Adam Higginbotham

Fascinating account, almost moment by moment, of the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. I'm not qualified to explain how it might fit into our broader understanding of the disaster, as I am not familiar with the considerable pile of published reports and books.

What I can say, however, is that this is a well-researched, well-written account of the meltdown, making use of eye-witness accounts and official reports. Some of the most interesting insights come from the accounts of the meetings of the show more Politburo, where the heads of the Communist Party debate how much they should tell the people of Ukraine and Russia about the accident. Reading about these mid-level politicians trying to massage the message and anticipate the reactions of their bosses reminds me of the spectacle of Trump appointees trying to anticipate and head off Trump's displeasure.

This history is a fable for our times, an account of when politics overrode expertise and managing up was more important than managing the meltdown. Highly recommended. show less

This book will leave you heartbroken, tired, and absolutely enraged. Seven brilliant people died not because of the vagaries of nature but due to amazing human hubris. Many narratives of tragedies spend their page count on the disaster and the gory aftermath. Challenger spends the vast majority of the time explaining not why Challenger happened but leaving the reader wondering how it didn't happen much sooner. Higginbotham is one of the few writers who can make even a boring science show more discussion seem propulsive. In fact, the book almost feels like a horror story at certain points as the author clearly leaves clues on what will ultimately be more casualties than just the crew of the Challenger. show less

Detailed account of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor meltdown in 1986 in the former Soviet Union (now Ukraine). Higginbotham takes a look at the reasons behind the explosion, what happened at the plant immediately afterward, the radioactive fallout, protracted clean-up efforts, and the consequences. The author’s account is based on interviews, archives, and de-classified documents.

Despite Gorbachev’s stated policy of glasnost, a blanket of secrecy was drawn over the catastrophe. Operators show more were blamed and punished, despite multiple design flaws. Thirty-one people died, according to official numbers, though the statistics were not meticulously tracked, and subsequent deaths were intentionally attributed to causes other than radiation. It is almost unbelievable how long it took to evacuate the nearby town of Pripyat.

This book provides a detailed analysis of causes and effects, focused on scientific and political explanations. It requires a strong interest in science to fully appreciate it. The chapters related to the disaster are both horrifying and riveting. There were many people involved and it is sometimes difficult to keep them straight. I listened to the audiobook, read by Jacques Roy. He does an excellent job. His narration is smooth and lively.

I found it an enlightening examination of the Soviet bureaucracy and cultural legacy of the era. Employees generally had no desire to communicate bad news upward in the organization for fear of reprimand. Political loyalty was prized above technical proficiency. The “narrative” was tightly controlled such that what really happened was obscured from public view. I think a great deal can be learned (mainly on what not to do) from this in-depth assessment of the disaster. show less

The first part of the book was devoted to the tragedy of Apollo 1, in which Roger Chaffee, Gus Grissom, and Ed White burned to death in a "routine" pre-mission test on the launch pad. In 1967, as a school child obsessed by space exploration, I was deeply upset by that tragedy. My understanding from news reports at the time, and brief references I've seen over the years, was that the conflagration was caused by the pure oxygen atmosphere in the capsule, but Higginbotham dug deeper and brought show more forward information that was not widely publicized or not emphasized at the time. The cabin was festooned with bundles of wires (surely they couldn't have intended to fly it like that!), some frayed or poorly connected. After the blaze, everything was so destroyed that there was no way of telling the actual cause, but it was probably a spark from a short that ignited the blaze. Then, the heavy door of the capsule was located *behind the commander's couch* and he had to reach over his head and around his back to undo *seven latches* to open it. It would have taken something like 40 seconds or more, and the crew didn't have anywhere near that amount of time. So there was bad design (the hatch), cost and weight cutting (the atmosphere mix), and slipshod construction.

There's a quote from an astronaut in the book -- quickly searching online attributes it to Alan Shepard -- When reporters asked Shepard what he thought about as he sat atop the Redstone rocket, waiting for liftoff, he had replied, 'The fact that every part of this ship was built by the lowest bidder.' (as quoted in Failure Is Not an Option by Gene Kranz)

This sums up both Apollo and the Shuttle project rather well.

The tragedy of Apollo 1 serves as an introduction to more of the same in the shuttle program. Again, the ship was designed without any easy method of escape, for the same reasons. Cost and weight. Cost and weight also played into the solid fuel boosters and O-rings that ultimately caused the Challenger explosion, but the truly chilling part of the story that was NOT publicized at the time is that the crew survived the initial explosion and the control capsule fell from the sky for two, almost three minutes with no way to eject, no parachutes. At least one member of the crew was alive when they hit the water.

The launch should have been put off, but there was serious pressure from bureaucrats to keep to the schedule (as indeed with Apollo 1). So engineers' concerns were ignored. In Chapter 7, speaking of the shuttle program in general, Higginbotham says "[T]he development plans for each of the engineering challenges involved" (many of which were impossible to meet at all without major scientific and engineering breakthroughs) "-- which NASA managers had based on the appealing and financially expedient expectation that their work would proceed without a single failure or setback -- had proved to be wildly optimistic." This also sums up the problems with the space program rather well.

And Columbia was more of the same. Engineers on the ground asked for photos of the damage thought to have been incurred during the launch, but their requests were three times denied or ignored.

This was quite a disturbing book. But it's well written and extremely well researched. Five stars. show less