David E. Hoffman

The Billion Dollar Spy gets at the crushing paranoia of running intelligence operations at the height of the Cold War in Moscow, right under the nose of the KGB. Adolf Tolchakev was a Russian radar engineer who had grown disenchanted with the Soviet Union, a country that crushed liberty and failed to provide for its people. This middle aged engineer with impeccable credentials began passing notes into the windows of American diplomatic cars (by chance his first target was a CIA officer and show more not an actual diplomat). It took years for the CIA to decide that Tolchakev was for real, and not a KGB gambit.

They provided cameras, and Tolchakev delivered thousands of page outlining the latest in Soviet R&D for radars, especially high-tech look-down/shoot-down designs which would give Soviet interceptors much better odds against the American bomber fleet. The US Air Force estimated the value of Tolchakev's intelligence as billions of dollars saved in R&D costs.

This book has two themes. The first are the Moscow Rules and operating "in the black". Americans in Moscow were routinely followed by the KGB. Any meetings with agents or transfer of items by dead drop had to be proceeded by breaking surveillance, going black in CIA parlance. Where the Mendez' book Moscow Rules presents this as sleight of hand, entertaining war stories, Hoffman focuses on the isolation and paranoia that agents experience. You could never know if you were clear, and failure would mean the arrest and execution of your agent.

The second is the psychological pressure of being a spy. In being a case agent is hard, being a spy is much harder. Most agents are abnormal in some ways, and the CIA had to balance Tolchakev's demands for cash, a suicide pill, and then consumer goods and medicine only available on the black market, with their fears that he would be unable to explain where the money or goods came from, or take the pill in a moment of weakness. But Tolchakev's desire to hurt the USSR, inspired by dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov and defector MiG-25 pilot Viktor Belenko drove him to stay on the job.

I avoided googling anything from this case, because I hoped that Tolchakev would make it out alive, but he was down in by betrayal from within the CIA, as two officers turned traitors, Edward Lee Howard and Aldrich Ames, turned over information revealing a high level source in the radar institute. The KGB was able to identify Tolchakev as the source, and he was arrested and executed. I've read a fair number of books on the spy game, and this is one of the best. show less

This amazing and, in many respects, chilling book is an account of the winding down of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is amazing because of the interplay on nuclear arms control between the US leadership, principally Ronald Reagan, and the Soviet leaders following Brezhnev. Reagan was sincerely repulsed by the philosophy and practices of communism and his tough talk was an honest expression of his views on the so-called “Evil Empire”. At the same show more time, and this isn’t so widely known, he was genuinely driven by the idea that the world could be rid of nuclear weapons. His disarmament overtures to the Soviets were bold, usually counter to the advice of his civilian and military advisors, and came remarkably close to succeeding.

Against this intention, however, were his constant provocative anti-Soviet public statements that could be legitimately received as antagonistic, even threatening. The story is chilling because of circumstances in the early 1980’s where misperceptions and the response to those brought us to the brink of an actual nuclear exchange. Reagan’s openly hostile demeanor toward the Soviets brought their leaders (a succession of old guard hacks – Andropov and Chernenko) to believe that the United States was planning a first-strike nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Their level of obsession reached a state of paranoia. They surmised that the US would first take out the leadership through an all-out attack with its nuclear arsenal. This led to devising a command and control protocol that would allow a launch command to be sent without the real-time authorization of the top leaders – a semi-automatic launch command to the missile officers at the silos, hence the “dead hand” that would in effect pull the nuclear trigger. One thing is clear: the Soviets felt genuinely, if erroneously, threatened about the West’s intentions. While they were not reckless about their own use of nuclear weapons, a series of missteps or technical breakdowns stemming from their fears could have resulted in a nuclear exchange. The book recounts incidents where, due to errors in early warning systems, the Soviets thought they were being attacked. The decision time to launch a counter attack is just minutes, the so-called “hair trigger” danger of nuclear strategy.

Reagan’s effort to eliminate nuclear weapons was thwarted by his obsession with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or the so-called Star Wars program). It is puzzling why he held so tightly to this new aspect that would inevitably upset the balance between the super powers. It seems clear that this was not just a bargaining chip he played against the Soviets. He apparently truly believed that this anti-ballistic missile “shield” would protect against nuclear attacks (although the science and technology were/are highly suspect) and could bring about the reduction or elimination of offensive weapons. The Soviets, whose economy could not bear another expensive weapons venture, logically viewed SDI as destabilizing the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) balance between the two countries. SDI would create greater threat to them since, after all, if the US could destroy the Soviet’s nuclear missiles then its own could be used without fear of retaliation.

Another chilling aspect of this story, told at great length and in remarkable detail, is the Soviet’s development of biological weapons. After an international treaty banning the production and possession of biological weapon agents was signed by most countries, the Soviet Union completely violated the treaty by continuing with a full-scale, highly secret program of manufacturing the most heinous weapons imaginable. The Soviets believed wrongly that the US was also ignoring the treaty and they continued on a massive scale to find and weaponize diseases that would create the most horrific consequences if used. The Soviet leaders were aware of this, but couldn’t exercise complete control as there was a powerful military-industrial combine that worked to perpetuate it. Indeed, the influence of the defense/warfare sector of the Russian economy (and surely our own) was a strongly contributing factor to the arms race in all dimensions. (One must remember that the Soviet economy had a huge defense industry, a much larger component of the country’s economy than in the US.)

The Soviet Union collapsed during Gorbachev’s rule. Gorbachev was not the radical reformer that he is often portrayed to be, but his moves to open up Soviet society unleashed forces that took matters far beyond what he intended. Gorbachev and Reagan develop a true rapport, but institutional impediments (including the military/industrial combines in both countries and the SDI) prevented making substantial progress on arms control. It was after the Soviet economy collapsed (and, yes, the constant pressure of keeping up with the Americans had something to do with this) that the unsustainability of the levels of nuclear weapons compelled change.

However, as the Soviet’s economy and authority structure collapsed the already poor controls over nuclear weapons and weapons materials have become clear and very worrisome. The book conveys the laxity of security over weapons and weapons materials and the ability of rogue actors to spread these elsewhere. Even if, thankfully, the chances of full-scale nuclear war have greatly lessened, the possibilities that weapons or weapons components could fall into maleficent hands has greatly increased. In the “MAD” era of the cold war (and one would not wish to return to this) the opposing powers had compelling institutional rationales for not attacking each other. Our new enemies have no such inhibiting pressure on them. There are international programs aimed at destroying stockpiles, or at least accounting for them under strict security, but the chances that these materials could fall under the control of terrorists seems very great. One remembers the fear and revulsion created by two homemade “pressure cooker” bombs in Boston; just think of what could happen if even a small amount of nuclear/radioactive elements were unleashed anywhere in the country. The efforts to gain (regain?) control over the security of the products of the Cold War deserve the highest attention possible. show less

Though politically informed, I am not particularly interested in political books in general, nor about Cuba in particular. My initial interest in this book stemmed from the accolades of its author. At first, the details of Cuban history confused me; then, it enlightened me; then, it moved me; finally, this book ended with my heart to yearn for the Cuban people. Hoffman weaves together many streams in this biography that centrally tells of one man’s crusade to have his children live in a show more free Cuba.

Although I pay close attention to American news, I did not know who Oswaldo Payá was before this book. I finished it admiring his character and wishing his efforts to succeed. Cuban freedom is a cause that seems like it should so obviously go forward, but the oppressive power of a few holds it back. Oswaldo and his family contended for this cause from within Cuba for his entire life. As portrayed by Hoffman, he never joined the Revolution and instead hoped that the Cuban people – not the US but the people – would take the primary voice to determine their own destiny. As such, this longing for freedom and self-determination speaks to the universal human condition.

Like many Cubans, Oswaldo’s search for freedom ran through the Roman Catholic church. He saw freedom as a gift from God. Though isolated from the rest of the world for much of his life, he searched his soul for how Cuban democracy should proceed. The Cuban secret police hounded and targeted him and his family for much of his life. Nonetheless, while working as a medical technologist, he continued leading the island’s movement with courage.

This movement was not without its successes. It delivered, several times, tens of thousands of signatures calling for free and fair elections along with social liberties. It advocated the adoption of principles from a prior Cuban constitution that was forgotten by the Castro regime. The visit of Pope John Paul II was a noteworthy highlight. Current unrest is still a dominant theme on the island.

Much violence, war, and loss reside in this book. I yearn for a good ending for this story, an ending filled with hope and freedom, yet the ending of this story remains relatively unwritten. As an American outsider, I cannot help but think the dictatorial regime in Cuba will meet its end, but raw, self-serving power seems to suppress its unpopular aura. Direct American intervention is not always wise; Oswaldo wanted Cuba to determine its own destiny, not the American giant to the north.

Many, particularly those in South Florida, will disagree with this or that in Oswaldo’s approach. Strategy can always be debated. Yet I hope – and I think Hoffman hopes – that this book will show Oswaldo’s character and enlighten the international community to the dignity his approach offers. I learned a lot from this book, and it taught me to cherish better the everyday value of freedom. Even in America, strong men can oppress – Fidel’s politics and American politics can seem eerily similar at spots. Oswaldo’s story teaches us all the value of democracy and human rights in very human terms. I’m grateful to Hoffman for sharing it. show less

If you’ve ever watched a James Bond flick and thought the spy life couldn’t be this action-packed, I have some news for you: you’re right! Turns out spying is mostly hours of driving around doing counter-surveillance, writing memos to headquarters, and waiting for the elephantine bureaucracy above you to let you actually do something.

Unless, of course, you’re the guy selling out your hyper-paranoid omnipresent police state. Then the spy life is mostly fingering the suicide pill in show more your pocket and wondering if you’ll have time to bite it before the torturing and executing really gets going.

This juxtaposition of two very different experiences of espionage drives David Hoffman’s nonfiction account of CKSPHERE, the CIA’s most valuable asset in Moscow in the early 1980s. As a Soviet engineer with access to secret military technology, he was positioned to betray information to the United States which is estimated to have saved $2 billion and years of research.

For fans of tradecraft, Hoffman’s account is ripe with interesting details of day-to-day tactics in the shadow war of the time. For example, although the KGB presence in Moscow was overpowering, CIA case officers learned to spot their cars by something as mundane as a triangular patch of dirt on the grills. Turns out every KGB agent used the same car wash, which was incapable of hitting that spot.

Another thing that made this book enjoyable for me is that it’s unabashedly pro-CIA. Perhaps that outs me as a neocon or imperialist or whatever the slur of the day is, but I’m old-fashioned enough to think “America good” and “Communists bad.”

At one point, a KGB turncoat planning an exfiltration for himself and his family received five different sedative pills from the CIA, so he and his wife could select the best one for their four-year-old daughter during the border crossing. Later, he said that was the moment he knew he could trust the CIA. The KGB, he said, was heartless — they would’ve given him one pill and ordered him to use it.

Hoffman’s work is a well-written peek behind the curtain of Moscow’s CIA station in the final years of the Cold War. If you have an interest in spy stuff, or if you just think America’s pretty great, then you might enjoy this book as I did. show less