Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror

A horrifying glimpse into the train wreck relationship between the CIA and FBI immediately before 911. Hindsight is 20/20 they say. After reading the briefing at the end that said, ‘something horrible is going to happen soon, somewhere’ - I can see why Bush didn’t immediately shake billions of dollars free to buy gas masks/radiation burn kits for the entire population of New York City.

Now that Clinton is out of office his brilliance is really beginning to come to light, the story of him here is no different - he was shown to be clever, erudite and very, very effective in wielding his power as president - Bush Jr. was not.

Clark clearly explains many concepts that have been heavily obfuscated and poorly (slantedly) written about in show more the media. Like al Qaeda, the Taliban, bin Laden the US invasion of Iraq.

Clark’s plea for preparedness is a bit hypocritical I think. It reminds me of all those bomb shelters that were built in the cold war. Of course Clark would see everything from his perspective of being the terrorism prevention/rediness Czar - but isn’t it a bit hypocritical to ask for the country to go further into debt for a ‘maybe/someday’ threat? Kind of like invading a country for a ‘maybe/someday’ capability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

A fascinating well written read. show less

Richard A. Clarke's account of his years as anti-terrorism czar has stood the test of time surprisingly well. Clarke has been a US career official working for all presidents from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush. Under Clinton, he became the chief counter-terrorism adviser. This is his story about the fight against terrorism and al Qaeda in particular. It is a story of a failure of intelligence, of a fight against uncooperative bureaucracies, of leadership (Clinton) and lack thereof (Bush), and of the perils of inconsistent foreign policy, in which your nominal allies are the biggest supporters of your enemy.

The book starts with a vivid account of September 11, 2001, as witnessed by Clarke in the White House. Crisis management is not an show more American strength due to its organizational preference for relying on an army of poorly-paid, under-equipped, process-driven agents (in CYA mode) led by managers selected by personal or political connections. The high demand for communication during a crisis eats up all managerial capacity. Subordinates mostly continue with their (now counter-productive) routine actions. Clarke recalls how he and his people, already in the White House, are repeatedly searched and refused access to the Inner Circle. Despite Clarke's later glowing stories about intensive planning exercises, the attacks of 9/11 caught an administration unprepared on all levels - from the non-working WTC walkie-talkies to the non-existent army radar over Washington DC. I doubt whether homeland security has improved US crisis management capabilities. Clarke offers the example of federal anti-terror dollars wasted by local government's "investment" priorities.

A second theme of Clarke's book is the difficulty of bureaucracies with mission change and preparing for the "unknown unknowns". The US military-industrial complex was built to contain communism with its huge armies and large weapon systems. The nimble, overlapping networks of terrorists speaking strange languages and hiding at the fringe of civilization was not to the taste of CIA, FBI or the military. It was not only a case of dealing with a new, amorphous threat but also an incredible amount of staggering incompetence such as allowing persons into the US who were on a terrorist watch list and lacked a visa or of not consulting the phone book. Potemkin security!

A third theme is the inconsistent and often self-defeating US foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. In a quest to control oil, US forces protect the reactionary Saudi regime, a major promoter of religious intolerance and financier of terrorists.

While Clarke merits an A for effort, the results of his work did not prevent or lessen the impact of the terrorist attacks. Too little, too late - Clarke was part of the problem. A problem that got even worse with the creation of a bureaucratic monster called Homeland Security. show less

This is a very interesting and compelling account of Clark's experiences in counter-terrorism in the decade or so leading up to 9-11. Clark's main point is that U.S. leadership was slow to wake up to the threat, especially Republicans. He has some criticism for Clinton but generally gives him good marks for attempting to institute a comprehensive program.

Clark savages the Bush (43) Administration, saying that Bush used 9-11 to fulfill long-held agenda items, including invading Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9-11. Clark puts the blame on a conspiracy theory that linked Hussein to the 1993 WTC bombings and subsequent Al Qaeda attacks, links which had no evidence to support them. He also criticizes Bush for his cheapness, refusing to show more put substantial resources into the war in Afghanistan because he was saving them for Iraq. He also comments that the newly formed DHS was also done on the cheap, making a flawed project that much harder. In essence, he argues that Bush wasn't serious about defeating terrorism because he didn't take time to understand the problem and didn't want to spend the money to counter it.

It is remember that this is a memoir and like most memoirs, it paints the author in a good like while taking shots (in this case with howitzers) at the people he didn't like. So take it with a big grain of salt. But with that said, it is difficult for anyone who reads the book to think highly of George W. Bush or his administration, and even harder to take their national security policy seriously. show less

Richard Clarke has worked in the area of national security for the past 30 years. He was head of counterterrorism affairs for Presidents Clinton and Bush II. In this book, he severely criticizes the current Bush Administration for its lack of interest in terrorism and al Qaeda before 9/11, and its disastrous decisions afterwards.

He first explores the Reagan and Bush I reactions to events like Lockerbie, TWA 800, and the Beirut bombing that killed over 200 American soldiers. The word "terrorism" had not yet entered the American lexicon. Whatever else is said about the Clinton Administration, at least President Clinton took the threat from al Qaeda very seriously, and tried to do something about it.

There were several opportunities to get show more Osama bin Laden during the Clinton years. Unfortunately, the reports that he was in a certain building at a certain time were never rock solid. Even if they were totally reliable, it takes time to get the report from Afghanistan to Washington, and for the appropriate orders to be sent to the ships or planes in the area. No senior al Qaeda figure, especially bin Laden, was going to stay in one place for any length of time. If the US had bombed innocent people, it would have been a public relations disaster.

The second Bush Administration came into office much more concerned about Iraqi terrorism than about al Qaeda (according to Clarke, for no good reason). When he tried to impress upon senior White House officials the seriousness of the threat from al Qaeda, he was met with bureaucratic delay after delay. Bush's decision to invade Iraq (again, according to Clarke, for no good reason) gave al Qaeda a propaganda coup of immense proportions.

After 9/11, the Bush Administration should have worked to improve relations with the frontline states, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, that are most vulnerable to al Qaeda. It should also have worked to improve relations with Islam, in general. These things were not done. Officially, there was no federal money available to fix the gaping holes in America's domestic vulnerability to terrorist attack, but there was plenty of money to invade Iraq.

Could 9/11 have been prevented, even if all parts of the intelligence community were running like a well-oiled machine (another area of criticism from Clarke)? Perhaps not. If a major attack didn't happen on that particular day, it would have happened some other day. This book is a huge wake-up call, and it is very highly recommended for all Americans. If I could, I would give this book three thumbs up. show less

Wow, this is enough to scare the shit out of you. Not so much at the strength of Al Qaeda, as the rampant incompetence that has afflicted almost every effort of our government to fight them. Clarke is biased, but mainly in terms of having tunnel-vision for just his issue, IE counter-terrorism and Al Qaeda. However, he turned out to be totally right about said issue, so it gets hard to discount his criticisms of all involved. I don't agree with him totally on methods, but I do agree that this was a very necessary clearcut through the enormous of morass of bullshit that has sprung up around the terrorism issue.

Read during Summer 2004

Richard Clarke was a intellegence/policy/anaylsis career government employee from the late 1970's to just after September 11. He states at first that he never intended to write a tell-all when he left government but felt he had to tell what had happened and it's an engrossing story. I knew from his testimony before the September 11 commission that he was deeply critical of the Bush Administration but I didn't expect him to be a former Cold Warrior, believing in force and military action when needed. He decribes his involvement in the Gulf War and his growing understanding of terrorism but sometimes runs through events quickly. It is fascinating and not what I expected but the crucial part is the final chapters, show more explaining what he feels should have been and still needs to be done to make the world and the USA safe. I don't know if I agree or share all of his beliefs but it is intrigiung, nonetheless. show less

From the inside, from someone who was there, we can see the failures of President Bush and to a lesser extent, his predecessors contributed to the tragedy of 09/11. Mr. Clarke may be asking for his own exoneration from that event, but he presents a compelling case against the Bush adminstration, that before and after the Twin Towers fell, he and his cohorts took their eyes off the ball and embroiled this country in a war is didn't have to fight. Conservatives will not be swayed by this book. For liberals, it will confirm their worst fears. To anyone who reads it, please keep an open mind.