Picture of author.

John Kenneth Galbraith (1908–2006)

Author of The Great Crash 1929

77+ Works 11,220 Members 118 Reviews 19 Favorited

About the Author

John Kenneth Galbraith is a Canadian-born American economist who is perhaps the most widely read economist in the world. He taught at Harvard from 1934-1939 and then again from 1949-1975. An adviser to President John F. Kennedy, he served from 1961 to 1963 as U.S. ambassador to India. His style and show more wit in writing and his frequent media appearances have contributed greatly to his fame as an economist. Galbraith believes that it is not sufficient for government to manage the level of effective demand; government must manage the market itself. Galbraith stated in American Capitalism (1952) that the market is far from competitive, and governments and labor unions must serve as "countervailing power." He believes that ultimately "producer sovereignty" takes the place of consumer sovereignty and the producer - not the consumer - becomes ruler of the marketplace. (Bowker Author Biography) John Kenneth Galbraith, born in 1908, is the Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics Emeritus at Harvard University and a past president of both the American Academy of Arts and Letters and the American Economic Association. He is the author of thirty-one books spanning five decades. He has received honorary degrees from, among others, Harvard University, Oxford University, the University of Paris, the University of Toronto, and Moscow State University. He is Commandeur de la Legion d'Honneur in France, and in 1997 he was inducted into the Order of Canada. In 2000, at a White House ceremony, he was given the Presidential Medal of Freedom. He lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts. (Publisher Provided) show less

Series

Works by John Kenneth Galbraith

The Great Crash 1929 (1954) 1,989 copies, 32 reviews
The Affluent Society (1958) 1,930 copies, 15 reviews
The New Industrial State (1967) 868 copies, 7 reviews
Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went (1975) 496 copies, 4 reviews
The Age of Uncertainty (1977) 468 copies, 1 review
A Short History of Financial Euphoria (1990) 379 copies, 8 reviews
The Culture of Contentment (1992) 353 copies, 3 reviews
A Life in Our Times (1981) 346 copies, 3 reviews
Economics and the Public Purpose (1973) 297 copies, 1 review
The Good Society: The Humane Agenda (1996) 281 copies, 4 reviews
A Tenured Professor (1990) 239 copies, 3 reviews
A History of Economics: The Past as the Present (Penguin Economics) (1991) — Author — 229 copies, 2 reviews
Ambassador’s Journal (1969) 223 copies, 3 reviews
The Anatomy of Power (1983) 218 copies
Almost Everyone's Guide to Economics (1978) 208 copies, 1 review
The Triumph (1968) 169 copies
Name-Dropping: From FDR On (1999) 147 copies, 3 reviews
The Liberal Hour (1960) 144 copies, 1 review
The Non-potable Scotch (1963) 108 copies, 2 reviews
The Essential Galbraith (2001) 98 copies, 2 reviews
The Nature of Mass Poverty (1979) 93 copies, 3 reviews
The Galbraith Reader (1977) 58 copies
A China Passage (1973) 52 copies, 1 review
How to Control the Military (1970) 37 copies, 1 review
Economic development (1964) 36 copies
Letters to Kennedy (1998) 28 copies
Economics and the Art of Controversy (1980) 27 copies, 1 review
The McLandress dimension (1968) 20 copies
A Theory of Price Control (1980) 11 copies
Economía y subversión (2007) 7 copies, 1 review
John Kenneth Galbraith introduces India (1974) — Introduction — 5 copies
Külluseühiskond (2024) 2 copies
Usikkerhedens år (1978) 1 copy
Økonomiens profeter (1988) 1 copy
Oekonomi og samfunn (1972) 1 copy

Associated Works

A Sense of History: The Best Writing from the Pages of American Heritage (1985) — Contributor — 490 copies, 4 reviews
An American Album: One Hundred and Fifty Years of Harper's Magazine (2000) — Contributor — 145 copies, 1 review
On the Firing Line: The Public Life of Our Public Figures (1989) — Contributor — 126 copies, 1 review
Great Stories of American Businessmen (1972) — Contributor — 18 copies
Money Should Be Fun (1980) — Introduction — 13 copies, 1 review
Theories of the Labor Movement (1987) — Contributor — 8 copies
Mrs. Kennedy Goes Abroad — Introduction, some editions — 1 copy

Tagged

Common Knowledge

Canonical name
Galbraith, John Kenneth
Other names
McLandress, Herschel
Epernay, Mark (pseudonym)
Birthdate
1908-10-15
Date of death
2006-04-29
Gender
male
Education
Dutton High School
Ontario Agricultural College (BS|1931|Agriculture)
University of California, Berkeley (MS|Ph.D|1934|Agricultural Economics)
Occupations
economist
professor
United States Ambassador to India (1961-1963)
editor
Director of the Office of Economic Security Policy
Deputy Head of the Office of Price Administration
Organizations
Americans for Democratic Action
Harvard University
Princeton University
US State Department
University of California, Berkeley
American Economic Association
Awards and honors
Presidential Medal of Freedom (1946, 2000)
Commandeur de la Legion d'honneur (1986)
Order of Canada (Officer, 1997)
American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1952)
American Philosophical Society (1980)
Padma Vibhushan (2001) (show all 19)
Medal of Freedom (1946)
Lomonosov Gold Medal (1993)
American Humanist Association Humanist of the Year (1985)
Association for Asian Studies Award for Distinguished Contributions to Asian Studies (1987)
Leontief Prize (2000)
American Economic Association Distinguished Fellow (1973)
Robert F. Kennedy Book Award (1997)
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum Distinguished American Award (2005)
BBC Reith Lecturer (1966)
Sarah Josepha Hale Award (1967)
50 Honorary Degrees
John Kenneth Galbraith Reference Library in Dutton, Ohio named in his honor
Minor Planet (4089) Galbraith (1986) named in his honor
Relationships
Galbraith, James K. (son)
Galbraith, Peter W. (son)
Bringa, Tone (daughter-in-law)
Cause of death
natural causes
Nationality
Canada (birth)
USA (naturalized 1937)
Birthplace
Iona Station, Ontario, Canada
Places of residence
Iona Station, Ontario, Canada
Dunwich Township, Ontario, Canada
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Townshend, Vermont, USA
Place of death
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Burial location
Indian Hill Cemetery, Middletown, Connecticut, USA
Associated Place (for map)
USA

Members

Discussions

What's happening in 2017? in Progressive & Liberal! (January 2019)

Reviews

129 reviews
This is a deep and considered, non-partisan, progressive (IMO) consideration of macroeconomics in American capitalism. Much is examined in how cyclical depressions and harsh class separation as well as regional poverty are results of this system and tolerated as expected when they are not needed outcomes. This is a book worth reading closely and re-reading. This is my first reading.

Galbraith looks past the typical Smith, Ricardo, and Keynes etc. writers on Western economics to other show more thinkers:
The two other distinctively American figures had more enduring influence. These were Henry George and Thorstein Veblen. But so far from manifesting the exuberant attitudes of the frontier, both were prophets of a gloom that was, in some respects, more profound than that of Ricardo. Henry George (1839-1897) was like Marx the founder of a faith, and the faithful still assemble to do honor to their prophet. Like Adam Smith he made clear his view of the social prospect in the title of his remarkable book: Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry in the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth... The Remedy. In the opening chapter he posed his basic questions: Why in a time of general economic advance-he was writing in the depression years following 1873-should so much labor "be condemned to involuntary idleness," should there be so much "pecuniary distress among businessmen," and so much "want, suffering and anxiety among the working classes?" Why, to press things further, should there be so little gain to the poorest classes from increased productive power? "Nay, more," why should its effect be "still further to suppress the condition of the lowest classes?"

The reason for this perverse aspect of progress was again part of the almost infinite legacy of Ricardo. Labor and capital increased in productivity; the land supply remained constant in quality and amount. Rents, as a result, increased more than proportionately and made the landlords the undeserving beneficiaries of advance. The anticipation of rent increases and attendant speculation in land values was also the cause of depression. ...


A trap is seen in addiction to marketed consumption.
A word of summary is now in order. We are impelled by present attitudes and goals to seek to operate the economy at capacity where, we have seen, inflation must be regarded not as an abnormal but as a normal prospect. The same attitudes which lead us to set store by capacity use of plant and labor force largely deny us the use of measures for preventing inflation. Monetary policy collides with the process of consumer demand creation and, since it works on business investment, is in conflict with our emphasis on growth. It is also ineffectual, discriminatory and, possibly, dangerous. Fiscal policy is sharply at odds with the commitment to a level of output that insures full employment and the accompanying economic security. Direct controls, which in theory might reconcile high employment with price stability, are under a comprehensive ban. We assume that we must have them in unworkable mass or not at all. They are in ostensible conflict with the goal of efficient production, for that has anciently been identified with market allocation of resources.

These conflicts are partly obscured. The conservative disguises the conflict between monetary policy and production by his faith that his policy has occult or other transcendental effects not visible to the naked eye. The liberal, including the Keynesian economist, conceals the conflict between fiscal policy and production at full employment not so much by resort to mysticism as by a systematic refusal to face issues.


This illustrative story seemed too good to fact check:
Not all venders of professional services do suffer. Occasional groups have discretion over their prices and are able to take prompt advantage of the general increase in money wages and demand, to raise their own charges and revenues. Lawyers and doctors normally fall in such a category. There are others. In 1942 a grateful and very anxious citizenry rewarded its soldiers, sailors, and airmen with a substantial increase in pay. In the teeming city of Honolulu, in prompt response to this advance in wage income, the prostitutes raised the prices of their services. This was at a time when, if anything, increased volume was causing a reduction in their average unit costs. However, in this instance the high military authorities, deeply angered by what they deemed improper, immoral, and indecent profiteering, ordered a return to the previous scale.

In a free market, in an age of endemic inflation, it is unquestionably more rewarding, in purely pecuniary terms, to be a speculator or a prostitute than a teacher, preacher, or police-man. Such is what the conventional wisdom calls the structure of incentives.


Chase, chase, chase...
....the tensions and the dangers of a society in which the pursuit of goods is paramount and which does not pause to reflect on the devices -mass persuasion leading on to mass encouragement to indebtedness-which further the chase.


Poverty has a solution in state-sponsored education to improve opprtunity.
The first and strategic step in an attack on poverty is to see that it is no longer self-perpetuating. This means insuring that the investment in children from families presently afflicted be as little below normal as possible. If the children of poor families have first-rate schools and school attendance is properly enforced; if the children, though badly fed at home, are well nourished at school; if the community has sound health services, and the physical well-being of the children is vigilantly watched; if there is opportunity for advanced education for those who qualify regardless of means; and if, especially in the case of urban communities, law and order are well enforced and recreation is adequate then there is a very good chance that the children of the very poor will come to maturity without grave disadvantage. In the case of insular poverty this remedy requires that the services of the community be assisted from outside. Poverty is self-perpetuating because the poorest communities are poorest in the services which would eliminate it. To eliminate poverty efficiently we should invest more than proportionately in the children of the poor community. It is there that high-quality schools, strong health services, special provision for nutrition and recreation are most needed to compensate for the very low investment which families are able to make in their own offspring.
show less
Brilliant little book, or long essay, by perhaps the greatest economic mind of the late 20th century.

In summary: There is no true financial innovation, only variations on the theme of leverage, and the specious association, or perceived but nonexistent correlation, between money and intelligence contributes to speculative euphoria and programmed collapse. In fact, “having money may mean, as often in the past and frequently in the present, that the person is foolishly indifferent to legal show more constraints and may, in modern times, be a potential resident of a minimum-security prison.”

Particularly love this quote: “... the discovery that high-risk bonds leveraged on limited assets should have a higher interest rate hardly stands on par as an invention with the electric light.” Ouch. Take that, dumbass Michael Milken, and everyone that invested with him!

The repeated emphasis on the problem lying with the market itself, not some invented or, at best, subordinate external factor is bold and brilliant. Particularly in 1990, when few others dared blaspheme the myth of the rational market.

Drumph even makes a small appearance at the end, and, charitably, Galbraith reserves his ire not for the charlatan himself, but for the idiot bankers that loaned him their depositors’ money.
show less
J. K. Galbraith produced his short book on the Great Stock Market Crash of 1929 in late 1954 in an atmosphere that still recalled recent witch hunts over communism (a fact that will help an early twenty-first century reader with some of the few obscure political references). The current Penguin edition adds the short Foreword to the 1975 edition that urged 'memory' as a necessary corrective to over-enthusiasm within the financial system. One can only guess what this grand old man of liberal show more economics would have written in 2008.

Galbraith's book is not the last word on the subject of the causes and consequences of 1929 - how could it be: it was written over 50 years ago within only 25 years of the events in question and largely from contemporary newspaper reports and available official documentation? But it is succinct on the facts, very witty (albeit in that dry professorial way affected by an older generation of intellectuals) but oddly conservative in its overall message.

Galbraith does not judge capitalism - he could scarcely do so in the middle of the most conservative phase of the Cold War. He is also far more sympathetic to the bankers of the late 1920s than we might feel minded to be of our bankers in 2008/2009. His model is of a crisis in the equity markets built on the greedy and deluded behaviour of a surprisingly small number of Americans, exploited and managed by a yet-smaller group in positions of financial power and influence. A stand-offish government allowed a burst bubble to hit a downturn in the wider business cycle and so triggered something that was much worse than it need have been.

Whether he is right or not is not for me to judge. This book is interesting not because of its ability to tell us the 'truth' but because it helps us to understand our own predicament through contrasts as much as similarities. I do not accept the implicit moralism of either Galbraith or today's commentators - people do bad or silly things but it is our responsibility as much as theirs if we have not constructed the political or regulatory framework that will set limits to political or economic collective hysteria.

His defence of bankers has to be seen in the context of his dislike of William Jennings Bryan's country populism with its roots in creationist Christianity and its ascription of all the nation's ills to East Coast elites. He clearly enjoys pointing out that Bryan was complicit in the promotion of inflated land values in Florida that, in retrospect, should have indicated that American popular interest in a 'fast buck' was getting out of hand. The Florida land speculation of the mid-twenties brought us the original Ponzi scheme.

Perhaps a million or so Americans out of a population many, many times as large were speculators on the stock market - either with enough money to burn or enough credit to burn other people's money. In some ways, the consequent economic crisis is the story of the loss of an upper middle class surplus available to purchases the good and services that would have kept the rest of America working.

And this is where we see the similarities and differences from today. Our crisis also starts in the US but it does not derive from the upper middle classes getting over-excited by speculation in industrial growth. It starts with bankers getting over-excited by what can be done in packaging or securitising massive debt both for wealthier investors and themselves. The collusion between bankers and investors in 'sure thing' economics is what marks out the latest crisis as similar to the collusion between trust promoters and investors in the earlier case.

The first crisis involved a disconnect from the fundamentals of American industrial strength and the international trading economy. Our current crisis derives from a lack of due diligence on the returns that could reasonably be expected from a whole range of instruments. The ultimate recipients and intermediate sponsors understood less about these instruments than Wall Street brokers understood their own investment trusts in 1928/1929.

Similarly, the 1929 crisis was a domestic national crisis which spread around the world because of other instabilities in the trading system. Our crisis is a global one arising to the degree that financial activity is integrated into Wall Street and the City of London. The UK, for example, is being hit as hard and probably harder than the US not because of a collapse of trade (yet) but because its entire polity is based on the privileging of a financial sector that is now going into as sharp a decline as any inter-war steelmaker.

There are coincidences in the tale - some amusing. Goldman Sachs is the broker behind two of the most egregiously speculative (and ultimately failed) investment trusts - Shenandoah Corporation and Blue Ridge. Its humiliation was to turn it into one of the most conservative broking houses by the time Galbraith was putting pen to paper. The rest is history. Lehmann Corporation, meanwhile, gets rare praise as a rarely well managed investment trust appearing in 1929 - another neat little historical irony.

Just as conventional property-based retailing today is the first line of collapse (evidenced by the closure of the British Woolworths) so, in a neat mirroring of history, the belief that industrial expansion would go on forever was based, in part, on vigorous programmes of retail consolidation and expansion that created the Montgomery Ward and Woolworths' chains in the US. Investors could see new stores with lots of stock in most major towns by the late 1920s and wanted a slice of the action.

The similarities do not lie in the causes or incidents of the crisis - although investment trusts built on sand perhaps have their parallel in today's hedge funds and private equity groups - as in the attitudes of those caught up in it. Galbraith has a great deal of fun at the expense of the 'boosters' of the stock market which seemed to have included just about everyone - including the almost comically wrong Harvard Economic Society.

Galbraith was Paul M. Warburg Emeritus Professor of Economics at Harvard but this does not stop him from detailing proof positive that a group of experts engaged in group-think are more than likely to persist in their errors long after the rest of us are staring the facts in the face. The Harvard Economic Society should be remembered whenever any school of public intellectuals and experts purports to tell us what is right and proper in any area of public policy. Those who were seduced by the neo-conservatives before the recent round of incompetent foreign policies, take note.

On the other hand, Galbraith points out that the specialist financial Press saw through the house of cards and warned investors of the risks in 1929. Unfortunately, professional investors on Wall Street who would read this material were making serious money out of the speculation, while the people providing cash on margin were not interested in research and analysis - only in profiting from the 'sure thing'.

This is in marked contrast to the role of the media in the current crisis - see http://asithappens.tppr.info/journal/2008/12/16/the-financial-times-a-slipping-a.... Sadly, the financial press, pace the important reporting of Robert Peston of the BBC and the critiques of a few individuals like Larry Elliott of The Guardian in London, signally failed to advise the public of the trajectory of bank lending and of the 'toxicity' within the financial system. The media in 1929 at least tried to educate the public and policymakers ... the twenty-first century media merely parroted the news releases and briefings of the market players.

The very differences between the two crises show, paradoxically, what is wrong with the system as a whole. The common denominators are weak laissez-faire governments, the fact that the wealthiest are not necessarily the brightest and the existence of a cadre of insiders within the financial system who are expert at relieving the relatively rich of their funds in mutually profitable (in the short to medium term) adventures. If the super-rich and their middle class hangers-on are relieved of their funds by cleverer and more devious professionals, then why should the rest of us worry. But, of course, the nature of capitalism in the 1920s and at the beginning of the Twenty-First Century means that nothing is so simple or so morally satisfying.

The pleasure of watching a Darwinian struggle amongst the top 5% is mitigated by the fact that the capitalist system operates on the assumption that the wealthiest re-invest their funds in productive capacity. If the wealthy are cutting back because their assets have halved in value and continue to fall or they have lost everything to some over-clever fraudster, then innovative businesses or businesses employing thousands do not get the cash they need. The ordinary Joe's money also, aggregated, fails to go back into the system to sustain the wider economy. The whole bloody thing starts to wind down and even go into reverse. Banks and the wealthy have now lost a great deal of money and want to make the rest safe and claw it back.

Galbraith will not criticise the system because he cannot. But there are fundamental questions to ask about how it is that innovation and employment are allowed to depend so much on hysterical decision-making by a tiny minority of the population in a collusive herd relationship with an even smaller group of 'technical experts'. More, how can they be allowed to continue to set the agenda after they have almost brought the system to its knees?

It may be time for Americans to ask a few questions about whether free markets and the American system of capitalism created by the likes of J P Morgan, centred on Wall Street, actually works for America. They won't, of course. Even Prof. Galbraith seemed unable to ask such questions.
show less
I read this when it was first published in 1967. As part of my freshman Honors Econ course I wrote a blistering critique of what I still consider one of the worst books I have ever read. I argued from the point of view shared by Milton Friedman and other free market thinkers that Galbraith believes in the superiority of aristocracy and in its paternalistic authority, that consumers should not be allowed choice, and that all should be determined by those with "higher minds" - never mind the show more choices of the individual consumer. Today Paul Krugman, who in ironic fashion criticized Galbraith as well, represents a similar strain in aristocratic economic thought. In this book Galbraith demonstrates the best example of an advocate of "bad" economics. show less

Lists

Awards

You May Also Like

Associated Authors

Statistics

Works
77
Also by
10
Members
11,220
Popularity
#2,101
Rating
3.8
Reviews
118
ISBNs
501
Languages
21
Favorited
19

Charts & Graphs