The Nicomachean Ethics

I come back to read Aristotle’s Ethics every few years. It’s not just out of scholarly interest. It’s much more because I get something out of reading it that I just don’t get elsewhere — a discussion of what it is to live a good life, plain and simple.

When we take Aristotle’s discussion at face value and forget scholarly critique, I think we see something distinctive in a modern context. Aristotle considers what makes a person “good” plain and simple — what kind of person is a good person? This contrasts with, and, to my eye, competes with contemporary popular discussions, where readers look for guidance on what kind of person a person needs to be in order to be successful, or to be leaders.

The guidance in those show more discussions leads us to consider what personalities, what characteristics, we need in order to attain those goals. Our character and personality are instrumental toward achieving those goals. In Aristotle’s discussion, character is not something instrumental to anything else — it is the goal. And the standard toward which we strive is simply to be a good person, not in order to achieve something else, but just for its own sake.

My suspicion is that we have crowded discussions like Aristotle’s out of modern life, in our focus on achievement. The reason I come back to The Nicomachean Ethics over and over is to get back to that more primary question, not how to make ourselves good for this or that, but just how to live a good life.

Modern uses of the terms “ethics” and “morality” tend to conjure up a much narrower scope than Aristotle has in mind. While acting justly, honestly, and the like are part of what it is to live a “good life”, so are enjoyment, pleasure, companionship — all of the facets of life.

He does speak of a goal to be achieved by a good life. But the goal, “happiness”, is, as he says, an activity — it simply is the activity of living a good life, attained by doing exactly that. When Aristotle speaks of “happiness” he means all facets of life. In an analogy he draws frequently, happiness is to the “soul” (where we understand the “soul” again more broadly, much like our conscious selves — all of our thoughts and feelings) as health is to the body. Just as our bodies function best when healthy, and we feel good” so do we feel good about ourselves, about our lives, when we act “ethically”, in Aristotle’s use of the word.

It is important that, in Aristotle’s system, Ethics (like Politics) takes its place as a “practical” science, as opposed to a theoretical one (metaphysics, physics, mathematics). Ethics is a practical matter of determining how best to live, not the discerning of an “ethical reality”. Although Aristotle can be said to have a “theory” of ethics, there is an anti-theoretical thread in his thought. The discussion of how to live a good life may have its theoretical aspects, e.g., the determination of what constitutes the “good”, but it lacks the precision of mathematics or physics, and it lacks the ideological strictness that many may associate with ethics and politics.

I don’t think it would be much of an exaggeration to say that, for Aristotle, you need to find your way to a good life. A good life is a life of virtue, and much of The Nicomachean Ethics is concerned with particular virtues — justice, courage, friendship, generosity, . . . Aristotle locates virtues as means between extremes. Courage for example is a mean between feeling too much fear and too little fear — one can be “reckless”, not experiencing fear when one should, or cowardly, experiencing too much fear, or at inappropriate times. Locating the mean is not a precise matter — knowing when to let fear govern your actions, building a consistent way of experiencing fear appropriately, despite Aristotle’s use of the term “mean”, doesn’t admit of mathematical precision.

In fact, Aristotle offers a seeming alternative formulation to the “doctrine of the mean.” For example, in defining virtue, he talks of experiencing fear, confidence, and the like “properly”, and goes on to describe what he means as experiencing these things “at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner.” Doing so is hitting what he means by the “mean”, but there is clearly a need for judgment and experience to find it.

There’s much more here. Aristotle’s moral psychology is laid out in this book, and it complements what he writes in De Anima. He discusses the role of choice, and of deliberation, and he discusses exactly what kind of thing a virtue is, as a “characteristic” of a person. Notably, and in keeping with what he has said about the limits of precision in ethics, virtues can’t be acquired simply by understanding the rules. Virtues are acquired by their practice. To become generous you practice generosity. I think that he has in mind not only the inculcation of the habit itself, but learning from experience when to act in a generous way, i.e., what is the “right time”, who is the “right person” toward which to act generously.

I’m generally recommending a reading of The Nicomachean Ethics as not just a work of philosophy in the academic, scholarly sense, but as having a place in anyone’s thought about what life to live. Granted, not everybody’s going to have the patience for much of Aristotle’s philosophical style. I will say though that this book reads more fluidly than one might think, maybe owing to the fact that it is, in effect, lecture notes from his teaching. At times, it reads as if spoken aloud in a teaching context. show less

I suppose there is a reason why books by ancient Greeks are still printed and discussed today. The Nicomachean Ethics shows why: the lessons on ethics, virtues, right thinking, and habits of right action are still just as meaningful and the questions Aristotle uses to get into the topics are still just as important to ponder.

I love that the core of Aristotelian ethics is happiness (eudainomia), which is different from pleasure (although not completely -- see book 10). There are lots of ways to take what happiness could mean on one hand it can be something like gratitude that someone feels as a result of ethical action or friendship (see books 8 and 9). It could be a collective, positive spirit if ethical action is practiced in the show more polis and in the community, becoming a spirit of good will. It could also be what I think of as "satisfaction," of things coming together or feeling like you have done something good.

Ultimately, this book is guide to contemplation, to the development of virtue and sound theoretical and practical wisdom (see book 4) by which people can recognize what a right action is and then identify and act upon an appropriate response. It is also about contemplation (book 10) and deliberation (book 3) that are required parts of a person's education and daily practice.

The arguments in this book are syllogistic in their construction and at times feel a little rickety based on the premises. There is also a fair bit of terminology that leaves room for interpretation. And modern readers are likely to bristle at Aristotle's blithe approach to the unequal status of women, children, and slaves. There is enough "justification" of this unequal treatment to be a distraction. It's a part of the time Aristotle lived in, I know. Still, it doesn't sit well. Fortunately, I think much of Aristotle's technique and central questions still hold up.

Another nice aspect of the book is seeing how grounded this system of ethics is on math: means, proportions, angles, areas, geometry, arithmetic. At the same time, so many of the examples and ideas about human nature are taken from literature and theater: Euripides, Sophocles, Homer, etc. All of this goes to show how important literature and theater were to Greek culture (approaching if not at the same level as philosophy) and it points up the importance of tying a concept as universal as ethics to another universal: math. What could make a topic more true than to be mathematically sound and reflected in literary observations of humanity.

The book was way more enjoyable to read than I expected. Surely, some of this is the translation, but it is also true that Aristotle has a knack for clear explanation and useful examples of his main concepts. There are clear tie-ins to Aristotle's other works on politics and rhetoric, which gives this treatment of ethics a feeling of cohesiveness and of being informed by a broader worldview. show less

This book’s a difficult case. On one hand there’s the infamous defense of slavery and the statements on the inferiority of women, and parts of the book seem downright pedestrian. But a closer reading of Aristotle on slavery suggests he supported a rather different and probably far more limited form than was his society’s practice. (If this is correct, implementing this version would have likely caused a revolution in the ancient Greek socieo-economic system, quite possibly eliminating the class which had the leisure to philosophize, but Aristotle doesn’t follow up on these implications here or in the Politics.) Perhaps a closer reading of Aristotle on women might suggest something less unenlightened than at first blush, and we show more should be careful about keeping historical and cultural context in mind and not unreflectively applying 21st c. views to the 4th c. BC. If nothing else, he writes of women with more sympathy and humanity than is typical of ancient Greeks (notable atypicals being Euripides and of course Sappho). And when you’ve been wading through some of the seemingly pedestrian material to the point that you’re losing faith in “the master of those who know,” suddenly the penetrating, profound, nuanced, and original mind reappears, notably in his discussion of “intellectual virtue.”

I won’t try to synopsize or critique this work other than to point out, as others have, that the Christian conception of the individual’s struggle with sin (and the “post-Christian” derivatives of this concept) significantly illumines a blind spot in ancient Greek psychology (or so I believe). However, Aristotle doesn’t try to prove the Socratic/Platonic notion that people never willingly choose to do wrong. Rather, he makes a compelling case that only a virtuous life is truly satisfying and that any rational and critically-thinking person should see this and live accordingly. It might be the most effective argument for ethical living that doesn’t rely on divinity (although there is a non-causal [at least in the modern sense] tie to divinity). It doesn’t try to say we ought to live a certain way; just that nothing else truly satisfies the most fundamental natural needs of man. Aristotle neither has to make an exclusive claim nor does he need to prove his claim: experience demonstrates it conclusively (he believes). (I probably wouldn’t have grasped this without reading Jonathan Lear’s thoroughly excellent Aristotle: The Desire to Understand, which has also helped me better understand Aristotle on slavery and on many other things.)

This is an argument which seems to have been forgotten in our “post-Christian” West as it’s been searching for a way to re-ground its inherited ethics (some of which are quite different from Aristotle’s, but that’s a comparison and critique I said I wouldn’t get into). Whether it’s a strong enough argument and whether it could succeed widely are open questions; Aristotle believed most people are neither inclined to virtue nor susceptible to rational argument, so he probably wouldn’t expect this argument to have much influence. But for the few, it seems possibly more sound than any ethical theory from Kant to Rawls. Perhaps Kant, Rawls and other moderns have hoped for something that could be convincingly translated for the masses. Like Aristotle, I’m skeptical that that could be done successfully. I also think Aristotle’s probably right that most people are motivated largely by animal desires and only effectively constrained by the threat of force, primarily through law (Aristotle’s almost starting to sound like a Calvinist). Which leaves a larger open question about ethics and contemporary society that I won’t try to address. Suffice it to say that Aristotle’s consciously preaching to a choir – explaining virtue to the already virtuous – not trying to convert heathens. show less

Mais um manual do pensador grego pé no chão, das listas de diferenciação. Aqui, aprendemos que se a questão não é o sumo bem da polis, então convém olhar para a felicidade, a boa vida da atividade virtuosa sendo uma finalidade em si, objeto da ética - essa nova área independente do conhecimento. Devemos lá chegar pelo conhecimento, prática das virtudes, habituação moral, com moderação, desenvolvendo bem nossas disposições de caráter, como bons humanos que somos, animais racionais. Entre o medo e a confiança, a coragem; entre a audácia e a covardia, a cautela, entre o prazer e dor, a temperança, entre a cólera e a apatia a calma, entre verdadeiro e falso o verossímil, entre aprazível e detestável, a show more espiritualidade. Mas a média é móvel - avaliemos as situações e contextos, e as decisões são caso a caso, lidas a partir do quadro categórico.

Há ações não-voluntárias por ignorância ou involuntárias por compulsão, ambas envoltas num contexto desfavorável e de responsabilidade diluída. Então falamos daqueles que tem akrasia. Então, existem componentes circunstanciais para atingirmos a boa vida. A lida com o dinheiro, da liberalidade que equilibra no dar a prodigalidade e a mesquinharia, a magnificência, que brilha perante a vulgaridade e a avareza. Assim também analisamos o orgulho, a ambição e a relação com a raiva, a interação social, franqueza e perspicácia (ser sagaz socialmente). E melhor ter amigos, sendo o melhor amigo o que não o é por interesse, mais por gostar do outro, no amor completo.

(é possível distinguir um homem feliz de um outro o observando dormir. E o mais feliz deles, imerso em sonhos de razão teórica, sem esquecer da política, será o filósofo) show less

Plato and Aristotle between them not only laid the foundations for Western philosophy, many would argue they divided it neatly between them: Plato the one who with his "Allegory of the Cave" gave birth to the idea of an existence beyond our senses, giving a rational gloss to mysticism. Aristotle, the father of logic and a scientist, with a this-world orientation. There's a famous fresco by Raphael, "The School of Athens," where that's illustrated, where the figure meant to be Plato points to the sky--the heavens--while Aristotle points to the ground--to this Earth. If you're going to ask me which school I belong to--at least as so categorized, Aristotle wins, hands down. Yet if you ask me which philosopher I found a joy to read, which a show more slog--well, Plato wins.

Unfortunately, much of Aristotle's works were lost, and what remains I've seen described as not his polished material, but "lecture notes." Plato's dialogues are like little plays, and reading them often are, I daresay, fun. Yes, really. So it was disappointing not to find Aristotle as lively a read. This is dry stuff. But then there are the ideas, which fully earn the five stars. Back when I was introduced to ethics in school, about the only two choices we were given was Utilitarianism--the "greatest good for the greatest number" or Kant and his "categorical imperative" with examples contrasting them such as, under Utilitarianism, if torture leads to good for the greatest number, then by all means, let the water boarding begin! Under the categorical imperative, on the other hand, rules... well, rule. It doesn't matter if there's a ticking atomic bomb, you don't use torture. You're not supposed to care about practical consequences, to yourself or others. What's left out of both philosophies is the individual and his or her happiness. But that's not left out with Aristotle. For him ethics is practical and about the pursuit of happiness. It's for that and from that virtues flow. It's in our personal interest to be virtuous, to practice habits of character that lead to a good life for a human being. Those ethics that appeal and resonate to me come from this school of thought. It's philosophy for human beings, on a human level. So, Plato for style--Aristotle for substance. For me, anyway. show less

Dear lord. Aristotle is thorough! Logical induction meets ethics in this classic work and doesn't stop until the last page. There are full stretches and really interesting ones throughout. Despite the age of the work it's easily understood.

I felt like every page contains about three "yeah, but..." moments that need exploring. Thankfully I have the next few thousand years of ethics writings to get through which do just that.

Anyone can get angry—that is easy—or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person,
to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.

The Oxford edition of The Nicomachean Ethics uses a revised version David Ross's truly readable translation. The notes are extremely helpful in elucidating Aristotle's sometimes tedious arguments around virtue, happiness, pleasure, and friendship. His conception of phronesis ("practical wisdom") is key in knowing the right thing to do and what leads happiness, which for Aristotle consists in excellence in activity directed by reason. In order to the right thing, show more we must know what the right thing is, choose it because it because it's the right thing, and act from a firm and unchanging good character. Easier said than done.

Aristotle thinks it's difficult to find “what is intermediate in passions and in actions." He argues that grasping the mean course of action is not for everyone, making virtue "rare and laudable and noble." One must always aim for what is intermediate and away from the extremes of the passions if one hopes to be virtuous, but this intermediate is often hard to identify or attain precisely in all situations, so we have to “incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the intermediate and what is right" – no easy task, indeed. Additionally, because childhood is where much of virtuous behavior is formed, if one is raised poorly or wickedly, one is put at an even larger disadvantage. Aristotle argues that it makes all the difference whether a person is raised properly to form virtuous habits in their youth, thus increasing the difficulty for many to become good people.

Anyone who's interested in ethical theory and how to live would do well to read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, especially this helpful and easy to read edition. show less