Fear and Trembling

Kierkegaard is often called the first existential philosopher. In this short review of this book, I will show why he is called this, and also why I disagree.

Fear and trembling is a book on the Biblical story of Abraham who sets out to sacrifice his son Isaac. God has spoken to Abraham to do this: this horrible command, even sinful command is what Abraham describes as an ordeal . With three questions about the story, Kierkegaard gives us an elaborate reading on what is happening here - and why Abraham's choice deserves respect rather than ridicule. His general thesis is:

either there is a paradox, that the single individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is lost.

What can we make show more of these words? Kierkegaard speaks long and lively, borrowing from imagery in literature and myths. The picture that he sketches, as I understand it, is the following. Religion has often been grasped as the need for the individual to go up in the universal. Tragic heroes have sacrificed themselves for others, died because they saw a good greater than themselves which it was worth dying for. Faith was the sacrificing of your individuality in order to be open for God. What Abraham does goes beyond this universality. His actions can even be considered sinful, for he goes against a fundamental bidding of God to respect your children. Moreover, he cannot explain his actions in universal terms. Whom could he have spoken to, to lessen his grieve, his torment? No one can understand his actions, but himself - and even he cannot grasp entirely what the task before him must mean. It is only in the absurd that one can find meaning in the sacrificing of Isaac. What Abraham does, is moving beyond what faith is in the universal, into the individual struggle, which can only ever be justified by virtue of the absurd. In metaphysical terms, he moves beyond what can be made sense of, and suffers precisely because he knows that we he is about to do can never make sense. Kierkegaard's reading is a unique one, warning us for the superficial justification through the universal, opening a world of faith which lies in ourselves.

This is why he is often been read as an existential philosopher. There is nothing universal that can help us when it comes to questions of faith. No words can soothe us, no other can guide us or show us the way. The most fundamental struggle of the human being takes place within the absurd. This is related to later existential thought, because it shows that in the end, all that the human being has to hold on to is his own bare existence. Questions asked here can only be solved in bitter loneliness, and no answer can ever make sense. I am grateful that Kierkegaard has opened to us this way of believing, but I think that he in fact was not entirely an existentialist yet.

My trouble with this work, is very similar to the qualms I have about Dostojevski's books. Pretending to be a work of deep doubt about faith, it is in its core still religious propaganda. Just like Alyosha cannot find any reason to believe Dmitri's stories, through the virtue of the absurd, he is still right in believing his brother. Though Abraham cannot find any reason to comply with God's strange wish, he is justified in doing so, by virtue of the absurd. What Kierkegaard promotes is a defense of religion beyond everything that can be said about it; still trusting in the truth of its absurdity. This is not existential in my reading, because it means relying on something unknown, rather than just on our own existence. Whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger underscore the importance of the mere individual struggle, cut loose from the everyday and the force of religion, Kierkegaard suggest that this struggle still takes place within Christian faith. This I cannot except. Hoping on the absurd to save you is a denial of your own power to save yourself. For me, the virtue lies in the endless senseless struggle - which is just as big a paradox as Kierkegaard's, and not in the deus ex machina.

I would like to end this review with the note that this is the first work of Kierkegaard I've studied, along with some secondary literature on Fear and Trembling . That is, don't be discouraged by my words to read Kierkegaard yourself. This sensitive Dane has a lot of wisdom and clever psychology to offer, reading him is definitely worth the while. show less

This text revolves around the Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac as described in Genesis 22:
[22:1] Some time later God tested Abraham. He said to him, "Abraham!"
"Here I am," he replied.
[22:2] Then God said, "Take your son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love, and go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains I will tell you about."

The story seems simple on the surface. It’s the ultimate test of faith and devotion, albeit very cruel. Abraham, who had waited 1,000 years for a son, is asked by God to turn around and sacrifice him. How could a just God ask that of any parent?

Abe’s choices seem limited:
1. Disobedience: basically flipping God off, and then of course fearing his wrath.

2. show more Arguing: trying to “backtalk” God, ala Dylan’s imagined lyrics in “Highway 61 Revisited”; “Man, you must be puttin’ me on”. Wrath would likely be involved here too, as the O.T. God was not exactly a pushover.

3. Resignation: obeying but expecting Isaac to die.

4. Faith: obeying and expecting Isaac to live.

Kierkegaard first explains that the test is to see if he will not only obey, but that it will not be in hangdog resignation – that he will truly have the faith that God will allow him to exercise paternal love, and in sacrificing to God he can expect to receive back not only Isaac, but also become the father of Israel. Abraham is to be praised for having passed this much harder test.

Kierkegaard then examines three questions:
1. Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? This is a fancy-pants way of saying can ethics be suspended if there is a higher purpose in mind? Hegel would say no. Kierkegaard’s answer: yes. The individual can become higher than the universal. “When a person sets out on the tragic hero’s admittedly hard path there are many who could lend him advice; but he who walks the narrow path of faith no one can advise, no one can understand.”

2. Is there an absolute duty to God? Kierkegaard’s answer in greatly condensed form :-) - yes, “or else faith has never existed.”

3. Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose from Sarah, from Eleazor, from Isaac? Kierkegaard’s answer: again, yes! Damn, Abraham was good. “…life is more just and fair; there is only one means of protection, it is innocence.”

The answer to #1 may indeed be yes, but it seems to me we must be careful with that lest people who believe there is a higher purpose commit heinous acts, and I’m not in agreement with Kierkegaard on #2 and #3. Still he puts forth the argument reasonably well, and I feel for him personally as some have commented that he was heartbroken over his breakup with fiancé Regine Olsen when he probed into this Biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice.

Just one more quote, on faith:
“…how monstrous a paradox faith is, a paradox capable of making a murder into a holy act pleasing to God, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, which no thought can grasp because faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off.” show less

Who, really, understands the Binding of Isaac, when you come down to it? At God’s command, Abraham goes to sacrifice his beloved son; if he knows why, we are never told. Writing under the pseudonym Johannes de silentio, Kierkegaard refused to accept pious defenses or rationalist criticism of Abraham’s action, and gave us, as a result, this masterpiece of modern philosophy. He declares that what Abraham did he did as a knight of faith, dedicated to the paradox of faith. And this—the paradox of faith—defies explanation. To weigh that claim, you must read this strange, uncompromising essay yourself.

I had a feeling reading this like the one I had reading Simone Weil’s Gravity and Grace. A lot of words are thrown around in this book like faith, hero, aesthetics, ethics; words that we may feel like we understand but besides having their own subjective definition for different people, have undergone seismic redefinition throughout history. Kierkegaard uses these words in a way that surely had real resonance for himself and all the readers who have found something worthwhile in his thought. I, however, don’t think I am as sensitive to the emotional echo these words and the concepts built around them, and I actually wonder how anyone reading this book in the 21st century and beyond could feel the feelings that Kierkegaard is show more describing so intensely. I’m reminded of going to a museum and seeing a tool taken from an ancient civilization. Maybe I can make out what seems to be a handle, or a cutting edge, or a design reminiscent of a person or an animal. It’s clear that it was made by a human being, and something about imagining it in my hands feels intuitive, like a dim memory thru a fog of amnesia. But in reality, I am totally ignorant of the way the tool is used - and in fact, I have absolutely no use for it. A lot of these feelings are certainly due to my ignorance - I intend to read a little more about Kierkegaard and his thought to try and understand him better. But I also feel like the issues that this book is concerned with are a kind of missing link, a primordial step towards a wrangling with the modern condition that for me, I’ve found more relatable versions of in later authors. show less

The "Attunement" alone is worthy of much contemplation. This entire work revolves around the story of Abraham as fodder for revealing Kierkegaard's philosophy of ethics and aesthetics. Faith is proven to be reliance on the absurd after having completely resigned from any possible salvation. He uses the story of Abraham as the supreme example of this, telling the story 4 different ways in order to show the alternatives that would invalidate the significance of the tale. He also uses the story of Iphegenia as a secondary example, nicely drawing parallels between Hebrew and Greek law. A third powerful metaphor is that of a knight and maiden seeking a true love. Through these means, Kiekegaard demonstrates the meaning of faith, doubt, and show more resignation in such a way that simple discussion could never achieve. And this in turn is backed by the explanation of what is true poetic force, the collision of two powerful emotions -- the maiden torn between holiness and a man rather than the hero lamenting his own situation. Finally, at a fundamental level, the truly faithful put the invidual ahead of the universal. It is the absurdity of such a paradox that establishes the meaning of faith. After the "Attunement," a general discussion culminates with the powerful observation that after 130 years, even Abraham got no further than faith. The remainder is divided into three problemata: (i) Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? (ii) Is there an absolute duty to God? (iii) What is it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose from Sarah? from Eleazar? from Isaac? In the role of doubt, Soren notes that Descartes began by doubting everything and then to solve it rationally, whereas the Greeks tried to preserve doubt no matter how much they discovered. The knight becomes heroic when taking on infinite resignation about a tragic situation. At this level, he accepts his position and has nothing to lose. Still, the next level beyond that involves having faith that victory will indeed happen and thus whatever prize is restored. "Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has not made this movement does not have faith; for only in infinite resignation doe my eternal validity become transparent to me, and only then can there be talk of grasping on the strength of faith." show less

Trippy mental acrobatics. Even though it was exceptionally difficult to understand i still enjoyed it. To find meaning in the absurd, to base faith on the absurd, to go beyond reason - that is rather clever! I have lots of questions to Soren but i don't think it's important to answer them. Learning to think like him is value enough.

Kierkegaard certainly seems to consider some rather grave questions, but provides some less than satisfying answers because of his insistence that one need go no further than faith. Towards the beginning of this work, he laments that his contemporaries are trying to go beyond faith, questioning its value, yet he never lays out a case for why faith is a virtuous thing. That faith is something desirable is taken as fact. It calls to mind Descartes' Meditations, where he finds himself limited to only knowing his cogito for certain via pure reason, and suddenly stops that line of inquiry and says, "Well, good thing we've got god, so here's all the other stuff we can know." It's disappointing to see such insight only to have these show more philosophers pull their punches when it matters most.

On the topic of Kierkegaard's problems, Problema I is the most relevant if one doesn't already have the faith Kierkegaard defends and tries to trace out in the later portions of the book. "Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?" In the more colloquial form, "Can the ends justify the means?" Kierkegaard quite rightly answers no, as you cannot know the outcome at the very beginning of whatever you undertake. At the very least, this would only allow one to be retroactively supra-ethical, once the desired and necessary end was achieved. In the moment of the action itself and all times leading up to that ultimate achievement, it would seem to me that one must remain unethical. The same could be said forever if your act failed to achieve its aim.

Where I disagree with Kierkegaard on this matter is that he sees a paradox and I see a hierarchy. By the mundane obtaining a perfect relation with the divine, the particular with the absolute in an absolute fashion, Kierkegaard finds a paradox. I think it would be more accurate to describe an ethical hierarchy, with some elements of such overriding importance that they can permit the ethical to be momentarily superseded. Kierkegaard provides no criteria for judging when one has come such a juncture, seeming to say that the individual will know for themselves, overcome by the passion of faith. I can't agree with him in his assertion that the passions provide the truest knowledge of all, when so often they cloud our mind from being able to perceive the obvious.

Curiously, ironically even, the individual who lacks Kierkegaard's faith in the absurd must also have another variety of absurd faith if he hopes to be ethically vindicated, faith in his fellow man and in chance. Should the individual believe they have come to a point where the ethical must be suspended to achieve the supra-ethical, they must believe that their fellow man and chance will allow their aim to be achieved exactly as they had conceived it. Additionally, it would take an immense confidence in the validity of one's assessment of the situation.

While perhaps disappointing in some regards, Kierkegaard is certainly thought provoking. I look forward to coming back to him in the future after I've furthered my understanding of the many others he references, and seen other points of view still. show less