Donald Kagan (1932–2021)

This book is wonderful because it takes Thucydides classic text--itself a wonder--and fills in the gaps, or corrects the ancient text where necessary. Thucydides is cited throughout in a manner reminiscent of the notation used to cite Biblical chapter and verse. In addition, Kagan refers to the writings of Plutarch, Xenophon, Diodorus, Socrates, Aristophanes, and others, especially for the last seven years of the war, a period Thucydides does not cover. Like any scholar worth his salt, Kagan show more is conversant with the scholarly consensus, with which he is for the most part in step, though he occasionally offers alternative scenarios. Much of the book is simply riveting. Like when the Spartan general Brasidas retakes Amphipolis, or the naval battle fought late in the war for control of the Hellespont. Woven throughout is the longer story of the Athenian turncoat, Alcibiades. Professor Kagan preceded this one-volume history with a four-volume history of the war that took him around 20 years to write. That 4-volume series is a much more detailed consideration of political motives and military strategy. But with this single volume, Kagan was able to produce a fast-moving tale, full of incident and colorful description. I am not a great reader of military histories; most, in my experience, are a boring slog. But because of Kagan's previous in-depth consideration of the same events, and the need to get the story told in a mere 485 pages, the result is a taut, compressed narrative that moves briskly and bears the reader delightedly along. show less

An absorbing book, providing a deep insight into what really causes, or leads to, armed interactions among countries and peoples. The chapters on the two world wars are especially absorbing. I, for one, got fresh insights into the role of individual leaders and statesmen like Bismarck, who balanced the European west and the east tirelessly and kept them from going to war. After his retirement, however, the bellicose factions gained ascendancy and took Europe into a devastating war. By show more drawing on the early examples of Sparta-Athens divisions in ancient Greece and the Rome-Carthage wars a little later, the author repeatedly makes the point that it is not only greed for plunder or land that leads to war between nations, but also, perhaps more usually, feelings of not being respected or given a just deal. Wars often become inevitable because of national pride and remembered or resurrected instances of humiliation or betrayal. His chapter on the Cuban missile crisis does not appear to me to be on par with the other examples, as he seems to be oscillating toward and away from a hawkish stance, and seems to be accusing John Kennedy of projecting a weak and pusillanimous character to the rough and bumptious Kruschev. On the whole, however, this author's analysis and insights into war and peace should surely improve our understanding of the current crises as well. show less

Kagan is trying to justify Bush era preemptive strike policy and aggressive foreign wars by using and comparing historical examples of failed peaces. This would more accurately say "...and the preservation of the status-quo", because the authors idea of "peace" is first strike wars against those who threaten it.

The one thing that really bothers me the most is that the examples he uses (the Punic wars, WW1, WW2)are all certainly illustrative of the consequences of leaving a tenacious enemy show more half defeated, but have little bearing on what it means to become involved in warfare in this modern age. Look at Afghanistan and Iraq to see that it is not a matter of crushing an enemy completely to secure victory, this simply can not be done in a insurgent style war. Anyone who reads the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field manual, or reads any of the modern theorists on insurgent warfare (which is really all that is happening anymore) can see for themselves that destruction of the enemy by force is an unrealistic approach to this kind of warfare and that military success will never look the same again as it did even sixty years ago. It's not enough to completely destroy the enemy and remove his ability to make war because the enemy is not an army, and he makes war in the shadows with nothing but scraps.

Kagan and his children are notorious insiders. His son Frederick Kagan is credited with conceiving of the famous "surge" in Iraq, his son Robert Kagan is a notorious neo-conservative who was directly involved in the bush era insanity (see his books). The U.S. went into Iraq with a "let's just smash 'em up and go home" attitude, and IT DIDN'T WORK. How soon after Bush declared victory did it become clear that there was no victory to be had then, or ever? immediately. these guys want nothing more than a conventional war like their fathers had, with the pitched field battles like their fathers fought, but they can not have them. We will all pay the price for this desire of these few militant men in high places who want so badly the glory of days long past. show less

Donald Kagan, one of the foremost scholars of Ancient Greek history, wrote a concise but thorough history of the Peloponnesian War for a general audience based off his four-volume academic masterpiece on the same subject. From the start Kagan brings the reader to the time period of the war with enough background information that someone not familiar at all with Ancient Greece will understand the circumstances of the beginning of the war from each side's viewpoint. Throughout the work, Kagan show more brings in a modern military and political view to help examine decisions of either side that the ancient sources' explain as social virtue or vice. This supplement to the ancient sources helps give a fuller view of the decisions of the Athenians, Spartans, and their respective allies. If you want to learn about Ancient Greek history beyond Marathon or Thermopylae, I fully recommend this book. show less