Plato: The Sophist [Translation]

Sophist is one of the few Platonic dialogues which don’t have Socrates as the main character (all are from the late period). This seems to offer Plato some advantages, especially for this book’s purposes. Using the Eleatic Visitor as the main speaker allows Plato to make sustained arguments consisting of series of positive statements as opposed to the Socratic character’s standard approach, claiming to know nothing and play the midwife of others’ thoughts – asking questions, testing answers, usually showing their inadequacy, and typically ending inconclusively. Arguably Plato could have used Socrates the same way he used the Visitor, but that would have been odd as Socrates is the main speaker in the Theaetetus, Sophist’s show more predecessor in a trilogy, in which Socrates is true to his old form. Sophist is an attack on Plato’s adversaries, the sophists, and on some of their most important (and to Plato, very dangerous) word or logic puzzles. His animus towards sophists, and towards poets, might seem excessive, but we should remember that he saw both as educators offering falsehoods, in some cases in the guise of truth and in others with a relativistic view of truth. And this was at a time when disinterested, rational investigation into truth was new and insecure. For some it was seen as impious, probably for others a potential threat to society and the state. Another danger that seems to have been quite real was the conflating of philosophy and sophistry (as we see in Aristophanes’ Clouds, and as Plato’s Apology seems to suggest, though in reality they were perhaps less distinct than Plato might have us believe). Regarding at least some sophists, the main issue was the reality and importance of truth and the importance of pursuing truth regardless of outcome as opposed to developing and teaching skill in persuasion regardless of truth. The sophists’ puzzles posed serious problems for Plato, causing fundamental aspects of existence (being and non-being, rest and motion, one and many, etc.) to appear hopelessly mired in contradictions and confusions, leading among other things to relativism about truth and morality.

Primary among these problems was confusion about being (i.e. the word “is”) and manipulation of the confusion of “is” as denoting existence with its denoting a thing’s having particular qualities. With this difference long clear to us, it’s hard to understand how the brightest minds in ancient Greece were stumped by it, but it was a major problem that Plato seems to have effectively clarified in Sophist. Another main problem in sophistical arguments was the equation of “not being x” with “being the opposite of x.” Plato pretty effectively clarifies that “not” indicates difference but not necessarily contrariety. He also, very importantly, believes he establishes that we can talk about things that don’t exist without necessarily contradicting ourselves. I’m not sure he established this in a way that would decisively undermine the sophists, but this issue was central to Plato’s problem with them. Some sophists claimed there couldn’t be false belief or speech because no one could think or say “that which is not” since “that which is not” has no share in “being” (this picks up an issue from the Theaetetus, while Sophist in general is largely directed against Parmenides, with some mostly indirect connection to the dialogue named after him). We might say that Plato demonstrated, or believed he demonstrated, that at least some things which don’t exist (e.g. things that are false) are nevertheless available to thought and speech.

Another main issue Plato tackles, also without the greatest clarity, is that qualities (possibly the Forms or Ideas from his earlier works) can blend with each other (this revisits a central problem from the Parmenides, at least if we take it as dealing with the Forms). He doesn’t provide much of an account of how this works, but in a proto-Aristotelian manner he doesn’t seem to need to so he doesn’t bother; he gives some examples which appear to adequately demonstrate that this “blending” happens in at least some situations and then forgoes further proof as he’s achieved his primary objectives: demonstrating that things can either “be” in the sense that they exist or they can “be” possessors of qualities; they can “not be” in possession of quality x but this doesn’t mean they have (or are) its opposite; they can “not be” something without meaning they don’t exist; we can discuss things that “are not” without contradicting ourselves or saying nothing; and things can possess a multiplicity of differing qualities, “blending with each other,” without this being inherently contradictory or problematic. At least this is my understanding of what I take to be the main points of the dialogue. (The first third of the book is an entertaining search for a definition of “sophist,” in which we also meet the Eleatic Visitor and are introduced to his “method of division.”)

The Visitor seems to speak for Plato much more clearly than the character Socrates elsewhere, and it’s hard to imagine Plato taking on the tasks of this dialogue with the usual Socratic limitations and dialectical method. Decisively refuting the sophists on the points addressed was critical to Plato’s project (there is truth, it’s absolute and unchanging, and it very possibly can be discovered and understood by man; there also must be falsehood – both deceit and misunderstanding or ignorance; similarly, justice and knowledge are real, and attempting to pursue and understand them is not necessarily destined to be fruitless). But we also find the Visitor as the main speaker in Statesman, while Parmenides had been the main speaker in that dialogue (with a young Socrates largely on the defensive), and Socrates doesn’t even appear in The Laws. Timaeus and Critias are essentially monologues by those characters, and even in Philebus, with Socrates as the main speaker, he asserts positive doctrine rather than questioning others and demolishing their definitions and arguments. It seems Plato in his late period needed something his earlier Socratic character and method could no longer provide him (with the exception of the Theaetetus, perhaps acting as a coda for the old Socrates and an introduction to the trilogy which apparently was to include Sophist, Statesman, and the unwritten Philosopher).

I mentioned a proto-Aristotelian aspect in this dialogue; it seems there are several of these in the Parmenides and Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman trilogy: The logic puzzles in Parmenides almost demand an analysis and categorization of logical fallacies, for which a formal logic would be a prerequisite. The Eleatic Visitor’s method of division (used in Sophist and Statesman) is a step away from Socratic dialectic and a step towards Aristotelian logic. The Visitor also insists on differentiation between general and specific, and seems to be moving towards something like Aristotle’s genus and species. The unmoved mover makes a very brief appearance in Statesman’s cosmological myth, which also includes something like an initial abstract of Aristotle’s Politics (i.e. a survey and critique of existing political systems). And there’s also something similar to Aristotle’s beloved doctrine of the mean in Statesman. To be fair to Aristotle, no one else in the Academy took these hints or produced the remarkable body of work he did, and there are plenty of things in Aristotle, e.g. his causality, which don’t seem to have any obvious precedents in Plato. Certainly Aristotle’s formal logic was one of history’s great intellectual achievements, regardless of the extent of the foundation Plato provided. And of course the mindsets of the two men were very different, not least in the place (or lack thereof) of empiricism in their respective worlds of thought.

Perhaps it should be noted that our view of the sophists may be excessively negative and otherwise unbalanced largely due to Plato’s well-preserved and brilliant dialogues which so often savage the group. It’s unlikely we’ll ever have adequate knowledge of them to be able to independently assess Plato’s characterizations. But perhaps it’s worth keeping in mind Plato’s harsh view of the poets, who we do know, when considering his even harsher view of the sophists. show less

I gave this a higher rating than "The Republic" because I finished it and can resonate with what Plato says. I listened to reviews on "The Republic" and they say context matters and it isn't really a political book, but I need some more time to reflect on it.

Plato, here, hates sophists. The entire book asks "what are Sophists?" and delves into abstraction. He uses a method called "Diaresis" that finds a larger subject, then divides it into 2 types until narrowing on the subject (in this case, sophists). Plato says, then, that sophists are private, persuasive, land hunters who target wealthy families; merchants selling the art of virtue; an argumentative fighter for profit; and educators who refutes a person's ignorance and cleanses show more their soul. Plato isn't satisfied as these are many titles and not the ideal form of the sophist.

They look to divide "imitation," but go on a detour about the idea of "Being." I still don't understand this fully, but they essentially claim that Being is when we say something exists. For example, "beauty." Being has a unique quality of containing opposites. For example, "hot" and "cold" are opposites, but both would still be described as Being. Meanwhile, non-Being (or other) is when something is just as real, but isn't fully explained. For example, "not beautiful;" it's still just as real but not as explicitly. From this argument, Plato claims that Being and non-Being are important to speech because it allows us to distinct what's real and what isn't. Being and non-Being connect ideas together and distinguishes truth from lies.

From this, Plato finishes his imitations "Diaresis" to say that sophists, fully, are imitators who mimic the ideas of others, and, while aware of their ignorance, use their cunning in private conversation. A philosopher, on the other hand, is one that seeks to looks at ideas and divide them into their proper category -- in other words, form a science.

I really liked this "Dieresis" approach the same way I do Picross. Writing notes on it always makes this fun image filled with arrows. And, while I thought the Being argument was a bit much, it made me think back to my "Post-Modern" phase and how Heidegger wrote a 600-page book on this idea alone. My God, I hope I don't read that lol. Overall, this was short and light-weight, but I'm proud to understand a full text :) show less

Yet another one of Plato's below par dialogues-- in my opinion.

Verzameld werk deel 5 van Plato heet De sofist en is een boek van 96 pagina’s in dialoogvorm. Het is een vervolg op deel 2 met de titel Theaitetos en deze briljante jongeling raakt in dit deel in gesprek met een vreemdeling uit Elea over ‘de sofist’.

Om meteen maar even hoog over te gaan, de twee delen zijn eigenlijk elkaars spiegelbeeld. In deel 2 wordt gezocht naar de waarheid door middel van kennis, in dit deel naar de onwaarheid, waar de gemiddelde sofist aardig in uitblinkt.

Volgens Plato dan, bij monde van de vreemdeling. Eerst maar even het begrip ‘sofist’, want wat is dat eigenlijk? Sofisten zijn eigenlijk rondtrekkende onderwijzers of leraren die tegen betaling lesgaven in ethiek, logica en retorica. Plato had het niet show more op de sofisten, ik had het er in mijn bespreking van deel 1 al even over. Volgens hem verkochten ze valse waarheden en spitsvondige redeneringen voor veel teveel geld. Daarom heeft hij met dit werk een definitieve afrekening geschreven.

Dat doet hij door de slimme vreemdeling een dialoog te laten voeren met de wiskundestudent Theaitetos om de sofist te definiëren. Dialoog is daarbij een groot woord. De antwoorden van Theaitetos dienen eigenlijk om het gelijk van de vreemdeling te bevestigen. De frasen ‘Inderdaad’, ‘Dat klopt!’, ‘Natuurlijk’ en ‘Zeker’ komen veelvuldig voor.

Maar hoe gaan ze die sofist dan achterhalen? Plato laat ze daarvoor de methode gebruiken van de ‘dihairese’ ofwel de tweedeling. Dat drijft hij tot in het absurde door en in die zin is het een vrolijk verhaal waar Plato zelf de nodige lol om moet hebben gehad. U dient het hoofd er ook wel een beetje bij te houden om al die redeneringen te volgen. Het begint nog eenvoudig;

Vreemdeling: Vooruit dan, laten we ons onderzoek naar deze figuur zo beginnen. Vertel me eens: moeten we hem als iemand met een bepaalde vaardigheid zien, of als iemand zonder vaardigheid maar met een bepaalde aanleg?

De eerste tweedeling is gemaakt. Vaardigheden worden ontleed in op-voortbrengen-gerichte-vaardigheden en in op-verwerven-gerichte-vaardigheden. Die laatste kan ook verdeeld worden in twee categorieën. In de eerste worden bezittingen vrijwillig uitgewisseld door schenking, pacht en verkoop. In de overige gevallen wordt er door woorden of daden bemachtigd. Dan wordt die laatste ook weer onderverdeeld en zo gaat het nog even door, het is een vrij hilarisch verhaal. Er komt zowaar een tussenconclusie;

Vreemdeling: Ons gesprek van zojuist kunnen we dus blijkbaar als volgt samenvatten, Theaitetos. In de vaardigheid van het bemachtigen is die van het jagen te onderscheiden, daarin die van de jacht op wat leeft, daarin de jacht op wat te land leeft, daarin de jacht op mensen, daarin de persoonlijke jacht, daarin de jacht waaraan je grof geld overhoudt, daarin die met een opvoedkundig doel, en daarin de jacht op rijke en gevierde jongemannen – dat moeten we, zo wil ons betoog, sofistiek noemen.

Ga er maar aan staan. Natuurlijk is de pientere vreemdeling pas net begonnen want we zitten pas op pagina 19. Hij gebruikt nog veel meer invalshoeken om tot de kern der sofisten te komen.

Zo ontkennen de sofisten het bestaan van dé waarheid. Plato zou Plato niet zijn als hij al het mogelijke zou doen om duidelijk te maken dat waarheid en onwaarheid wel degelijk bestaan. Daarom dient er uitvoerig over bestaan en niet-bestaan gediscussieerd te worden. U krijgt een klein fragment om een idee van de strekking van dit verhaal te krijgen;

Vreemdeling: Maar als het geheel helemaal niet bestaat, dan heeft dat voor het bestaande dezelfde gevolgen. Het bestaat dan niet, en zelfs kan het nooit tot ontstaan komen.
Theaitetos: Waarom niet?
Vreemdeling: Omdat wat ontstaat, altijd in zijn geheel ontstaat. Zodoende kun je, als je het geheel niet tot de beginselen rekent, onmogelijk zeggen dat bestaan en ontstaan realiteit zijn.

Gelooft u mij, het gaat nog veel verder en het is prachtig om te lezen. Leest u het wel als u nog redelijk scherp bent anders knoopt u er geen touw aan vast.

Als Plato bij monde van de vreemdeling ook nog beweert dat de sofist het bestaan van valsheid ontkent gaat hij helemaal los. Na zoveel overtuiging kan Theaitetos op het einde van het verhaal het moeilijk meer ontkennen;

Eigenlijk heb ik het al door. Van hém moeten we met recht en reden zeggen: hier heb je ‘m nu, echt en helemaal, de wijsneus of sofist.

Die vermaledijde sofist helemaal de hoek in geredeneerd en daar was het uiteindelijk om te doen. De vertaling lijkt me een huzarenstukje. In het Nederlands al rijp voor een Babylonische spraakverwaaring, kan ik me nauwelijks voorstellen hoe het is om dit in het oorspronkelijke Grieks te lezen. Grote klasse, want het is wél te volgen allemaal.

Vertaling: Hans Warren en Mario Molegraaf show less

184 PLA