but that kind of positivism is half religion and half venal self-justification and has been taken apart definitively (I think) by Evgeny Morozov. Then there are arguments like that of Acemoglu and Robinson that r > g is not an iron law but merely a matter of policies and happenstance--but, shrug, if so, all the more reason we can use policies to fix it. Their comment may be meaningful for economists engaging with this as a work of theory, but not for the rest of us wondering how to fix the problem.
And the rest of the critiques seem largely to follow this mode: his concepts could use tweaking, or he is too mathy and insufficiently theoretical, or feminist economics will flip your whole conception of what economics is about Thomas Piketty. Or here are some errors in the data that don't affect the outcome. Everybody seems to be piling on, but what nobody seems to disagree with except from some ideology-first right-wing perspectives is that a tax like Piketty's would reduce inequality and concentration of capital. And though he himself acknowledges that it would be politically impossible, for those of us who see such effects as a self-evident good, it still acts as a kind of beacon: not a "general strike for our times," given the top-down nature of the proposal and the lack of a whole worldview and engagedness and structure of action and empowerment that the general strike would have implied, but something in that direction: a benchmark against which we can evaluate policy changes and their effects and an inspiration to dream big. show less
Probably you're familiar with the basic argument. First, 1) the period from WWI to the 1970s, where capital stock was greatly decreased by shocks like the wars and the depression, as well as the relatively egalitarian policies that followed, and where economic growth and wage income increased faster than invested wealth or property values, was a historical outlier, and that we are now returning to something more like the nineteenth century in terms of the concentration of wealth and its impact on society. (This book's central topic, to be clear, is "Inequality," which easily could have been the title.)
With reams of data, magnificently processed, packaged, and summarized, Piketty makes this case, leaving us with his theoretical contribution: 2) the central inequality r > g, or rate of return on capital is greater than economic growth. It certainly is not empirically demonstrated that this is feature of capitalism per se, as Piketty purports, rather than a historical accident, but I do not see this as a flaw; seemingly the only way we could demonstrate it, especially in light of Piketty's laudable commitment to empirical evidence and not just conceptual or mathematical theory, would be to have a whole lot more centuries under capitalism to see what kinds of things happen (spare us that!). And what we do know is that it is happening, regardless of whether it must happen, and that rules that protect large fortunes and the fact that the more you have to invest, the better your return are the cause. Piketty demonstrates all this with data and arguments that seem cogent to a bilbo like me, and spices it up with the constant references to the novels of Balzac, Austen, Henry James and others that he uses to depict the kinds of socioeconomic structures he's talking about. Citing Balzac of course proves nothing, but it certainly helps us envision the kind of situation--a return, since all things being equal slower growth increases the power of wealth in a society--to oligarchy and "patrimonial capitalism"--that he's projecting, and it's one of the joys of this book.
Said joy makes Capital (let's call it Le Capital, please, though Piketty doesn't create or work within a parallel set of assumptions about how economics works as Marx did--one cool thing about this book is how--as far as this B.B. can see--it makes sense entirely within the assumptions of classical economics) as much a work of economic history as a theoretical contribution or a comment on policy; and as such, of course, can inform the way we understand the past and even read its literature--did you know inflation was essentially zero throughout the nineteenth century? That's how they could get away with shillings and ha'pennies. And guineas were 1.05 pounds, and were a kind of parallel unit of pay that you used at fancy restaurants and to pay for certain professional services in order to say "I'm a rich asshole"--a kind of tipping, in a sense, though also a rich asshole tax. But speaking of rich asshole taxes..., he does make one central policy recommendation, to avoid the mild dystopia r > g takes us to: 3) a progressive annual global tax on capital (starting at perhaps 0.1% on capital of $100,000 and moving to say 10% on the largest fortunes of over $1 billion, though the precise numbers are obviously secondary to the concept), combined with greatly increased income taxes at the high end. The intent would be to keep inequality under control and stop it increasing (without necessarily touching social mobility, though I know for me a society where I know my place and it's making 5/7 of what the doctor or lawyer or CEO makes is far preferable to the one where the doctor makes 15 times what I do and the CEO 300 times and increasing all the time, and my main concern is how to rocket up the social ladder and join them and sneer downward), not to remove it entirely.
This is the game-changer, and as such it is the part that has come in for controversy and criticism. But looking at the criticisms (conveniently summarized in many places online), sorry, they're a poor lot: there are critiques of the assumption that inequality matters and assertions that what's important is that absolute wealth keeps growing (without even getting into the large literature on the socially and psychologically corrosive effects of inequality, we've seen the material effects of growing inequality based on r > g in places like the real estate bubbles that are popping up all over these days: what does it matter if my dollar income keeps increasing if the price of necessities like shelter increases multiple times faster? (This also leaves aside the fact that absolute incomes are not increasing, so how much inequality would matter if they were is a moot point and the argument a red herring). Then there are basic libertarian critiques of government and redistribution, which have little to do with Piketty specifically, and you probably already know where you stand on those (yes, if you think the free market distributes income fairly and rewards people according to their deserts, you will probably not be in favour of redistribution downward, no surprise there). Then there is the major countervailing force that Piketty acknowledges, the decreasing rate of return on capital, but as long as it still remains higher than economic growth all this means is that an upper limit on equality will be set--and if you like the way society is now, that limit might be low enough for you, but it isn't for me. Then there are the tech bros who say innovation will spur growth that will overcome either a) inequality, by spurring economic growth (but we've seen how that has worked so far) or b) the deleterious social effects of inequality, by freeing us from labour robots singularity something something, but that kind of positivism is half religion and half venal self-justification and has been taken apart definitively (I think) by Evgeny Morozov. Then there are arguments like that of Acemoglu and Robinson that r > g is not an iron law but merely a matter of policies and happenstance--but, shrug, if so, all the more reason we can use policies to fix it. Their comment may be meaningful for economists engaging with this as a work of theory, but not for the rest of us wondering how to fix the problem.
And the rest of the critiques seem largely to follow this mode: his concepts could use tweaking, or he is too mathy and insufficiently theoretical, or feminist economics will flip your whole conception of what economics is about Thomas Piketty. Or here are some errors in the data that don't affect the outcome. Everybody seems to be piling on, but what nobody seems to disagree with except from some ideology-first right-wing perspectives is that a tax like Piketty's would reduce inequality and concentration of capital. And though he himself acknowledges that it would be politically impossible, for those of us who see such effects as a self-evident good, it still acts as a kind of beacon: not a "general strike for our times," given the top-down nature of the proposal and the lack of a whole worldview and engagedness and structure of action and empowerment that the general strike would have implied, but something in that direction: a benchmark against which we can evaluate policy changes and their effects and an inspiration to dream big. show less
Старая се да чета книги, които са, така да се каже, от другата страна на барикадата на моите възгледи, за да избегна затварянето в идеологичен информационен балон, в който всичко, което четеш само подхранва вижданията ти, нищо ново не влиза в главата ти и въпреки това си мислиш, че си най-правия и най-информирания на света. Сещате се за какъв тип хора говоря...
Томас Пикети се опитва да бъде Карл Маркс на 21 век, show more като не само наименува книгата си по подобие на неговата (Капиталът), но и споменава името му 3 пъти само в първата й страница. За съжаление, Пикети не е Маркс и това му личи отдалеч.
Четейки книгата, човек остава с впечатлението, че Пикети не познава нито един жив, дишащ, работещ и живеещ човек. Всички негови мисли, понятията, които използва, разсъжденията му, се отнасят към света, в който живеем, към икономиката - но на нито едно място той не ги свързва с живите хора, които населяват този свят и изграждат тази икономика.
"Финансовият капитал", "дивидентът върху капитала", "пазара" и т.н. са за него живите, дишащите същества - те нямат нищо общо с хората, някак съществуват самостоятелно и отделно. За него икономиката не е функция на решенията на отделни хора, личности, които всеки ден преследват желанията и интересите си - а някакво едва ли не астрално тяло, което расте, движи се и се развива самостоятелно, без връзка с хората.
Карл Маркс също клони в подобна посока, но поне е наясно с ролята на действията на отделните хора за икономиката - просто обяснява, че техните желания могат да бъдат пренебрегнати, в името на "общото благо". Пикети, в своя апел към регулации и високи данъци, дори не признава, че хората и желанията им съществуват и това, което предлага би имало какъвто и да е ефект върху тях. show less
Томас Пикети се опитва да бъде Карл Маркс на 21 век, show more като не само наименува книгата си по подобие на неговата (Капиталът), но и споменава името му 3 пъти само в първата й страница. За съжаление, Пикети не е Маркс и това му личи отдалеч.
Четейки книгата, човек остава с впечатлението, че Пикети не познава нито един жив, дишащ, работещ и живеещ човек. Всички негови мисли, понятията, които използва, разсъжденията му, се отнасят към света, в който живеем, към икономиката - но на нито едно място той не ги свързва с живите хора, които населяват този свят и изграждат тази икономика.
"Финансовият капитал", "дивидентът върху капитала", "пазара" и т.н. са за него живите, дишащите същества - те нямат нищо общо с хората, някак съществуват самостоятелно и отделно. За него икономиката не е функция на решенията на отделни хора, личности, които всеки ден преследват желанията и интересите си - а някакво едва ли не астрално тяло, което расте, движи се и се развива самостоятелно, без връзка с хората.
Карл Маркс също клони в подобна посока, но поне е наясно с ролята на действията на отделните хора за икономиката - просто обяснява, че техните желания могат да бъдат пренебрегнати, в името на "общото благо". Пикети, в своя апел към регулации и високи данъци, дори не признава, че хората и желанията им съществуват и това, което предлага би имало какъвто и да е ефект върху тях. show less
Nenhum livro de economia publicado nos últimos anos foi capaz de provocar o furor internacional causado por O capital no século XXI , do francês Thomas Piketty.
Seu estudo sobre a concentração de riqueza e a evolução da desigualdade ganhou manchetes nos principais jornais do mundo, gerou discussões nas redes sociais e colheu comentários e elogios de diversos ganhadores do Prêmio Nobel.
Fruto de quinze anos de pesquisas incansáveis, o livro se apoia em dados que remontam ao século XVIII, provenientes de mais de vinte países, para chegar a conclusões explosivas. O crescimento econômico e a difusão do conhecimento impediram que fosse concretizado o cenário apocalíptico previsto por Karl Marx no século XIX. Porém, os show more registros históricos demonstram que o capitalismo tende a criar um círculo vicioso de desigualdade, pois, no longo prazo, a taxa de retorno sobre os ativos é maior que o ritmo do crescimento econômico, o que se traduz numa concentração cada vez maior da riqueza. Uma situação de desigualdade extrema pode levar a um descontentamento geral e até ameaçar os valores democráticos. Mas Piketty lembra também que a intervenção política já foi capaz de reverter tal quadro no passado e poderá voltar a fazê-lo.
Essa obra, que já se tornou uma referência entre os estudos econômicos, contribui para renovar inteiramente nossa compreensão sobre a dinâmica do capitalismo ao colocar sua contradição fundamental na relação entre o crescimento econômico e o rendimento do capital. O capital no século XXI nos obriga a refletir profundamente sobre as questões mais prementes de nosso tempo.
“Piketty transformou nosso discurso econômico; jamais voltaremos a falar sobre renda e desigualdade da maneira que fazíamos.” - Paul Krugman (Prêmio Nobel de Economia), The New York Times
“Um livro seminal sobre a evolução econômico-social do planeta... Uma obra-prima.” - Emmanuel Todd, Marianne show less
Seu estudo sobre a concentração de riqueza e a evolução da desigualdade ganhou manchetes nos principais jornais do mundo, gerou discussões nas redes sociais e colheu comentários e elogios de diversos ganhadores do Prêmio Nobel.
Fruto de quinze anos de pesquisas incansáveis, o livro se apoia em dados que remontam ao século XVIII, provenientes de mais de vinte países, para chegar a conclusões explosivas. O crescimento econômico e a difusão do conhecimento impediram que fosse concretizado o cenário apocalíptico previsto por Karl Marx no século XIX. Porém, os show more registros históricos demonstram que o capitalismo tende a criar um círculo vicioso de desigualdade, pois, no longo prazo, a taxa de retorno sobre os ativos é maior que o ritmo do crescimento econômico, o que se traduz numa concentração cada vez maior da riqueza. Uma situação de desigualdade extrema pode levar a um descontentamento geral e até ameaçar os valores democráticos. Mas Piketty lembra também que a intervenção política já foi capaz de reverter tal quadro no passado e poderá voltar a fazê-lo.
Essa obra, que já se tornou uma referência entre os estudos econômicos, contribui para renovar inteiramente nossa compreensão sobre a dinâmica do capitalismo ao colocar sua contradição fundamental na relação entre o crescimento econômico e o rendimento do capital. O capital no século XXI nos obriga a refletir profundamente sobre as questões mais prementes de nosso tempo.
“Piketty transformou nosso discurso econômico; jamais voltaremos a falar sobre renda e desigualdade da maneira que fazíamos.” - Paul Krugman (Prêmio Nobel de Economia), The New York Times
“Um livro seminal sobre a evolução econômico-social do planeta... Uma obra-prima.” - Emmanuel Todd, Marianne show less
Minden korszaknak megvannak a maga Nagy Könyvei, amiket kevesen olvasnak, de mindenki hivatkozik rájuk – ilyen volt Fukuyama és Huntington klasszikusa, Marx Tőkéje, vagy épp a Biblia. No most szerintem a „XXI. század Nagy Könyve” megtisztelő titulusra idáig Pikettynek van a legnagyobb esélye. Nem laikusoknak való olvasmány, ezt én, mint laikus mondom: hosszas fejtegetéseit tőke/jövedelem arányának változásairól, alsó és felső decilisek és centilisek eltéréseiről és ezek jelentőségéről gyakran inkább csak érteni véltem, mint értettem, és bizony mondom néktek: még úgy sem volt élvezetes magamba szívni őket, hogy közben kiültem a teraszra napozni, és bontottam egy meggyes radlert. show more Persze az alapmondanivaló végtelenül világos, egy mondatban összefoglalható (következésképpen nem kell hozzá átrágni magunkat a könyvön, elég, ha elolvasunk egy recenziót, vagy esetleg ezt az értékelést): minden jel arra mutat, hogy a közhiedelemmel ellentétben az anyagi egyenlőtlenség a világban egyáltalán nem csökken, sőt. Nő. (Így viszont már két mondat.)
Ennek bizonyításra Piketty beveti a teljes arzenált: adatok, kimutatások, táblázatok, Jane Austen és Balzac regények… amit csak akartok, sőt, egy kicsit több. Legfőbb irányszáma a tőke/jövedelem arány, ugyanis értelmezésében a jövedelem nem árul el eleget az egyenlőtlenségről, sokkal érdemesebb tehát a tőke, vagyis (némi egyszerűsítéssel) a vagyon felől megközelíteni a kérdést*. Merthogy a vagyon ugye öröklés útján halmozódik (különösen egy demográfiailag csökkenő népesség esetén), ráadásul a nagy vagyonok hozamai többnyire magasabbak, mint a gazdasági fejlődés üteme. A vagyoni egyenlőtlenség anno a XX. század elején tetőzött, egészen extrém különbségeket hozva létre ember és ember között – ám egyszer csak bekopogott a Történelem ajtaján az első világháború (jó, talán inkább berúgta az ajtót), és hopp, a nagy öröklött vagyonok jó része elértéktelenedett, a vállalatok csődbe, a járadékosok pedig tönkrementek. Mire nem jó egy háború, ugye? Ez a relatív egyenlőség egész sokáig kitartott, nagyjából a hetvenes évek végéig, többek között azért, mert a páratlan gazdasági fellendülés Európában magasabb növekedési ütemet tudott produkálni, mint a vagyonok hozamai, és a hidegháború miatt erős egyenlősítő szociális programokat működtettek az államok azért, hogy polgáraik nehogy szovjetizálják magukat. Azonban a gazdasági növekedés egyszer csak behúzta a kéziféket, és feltűntek a színen a neokonzervatív közgazdászok, hogy Hayek nyomán átszabják kicsit a jóléti rendszereket – és ennek következtében a nyolcvanas évektől kezdve az egyenlőtlenségek megint robbanásszerű növekedésnek indultak, és mára már szinte elérték az 1910-es szintet**. És még hol van a vége, ugye.
A legérdekesebb mindazonáltal az utolsó száz oldal (sajnálhatja is, aki eddig már falhoz csapta a művet), ahol Piketty felvázol egy stratégiát, amivel kezelni lehet a helyzetet – vagy ahogy ő fogalmaz, visszahódítani a kapitalizmust a demokrácia számára, mert eléggé kezdenek eltávolodni egymástól. A progresszív (többkulcsos) jövedelemadót nem érzi elégségesnek, ezen felül brutális progresszív örökösödési adót, illetve progresszív vagyonadót tartana üdvösnek. Persze azzal is tisztában van, hogy a kőgazdagoknak szokása anyagi javaikat különböző adóparadicsomok bankszektorában elrejteni a magasabb hazai adókulcsok elől – biztos úgy vannak vele, nekik nem kell finanszírozni saját államuk jóléti rendszereit, hisz ők anélkül is elég jól élnek. (Amiről eszembe jut, bár nem tartozik szorosan ide, hogy rendszeresen látok itt a Hűvösvölgyben parkolni egy szlovák rendszámú kék Ferrarit.) Erre a problémára egy globális banki adatszolgáltatási kötelezettséget, illetve globális vagyonadót gondol orvosságnak, és érvel is ezek megvalósíthatósága mellett – akár még azon az áron is, hogy ez nagy feszültséghez vezet a Svájchoz hasonló renitensekkel szemben, akik hajlamosak felmondani a nemzetközi szolidaritást, csak hogy a többiek kárára magukhoz csalogassák a zsíros milliárdokat. Persze hogy mindez gazdaságilag mennyire racionális, abban nem merek nyilatkozni, de látni kell, hogy ez szinte másodlagos: Piketty fejtegetései ugyanis (állításainak helyességétől függetlenül) olyan politikai muníciót szolgáltathatnak a progresszív (talán populista) baloldalnak, amit az zászlajára tűzhet, és felveheti a versenyt az egyre inkább nacionalista-szuverenista színezetet öltő jobboldallal. Már ha sikerül ennek a baloldalnak ezt a 700 oldalt értelmezhető jelszavakká desztillálni.
Bizonyára nem hibátlan fejtegetés, de attól a tény még tény marad: ez a könyv megkerülhetetlen – legyél akármilyen irányultságú közgazdász, egész egyszerűen muszáj manapság valahogy viszonyulnod Piketty téziseihez. (Még én is viszonyulok valahogy – pedig hol vagyok én közgazdász?) Arról nem is beszélve, hogy ugye itt vannak ezek a neokonzervatív közgazdászok***, akik annak idején azzal robbantak be, hogy drasztikus varázsszert kínáltak a jóléti állam betegségeire: azt állították, hogy ha azzal élénkítjük a gazdaságot, hogy a szociális juttatások helyett a vagyonosoknál hagyjuk a pénzt, akkor az vissza fog gyűrűzni a társadalomba, és előbb-utóbb a szegényeknek is jut a kaviárból. Piketty monstrumja elég meggyőzően szaggatja szét ezt az illúziót, jelezve, ebből a gyakorlatban alig valósult meg valami, cserébe viszont megágyazott az orbitális egyenlőtlenségeknek. Ráadásul a neokonzervatív idea még a gazdaságot se pörgette fel úgy, ahogy várták, talán mert a vagyon jelentős része ebben a folyamatban a pénzügyi körforgásból kivont improduktív tőke – csak arra jó, hogy pár Dagobert bácsi üldögélhessen egy kupac aranyon. És azt se felejtsük, hogy – ha hihetünk Balzac Goriot apójának – a nagy egyenlőtlenségek az innováció szempontjából is ártalmasak, mert nem arra késztetik a társadalom nagy részét, hogy keményen dolgozzon és fejlődjön, hátha feljebb jut, sokkal inkább arra, hogy ügyeskedni kell, hízelegni a szupergazdagoknak, és ha egy mód van rá, elvenni valamelyik csilliárdos randa lányát. Minden összevetve tehát Piketty hosszú évek óta az első erős, karakteres progresszív állítást**** tette le az asztalra.
Mindazonáltal a csillagozáshoz nem érzem elég kompetensnek magam – nem tisztem eldönteni, hogy Piketty állításainak igazságai egy, három, vagy öt csillagot érnek-e. (Bár bevallom, én hiszek neki.) Ráadásul olyan szakadékot érzek e könyv élvezeti értéke és tartalmi súlya között, amit egy pórias osztályozással nem vagyok képes áthidalni. Szóval ez egy tiszletetteljes csillagtalanság. És annyira boldog vagyok, hogy holnap nem kell már olvasnom ezt a könyvet, hogy azt el se tudom mondani.
* ”A nagyságrendek érzékeltetésére előzetes példaként nézzük a következőket: a lakosság legnagyobb munkajövedelemmel bíró 10%-a általában a munkajövedelmek 25-30%-ával rendelkezik, míg a legnagyobb vagyonnal bíró 10% vagyona mindig meghaladja az összvagyon 50%-át, sőt, egyes társadalmakban ez akár a 90%-ot is elérheti.” (262. oldal)
** Bár ezt az egyenlőséget némiképp enyhíti, hogy most a két véglet (hipergazdagok és hiperszegények) között egy vastagabb középosztály teng-leng.
*** Mely neokonzervatív közgazdászokat a szerző szőrmentén meg is gyanúsítja azzal, hogy erős érdekek fűzik őket azokhoz a milliárdosokhoz, akiket véletlenül épp megvédenek érveikkel a progresszív adózástól. Ami vagy igaz, vagy nem, mindenesetre nem túl elegáns módszer arra, hogy eleve hiteltelenítsük a lehetséges ellenvéleményeket.
**** És tegyük hozzá: a jellemzően angolszászok uralta közgazdászszakmán belül a kevés kontinentális európai válasz is, aminek szintén lehet üzenete. show less
Ennek bizonyításra Piketty beveti a teljes arzenált: adatok, kimutatások, táblázatok, Jane Austen és Balzac regények… amit csak akartok, sőt, egy kicsit több. Legfőbb irányszáma a tőke/jövedelem arány, ugyanis értelmezésében a jövedelem nem árul el eleget az egyenlőtlenségről, sokkal érdemesebb tehát a tőke, vagyis (némi egyszerűsítéssel) a vagyon felől megközelíteni a kérdést*. Merthogy a vagyon ugye öröklés útján halmozódik (különösen egy demográfiailag csökkenő népesség esetén), ráadásul a nagy vagyonok hozamai többnyire magasabbak, mint a gazdasági fejlődés üteme. A vagyoni egyenlőtlenség anno a XX. század elején tetőzött, egészen extrém különbségeket hozva létre ember és ember között – ám egyszer csak bekopogott a Történelem ajtaján az első világháború (jó, talán inkább berúgta az ajtót), és hopp, a nagy öröklött vagyonok jó része elértéktelenedett, a vállalatok csődbe, a járadékosok pedig tönkrementek. Mire nem jó egy háború, ugye? Ez a relatív egyenlőség egész sokáig kitartott, nagyjából a hetvenes évek végéig, többek között azért, mert a páratlan gazdasági fellendülés Európában magasabb növekedési ütemet tudott produkálni, mint a vagyonok hozamai, és a hidegháború miatt erős egyenlősítő szociális programokat működtettek az államok azért, hogy polgáraik nehogy szovjetizálják magukat. Azonban a gazdasági növekedés egyszer csak behúzta a kéziféket, és feltűntek a színen a neokonzervatív közgazdászok, hogy Hayek nyomán átszabják kicsit a jóléti rendszereket – és ennek következtében a nyolcvanas évektől kezdve az egyenlőtlenségek megint robbanásszerű növekedésnek indultak, és mára már szinte elérték az 1910-es szintet**. És még hol van a vége, ugye.
A legérdekesebb mindazonáltal az utolsó száz oldal (sajnálhatja is, aki eddig már falhoz csapta a művet), ahol Piketty felvázol egy stratégiát, amivel kezelni lehet a helyzetet – vagy ahogy ő fogalmaz, visszahódítani a kapitalizmust a demokrácia számára, mert eléggé kezdenek eltávolodni egymástól. A progresszív (többkulcsos) jövedelemadót nem érzi elégségesnek, ezen felül brutális progresszív örökösödési adót, illetve progresszív vagyonadót tartana üdvösnek. Persze azzal is tisztában van, hogy a kőgazdagoknak szokása anyagi javaikat különböző adóparadicsomok bankszektorában elrejteni a magasabb hazai adókulcsok elől – biztos úgy vannak vele, nekik nem kell finanszírozni saját államuk jóléti rendszereit, hisz ők anélkül is elég jól élnek. (Amiről eszembe jut, bár nem tartozik szorosan ide, hogy rendszeresen látok itt a Hűvösvölgyben parkolni egy szlovák rendszámú kék Ferrarit.) Erre a problémára egy globális banki adatszolgáltatási kötelezettséget, illetve globális vagyonadót gondol orvosságnak, és érvel is ezek megvalósíthatósága mellett – akár még azon az áron is, hogy ez nagy feszültséghez vezet a Svájchoz hasonló renitensekkel szemben, akik hajlamosak felmondani a nemzetközi szolidaritást, csak hogy a többiek kárára magukhoz csalogassák a zsíros milliárdokat. Persze hogy mindez gazdaságilag mennyire racionális, abban nem merek nyilatkozni, de látni kell, hogy ez szinte másodlagos: Piketty fejtegetései ugyanis (állításainak helyességétől függetlenül) olyan politikai muníciót szolgáltathatnak a progresszív (talán populista) baloldalnak, amit az zászlajára tűzhet, és felveheti a versenyt az egyre inkább nacionalista-szuverenista színezetet öltő jobboldallal. Már ha sikerül ennek a baloldalnak ezt a 700 oldalt értelmezhető jelszavakká desztillálni.
Bizonyára nem hibátlan fejtegetés, de attól a tény még tény marad: ez a könyv megkerülhetetlen – legyél akármilyen irányultságú közgazdász, egész egyszerűen muszáj manapság valahogy viszonyulnod Piketty téziseihez. (Még én is viszonyulok valahogy – pedig hol vagyok én közgazdász?) Arról nem is beszélve, hogy ugye itt vannak ezek a neokonzervatív közgazdászok***, akik annak idején azzal robbantak be, hogy drasztikus varázsszert kínáltak a jóléti állam betegségeire: azt állították, hogy ha azzal élénkítjük a gazdaságot, hogy a szociális juttatások helyett a vagyonosoknál hagyjuk a pénzt, akkor az vissza fog gyűrűzni a társadalomba, és előbb-utóbb a szegényeknek is jut a kaviárból. Piketty monstrumja elég meggyőzően szaggatja szét ezt az illúziót, jelezve, ebből a gyakorlatban alig valósult meg valami, cserébe viszont megágyazott az orbitális egyenlőtlenségeknek. Ráadásul a neokonzervatív idea még a gazdaságot se pörgette fel úgy, ahogy várták, talán mert a vagyon jelentős része ebben a folyamatban a pénzügyi körforgásból kivont improduktív tőke – csak arra jó, hogy pár Dagobert bácsi üldögélhessen egy kupac aranyon. És azt se felejtsük, hogy – ha hihetünk Balzac Goriot apójának – a nagy egyenlőtlenségek az innováció szempontjából is ártalmasak, mert nem arra késztetik a társadalom nagy részét, hogy keményen dolgozzon és fejlődjön, hátha feljebb jut, sokkal inkább arra, hogy ügyeskedni kell, hízelegni a szupergazdagoknak, és ha egy mód van rá, elvenni valamelyik csilliárdos randa lányát. Minden összevetve tehát Piketty hosszú évek óta az első erős, karakteres progresszív állítást**** tette le az asztalra.
Mindazonáltal a csillagozáshoz nem érzem elég kompetensnek magam – nem tisztem eldönteni, hogy Piketty állításainak igazságai egy, három, vagy öt csillagot érnek-e. (Bár bevallom, én hiszek neki.) Ráadásul olyan szakadékot érzek e könyv élvezeti értéke és tartalmi súlya között, amit egy pórias osztályozással nem vagyok képes áthidalni. Szóval ez egy tiszletetteljes csillagtalanság. És annyira boldog vagyok, hogy holnap nem kell már olvasnom ezt a könyvet, hogy azt el se tudom mondani.
* ”A nagyságrendek érzékeltetésére előzetes példaként nézzük a következőket: a lakosság legnagyobb munkajövedelemmel bíró 10%-a általában a munkajövedelmek 25-30%-ával rendelkezik, míg a legnagyobb vagyonnal bíró 10% vagyona mindig meghaladja az összvagyon 50%-át, sőt, egyes társadalmakban ez akár a 90%-ot is elérheti.” (262. oldal)
** Bár ezt az egyenlőséget némiképp enyhíti, hogy most a két véglet (hipergazdagok és hiperszegények) között egy vastagabb középosztály teng-leng.
*** Mely neokonzervatív közgazdászokat a szerző szőrmentén meg is gyanúsítja azzal, hogy erős érdekek fűzik őket azokhoz a milliárdosokhoz, akiket véletlenül épp megvédenek érveikkel a progresszív adózástól. Ami vagy igaz, vagy nem, mindenesetre nem túl elegáns módszer arra, hogy eleve hiteltelenítsük a lehetséges ellenvéleményeket.
**** És tegyük hozzá: a jellemzően angolszászok uralta közgazdászszakmán belül a kevés kontinentális európai válasz is, aminek szintén lehet üzenete. show less
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ThingScore 75
The core message of this enormous and enormously important book can be delivered in a few lines: Left to its own devices, wealth inevitably tends to concentrate in capitalist economies. There is no “natural” mechanism inherent in the structure of such economies for inhibiting, much less reversing, that tendency. Only crises like war and depression, or political interventions like taxation show more (which, to the upper classes, would be a crisis), can do the trick. And Thomas Piketty has two centuries of data to prove his point. show less
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Author Information
Thomas Piketty was born in Clichy, France on May 7, 1971. He received a M.Sc. in mathematics at Ecole Normale Supérieure and a PhD in Economics at EHESS and at LSE. He is a professor at the Paris School of Economics. His articles have appeared in numerous journals including the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Political Economy, the show more American Economic Review, and the Review of Economic Studies. He has written several books including Capital in the Twenty-First Century. (Bowker Author Biography) show less
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Common Knowledge
- Canonical title
- Capital in the Twenty-First Century
- Original title
- Le capital au XXIe siècle
- Original publication date
- 2011-01-27 (1e édition originale française, La République des idées, Seuil) (1e é | dition originale franç | aise, La Ré | publique des idé | es, Seuil); 2013
- People/Characters*
- Joséphine Cortés; Hortense Cortés; Zoé Cortés; Antoine Cortés; Iris Dupin; Philippe Dupin (show all 12); Alexandre Dupin; Henriette Gorsz; Marcel Gorsz; Shirley; Josiane; Mylène
- Important places*
- África; Europa; Francia; Kenia; París, Francia
- Related movies
- Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2019 | IMDb)
- Epigraph
- "Social distinctions can be based only on common utility." -Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, article 1, 1789
- First words
- On August 16, 2012, the South African police intervened in a labor conflict between workers at the Marikana platinum mine near Johannesburg and the mine's owners: the stockholders of Lonmin, Inc., based in London. (Chapter 1)
- Last words
- (Click to show. Warning: May contain spoilers.)Refusing to deal with numbers rarely serves the interests of the least well-off.
- Publisher's editor*
- Rosanvallon, Pierre (Directeur de collection)
- Blurbers
- Krugman, Paul; Sanger, Toby; Cassidy, John; Bruenig, Matt; Dewan, Shaila; Henwood, Doug
- Original language
- French
- Canonical DDC/MDS
- 335.4
*Some information comes from Common Knowledge in other languages. Click "Edit" for more information.
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