Kevin Dougherty

THE SUBJECT:
The book surveys eight models of decision-making and in turn applies each model to three military events ranging from the Civil War to the present era.

THE SCRIBE:
A retired Lieutenant Colonel from the US Army and author of over a dozen books, Kevin Dougherty serves as an adjunct professor at The Citadel. His coursework includes policy case studies, decision-making procedures, and national security issues, and his books have focused on various aspects of the Civil War and military show more decision-making.

THE STYLE:
Regimented. Following a brief introduction, Dougherty explains eight decision-making models/theories: the Rational Actor Model, Prospect Theory, Poliheuristic Theory, the Bureaucratic Model, the Organizational Process Model, the Small Group Model, the Elite Theory, and the Pluralist Model. Each chapter begins with a dissection of three military decisions using the respective model/theory and ends with a discussion of the model's utility in the decision-making process.

THE SUBSTANCE:
This is an academic treatise, and as such, Dougherty is attempting to contribute research to this field that has not been submitted previously. As he surveyed military decision-making litereature, he found that no one had presented a collection of decision-making models for comparison and contrast, and this formed the foundation for his research. Following a brief introduction of the eight models under his review, Dougherty proceeds to a detailed excursus for each.

THE SPECIFICS:
As an example of Dougherty's methodology, he applies Prospect Theory to Washington's attack on Trenton in December 1776. Having suffered devastating losses in New York and Long Island, Washington retreated into Pennsylvania and marshalled his army for another strike. Dougherty applies Prospect Theory to correspondence between Adjutant General Colonel Joseph Reed and General Washington:

"'We are all of the opinion my dear General that something must be attempted to revive our expiring Credit give our Cause some degree of Reputation & prevent a total Depreciation of the Continental Money which is coming on very fast.' Reflecting prospect theory's predictions about one's willingness to accept risk in such a clear domain of loss, Reed added, 'even a Failure cannot be more fatal than to remain in our present Situation.' Reed saw no alternative but that 'some Enterprize must be undertaken in our present Circumstances or we must give up the Cause.'"

Thus was born Washington's desperate plan to cross the Delaware River under cover of darkness and attack the Hessian garrison in Trenton, followed by another surprise attack days later in Princeton. Yet following these victories, Dougherty notes that Washington, "as prospect theory would predict, became much more risk averse than he had been at Trenton." Washington relied upon a war of attrition to defeat the British forces for the next few years.

THE SCOOP:
The strength of this book lies in the comparative analysis supplied by Dougherty on multiple theories of decision-making. However, the great weakness lies in what the book does not address. If this work is to be of service to today's decision makers, why does Dougherty not use examples of the issues confronting those decision makers, such as asymmetric warfare, cyber warfare, non-state actors, terrorism, and more. By focusing exclusively on conventional warfare, Dougherty leaves much left unsaid. Nevertheless, his book is an outstanding first contribution upon which he and other researchers can develop further study. show less

Mostly derivative, although there are some insights of interest. Author Kevin Dougherty’s endnotes and bibliography is short of primary sources on long on Shelby Foote and Bruce Catton, so we’ve seen all this stuff before; yet it’s somewhat useful to have it broken out of general discussion of the war. When the war started, the Lincoln administration quickly created a Navy Board, composed of USN Captain Samuel DuPont, Coast Survey Superintendent Professor A.D. Bache, Army engineer and show more fortress specialist Major John Barnard, and USN Commander Charles Davis. The Board quickly issued recommendations – the Navy should seize key locations along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts to establish coaling stations for blockading vessels. The USN quickly adopted most of the Board’s recommendations and seized Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina, Port Royal in South Carolina, and Ship Island off the coast of Louisiana.


Dougherty doesn’t mention a key diplomatic situation here; the Union initially referred to a “blockade” of the south. Secretary of State Seward quickly pointed out that a “blockade” was defined by international law as affecting a foreign nation, and by declaring a “blockade” Lincoln was implicitly recognizing the Confederacy as a nation. Lincoln quickly acknowledged by declaring the various ports in the south as “closed” rather than “blockaded”; nevertheless the situation was always called a “blockade” by the north and the naval forces involved were the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons and the East and West Gulf Blockading Squadrons.


Dougherty notes the Confederacy initially put way too much trust in the efficacy of forts against naval vessels. The doctrine of the time is ship guns had to outnumber fort guns by at least 4 to 1 to have a chance, but that was developed before the days of steam power and rifling. The Federal navy quickly obliterated Fort Hatteras at Hatteras Inlet and Fort Beauregard at Port Royal, and just steam past Forts St. Philip and Jackson guarding New Orleans. However, Federal exploitation of their coastal enclaves was also inhibited by doctrine; Dougherty notes that Union forces never advanced, even though a relatively short march from New Bern, North Carolina, could have cut the Weldron Railroad that served Richmond. Dougherty attributes this to lack of initiative and poor cooperation between the Army and Navy; however I propose a better reason is that the Federals simply didn’t realize it was possible at this stage of the war. It wasn’t until Grant bypassed Vicksburg to come at it from the rear that Sherman realized it was possible to operate in the deep south without a supply line. No Federal general in 1861 or 1862 would have risked a force without a supply line and flank guards.


As the war went on, the south got better at coastal defense and administrators in the north began expecting more from the Navy than was possible. In particular, the his failure to capture Charleston led to the dismissal of Flag Officer Du Pont; he was accused of having “the slows”, like McClellan, but despite pointing out repeatedly that the situation at Charleston was different than New Orleans or Port Royal – steaming past the outer forts wouldn’t work because it would just leave the fleet trapped between them and the inner forts, and the forts themselves were no longer brick and masonry that shattered under cannon fire but sand and earth that absorbed shells. Charleston wasn’t taken until Sherman arrived from the land side.


There’s no capsule biography to give Dougherty’s background; he makes a couple of errors of fact, describing the Sharps as a “repeating rifle” and calling the New Ironsides a monitor. There are photographs of various personalities mentioned. The maps aren’t really adequate, generally too large a scale to illustrate what’s discussed in the text. As mentioned, the bibliography is mostly secondary sources. I can give it a half-hearted recommendation; worthwhile from the library or if you are a compulsive Civil War book collector. show less

Decision making, we all face it every day of our lives with most not life involving. In fact we have standard procedures we follow either knowingly or unknowingly to ease the task. Our cell phones have a plethora of “Assistants apps” to help us plan our day. But at the heart of it all a decision is an action that must be taken when information is so incomplete that the answer does not suggest itself. And the application of military force is fraught with these kinds of decisions.

Mr. show more Dougherty’s book examines eight decision making models, using the case study method involving three each decisions per model. Having laid out the model’s use he then explains the utility of each model. The cases used are at a very high level. For example in the Rational Model the studies include Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb, Reagan’s decision to bomb Libya, and Bush’s decision to halt Operation Desert Storm.

As each of the actors in these models struggle with the problem solving activity, seeking a solution deemed to be satisfactory, I am reminded of Samuel Butler who said: “ Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises.”

Military-Decision Making Processes is well written and a thorough exposition of the author’s subject but as he points out other authors have taken different views of these same case models. In which case, as you read it, keep in mind that decision making range from following the famous Standard Operating Procedure to the fact that tactics are frequently the opinion of the senior officer present.

In closing it must be noted that the principal actors making the decisions are not military officers and the case models involve policy making which is not in the military’s purview. It remains a good book to add to your shelf if you are a military history buff. show less

Eight models or theories of decision making processes are presented. The eight are described and then three case studies for each model are presented with a short summary of utility following.
In the epilog the author acknowledges that the models are more useful as tools for historical analyses than as guides to be used going into a decision making situation—the real world is much too complicated and events evolve too dynamically to capture in a mechanistic ‘recipe’.
As presented by show more Dougherty the models are not crisply defined but rather generalities about leadership styles. As a consequence, the case studies seem more focused on the execution of the decision than on the decision itself. An example is the Chapter Six case study of the action of the ‘Blockade Board’ in the Civil War. It starts with Lincoln’s decision to blockade the Southern ports which was a decisive act but then focuses on the evolving methods of execution. The author makes some attempt to knit the case studies to the models but the relationships are often obscure.
Many of the case studies concern the determination of policy rather than the determination of specific courses of action. This seems contrary to the book’s title which implies a concentration on military decision-making—in our society, the making of policy is not a prerogative of the military. It is important, however, that policy be fixed because there is a natural lag between the making of policy and its execution so a wavering policy usually results in muddled execution such as in Viet Nam.
The main value in the book is that it underscores the importance of defining a path—any path—leading to a successful outcome of a crisis. Any one of the eight models presented can work but can also lead to disaster if objectives are ill-defined or resolve lost.
A lesson that can be drawn from the book but not explicitly addressed is that the lower in the decision making hierarchy, the more probable it is that the decision can be successfully executed. Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb is a notable exception. Another latent message is that decisions not to act and even decisions not to make a decision can and often do have historical consequences.
This is a good book if only for the interesting case studies rather than the models and processes described. show less