Carl Schmitt (1888–1985)

The Political Theology of Undivided Sovereignty

This book is seemingly (and certainly at times) a rather tedious point by point refutation of Erik Peterson's 1935 'Der Monotheismus als Politisches Problem', which, unfortunately, has only recently been translated into English. Erik Peterson was a Lutheran who converted to Catholicism, I believe in 1930. In his book, Peterson wishes to show that a Christian 'Political Theology' is impossible. This book by Schmitt is his attempt to refute this. show more Thus the terms 'Myth' and 'Legendary' in the chapter headings refer to Peterson's thesis, not political theology itself. Now, I have not seen Peterson's essay, so I cannot judge whether Schmitt has accurately represented his argument. But for the purpose of this review, I will assume that he has done so.

The first chapter consists of not only Peterson's argument but also the stances of several others involved in the controversy regarding the possibility of a Christian political theology. We are told that Peterson builds his argument around Augustine's division between the earthly and the heavenly cities. Schmitt argues, conclusively I think, that for the representative of the Heavenly City here on earth (i.e., the Catholic Church), there is no impermeable separation. Schmitt endeavors to point out that, in fact, theologians have been political all along. In another untranslated essay, 'Was ist Theologie', Peterson (as quoted by Schmitt) writes, "Only because of dogma is theology separated from its association with that most dubious of all academic disciplines, the so-called Humanities. It is liberated from the contexts of the history of civilizations, the history of literature, art history, philosophy of life, or whatever they might be called. (quoted on p. 41)" You see, Peterson has a very pristine understanding of Theology. Schmitt goes on to quote Peterson, "Neither the Jews nor the pagans have a theology; theology exists only in Christendom and only on the precondition that the incarnated word spoke of God. The Jews may do exegesis and the pagans mythology and metaphysics; but theology, in its proper sense, only began when the incarnate one spoke of God. (p. 42)"

Theology, for Peterson, is about God - and nothing else. "But given the changing friend-enemy constellations throughout history, theology can become a political tool of the revolution as well as of the counter-revolution. (p. 42)" That, of course, is Schmitt speaking. This whole essay is a meditation upon (and demonstration of) how theological political commitments have changed over time. "The spiritual-temporal, this world and the hereafter, transcendence-immanence, ideas and interests, superstructure and substructure - can only be determined according to the struggle between the subjects. (p. 44)" Now that the Political has separated itself from the State, Christianity must get its hands dirty if it wants to survive. The slogan of the sixties, 'Everything is Political', was of course anticipated by Schmitt: the political has no discreet object. And it is precisely in this vicious all-encompassing storm that the Church must somehow find its way. What our author believes to be at stake here is the church's very survival.

And Schmitt most certainly thinks that the post Vatican II Church has lost its way! However, Schmitt will timidly utilize the work of the theologian Hans Barion to make this point. But that is not really the issue here; the issue is political theology. Against Peterson Schmitt shows that there are indeed theologians who specifically have a political theology, for instance, the left-leaning J. B. Metz. In the controversy over Metz's work the notion of political theology, and Schmitt himself, were often at issue. It seems in these contemporary controversies that while it was possible to believe in a political theology of revolution, a political theology of counter-revolution was ruled out. How very convenient! (Now, since Metz has been understood to be offering a political theology of Revolution, it is perhaps not merely an exaggeration or a mistake to believe that our author is presenting a political theology of Counter-Revolution in these pages.)

But all these oppositions (left/right, reactionary/progressive, revolution/counterrevoloution) change over time. Commenting on Ernst Feil's contribution to the controversy over political theology Schmitt writes,
-What is new today is old tomorrow. Feil comes alarmingly close to progressive theologians of the nineteenth century like David Friedrich Strauss. For them, at that time, Christendom was the revolutionary new compared with pagan polytheism, and Christian monotheism was progressive compared to such pagan polytheism and pluralism. Julian the Apostate was seen as both a romantic and a reactionary, while the holy Athanasius was seen as a revolutionary. Today the situation is reversed. Today, the traditional Christian church represents the old and the reactionary, and progress as such is the new. (p. 52.)-
So, you don't like being called a reactionary or a revolutionary? Wait a few decades (or centuries) - and you are practically guaranteed to be called the opposite!

We will often be reminded that the problem of 'progress as such' and 'the new' are also Schmitt's targets in this book. "I think that such a progressive, plurivalent, hominising society permits only that kind of eschatology which is immanent to the system and therefore also progressive and plurivalent. (p. 54)" Everything, including eschatology, today rests on Man. (We are not stunned by this; Schmitt wishes we were.) Regarding our books main concern, political theology, part of the problem is that "the pure emphasis on an unreflected catchphrase, 'divine monarchy' (rather than 'political unity')" has obscured the question. Indeed. Schmitt argues that Political Theology, understood as political unity, is always relevant. I want to here insist upon one point: what is vital for Schmitt has very little to do with any monarchy; the crucial point for him is always undivided sovereignty.

The contribution of Ernst Topitsch to our controversy is said by our author to praise Peterson because he "has 'clearly distinguished' the Catholic religion from the Arian ideology of the Empire. (p. 55.)" The Arian position in this controversy, of course, has to do exclusively with divine and earthly monarchy. The "victory of the doctrine of the Trinity over Arian monotheism was in itself 'clearly of eminent political significance' (p. 56)." But all this has little to do with contemporary circumstances. This book we are reviewing was published in Germany in 1970. The postmodern was already stirring:
-The immensely polymorphous realm of political theology or metaphysics contains naive projections, numinous fantasies, reflective reductions of the unknown to something that is known, analogies between being and appearances, ideological superstructure over substructure. (pp. 57-58.)-
And so, for our author, Political Theology is always (at least potentially) relevant, it can be anything; and this is true whether we are subjects of an Arian(-leaning) Emperor or 'living the dream' in our wretched capitalist postmodernity.

After this discussion of the current state of the controversy Schmitt, in the next chapter, turns to consider the original 1935 treatise by Peterson, 'Monotheism as a Political Problem'. Schmitt begins by examining an earlier monograph by Peterson called 'Divine Monarchy'. Regarding any possible attempt to achieve a Divine Monarchy in this world we learn that "[w]hoever would attempt such a realization imitates the antichrist" of whom it is said "he alone will have rulership over the whole world. (p. 62)" It must be noted that Schmitt agrees with this point by Peterson. He too fervently believes that there can never be a single ruler of the entire planet. Sovereignty in this world, for Schmitt, must certainly be internally undivided; but it must also always face other undivided sovereigns. The interactions between these sovereigns are to be ordered by international law.

Now, as to the difference between the 1931 and 1935 treatises by Peterson we are told that "the essential, and decisively significant, addition is a confrontation between Bishop Eusebius and St Augustine as a transition to the conclusion (p. 62)." Schmitt observes that the "rationale for the argument is simply that the epoch of the Roman Empire and the case of Eusebius should be exemplary for the whole problem of political theology. (p. 63)" Of course, Schmitt completely denies this. This is not "a convincing argument for all the different forms into which political theology can be translated. (p. 63)" The concrete situation of the age of Constantine, who Eusebius went so far as to understand as the Bishop(!) of those 'outside' (episkopos ton ekton), is simply too unique to be applicable to all subsequent history.

At this point Schmitt mentions Varro and his fecund distinction between mythical theology (poets, theatre), natural theology (philosophy, the world), and political theology (polis, the city). (For an extended discussion of Varro and Theology see Augustine's "City of God', especially books 6 and 7.) Following this Schmitt says,
-Political theology is part of the Nomos and constitutes the public sphere through the worship of the gods, rites of sacrifice, and ceremonies. It belongs to the political identity and continuity of a people for whom the religion of the fathers, regulated public holidays and the deum colere kata ta nomima ['to worship God according to custom'] is essential in order to identify one's heritage, one's legitimate succession and oneself. (p 65)-
Political theology has to do with the customary; that is to say (insofar as there are no eternal customs), changeable fashion!

But is Christianity merely then but another religious custom, like paganism? "The Church of Christ is not of this world and its history, but it is in this world. (p.65)" And in order to survive, the Church must take the world into account. This means, for Schmitt, that Christianity must, in some ways, be like other religions. "There are many political theologies because there are, on the one hand, many different religions, and, on the other, many different kinds and methods of doing politics."(p. 66) According to our author, in a fragmented world, political theology is split into several specific types based on different religions, polities, and I dare say, cultures, laws and ethnicities too. That is to say, Christianity (whether it wants to or not) inhabits several different nomoi (or, if you prefer, cultural traditions). I suspect that once postmodern particularism eclipsed modern secular universalism, the revival of Schmitt's atomistic understanding of political theology was well nigh inevitable.

But for "Peterson, political theology is over." Schmitt at this point mentions Peterson's use of the phrase 'le roi règne, mais il ne gouverne pas' (the king reigns but does not govern) in the 1931 treatise. Obviously, this phrase could not have originated in the early christian milieu that Peterson is considering. (I believe it originates with Benjamin Constant.) Its deistic undertones are duly noted by Schmitt. "The parallel between the monarch of a parliamentary regime (who does not interfere with his government's decisions, and who reigns rather than governs because of a notional transcendence accorded him by that parliamentary government or a cabinet) and the idea of a passive being from a higher sphere is striking. (p. 68)" Now, Peterson, of course, is alleging this of paganism, not christianity. In Peterson's 1935 treatise this argument is 'significantly developed and emphasized'. What does this phrase regarding kings indicate for the theologian Peterson? That for the pagans, "the almighty god reigns, but national gods govern. (p. 69)" Obviously, all this is "acceptable for Peterson because they do not concern christian monotheism and its doctrine of the Trinity. (p. 69-70.)"

Why is it acceptable? Because for Peterson, the monarch of political theology is "an arche as a singular person" and therefore it "is impossible to transfer the concept of monarchy to a Trinity within which arche and potestas 'have a meaning of their own'. (p. 70, 71.)" But is this understanding of paganism as monarchistic legitimate? No. Schmitt tells us that each pagan polity is a people, and that even the Jews (as God's People) and Christians (as ecclesia, as God's New People) were thought of in a similar manner.
-At this point it becomes evident that the accurate, central, and systematic concept for the politico-theological problem that Peterson discusses cannot be oriented towards monarchy, but has to be oriented towards political unity and its presence or representation. (p. 72)-
We are reminded that Hobbes "has systematically positioned the concept in that way: the Highest, the sovereign, can be a single human being, but also an assembly or a majority of people capable of action. (p. 72)"

Peterson's 'One God - One King' understanding of political theology is to be replaced by the 'One God - One People/Polity' understanding of Schmitt (and Hobbes). "The plausible coincidence between monotheism and monarchism breaks down and is no longer valid. (p. 72)" I believe Schmitt is right in this understanding of Political Theology. And so one is theologically tempted to say that while there is political strife here on earth, peace reigns in heaven. "The decisive argument for the Trinity that St Gregory of Nazianzus offers - that in the Trinity stasis is no longer imaginable - is, for a correct political theology, far away from being as irrelevant as Peterson claims (p. 75.)" The (ahem) 'political situation' of the Trinity is something Schmitt will return to at times through the remainder of the book.

At this point Schmitt will content himself to noting how Peterson limits his treatise. "'Monotheism as a political problem' does not mean anything more for Peterson, than the Hellenistic transformation of the Jewish belief in God. (p. 76)" Islam, for instance, is entirely ignored by Peterson. But Christian Trinitarianism was in turn ignored by them. "All attempts failed to make the unity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit plausible for other monotheistic faiths. (p. 76)" Monarchianism was once such attempt. It failed to convince almost everyone. Again, for Peterson, "the doctrine of the triunity of the One God serves, without any qualification, as an argument for the impossibility of any political theology. (p. 77)" Therefore non-Trinitarian monotheism is "expressly conceded to have the potential for a political theology. (p. 77)"

Peterson claims that only Trinitarianism saves us from political theology; of course, this is precisely what Schmitt needs to contest. Schmitt indicates that whenever Peterson finds examples of political theology in early Christians (Schmitt here not only mentions Eusebius, but also St Ambrose, St Jerome, and St Cyril) Peterson justifies this as Christians not yet being independent of the Jewish-Christian milieu or he argues that the pagans have 'forced' Christians into political theology due to the controversy between them. Of course, this last will turn out to be part of the case against Peterson. - Exactly when has Christianity not faced enemies? And if not ever, how can politics and theology be entirely separated?

Also, Christology itself seems to forbid such strict separation. "Peterson wants to uphold the absolute separation between the two domains, but, where the doctrine of the Trinity is concerned, an absolute separation would only be possible in the abstract, given that the second person of the Godhead represents the perfect unity of the two natures, the human and the divine... (p. 82-83)." Another point Schmitt makes here is that the emphasis on Eusebius' heresy by Peterson is irrelevant to the main point: "Countless church fathers and canonical teachers, martyrs and saints throughout the ages have passionately engaged in the political struggles of their time because of their Christian convictions. (p. 83)" Christians, whether heretical or not, have played at politics. The 'heresy' of Eusebius (Arianism) is only crucial to the argument if the orthodox never engaged in political theology. But this is not the case.

And Schmitt continues his assault with the point I found especially telling: the Christian Church exists between the Incarnation and the Second Coming. "Within this long interim, there emerge continually numerous new worldly interims, larger and smaller," and it is this ceaseless parade of political positions that the Church-in-this-world must deal with. The only permanence is that the Church must always find a way to survive while awaiting the return of the Savior, and thus all its politics must be temporary. Schmitt points out that Peterson was once well aware of this. In a 1929 essay (Die Kirche) Peterson writes, "[...] the church is not simply not a purely spiritual entity in which concepts such as politics and dominion are entirely prohibited, something which has restricted itself entirely to service. The intrinsic ambiguity of the church can be clarified through the interpenetration of empire and church. (pps. 86-87)"

But again, this is also Schmitt's point. One now finds oneself wondering if Peterson's 1935 treatise is itself a politico-theological exercise? Perhaps the Sacred and the secular cannot be entirely separated. And who knows - maybe even the laity practice political theology? "[...] all Christian peoples praised the champions of Christ and the defenders of his church, and even venerated them as saints. There was never a Christian people who would not have seen a providential, and therefore to some extent theological, meaning in the earthly success or defeat of Christ's church. A church is not only composed of theologians... (p. 87)" But the Church itself practices "a liberal tolerari potest [it can be tolerated]." Even if this is only done in a theologically non-dogmatic way, it is still done. Schmitt will note that during the thirties the Church herself would achieve a modus vivendi regarding fascism "tant que cela dure [for as long as it lasts]". (See pages 88-90.)

Technically, a 'wrong' Political Theology could only come from a heretical christian. If not, Political Theology itself (for the Church) is then but a temporizing maneuver, waiting on the return of Christ. Eusebius' mistake was that he "greatly exposed himself as a panegyrist and glorifier of the Roman Empire. (p. 91.)" For him, Constantine completes what Augustus began: "The Roman Empire is the peace, the victory of order over uproar and over the factions of the civil war: One God - One World - One Empire. (p. 91)" Schmitt even hints that, for Eusebius, this 'Pax Romana' might be the Katechon itself, the Restrainer who holds back the advent of Antichrist. But this is going off on a a tangent. "Peterson's argument revolves around the distinction between the purely theological and the impurely political, in an abstract and absolute disjunction which enables him to circumvent the mixed nature of the spiritual-secular combination of any specifically historical event. (p.92)"

Eusebius is dismissed by Peterson as a Christian ideologist who employs rhetoric to make propaganda. But why does Peterson insist that Eusebius be emblematic for question of the Political Theology? "We are dealing here with a political answer to a political question which has emerged from the crisis of Protestant theology between the years 1925-35. Peterson believed that he had evaded the crisis through a return to an unproblematic dogmatism and through the discovery of a safe haven of pure theology. (p. 95)" So you see, the great essay disproving christian political theology was, according to Schmitt, both an evasion and an example of it. Schmitt even calls Peterson's use of Eusebius and his caesaro-papism a 'political myth' that is ultimately based on the work of Jacob Burckhardt.

Now we finally come to the confrontation between Eusebius and Augustine. Schmitt dismisses it as a mere maneuver. We are told that "you cannot compare the context of a Greek church father of the Nicaean Council with that of a Latin church father under the rule of the Vandals. (p. 98)" Of course Augustine knows that the Roman Empire falls! As far as our author is concerned, the whole argument "demonstrates nothing but the superiority of someone born later, who makes judgments post festum on people who have acted in the past. (p. 100)" Regarding the Pax Romana Schmitt argues that "Peterson calls such forms of peace 'questionable', and he juxtaposes the Augustan peace with the authentic Christian Augustinian peace, which will only emerge at the end of time, with the return of Christ. (p. 101)" But that too is Schmitt's point. Only the Second Coming brings Eternal Peace; an authentic christian political theology merely allows the Church to survive in changing circumstances until then. It certainly does not (and absolutely cannot!) bring eternal peace.

The final chapter is a meditation on the consequences of the fact that there is no generally accepted answer to the question "quis judicabit? ['who will decide?'] (p. 114)" The problem is that, in this world, there is no (and Schmitt believes there never can be any) generally accepted authority. Theology, since it is anchored in the 'next world' can, if it chooses, take a 'pure' stand, but the price is terrestrial irrelevance. If this is not to be the case, theology (even as an academic discipline) must speak to someone. But who? Schmitt argues that "theology's academic twin, which is - when not diluted into history - the theory of law. (p. 108)"

And it is precisely in the conversation between these two that state and church can communicate. Why? Because the legal theorist and the canon lawyer both belong to 'concrete orders'. They are both also performances that are not limited to pure theory. "A conflict is always a struggle between organizations and institutions in the sense of concrete orders. It is a struggle of institutions over stances. (p. 114)" These various 'stances' (whether personal, philosophical or theological) Schmitt holds in utter contempt. God knows theory can be done irresponsibly; - if our postmodernity has 'proven' anything it is that! But the performances of State and Church are no merely private matters. What is the political-theological question?
-Who answers in concreto, on behalf of the concrete, autonomously acting human being, the question of what is spiritual, what is worldly and what is the case with the res mixtae, which, in the interval between the first and the second arrival of the Lord, constitute, as a matter of fact, the entire earthly existence of this spiritual-worldly, spiritual-temporal, double creature called a human being. (p. 115)-
And though he does not here say it, everything besides the concrete institutions of various Churches and States is but an invitation to anarchy.

To recapitulate, Peterson claims that Theology only proclaims the Truth of the Triune God and His Salvation of Man. This is because "the mystery of the Trinity only exists in the divinity itself, not in the creature. Likewise, the peace that the Christian seeks is not granted by any Caesar, but is only a gift by Him who is 'higher than any rationality'. (p.132)" However, Schmitt counters that political theology must remain operative between the time of His ascension and His return because circumstances, in the City of Man, continually change. And it is these changing circumstances (until the Second Coming) that we are always mired in. Peterson wished to salvage Christian Theology's purity; all he has done, according to our author, is to assure its irrelevance and impotence.

And I believe that this situation is not unique to Christianity. Any universalism, whether secular or transcendent, that fails to bring the world under its sway must always be surrounded (from its point of view) by various particularisms. These particularities are the sea in which every non-hegemonic universalism flounders. Therefore, every universalism has its (ahem) 'political theology', whether it wants to or not. This is due to the fact that each universalism must (at the very least) find a way for its singular Truth to survive in a world of outright enemies and indifferent unbelievers. And that is why Schmittian Political Theology has become so interesting to the marxisant left, they no longer believe in the imminence (or perhaps even the necessity!) of their victory. In our awful postmodernity, all universalisms are today treading water in a stormy sea of particularities. - They study Schmitt in order to learn how to swim.

All of the above, however, is (I believe) foreground to Schmitt's most important purpose. He is rebelling against nothing less than the progressive turn of modernity itself, which has occurred both within Christianity and far beyond it. At the beginning of this book, in his 'Guideline for the Reader', our author announces that,
-The thematic development of my political theology from 1922 takes a general direction which departs from the ius reformandi [right of reformation] of the sixteenth century, culminates in Hegel and is evident everywhere today, from political theology to political Christology. (p.32)-
Schmitt is at war with modernity. At bottom, he believes that modernity is everything Hegel said it was. It begins with the rejection of Papal Authority by the Reformation, gathers steam in the Enlightenment, and culminates in Hegel's dialectical philosophy of ever-moving Spirit. On page forty of this text we learned that "critique is the essence of Protestantism." For Schmitt, reformation critique was but the first step towards secular modernity. And this is the root, I believe, of Schmitt's anti-modernism. This acidic criticism (whether it stems from Reformation, Enlightenment, or Hegelian Dialectic is unimportant) tears everything apart.

But isn't that what happens within the sphere of 'The Political' anyway? After all, the premodern world was itself a festival of war! Yes, but reform, secular enlightenment and revolution (that is, the critiques that make them possible) eat away at all established institutions from within. These critiques are not (or at least not necessarily) enemies that one faces over a border. They count your neighbors as adherents. This is why Schmitt so often insists upon the importance of having well-defined enemies throughout his books. Every sovereign polity, he believes, must exclude the Other in order to survive. The Protestant Reformation, liberal secular enlightenment, and Hegelo-Marxist dialectics are, for our author, (at least potentially) the stance of the traitor within. For Schmitt, modern pluralistic societies no longer are locii of sovereignty, they are mere debating societies.

But what is really at stake here? For Schmitt, as always, there is only one thing that ultimately matters: Sovereignty, and what it commands and forbids. (At minimum, who it designates Friend, who it designates Enemy.) And so, for our author, divided sovereignty is very bad indeed.

The Postscript to this book ends thusly:
-stat pro ratione Libertas, et Novitas pro Libertate [Freedom replaces Reason, and Novelty replaces Freedom]. (p.130)-
This should be read as a theological statement: Reason = God the Father, Freedom = Christ, Novelty = Holy Spirit.
One ends up suspecting that Schmitt's private 'Christology' boils down to an entirely Sovereign 'God The Father', with His Word, the Christ, merely as His Herald, and the ever-moving Spirit under house arrest for subversive activities!

"The One - to Hen - is always in uproar - stasiazon - against itself - pros heauton. (Postscript, p. 122)"

Schmitt explains that stasis means 'quiescence, tranquility, standpoint, status' but on the other hand it also means 'unrest, movement, uproar and civil war'. A bit later he adds that at "the heart of the doctrine of Trinity we encounter a genuine politico-theological stasiology. Thus the problem of enmity and of the enemy cannot be ignored. (p. 123)" It is genuinely stunning that a catholic would even imply that within the 'inner life' of the Holy Trinity enmity occurs. So you see, there is for Schmitt more to the argument regarding political theology than merely our 'sublunary' world. Tumult may (God help us!) smolder in the Trinity Itself.
Although I am quite sure he doesn't mind being understood as only speaking of this world. As always with Schmitt, there is more than one thing going on.

And so, I would argue that although Schmitt often makes a great show of his catholic orthodoxy, he is, I believe, quite nearly a crypto-Arian. When I put this book down I couldn't help suspecting that Schmitt wishes God the Father had retained His Singular Authority and ruled entirely alone. Even The Trinity, to Schmitt, must always (at least potentially) be an endless source of 'tumult'. Hegel famously said that the only sin was the sin against the Holy Spirit. Schmitt, however, says (in effect) that the only Sin is the sin against undivided sovereignty. This is the heart of his discomfort with both the Trinity (at least as it is understood today) and progressive modernity. They 'sin' against undivided authority. Therefore, while his 'political Arianism' is certainly not necessarily committed to any particular form of theological monarchism, it is always unreservedly committed to the notion of undivided sovereignty.

Obviously, throughout this essay Schmitt is playing the part of a dutiful Catholic. It is Peterson (the former Protestant!) who has misunderstood the concrete situation of the Church. In an endnote where Schmitt affirms that he is merely a jurist he states, "I would not dare, as a non-theologian, to enter a discussion on theological aspects of the doctrine of the Trinity with theologians. The unfortunate case of Donoso Cortés teaches us what happens to lay theologians and to their efforts in this direction. (p. 148, note 2)" Now, Cortés was, to the best of my meagre knowledge, neither excommunicated nor did he even suffer any interdiction when some of his statements were deemed heretical by the Abbé Gaudel, Vicar-General of Orléans. Although I am not sure what Schmitt's point is here I will venture a guess. Cortés is, like Schmitt, a catholic reactionary who was disgusted with modernity. Perhaps he means to indicate that the post Vatican II Papacy cannot be relied upon to defend his very peculiar 'conservative' orthodoxy? But ...in his surprising (but covert) anti-Trinitarian animus, how can Schmitt in any sense expect to be deemed orthodox?

This is an extremely suggestive essay. I have only touched on some themes I thought especially pertinent today. But, as circumstances change, Schmitt would certainly expect us to find other things worth mentioning. This is purposely a book which will be read a bit differently every generation. It is a truly great political-theological performance! show less

Who is, was, and will be, the Partisan?

This book, the 'Theory of the Partisan', grew out of two lectures delivered March of 1962, fittingly, in Spain. I say 'fittingly' because it was in Spain, during the resistance to Napoleon, that we first encounter the full figure of the partisan fighter. Schmitt observes that 'regular' warfare (which is contrasted with the irregular warfare of the partisan throughout this text) only emerged with (that is, in opposition to) Napoleon and the armies of the show more French Revolution. It is as if, from the very beginning, modern 'enlightened' politico-military order called forth its demonic other. We are reminded that Napoleon had 250,000 troops who were held in check by 50,000 partisans. ...What? How? - This is Napoleon for God's sake! Well, yes, but in order to be a great General one needs at least two things: an army that will competently obey, and an enemy who will stand and fight. Even though the French Revolutionary troops provided the former, the Spanish partisans refused to provide Napoleon the latter...

From these beginnings Schmitt traces the History and Theory of the Partisan in a very terse manner. (Schmitt's book, really only an essay, is only 95 pages long.) After the defeat of Napoleon the victors, at the Congress of Vienna, 'reestablished the concepts of European laws of war.' However, as Schmitt points out, with 'the introduction of compulsory military service, all wars become in principle wars of national liberation...' Thus Schmitt implies that to lose a war now means to lose the right to be a self-determining people. Since every war is now, at least potentially, a fight for national survival, there can be (in fact) no more limited wars... Naturally, along the way, we learn something of civil wars and colonial wars, both of which always had a partisan presence. Our author also reminds us that the Russian Empire, throughout the 19th century, fought various irregular wars against numerous mountain people it sought to subdue.

Russia is important to Schmitt's thesis because it is from Russia (i.e., from Lenin and Communism) that, according to our author, a most pernicious form of Partisan warfare (communist internationalism) would eventually arise. Schmitt reminds us that Napoleon also fought partisans in Russia, and that Napoleon also lost there. In frustration, Napoleon reportedly said, that 'in fighting the partisan anywhere, one must fight like a partisan'. But who is the Partisan? Anyone? No. Early on in this essay Schmitt concedes that one can say that 'to be a man is to be a fighter', and adds that 'the consistent individualist does indeed fight on his own terms and, if he is courageous, at his own risk. He then becomes his own party-follower. (p. 19)' Though noting this possibility he dismisses this anarchy vaguely as merely a 'sign of the time'.

So then, who are the Partisans that we are to be interested in? Schmitt defines them thusly, they are:
1. Irregular Troops (no uniforms, weapons hidden, e.g.)
2. Mobil (flexibility, speed, the ability to quickly attack and retreat)
3. Intensely Political (unlike, say, pirates, - who are really only unpolitical 'businessmen'!)
4. Telluric (a local movement, rooted to a given 'land')

Or, at any rate, that is who Schmitt wishes they were. You see, the partisan 'changes his essence once he identifies with the absolute aggressivity of a world-revolutionary or a technicistic [sic] ideology. (p. 20)' But of course the 'old-school' partisans described above will always be with us. 'For at least as long as anti-colonial wars are possible on our planet, the partisan will represent a specifically terrestrial type of active fighter.' So, you see, it is not only communist universalism that is changing the nature of the Partisan (for the worse), but progressive technocratic modernity itself. Modern weapons and communications allow telluric partisans to be easily used as pawns in the various chess matches of the Great Powers. But who really is using whom? ...Huh? Don't the Great Powers, especially the nuclear powers, seemingly by definition, always have the 'upper hand'?

...So it would seem. But the following remark of Schmitt does make one wonder:
'...belligerent actions after 1945 had assumed a partisan character, because those who had nuclear bombs shunned using them for humanitarian reasons, and those who did not have them could count on these reservations - an unexpected effect of both the atomic bomb and humanitarian concerns. (p. 24)'

The Geneva Conventions (which 'widened the circle of persons equated with regular fighters [...] and in this way [the partisans] were granted the rights and privileges of regular combatants') and nuclear weapons had the unexpected side effect of placing the Partisan at the center of World History. What no great power dared to do on its own could now be done by surrogates fighting for them. If this book were written only yesterday, instead of originating in talks delivered in the early sixties and first published then too, Schmitt would undoubtedly here say something smart about the Soviet Union destroying itself in Afghanistan fighting 'partisans' armed by America, only so the latter could then be slowly consumed in a war with its own creatures. - But that is exactly what is so astonishing about this book! At the height of the cold war Schmitt foresaw, however darkly, the utter futility of being a 'superpower'. And he sees this at a time when the 'best and the brightest' in both camps (i.e., that is, capitalists and communists) were certain that they were in a bi-polar world and that it was either 'them or us'; but Schmitt, virtually before anyone, realizes that it could be neither ...and no one.

The second chapter presents a brief history of the development of the theory of the partisan. We are told that the Germans historically were allergic to Partisan warfare. But we also learn of the importance of the Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 1813 ('this document is a Magna Carta of Partisan Warfare') which was changed three months later ('cleansed of all partisan dangers') even though Napoleon had not been defeated (p. 43). But that is not the end of it. Schmitt points out that while the partisan efforts of the Spanish and the Russians were, let us say, 'pre-enlightened' (if not anti-Enlightenment!), the Landsturm Edict is a result of the Enlightenment itself! Here the Partisan became, 'philosophically accredited and socially presentable.' (p. 47)

'Berlin in the years 1808-13 was infused with a spirit that was thoroughly consistent with the philosophy of the French Enlightenment, so consistent that it was the equal of it, if not allowed to feel superior to it. [...] The nationalism of this Berlin intellectual stratum was not just a matter of some simple or even illiterate people, but rather of the educated elite. In such an atmosphere, which united an aroused national feeling with philosophical education, the partisan was discovered philosophically, and his theory became historically possible. (p.44)'

What is important to note here is that what had previously been merely and purely telluric pre-theoretical partisan resistance movements first became theorized by the political Right in the German Enlightenment. Churchill somewhere remarked that the Germans, 'transported Lenin in a sealed train like a plague bacillus from Switzerland into Russia.' One of the burdens of Schmitt's essay is to indicate that this 'plague' was in reality of an Internationalist Partisan character, and that it was, ultimately, a product of the German Enlightenment! But today we know even more than that; we know that, as plagues are wont to do, it survived the death of its host (i.e., the USSR) and became that free-floating phenomenon we call 'terrorism'.

But we have gotten ahead of ourselves. Clausewitz, a product of this Berlin Enlightenment, in '1810-11, had given lectures on guerilla warfare at the General War College in Berlin [...].' But Prussia chooses to not carry out an insurrectional war as many enlightened reformers had hoped. In the end, Clausewitz 'remained a reform-minded professional officer of a regular army of his time, who could not let the seeds that we see here be developed to their ultimate consequences. (p. 46-47)'

Schmitt tells us that this development 'required an active professional revolutionary.' That would be Lenin. He was 'the first to fully conceive of the partisan as significant figure of national and international civil war, and he sought to transform the partisan into an effective instrument... (p. 49)' of the USSR. Lenin, of course, realizes that all partisans are not equal. As Schmitt observes, for Lenin if 'partisans are controlled by the Communist Central Committee, they are freedom fighters and glorious heroes; if they shun this control, they are anarchistic riffraff and enemies of humanity. (p. 50)' This, of course, is the (in)famous 'they may be bastards, but they are our bastards' rationale that was the common tactic of both sides throughout the cold war era. One could perhaps say that Schmitt's essay is a meditation on how 'the bastards' emerged as a power in their own right...

Lenin read Clausewitz quite seriously and annotated him in his notebooks. According to Schmitt, Lenin uncovers the primacy of the 'Friend-Enemy' distinction in this reading. Of this Schmitt says, that for 'Lenin, only revolutionary war is genuine war, because it arises from absolute enmity. Everything else is conventional play (p. 52)' Unless war is based on 'absolute enmity' with the bourgeois it is merely play. This is why, for Lenin, any partisan resistance outside of the control of the communist party is such a contemptible thing. It is only a game! This 'bracketed war and prescribed enmity [of International Law] were no longer any match for absolute enmity. (p. 54)'

And here we have reached what for me is the heart of the problem of the Partisan. The theory of the Partisan has pre-modern, modern and postmodern moments. In its pre-modern form it is not a theoretical problem; in fact, it just says 'No!' to Enlightenment Theory. In its modern form it is a problem; it has been thoroughly theorized and 'universalized'. This means that it overturns the structures of International Law, the old 'European System', in favor of another Order, a (communist) Utopia always yet to come. We have moved from 'prescribed enmity' to 'absolute enmity'. But, I would argue, this is not the worst of it. Partisanship, after the collapse of the USSR, retains a negative 'universalism' in that one can now foment partisan war against anyone! Absolute Enmity can now be aimed at anything...

Now, perhaps, I may be permitted at this point to end with a digression. Several people have asked me why I bother to read Schmitt, who is, after all and as I hope we all know, a former Nazi. The Rabbi Jacob Taubes was asked that question too. He provides an answer in Appendix A of his excellent book, 'The Political Theology of Paul'. First, he mentions that the hard and fast lines between Left and Right that we see today were not so clear before the Nazi's came to power. Indeed, both extremes shared an almost equal contempt for bourgeois democracy.

The great Marxist Critical Theorist Walter Benjamin, for instance, was quite enamored of Schmitt and, in December of 1930, sent an admiring letter, with a copy of his 'Trauerspielbuch' to Schmitt explaining that he made free use of several of his works. When Taubes (much later) asked Adorno about the letter he was told no such letter exists. Of course, Adorno later admits it was 'misplaced'. Taubes intends for us to understand that this misplacing was a matter of political convenience; when one builds a shrine one typically excludes unpleasant materials...

Next, Taubes mentions that Alexandre Kojève had the highest regard for Schmitt. (Kojève's 'Existential-Marxist' Hegel interpretation has influenced almost everyone in Continental Philosophy. Also, Kojève -not Fukuyama- is the true origin of the so-called 'End of History' debate.) In 1967, after giving lectures at the Free University of Berlin, Kojève announces 'I'm going to Plettenberg', which is where Schmitt lived. More surprising than that (though, I believe, not mentioned by Taubes in this book), Kojève will say that Schmitt is the only one 'worth talking to' in Germany!

Now, that does seem rather extravagant!; - the admirer of Stalin and the ex-Nazi in embrace. But as Taubes indicated, the anti-bourgeois extremes are often in practical, if not theoretical, agreement. Indeed, Kojève and Schmitt had been carrying on a lively correspondence since the fifties. But the meeting of these two in 1967 intrigues me. This essay on the Partisan was already published. It is quite likely that Kojève and Schmitt discussed it. Now, what would they have said about it?

Well, what I believe both Kojève and Schmitt glimpsed in the figure of the Partisan was the vanishing of Reason from History. For the one this meant the impossibility of (Hegelian) Knowledge, while for the other this meant the impossibility of Political Order. Yes, Kojève is a Universalist while Schmitt is a Particularist. For Kojève, Knowledge (in the Hegelian sense) can only be achieved when Humanity becomes One. Ultimately, this is why, for him, History must End in the Universal Homogenous State; it is a technical requirement of Absolute Knowledge! But, as Taubes correctly points out, Schmitt is a Jurist, not a Philosopher. His problem is not Knowledge, - his problem is Order. For Schmitt, Political Order is, and can only be, a relation between separate and distinct parts. I believe that for for Schmitt, Universalism (the 'Oneness of Man' and the Universal State) is Chaos. (-That is because there are here no 'parts' to Order. Or, if you prefer, no enemies whose interactions are ordered through Law.)

Okay, but if Kojève and Schmitt are almost mirror opposites how is it that I imagine that they are both opposed to the Partisan? Well, the 'Partisan Wars' that began in the late twentieth century, and still continue, are perhaps the only real material force opposing the globalization that leads to Kojève's Universal State. But why would Schmitt oppose that? - He is an anti-Universalist! Because partisan warfare, once theorized (that is, universalized and modernized), becomes unending and all-consuming; in practice (and especially today, after the collapse of the USSR), the Partisan can (or will) oppose anything. Not only any Empire, but any State, is a potential target of a Partisan War. (In the late Twentieth Century the Partisan Oppositional stance has been Universalised!) Thus our contemporary (post)modern world, under the sign of the Partisan, slowly swirls towards Chaos. Both (Universal) Knowledge and (Political) Order are ever more swiftly becoming impossible...

A friend of mine once told me that this meeting between Kojève and Schmitt in '67 was a 'feast of thought'. ...No, I think it is far more likely that it was a wake. One imagines the Philosopher Kojève and the Jurist Schmitt staring into the gathering gloom, sharing a mournful brandy, toasting the impending deaths of their respective dreams... And (or so I imagine) all subsequent history has been a verification of the long, drawn out deaths (of Universalism and Order) that they first glimpsed two generations ago in the figure of the Partisan. show less

From Goodreads:

It isn't a surprise why many avoid Carl Schmitt. He was, after all, a prominent jurist in the Third Reich. Many political theorists argue it was Schmitt's very ideas that paved the way for Hitler and the Nazi's so what value could one possibly find in his works?

Though the claim that Schmitt's views enabled Nazism is contestable (see Schwab's introduction), it does not appear as if Schmitt ever denounced his party allegiance. The waters are murky indeed.

What is not up for show more debate, however, is that Schmitt provides a salient right-wing critique of liberalism that now reads as prescient. If human life is essentially political, then modernity's proclivity to diminish the political is equally dehumanizing. Liberalism's feeble attempt to make politics safe sucks the vitality out of life, trapping man in "the dynamic of perpetual competition and perpetual discussion" where there are only new products to buy, new debates to be had, and no decisive actions to be made (72).

For Schmitt, liberalism is fake politics. True politics only occurs with the possibility of conflict between friends and enemies: the chief distinction in the realm politics as good and evil is the chief distinction in morality.

Dividing the world between friends and enemies may appear brutal and militaristic to our modern sensibilities. But we ought to be careful about importing ideas into that distinction that Schmitt does not and even rejects. For example, calling someone an enemy does not necessarily imply a moral category or private animus. One is an enemy solely on the grounds of difference. Their way of life is not our way of life and though they may be quite peaceful now, the possibility of conflict some day under the right circumstances creates the friend-enemy distinction.

For Schmitt, this is actually a more humane way of doing politics since he rejects any appeal to universal moral principles by either the friend or the enemy. As soon as one side appeals to "humanity"to use one value of modern liberalism, he has coincidentally placed his enemy on the side against humanity. There is now no limit to what one may do to him. Total annihilation is now on the table in a way it wasn't when the difference was merely cultural. Thus, Schmitt defends the old European nation-state as the primary political organization as well as diversity, as ironic as that may be for a right-wing post liberal critic.

But as noble as Schmitt's intentions are to rid the political of universal morality, it simply won't do because there's no escaping our moral universe. Even Schmitt is inconsistent on this point, an observation Leo Strauss makes noticing Schmitt's use of "meaning." There is life and there is a meaningful way to live. Some ways of life--as Schmitt's own Nazi regime proved--really are morally abhorrent. There is also a sense that no group holds to their way of life merely because its their's but also because they think it's good. This is likely true for every group thus requiring some moral standard by which to judge which align with truth, goodness, and beauty. Even such an evaluation will help us discern friends from enemies. show less

What is Seapower?

This book is translated by Simona Draghici. Since it is out of print I will summarize its twenty sections and give my thoughts at the end.

Myth and History

One.
The text begins with the epigraph 'As told to my daughter Anima'. When we begin to read, we wonder if we are reading a fairy tale. And it does begin that way. We learn that Man is a terrestrial being. Earth is represented as our mother in innumerable myths. So it seems that it is only the first of the ancient four show more ancient elements (earth, water, air, fire) that is truly ours.
- Or is it? Schmitt mentions that there are legends of deities and also men born of the sea. He does not seem to wonder at this, and approvingly quotes Goethe:
Everything is born of water,
Everything is preserved by water
Ocean, bring us your eternal rule!
"So, it is worth asking: what is our element? Are we the children of the earth or of the sea?"

Two.
Now, the term 'element', as used in the mythic 'four elements', is an unscientific term. "For our historical analysis, however, we retain the four elements, with their simple but evocative names. As a matter of fact, they are global designations of the various possibilities of human existence." I believe he means most especially land and sea powers.
We speak 'mythically,' because men are not things that only have causes; Man also has Reasons. He can respond to circumstances, especially novel circumstances, in novel ways. The implication is that the sciences will never entirely know Man. He can "choose, and at certain moments in his history, he may even go so far, through a gesture peculiar to him, as to change himself into a new form of his historical existence, in virtue of which he readjusts and reorganizes himself."

Three.
Yes, Man can go wherever he wants; but within the limits imposed by the physical world and his own nature. "World history is the history of the wars waged by maritime powers against land or continental powers and by land powers against sea or maritime powers."
We are no longer in a fairy tale. We have fallen (or, if you prefer, risen) from the mythical, via the 'constructivism' inherent both in man and history, to the given. The limits to our power are our material geo-political world and (Schmitt would add) the fact that there are always friends and enemies. This is the boundary that no historical creation can ever cross.
In the nineteenth century, the great example of the struggle between Land and Sea Powers was England and Russia. In Schmitt's explication of the battle between land (Behemoth) and sea (Leviathan) he says that "according to the cabbalists, behemoth tries to tear leviathan to pieces with its horns and teeth, while in turn, leviathan tries hard to stop the land animal’s mouth and nostrils with its flaps and fins in order to deprive it of food and air." Land power battles; sea power blockades.
No, we have not returned to myth. Everywhere we look in history we see this struggle between Land and Sea. For instance:
Persia-Greeks
Sparta-Athens
Rome-Carthage
Now, do not think of Rome as only a land-power. It was after the defeat of Carthage that they started referring to the mediterranean as Mare Nostrum (our sea). In some sense the Romans chose a new form of historical existence. And long after defeating Carthage declining Rome "saw its domination of the seas snatched by the Vandals, the Saracens, the Vikings, and the Normans." But sea-powers at this time were not merely pirates and raiders. The Byzantine Empire is singled out for high praise. He calls it a Katechon(!), i.e., the restrainer of The Antichrist, (see Thessalonians 2) for holding back Islam and, by this, even protecting the Roman Church.
The last sea power Schmitt speaks of here is Venice. Those who think Schmitt is contemptuous of all sea powers should read this. Venice is for Schmitt a preview of the British Empire: great wealth, diplomatic superiority in maneuvering others powers to fight its wars, and an aristocracy tolerant enough to avoid internal division while open to heterodox religious and political views, even offering asylum to political emigrants.
Now, Venice enacted rituals too; most famously the sposalizio del mare (marriage to the sea). Each year the Doge would board an 'official vessel of the Republic' and throw a ring into the sea. Even today Venice attracts romantics, but its great age (Schmitt says from 1000 to 1500) is long gone. Our author does not want to "darken the brightness of such splendor." But he closes this section wondering what the Adriatic and Mediterranean are compared to all the oceans of the world.
And so we see that it is not only geopolitics, human nature, and the friend-enemy distinction that is to be the object of our inquiry. We are to remain concerned with the mythical too.

Four.
Quoting Ernst Kapp our author indicates that one could divide history into three stages.
1. The fluvial culture of the ancient middle east, from Mesopotamia to Egypt.
2. The thalassic era from classical antiquity to the Mediterranean middle ages.
3. Oceanic civilization. The discovery of America and the rise of ocean-spanning empires.
Schmitt will categorize this as river, closed sea, ocean. Schmitt will archly note "of 'oceanic' civilization, the carriers [...] are the Germanic peoples." Again, Schmitt doesn't simply despise sea-power.
Now Schmitt will conclude his discussion of the Venetians. Venice came to a halt at the second stage. They were a 'terrestrial people' that only married the Sea. It was not their element. Schmitt notes two limitations on Venice's power. First the limitation that haunts all Sea Powers. It is difficult "to exert one’s domination over a continent merely by means of a fleet." The other point is that Venice lacked innovation in seafaring warfare. Venice, at Lepanto in 1571, was essentially fighting the same type of battle that the fleets of Anthony and Octavian fought at Actium 1500 years earlier. Innovation would fall to the Dutch, and then the English. And there our current history begins.

Five.
But it begins with Myth; that of whales and whalers. They are images of each other. How? Well, after calling the whale a 'monster', Schmitt says of it that "a warm-blooded giant has been handed over to the element without having been physiologically intended for it." Both whalers and whales are terrestrial animals that have turned themselves into creatures of the Sea. Are they both monsters? Also, note that the nature of hunting has changed.
"And the hunters of this fish were in the times that concern us here, that is, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, genuine hunters in a grand style, and not mere 'catchers.' This detail is not lacking in importance for our story." Schmitt points out that both the nature of whaling and warfare has changed thanks to technology. The whalers are no longer the heros they were 500 years ago. We infer that the same can be said of sea powers; like whalers, they have been given an unnatural advantage due to advances in technology. Thus they are both now doubly 'monsters.'
This section ends with Schmitt pointing out that the sixteenth century had two different type of hunters. In Russia, fur trappers who led the way into Siberia. And our whale hunters.

Six.
A new technology appears around this time too. The Dutch invent a new smaller square sail that allows for more mobility by better utilizing the wind. A new ship, the man of war, appeared too. It was a "sailing ship equipped with cannons that fired broadside salvos at the enemy." Thus the nature of sea battle changes too.
Many European nations had a "part in the great epic of the discovery of the new Earth, that led to the domination of the world by the Europeans." And not only the contemporary colonizers. Germans made maps. Italians 'perfected' the compass. Oh yes, and the English are involved too.

Seven.
Pirates! Schmitt is mostly concerned with English Pirates because of England's struggle with Spain. The Pirate Era "lasted approximately a century and a half, from 1550 to 1713, or said differently, from the beginning of the struggle carried on by the Protestant powers against the world power of Catholic Spain, and until the Peace of Utrecht." (Note that Schmitt is a Catholic.) Of course there have always been pirates. But "the privateers of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries [...] played a considerable part in history." Now, that part, whether carried out by pirate or privateer (with their Royal Commissions!) was usually aimed at Catholic Spain, but it was only a moment. It passes.

Eight.
But that moment put little England onto the road of world power. Before Elizabeth I they were ''sheep-breeders'; after... 'predatory capitalists'! Schmitt underlines the 'corsair-capitalist' nature of this period in English history by telling the story of the Killigrews of Cornwall, who were gentlemen pirates. Schmitt intends us to understand that this was 'normal' at the time. "For the first fourteen years of Elizabeth’s reign the largest part of the English navy was actively engaged in piracy and illegal transactions..."
Myth: a "thirteenth-century English prophecy: 'The lion’s cubs will turn into the fishes of the sea.'"
Schmitt concludes thusly:
-It was only in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries that this nation of shepherds recast itself into a sea-roaming nation of privateers, into 'children of the sea.'-
The point is that British supremacy begins doubly in crime. First, and obviously, as Pirates. Secondly, as monstrous 'children of the sea'.

Nine.
The other European powers chose, however unwittingly, either to be land powers, or were bested by English arms or trade on the high seas. The Portuguese, Spanish, French and Dutch all eventually were surpassed by the English. Thus "Spain and Portugal, for instance, preserved their huge overseas possessions, but lost control of the seas and the communication routes." The Netherlands were "continentalized". The French? When In 1672 "the French king sacked Colbert, his great secretary of trade and of the navy, the choice in favor of the land element became irreversible."
Schmitt explains that English domination cannot be reduced to the failure of others. Or fully illuminated by comparisons to earlier maritime powers:
-The case of England is in itself unique. Its specificity, its incomparable character has to do with the fact that England underwent the elemental metamorphosis at a moment in history that was altogether unlike any other, and also in a way shared by none of the earlier maritime powers. She truly turned her collective existence seawards and centered it on the sea element. That enabled her to win not only countless wars and naval battles but also something else, and in fact, infinitely more—a revolution. A revolution of sweeping scope, that of the planetary space.-

Ten.
"What is a space revolution?"
What Schmitt is after is certainly not the concept of space given by various sciences. (Such as physics, geometry, psychology and biology.) Not even philosophy is a help. But history rolls on nevertheless:
-Each time the forces of history cause a new breach, the surge of new energies brings new lands and new seas into the visual field of human awareness, the spaces of historical existence undergo a corresponding change. Hence, new criteria appear, alongside of new dimensions of political and historical activity, new sciences, new social systems; nations are born or reborn.-
I want to underline this. What "new criteria" means is that, before the 'breach', the future is largely unknowable for all observers. Schmitt would add that the divisions between land & sea, friend and enemy will remain; but I believe he would concede that neither their shape nor content can be known in advance.
"Actually, all important changes in history more often than not imply a new perception of space." Schmitt gives three examples of Spatial Revolution.

Eleven.
1. The conquests of Alexander the Great. Hellenism: Aristarchus taught that the earth revolved around the sun. Euclid. Heron of Alexandria and his inventions. Eratoethenes knew of the equator and taught that the earth was round. But all this was no revolution of 'planetary space', that is, no knowledge of the ocean.
2. The first century of the Roman Empire. The northwest came into view: Gaul, Britain, the Atlantic. Conquests, civil wars, and trade established a 'common political destiny' from Spain and Germany, to Illyria, Syria, and Africa. Persia in the East, Arabia to the South were part of this World. "Agrippa’s map of the world and Strabo’s geography are evidence of this spatial expansion." Schmitt quotes Seneca:
-The Indian drinks of the icy Araxes.
The Persians quaff the Elbe and the Rhine.
An age will come in the far-off centuries,
When Ocean will loosen the bonds of things,
And the whole broad Earth will be revealed,
When Thetis will disclose new worlds.
And Thule will no longer be the bound.-
A prophesy of globalization!
3. But Rome fell, and the world got smaller. The 'continentalization' of europe happened thanks largely to the loss of the eastern trade to the Arabs. And then the Crusades happened. This was the beginning of trade and a communication network that was a nascent 'world economy'. I do not think that, given the provincialist torpor that was shaken up by the crusades, it would be outrageous to suggest that european progress began here!

Twelve.
But none of these are comparable to the planetary revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Beginning with the discovery of the americas and then sailing around the world, a new 'global consciousness' was born, first in europe, and then, inexorably, the rest of the world. Schmitt calls it "the first, complete, space revolution on a planetary scale". (I think that 'space' s/b translated as spatial, here and elsewhere.) It had repercussions far beyond political economy with its colonies and trade. It wiped out not only peoples traditional everyday conceptions of the world but also those of cosmology and astronomy. Schmitt will single out the notion of the infinite void. After the development from Copernicus to Newton, the stars are "masses of matter, [that] move while the forces of attraction and repulsion balance each other in an infinite void, in virtue of the laws of gravitation." An entirely materialist cosmology reigned. The traditional 'horror vacui' was a thing of the past. Aufklärungen like Voltaire "were taking pride in the very idea, scientifically demonstrable, of a world placed inside an infinite void."
A revolution like this is no mere emendation of geography. Vikings and Basque whalers had been to the 'new world' before Columbus, but nothing came of it. "A space revolution presupposes more than just setting foot on land previously unknown. It assumes the transformation of the notion of space at all levels and in all the aspects of human existence." Examples? Renaissance perspectival painting and architecture and sculpture are all witness to a change in our understanding of space. There were revolutions in music and on the stage too. What today we all think of as 'globalization' began here.

Thirteen.
What is a spatial order?
-To talk of the constitution of a country or a continent is to talk of its fundamental order, of its nomos. The true, the authentic, rests essentially upon distinct, spatial delimitations. It presupposes clear dimensions, a precise division of the planet. The beginning of every great era coincides with an extensive territorial appropriation.-
What historical 'modes of production' are to Marx, historical 'spatial orders' (Nomoi) are to Schmitt. They are the key to understanding history and large-scale historical change.
The spatial revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries changed not only Europe, but the world. At first, colonialism was justified because it was spreading christianity, later because it was spreading (the european conception of) civilization. In this process, a european christian civil law was born. To be considered civilized one had to accept that civil law. Of course, european nations in this period did not behave civilly towards each other. There were terrible wars fought between them. However, for the period there is, "the dominant fact: the collective conquest of the New World by the Europeans." European civil law was both the delineation and implementation of a new spatial order, a new Nomos of the Earth. Schmitt says that the 'age of discovery' is the era of european territorial conquest. He ends the section with Heraclitus:
"war brings people together, while law divides them."
What is Nomos? In one of the very few notes in this text Schmitt says the term (the Greek noun nomos derives from the verb nemein) consists of three meanings:
1. Taking, seizure, appropriation.
2. Division, repartition, distribution.
3. Use, exploit, produce, consume.

Fourteen.
How are these conquests related to law? Well in the beginning, all european powers did was arrive at some new territory, have a ceremony, read a proclamation, perhaps leave a symbolic object, and go. Later, these claims were naturally contested. So long as it was Portugal and Spain, disputes could be settled by the Pope. As early as 1493(!), the Papal Bull Inter caetera gave all the new lands 100 leagues west of the Azores to Spain. Later (1494), Portugal and Spain agreed that all the new lands east of the line belonged to Portugal. Of all this Schmitt says that the, "dividing line traced by the Pope in 1493 marked the beginning of the struggle for the new fundamental order, for the new nomos of the planet."
As one might guess, other european powers (the French, the Dutch, the English, eg) were unimpressed by this. When some of these powers became Protestant, "the struggle for the ownership of the new Earth turned into a struggle between Reformation and Counter-Reformation." I would argue that the rise of a new Nomos always includes the rise of new religions or, at the very least, new religious sects. I am not sure Schmitt would agree.

Fifteen.
The European Religious Wars and the struggle between the Colonial Powers Schmitt proposes to treat as one. But before he gets to that, - what of Germany? Schmitt singles out Emperor Rudolf II. While most of the world remembers him as an ineffectual leader whose mistakes brought about the Thirty Years War, Schmitt will go so far as to call him a katechon! (In secular terms, the katechon is the restrainer of inevitable catastrophe.) Our author sees Rudolf II as "a brake, a delaying factor." Why? He "understood that the fighting that was going on far from the German borders was no concern of Germany whatsoever." In his time, germany did not participate in the wars of religion.
Schmitt (a Catholic) sees Germany at the time divided between Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists. And certainly there was conflict between them. But beyond Germany there was a struggle for the entire globe. "A more clear-cut and deeper-going conflict emerged above and away from Germany’s internal problems, namely, that between the Jesuits and the Calvinists. Henceforth, the friend-foe distinction would serve as the axis of world politics." Within Germany, the Emperor strove to balance these three sects. This was achievable because Lutherans were 'observant of the principle of obedience to authority.' -But Calvinists were not.
Like Max Weber, our author hangs a great deal of the responsibility for modernity around the neck of the Calvinists. But not everything; continental Calvinists "had no significant repercussions upon world politics, unless they joined the train of maritime forces." It was the combination of Calvinism and seapower that changed the world.
Calvinist predestination is "characteristic of an elite assured of its social position and its hour in history." This certainty, this energy, needed an outlet. “The land will become sea, and so will be free.” The natural ally of expansive Calvinism was seapower. Schmitt ends this section thusly:
-But let us turn our eyes to the sea: almost instantly, we notice the osmosis, I would even call it the historical brotherhood, between politicized Calvinism, and Europe’s released maritime energies. Even the religious battle-fields and the theological slogans of the period were pervaded by the opposition of the elemental forces that brought about the shift of historical existence from firm land to the sea.-

Sixteen.
Eventually this separation of Land and Sea was enthroned as follows: "the dry land would belong to a score of sovereign states. The sea, on the other hand, would belong to nobody, or everybody, but in reality, it would belong to a single country: England." Understand this: for Schmitt, Land _is_ Order; Sea is an anarchy that always (/probably) culminates in rule of the strongest. We are told it was upon these 'spatial premises' that "Christian-European civil law was built during three centuries."
Practically speaking, what does this mean? Well, land and sea war were always two different things. But now, Land and Sea become "two distinct worlds, and two antithetical, juridical convictions." Schmitt tells us that since at least the 16th century land war was becoming a "state-to-state affair", civilians were left out. Bur seapower wars, by definition, is war on civilian population because it always involves blockade and thus effects trade and the economy. Blockades indiscriminately target 'enemy combatants and noncombatants'. I would note that invading armies also live off the local population simply because they always need food. But rather than believe real land wars resembled Schmitt's description, I suggest thinking of this in the terms of Law, and European international Law evolved in the manner our author suggests.
The amazing success of England turning herself into a world power had repercussions throughout europe. How? Well, while one landpower ruling all was unacceptable; one seapower ruling the high seas was, well, if not exactly acceptable, all acquiesced anyway. Great theories of 'economies, lawyers, and philosophers' rose to explain England's dominance. Of England's success and its acceptance Schmitt says:
-Here you can see that the great leviathan had exerted its power over minds and hearts too. Of all the signs of its domination, it is indeed the most remarkable.-

Seventeen.
"England is an island." There are two senses of that. First, the English thought of their Island as a castle with a moat that kept enemies away. “This precious stone set in the silver sea”. Olde England, Schmitt calls "land-bound, soil-bound and so territorial through and through." Later, England is thought of as a ship or a fish(!), and a ship is "a floating extension of the national territory." Now, the "Continent is but a shore, a strand with its hinterland." And so England's relations with the continent were transformed. "Henceforward, all the standards and criteria of British politics became incompatible with those of all the other European countries." England built a world empire. And "Her destiny was no longer necessarily linked to that of Europe. She could free herself and change seats, as metropolis of a world maritime empire."

Eighteen.
The "age of the total and uncontested supremacy of England" had begun. This happened thanks not only to her seagoing prowess but also her advantage in technology and industrialism. This, however, had an unexpected consequence: Leviathan, a sea-beast was now "turning into a machine." The Heroic Age of Seapower was over. But, "Fish or machine, the leviathan was gaining in strength and power, on every occasion, and its realm seemed eternal."

Nineteen.
This chapter is a brief discussion of Alfred Thayer Mahan's geopolitics. We are told he thought the USA was best placed to continue the anglo-saxon domination of the sea. He even proposed "the possibility of England’s reunification with the United States of America." The continental size of the US would allow it to be equal to any foreseeable challenge. What he did not foresee is how technology would change the character ("the elemental relationship between man and the sea") of English and American seapower.
For Schmitt, this was not the way forward. Mahan's theory was geopolitically 'conservative'; it did not point towards a new spatial order. (Which Schmitt surely believes the world needs.) Mahan's theory:
-had nothing of the energy of the elemental irruption, which in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries gave birth to the historical alliance between the navigators’ spirit of adventure and the Calvinist predestination.-

Twenty.
Industrial and technological development continued. Electricity, radio, airplanes all contribute to a new understanding of space; and perhaps even a new spatial revolution. WWI was an educator in this, - it showed how much had changed. "The invention of the airplane marked the conquest of the third element," that is, after land and sea, air. "Standards and criteria undertook further changes." Man had even more power, for war and peace. Is air now our element? No, "caution is recommended when making such affirmations, the implications of which are not all at the tips of our fingers."
Leaving the question of elements aside, Schmitt notes two points. First, in the early modern period space was thought of as a void in which things merely existed. Today, space "has become the field of man’s energy, activity, and creativity." Secondly, technology has changed mans relation to the sea:
-Nowadays, in times of peace, a ship owner may know the whereabouts of his ship at sea day by day and hour by hour.
That means that, compared to the age of the sailing ship, the sea environment has changed drastically in man’s favor.-
Thus the difference between Land & Sea is fading. "Relentlessly the new nomos installs itself upon the ruins of the old." And no one knows what it will be. Surprisingly for some, Schmitt does not fear the rise of a new Nomos. Nomos is Order; Schmitt fears the sea and its anarchy that culminates in Tyranny. The essay concludes:
-Here, too, are gods that rule.
Ample are their bounds.-
We go from Nomos to Nomos, from Order to Order - forever.

Final Thoughts
For Schmitt, seapower is tyranny. He therefore uses the term Leviathan in both senses, a great maritime power and a mighty tyrant. Isn't Behemoth also a Tyrant? Yes. But an orderly one. Why?
First, let us recall the 'sins' of sea-power:
1. 'unnatural' for terrestrial Man to turn his socio-political being to the open Ocean.
2. the anarchic criminality of piracy, whose avatar is free-trade capitalism.
3. 'politicized' calvinism and its millenialist propensity for the overturning of Order.
4. unfettered technology and industrialism.
5. ideological domination.
Geopolitically, the 'choice' before us is between Leviathan and Behemoth(s). It is peculiar to speak of choice without 'freedom'. But their is no freedom in Schmitt. Freedom, for him, has (geopolitically) become an ideological / propagandistic term employed by hegemonic seapowers. For our author, fundamentally, there is only Order and disorder, Land and sea. Fine. But how do individuals choose between brutish regimes? I am here reminded of a remark of Solzhenitsyn regarding WWII. He said something to the effect (- I no longer remember the exact quote) that in choosing between communists and nazis the russian people chose to fight for the monster that spoke its own language. Behemoth always speaks the language (and glorifies the culture) of the local population. Schmitt is well aware of that. Localisms are the strength of Behemoths - and therefore there is always more than one of them.
And what of the History of freedom that seapower trumpets? Perhaps we should say histories of Freedom. -Little seafaring republics, libertarians, liberals and socialists all tell different stories. But each story is a rational (or rationalizing) account of historical change. Where change is found to be rational (liberating, enriching, cosmopolitan, universal) they call it progress. But it is change that landpower always wishes to prevent or forestall. The 'stages of history' that we find everywhere from Montesquieu to Adam Smith to Marx were not merely records of what happened to happen. They all thought that these stages were leading to a better world. Insofar as they were, - they were also the graveyards of earlier Orders. Freedom in Athens, in Rome (even after the Carthaginian Peace), and in Venice, is not the target of Schmitt's venom. States are always struggling against other states. It is the overturning, according to Schmitt, of the very possibility of Order that he here opposes.
And this is what Schmitt finds in seapower. Again, Schmitt has no problem with premodern seapowers. They were, for the most part, but coastal trading powers plying the inland seas. It is the oceanic powers that changed everything. Now all oceans can be regarded an 'inland sea' thanks to technology, unfettered capitalism, and oceanpower ideologies. (And thus, imo, there tends to be only one hegemonic seapower at a time.) But this does not mean that all inhabited land is now merely seashore. How do oceanpowers control the interior of continents? (Especially central Eurasia!) The short answer is that they can't. Schmitt's argument of the irreducibility of the Land and Sea Dichotomy hangs on this small fact.
...And I do not see any way to get around it.
Make no mistake, the succession of world orders (nomoi) that Schmitt here sketches is meant to be a theory of history on a par with Montesquieu, Adam Smith and Marx. This essay is not his comprehensive position. For that, one must turn to his 'The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum'.
Four stars for a brilliant thought provoking essay with a sub-optimal translation. Five stars reserved for Schmitt's Nomos book when (if) I get around to reviewing it.
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