Picture of author.

David Stevenson (1) (1954–)

Author of Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy

For other authors named David Stevenson, see the disambiguation page.

8 Works 1,079 Members 19 Reviews

About the Author

David Stevenson is Professor of International History at London School of Economics

Works by David Stevenson

Tagged

Common Knowledge

Birthdate
1954
Gender
male
Education
University of Cambridge
Occupations
historian
university professor
Organizations
London School of Economics
Nationality
UK
Map Location
UK

Members

Reviews

21 reviews
I don't often hand out five stars to a book but this magisterial examination of why the Great War ended when it did is one of those times. Stevenson takes you from the last great offensives of the Central Powers, thru the Entente military response, to a systematic survey of how the various powers handled the military, economic, social, managerial, and political aspects of their wars; I'm hard pressed to imagine that any but the most well-read specialists on World War I won't get something show more out of this work.

So, how does Stevenson answer the question of why the armistice happened on November 11, 1918? While the rot was well underway in terms of the war-time economies of all the major powers the somewhat surprising answer is that final domino was that of Bulgaria accepting a ceasefire in September of 1918. Why Bulgaria? In part this was the signal to the knowledgeable German leadership that the time had come to ask for a ceasefire themselves, because they did recognize that victory had ceased to be an option and that the loss of Bulgaria meant being cut off from the Romanian oil needed to fuel the German military. From there it was race between agreement and revolution.

One will also come away from this book with new respect for the Entente leadership, as for all their mistakes it can be demonstrated that men like Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Wilson played their cards better then did Wilhelm II, Erich Ludendorff, and the like. In particular, an astute leadership of the Central Powers would, in Stevenson's opinion, have sued for peace on the basis of Wilson's 14 Points in April of 1918. An even more sensible German leadership would not have goaded Woodrow Wilson into the war in 1917. Of course, astute leadership is not what the Imperial Germany of Wilhelm II is famous for.

As for the Entente, Stevenson can note that it was perhaps unfortunate that the war did not continue a week or two longer, as that it would have made it obvious that Germany had reached a point of military bankruptcy, and that there was no "stab in the back" leading to defeat. This is the difference between a coalition being clear on what their minimal demands were, and a government that never had a clear grasp of what constituted a viable strategy.
show less
Stevenson's "With Our Backs to the Wall" had impressed me as much as any book on the Great War has, so I approached this volume with a great deal of anticipation. In the end though I'm not quite as impressed; possibly due to Stevenson taking on a harder problem. As opposed to examining how World War I ground to a halt when it did, the question here is why did the war grind on when it was clear that the damage being done to the respective societies did not merit any possible gains. Stevenson show more has several suggestions here. One, just as the pre-1914 treaty system drew all the major players into the conflict, the alliance system of 1917 was a structure that kept all participants inline, at least until collapse did come. Two, in 1917, the respective powers could imagine other options for themselves, with the big choice being Germany making the bet that unrestricted submarine warfare would lead to success before an American contribution could make a difference. Three, even in depths of the greatest war the world had yet seen, many of the participants could imagine yet another round of great power struggle, and wanted to put themselves in a position to win the future conflict; Berlin's version of a just outcome remains breathtaking in its lack of realism. show less
As a first remark, I have to say that what David Stevenson doesn't know about 1918 isn't worth knowing. His grasp of the subject is really impressive.
The main question of the book is why the armistice came end 1918 when it did, and sooner or later. The Allies were fully convinced that the war could only be won by a great spring offensive in 1919 at the earliest.
Stevenson gives his answer in an extensive analysis. The military events are dealt with succinctly and competently. However, if you show more are looking for a detailed account of the fighting, you'll have to look elsewhere. He really comes into his own analysing the broad background of the war: politics, manpower questions, industrial production, agriculture, transport, finance, logistics, morale... Both sides were clearly at the end of their tether in 1918, and David Stevenson shows how they tried to deal with a succession of interlocking crises.
An interesting thought here is that while the Central Powers were essentially run by a military dictatorship that allowed no interference in their plans, the victorious Allies were all parliamentary democracies, run by left-wing politicians who asserted the primacy of civilian politics over military operations. Russia, the Allied power who tried to impose an autocratic system also collapsed spectacularly.
show less
Il 28 giugno 1914 la belle époque finiva all'improvviso: l'erede al trono austriaco, Francesco Ferdinando, e sua moglie Sofia cadevano vittime di uno dei più famosi atti di terrorismo del Novecento. L'attentatore, Gavrilo Princip, era un serbo-bosniaco di soli diciannove anni.
Fu la scintilla che fece esplodere un conflitto che si andava preparando da tempo. L'impressionante crescita economica, la fame di mercati, le politiche imperialistiche, il ruolo della finanza e lo sviluppo delle show more comunicazioni avevano portato il mondo a una piccola globalizzazione. Il progresso avrebbe dovuto consolidare gli equilibri, ma le cose andarono diversamente. Quattro anni dopo, la Grande Guerra aveva mietuto milioni di vittime, gettato nel caos intere popolazioni, cancellato quattro imperi, disegnato un nuovo ordine e lasciato ferite ancora oggi – a oltre novant'anni dall'inizio del conflitto – non del tutto rimarginate.
Due sono i volti della prima guerra mondiale: da una parte, essa rappresenta un emblema della modernità per le tecnologie con cui fu combattuta, per i radicali cambiamenti che comportò nella produzione industriale come nella chirurgia; allo stesso tempo, costituisce un ritorno alla preistoria per la violenza e la barbarie che dilagarono anche in nazioni ricche ed evolute.
show less

Lists

Awards

You May Also Like

Associated Authors

Juan Rabasseda Translator

Statistics

Works
8
Members
1,079
Popularity
#23,833
Rating
4.1
Reviews
19
ISBNs
121
Languages
7

Charts & Graphs