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About the Author

Herbert Raymond McMaster was born on July 24, 1962 in Philadelphia. He is a U.S. Army lieutenant general and the 26th National Security Advisor. His military assignments include Director of Army Capabilities Integration Center and Deputy Commanding General, Futures, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine show more Command. McMaster earned a Master of Arts and Ph.D. in American history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His thesis was critical of American strategy in the Vietnam War, which was further detailed in his 1997 book Dereliction of Duty. In this book McMaster's explores the military's role in the policies of the Vietnam War. The book criticized high-ranking officers of that era, arguing that they inadequately challenged Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson on their Vietnam strategy. His other titles include The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell, Lesson for a Long War: How America can Win on New Battlefields and Ideas and Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare. (Bowker Author Biography) show less

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25 reviews
McMaster came to my cognizance through his tenure in the Trump administration, but I actually stared into this book expecting a combat memoir like turning off the news to watch Saving Private Ryan. Instead, the scholar warrior schooled me in the necessity for a big picture, long-term view of The Great Game of Afghanistan, etc., Sino-American relations, confronting Iran, and more.

I found his cogent, coherent reasoning rooted in serious historical research convincing and well articulated. He show more formerly taught history at West Point and the book includes this insightful anecdote from just after President Trump's appointing him National Security Advisor:

...he [an aide] asked me why I was spending more time packing books than clothes.

I explained to him that I intended to draw on history to help frame contemporary challenges to national security. An important first step in developing policy and strategy, I believed, was to understand how the past produced the present. I also believed that the history of how previous presidents, their cabinets, and the National Security Council staff made decisions, developed policies, and crafted strategies held lessons for how to deliver the best advice and sound options to the president. For me, history was an avocation.


I honestly hope to at least read more of his work and also hope to see him return to appointed or elected high office.

His recurring theme of "strategic narcissism" and its application is nicely summarized in this quote from the concluding section:

A THEME in this book, strategic narcissism, and the corresponding tendency to artificially separate interconnected problem sets, encourages short-term, simplistic solutions to complex problems. Bias against the long-term approach, like other maladies affecting U.S. policy, stems from a lack of empathy. Jamil Zaki, professor of psychology at Stanford University and the director of the Stanford Social Neuroscience Lab, observes in his book, The War for Kindness: Building Empathy in a Fractured World, that both time and distance diminish empathy because humans’ “caring instincts are short sighted.” Our ability to feel empathy about future developments is limited because “we tend not to feel for our future selves. It goes against our instincts, therefore, to tackle problems that we have not yet been forced to confront. If the consequences of action or inaction are far off and afflict strangers yet to be born, we are less likely to sacrifice or invest today.” That tendency is evident across the globe on the interrelated problems of climate change, pollution, energy security, and food and water security.

Like discussions with President Trump concerning the Iran Nuclear Deal, those concerning the Paris climate accord were animated. I was far from an expert on the subject, but it was clear to me that the issue of climate change tended to move people toward polar extremes. Climate activists endorsed impractical measures, while climate deniers and skeptics disregarded compelling evidence that global warming is happening, that it is caused by humans, and that, if unchecked, it will have disastrous consequences. Perhaps naïvely, I thought that if we simply focused on what Americans agreed on, we could develop options for a climate strategy, get beyond disagreements between those on the fringes of the issue, and make real progress.

I recommended to the president that the United States stay in the Paris Agreement, an environmental accord adopted by nearly every nation in 2015 to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and limit the global temperature increase in the twenty-first century to 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. I believed that climate change was manmade and that we had to develop a sound, multinational solution. The agreement was nonbinding, so I did not see the downside of staying in it. Besides, I felt that withdrawing would result in a loss of American influence not only on the range of climate-related issues, but also on other challenges that required multinational efforts.

Those who argued for leaving, however, believed that if the United States failed to meet its targets for carbon reduction in the agreement, activists would initiate litigation against the government and industries. They also believed that meeting the targets would limit economic growth and impose costs on the American people even as the world’s greatest polluters not only agreed to less ambitious goals, but also received payments from the United States and others as an incentive to convert to renewable energy sources. The agreement, like the Iran nuclear deal, was not ratified by Congress; many saw it as an infringement on sovereignty. In Trump’s Rose Garden speech in June 2017 announcing his decision to initiate the withdrawal process, he said the deal “disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers, who I love, and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.”23 In short, the president believed that the accord would be an economic burden to the United States and, additionally, that it would result in a large-scale loss of jobs, putting the U.S. at an international disadvantage, all the while doing nothing to stop climate change in the long term.
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Fascinating and infuriating at the same time. Fascinating for the glimpses inside the chaotic Trump administration. Infuriating in so many ways, most essentially in the way McMaster legitimizes a reality TV malignant narcissist who bamboozled his way into the presidency. He compares Trump to LBJ. He makes excuses for Trump's incompetence, asserting there was no "collusion" with Russia. He makes excuses for his own performance, whining that he was shut out by Mattis and Kelly, who at least show more did seem to realize that Trump was a problem. All in all, quite a disappointment. show less
The definitive account of America's slow slide into the Vietnam War, McMaster explores how the Kennedy administration disabled the formal Joint Chief's advising process in favor of ad hoc committees of civilian advisers, cutting the military out of the decision-making loop. This insularity, coupled with President Johnson's duplicity and Secretary McNamara's arrogance lead America into war without a real decision on "why", or "how much." The consensus demanded by Johnson to foster his show more domestic agenda concealed a lack of strategic thought, a desire to avoid making any decision until it was too late. McNamara's strategy of "graduated pressure" was fundamentally flawed, and the outmaneuvered JCS were unable to force the issue. But by buying into the administrations lies, in the 1965 Congressional hearings on the war, the JCS fundamentally abrogated their duty to the American people and Constitution.

The topic of America's entry into Vietnam is complex, McMaster's account is readable, but frequently repetitive, and occasionally more opinionated than history warrants. On the other hand, it beats going to the primary source material.
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I saw Dereliction of Duty many years ago in my library (back when it was a relatively new book), and only now got around to reading it (remembering it probably because the author, General H.R. McMaster, worked for President Trump for a while).

Well before I finished Dereliction of Duty at this moment, I had already figured out that it is an essential history book and I would like to own a copy after I turn this back in. The book told me everything I wanted to know about the political show more (mis)management of the Vietnam War, beginning in the Kennedy administration and continuing into the Johnson administration. I would feel incredulous if I didn't already know the most basic political problems (mainly from hearing my Vietnam veteran father's explanation).

I sent a recommendation to everyone on my list who cites history as an interest.
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7
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Rating
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