Philosophical Investigations

“Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about” (203).

Although this book is considered illustrative of the “late Wittgenstein,” in contrast to the “early Wittgenstein” of the Tractatus, I see a persistent concern with the use of language as a medium through which one acquires and understanding of the world. Whereas in the Tractatus it seems that Wittgenstein detailed the limits of language to express pictorial truths about the world, in Philosophical Investigations I see him talking about the potential of language to mean a great many things but that the truth conditions for meaning are there, to be show more established by the rules of use, expectation, and intention that we recognize as parts of common and specialized language-games. A critique of the premise of analytic logic is still here but without the frustration and futility. Instead, I see Wittgenstein embracing a kind of pragmatic sense of truth.

Although saying that we engage in language-games does suggest the possibility of back-sliding into a kind of relativistic “it’s all just language” view of reality, I find it more productive to think of Wittgenstein saying that language-games are reflecting a reality that is present regardless of our belief in it. Language guides our interactions with the world and with each other, allowing the expression and fulfillment of our intentions within the conditions of satisfaction that the world allows. The language is not a reflection of that reality but an instrument for dealing with it (141). And the more we try to isolate language and study it in isolation for use, the more confusing it becomes and with that also comes greater risk of deluding ourselves into thinking that we can reach a true understanding of reality through a study of language. “The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work” (132).

The notion of language-games, situated uses of language, and the guiding functions of language are valuable concepts that we would do well to remember in an age when we can now use generative AI to mimic functional and transactional language use. Just think about how vacant AI-generated arguments are of either actual intention or motive. Or rather think of what remixed intention and motive is captured in the LLMs from which AI outputs are derived. Does AI really know what language-game it’s playing when it generates its content? Does that matter?

I do think that W’s use of numbers and number series sometimes confuses the point that language-games are interactive and that clarity and the ability to go on is worked out in the moment and with the guidance of other players. This interactivity is certainly implied in the treatment of language but it is often not apparent through the examples given. show less

It's more than a little presumptuous to attempt a short review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. After all, it's one of the few most important philosophical works of the twentieth century. This edition is sorely awaited by some, after years of close examination and criticism of the Anscombe translation.

First, the geeky stuff on the translation and editing. Like the Anscombe translation, this one with Hacker and Schulte joining their efforts to Anscombe's, presents the original German and the English translation on facing pages. As a reader with a spotty knowledge of German, this gives me the opportunity to refer to the original where the English seems obscure, ambiguous, or just plain impenetrable. If you're a student of show more Wittgenstein, Hacker and Schulte have helpfully addressed numerous, controversial aspects of Anscombe's translation -- many of these, such as the difficulty with the German "Satz" (translated relative to context by "sentence" or "proposition", two very different English words) and "Seele" ("soul" sometimes but "mind" others by context in English), are discussed in their Preface.

If you are a quasi-casual reader, many of these points of translation are probably less important than overall readability. And I think Hacker and Schulte have improved readability, updating the feel of Wittgenstein's writing, which is often colloquial, to something more modern.

They've also added over 20 pages of sometimes helpful footnotes, where additional information about the translation or about Wittgenstein's thoughts are enlightening. And they've recast "Part II" of the Investigations itself as "Philosophy of Psychology -- A Fragment" -- their reasoning for that is given in their Preface.

Like most great philosophical texts, no matter how many times I read the Investigations, it's different each time, and I feel foolish for having understood so little the previous time. The new translation offers a great excuse to give it another read.

There are many themes to pick up, including the great variety of linguistic behavior (as contrasted with naive views of language as representing or naming, or with Wittgenstein's own view in the Tractatus), the illusions of distinctive mental activities (such as "meaning" a word while uttering it, or translating the inner to the outer or public), and the general theme of philosophical problems arising when "language goes on holiday".

It's the last that continues to grab my attention, persistently through readings, with different remarks jumping out of the text each time. The simple view is that Wittgenstein thinks ordinary language (what we all say and do in practical contexts every day) is fine as it is, but that it's when we detach ordinary language from those practical contexts that we get in trouble. We fall into perplexing philosophical quandaries, supposing ourselves to really wonder whether the external world or other minds exist, or whether objects are material or ideal.

But philosophical exercises of language are exercises of language, after all. It's not as though we can simply say, "Don't do that" when philosophers speak, and point out that they've left the "ordinary" behind. It's not a simple mistake, and the line between the "ordinary" and the "philosophical" is crossed sometimes without special notice. And it's not even the exclusive province of professional philosophers (amateurs seem even more impressed than the professionals sometimes by their own metaphysical musings).

Certainly, there is more to say about the mistake that philosophers, amateur and professional, make. In particular, there is Wittgenstein's distinction between empirical remarks (remarks about facts in the world) and grammatical remarks (by contrast, remarks about how we speak or are to speak about those facts in the world). The philosopher mistakes the one for the other, thinking that, for example, by adopting what we call an idealist grammatical position (when we talk of objects in the world, we are really talking of mental or ideal objects) we have really discovered something about the objects and not just made a statement about how we should speak of them. Much more to say on this, of course -- which is why a short review is so presumptuous. In fact, it's Wittgenstein's thoughts on why we fall victim to such a misunderstanding that I puzzle most about. show less

This is one of the books I read again and again. I never grow tired of the brilliant analysis of the potentials and the limitations of any language. His arguments seem to apply equally well to human languages, to animal languages and to robot languages. I like his way of debunking most of the traditional philosophic lingo while discussing the central issues of philosophy. He demonstrates the superiority of the simple words over the convoluted crap most academics seem to love. Seeing the force of the simple words is totally exhilirating. Another great thing about the treatise is the insight that language is something evolution has given us as a bunch of tools crafted to help us out in different situations. That means language is not a show more consistent logical system. It is fragmented, and its various bits and pieces are governed by different logics. Even if this insight seems rather obvious it is a surprisingly efficient tool to eliminate a whole lot of paradoxes and dilemmas that are simply the effect of us using the logic of one compartment of language in another compartment where it does not apply. Refreshing as an early morning in March. show less

I found this book powerful when I first read it because I had just read the Tractatus and the contrast was challenged my mind. You enter into a philosophy where outside of human thought and speech there are no independent, objective points of support. Meaning and necessity are preserved only by the linguistic practices which embody them. This then is a world that seems not unlike the skeptical realms of those from at least Descartes onward that allow for no objective reality independent of one's mind.
For Wittgenstein it is not quite so simple as that, as he continually asks questions and in doing so creates a philosophy of process much more akin to that of Socrates than Descartes, Kant or any other modern - particularly the camp of the show more logical positivists where he once dwelt.

His questions center on words and language so we find ourselves asking: is language a real thing? Is there any knowledge of things as they are independent of our language? How can we look at knowing as understanding the nature of things? In this sense there are things (objects) in the world and we can develop an understanding of their nature. This will not necessarily be certain knowledge, but knowledge of a sort nonetheless. "For them after all it is not nonsense" to say that "there are physical objects." (37)

It would seem that statements are only meaningful if they ask questions - Wittgenstein would ask - but there are other points of view out there. show less

With Wittgenstein there is a concern with the actual use of language – what is the problem and how we can illuminate/imagine a method for going forward. It is among other things a process. Observation precedes explanation and may yield only a description of the reality of a particular situation. (109) That means we should try to understand that Wittgenstein's own philosophical activity is like bringing words back to regular use (out/above/below the realm of “metaphysics”).

What is the process of trying to understand what it means to know something? Is there any conflict within a language game? There may be infinite variations in our everyday experiences; if so, how can we reach a resolution or should we seek that as a useful show more goal?

We should consider the use of comparison and noticing similarities. Sometimes that may bring insight. However the text often provides an invitation to enter into a dialog about the meaning of life and how one might understand the proper end of one's life. (language and dialog)

I am reminded of “the search” --- “What is the nature of the search . . . The search is what anyone would undertake if he were not sunk in the everydayness of his own life.” - Walker Percy

That is we are not looking for philosophical statements but the reality of what is here in everyday language. One wonders if this is a method for escaping the “everydayness” of life and the seeming incongruity of such a process? (117) One key for escaping the everydayness of life is recognizing the situation of a “fish out of water” and thinking in a way that you may become just that.

Our imagination may be a tool that allows recognition of just such a situation. (129) I personally am intrigued by the effect on my imagination of listening to music – different effects result from different types of music (Liszt or Ligeti). Whatever the means you may choose it is important to realize that language can do many things if we only look at the way we use words. We should aim to see clearly if possible. (Observation) show less

I get the impression that philosophy is no longer offered in most UK universities, especially philosophy of this calibre. Having studied philosophy to first degree level back in the 1960's, I think the overwhelming thing about Wittgenstein, apart from the general difficulty of coming to terms with what he was attempting to do, is his single-minded quest for clarity. In this book he takes this to the extreme by rejecting his own first philosophical writings (The Tractatus...) and putting this work in its place. Not many people would have the courage to do such a thing. I think his name will live on.

I could see myself returning to this book at some point in the future, but after "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" I think my brain needs a break.