Richard B. Frank

The particular value of this trilogy is that, over the last 10-15 years, the historical understanding of Chiang Kai-shek's war with Japan has been brought into much finer focus, and the result is that one is left with a more favorable image of Chiang. Not to mention that the government of the PRC has come to lean heavily on China's participation in World War II as a validation of Beijing's international legitimacy. These are realities that Frank is seeking to bring to a more general show more readership. Having fairly recently read some of the academic history that Frank leans upon in writing this work, you can argue that I'm not the main audience. But what I appreciate about Frank, thinking back to some of his earlier works, is that he does a particularly good job of putting the contingency back into controversial events, when 20/20 hindsight tends to warp the perception of how period decision makers came to make the choices they did. I look forward to the coming books in this trilogy with considerable enthusiasm. show less

Detailed account of the Sino-Japanese War which makes a compelling argument that no action of the Japanese in WWII can be fully explained without consideration of its China dilemma. The Japanese wanted to make peace but Chiang Kai-Shek stubbornly refused to concede any Chinese territory. Thus the Japanese, able to defeat the Chinese in battle after battle, but ultimately unable to defeat the Chinese will to resist--were trapped into a blood-sucking conflict that tempered everything they did show more in the Pacific Theater. Very good book published by an accomplished historian. show less

Military histories can be well written and informative but they're often out of balance. Richard Frank states at the outset that he will include everything of relevance so he looks at American and Japanese sources, tracing the battle from both sides. He covers the ground, sea and air actions, equipment performance, training, tactics, strategy, supply, the political context and psychology (the beliefs true and otherwise of participants about themselves and their opponents).
The picture that show more emerges is of Japanese dominance at sea(better training), rough equality in the air and American dominance on the ground. Interesting points are the full use by the Japanese of their effective "Long Lance" torpedoes from ships and aircraft while the Americans virtually throw away their great advantage in radar. The Japanese leadership high and low place too much faith in the "quality of the Japanese soldier" leading to the bizarre idea that he can fight almost without food (!), undertake 20 mile marches through impenetrable jungle and make successful bayonet charges against machine guns. They just can't believe that they can be defeated by Americans and a general hubris leads them to send too few units, do poor intelligence work and not press their advantage when they could have won the battle in it's early stages. Somehow the Japanese also missed the point that it was only necessary to shut down Henderson airfield, something they could have done fairly easily by gaining and holding firing positions without trying to occupy the whole island.
On the American side there was a deep lack of experience, especially in the navy, but superior supply and some occasional fine leadership (e.g. Vandegrift of the marines) let them stabilize the situation and eventually win. show less

Seemed to be a fair and balanced look at MacArthur's life, a complex individual for certain. Much less critical of the view of the General one gets from Davis Halbertam's "The Coldest Winter", which discusses MacArthur during the Korean War. You get a sense from reading Richard Frank's book that like most of us, there are the good sides and the bad, and with someone in a leadership position such as General MacArthur's, it's inevitable that he'll have his serious detractors as well as his show more staunch supporters,and the real person probably incorporates parts of both. show less