Sir John Winthrop Hackett (1910–1997)
Author of The Third World War
About the Author
Works by Sir John Winthrop Hackett
Associated Works
Providence Their Guide: A Personal Account of the Long Range Desert Group, 1940–1945 (1980) — Foreword — 48 copies, 1 review
Tagged
Common Knowledge
- Other names
- Hackett, Shan
Hackett, John - Birthdate
- 1910-11-05
- Date of death
- 1997-09-10
- Gender
- male
- Education
- Central School of Art
University of Oxford (New College) - Occupations
- soldier
Principal of King's College, London (1968-1975)
Commander, NATO Northern Army Group
Commander in Chief, British Army of the Rhine (1965-1966)
Deputy Chief of the General Staff (1963-1964)
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Ireland Command (1961-1963) (show all 10)
Commandant, Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham (1958-1961)
commander, 4th Parachute Battalion, British Army (1944)
officer, 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars (1933)
British Army officer, Supplementary Reserve of Officers (1931) - Organizations
- British Army (career incl. WWII)
- Awards and honors
- Order of the Bath (Knight Grand Cross)
Order of the British Empire (Commander)
Distinguished Service Order (and Bar)
Military Cross - Nationality
- Australia
- Birthplace
- Perth, Western Australia, Australia
- Associated Place (for map)
- Western Australia, Australia
Members
Reviews
This is a solid set of essays from academic specialists on ancient warfare, from the Assyrians through to the last days of the Roman Empire, edited by General Sir John Hackett and with illustrations to fit the text from Peter Connally.
The text can be densely specialist in places, the diagrams (though extensive) could have been better thought through and the narrative is nearly a quarter of a century old but it provides a continuous account of the use of force by the succession of gangsters show more we call kings and emperors.
Specialists will demur at my generosity in giving five stars (the easy acceptance of the presumed division between the heroic age and the age of the phalanx is no longer widely accepted) but the flow between the chapters works well and we get a strong sense of history unfolding.
In essence, warfare in the ancient world can be characterised as the skilful use of massed ranks of armed men, with the same human force being used to bring down the walls of besieged cities. The phalanx and the legion dominate the story but both are mere variations on a theme.
Technological change is present but remarkably limited. There are changes in tactics but the aim remains to get position for a set piece battle and use your men well. Naval force is of limited value except against sea brigands and still relies on brute human labour as oarsmen and marines.
Even horse power, while having an important role in battle, is weakened by the lack of the invention of the stirrup. Elephants died in cold climates. Animals were as likely to be part of the problem behind a failure as the means for success.
The genius of ancient generals lay in both a quick intelligence about the calculated risk to be taken and their ability to create or take advantage of systems that relied on masses of men being incentivised, out of fear or interest, both to win battles and exploit populations.
Many of these systems - the Assyrian, the Alexandrine and the Roman - were little more than self-creating machines for rapine and plunder and we can see the seeds of Napoleon and Trotsky in the actions of the Ancients.
Little changes when it comes to the exercise of brute power. Terrorism against populations alternates with cutting deals with troublesome enemy elites, a form of natural instinctive game theory builds up empires until the next innovator can smash them.
Empires rarely implode from within though the classic split in the ruling order can weaken an Empire and open the door to a superior organisation. Revolts rarely succeed because they cannot build the critical mass of manpower or learn how to organise themselves against the organised.
Indeed, the achievement of Trotsky and other liberation Communists in this context - mobilising and creating a military machine to defend and promote a revolution - stands up alongside those of Alexander and Caesar though, of course, the ideals were soon lost to the necessities of Power.
There is a possible truth that only the brutal realism of Communism, with its culture of terror and expediency, can overthrow the world of kings and emperors completely. Power and military ruthlessness have been and will always be inextricably linked. This book shows us for just how long. show less
The text can be densely specialist in places, the diagrams (though extensive) could have been better thought through and the narrative is nearly a quarter of a century old but it provides a continuous account of the use of force by the succession of gangsters show more we call kings and emperors.
Specialists will demur at my generosity in giving five stars (the easy acceptance of the presumed division between the heroic age and the age of the phalanx is no longer widely accepted) but the flow between the chapters works well and we get a strong sense of history unfolding.
In essence, warfare in the ancient world can be characterised as the skilful use of massed ranks of armed men, with the same human force being used to bring down the walls of besieged cities. The phalanx and the legion dominate the story but both are mere variations on a theme.
Technological change is present but remarkably limited. There are changes in tactics but the aim remains to get position for a set piece battle and use your men well. Naval force is of limited value except against sea brigands and still relies on brute human labour as oarsmen and marines.
Even horse power, while having an important role in battle, is weakened by the lack of the invention of the stirrup. Elephants died in cold climates. Animals were as likely to be part of the problem behind a failure as the means for success.
The genius of ancient generals lay in both a quick intelligence about the calculated risk to be taken and their ability to create or take advantage of systems that relied on masses of men being incentivised, out of fear or interest, both to win battles and exploit populations.
Many of these systems - the Assyrian, the Alexandrine and the Roman - were little more than self-creating machines for rapine and plunder and we can see the seeds of Napoleon and Trotsky in the actions of the Ancients.
Little changes when it comes to the exercise of brute power. Terrorism against populations alternates with cutting deals with troublesome enemy elites, a form of natural instinctive game theory builds up empires until the next innovator can smash them.
Empires rarely implode from within though the classic split in the ruling order can weaken an Empire and open the door to a superior organisation. Revolts rarely succeed because they cannot build the critical mass of manpower or learn how to organise themselves against the organised.
Indeed, the achievement of Trotsky and other liberation Communists in this context - mobilising and creating a military machine to defend and promote a revolution - stands up alongside those of Alexander and Caesar though, of course, the ideals were soon lost to the necessities of Power.
There is a possible truth that only the brutal realism of Communism, with its culture of terror and expediency, can overthrow the world of kings and emperors completely. Power and military ruthlessness have been and will always be inextricably linked. This book shows us for just how long. show less
Had to re-read this one as it's over 45 years since I read it the first time. Now it reads as alternate history, it was written as plausible prediction. Still readable, although laughably wrong as prediction. Tainted by the authors obvious politics and more than a few whiffs of subtle racism. It brought to mind a quote from Sandy Berger: "History is written through a rear-view mirror but it unfolds through a foggy windshield." The good General wrote this as though he was looking in the show more mirror, but his windshield proved exceptionally foggy. Still a worthwhile read. show less
Early in 1977 a retired NATO general called together six of his colleagues--including an admiral, an airman, an economist and a diplomat--to write a dramatized fantast of the next world war.
The vivid, detailed imagining of on-the-spot reports from battlefronts, excerpts from fantasy memoirs, internal Soviet documents, etc. reads like a treatment for a big screen war movie.
Well, since it it looks like World War III already started, I thought it was finally time to take this prediction of a show more 1985 WWIII and see how well it matches up. Now, this is basically NATO vs. USSR, so in the post-Soviet world it cannot be an apples to apples comparison. We don't have Warsaw Pact nations (most are in NATO, now) and so no blitzkrieg across the Fulda Gap into Central Europe. Still, some similarities and dissimilarities are of interest to me. This war is over in a few weeks and basically starts with Russian expansionist African movements to me somewhat similar to the agitation in provinces of various nations of Central Asia seeking to foment separatism. Also, things go from chemical attacks from both sides to both sides skipping strategic nukes to each launching one city killer in over about ten days. Whoa! Things went from bad to worse fast in this vision!
One thing that does jive with where we are at is anti-tank and other potent man-portable armaments making wreckage out of armor directed from Moscow.
Also, this one imagines beams against space vehicles, etc. and of course misses the cyberwar.
One eerie bullseye is the neo-Nazi claims from the Kremlin:
The vivid, detailed imagining of on-the-spot reports from battlefronts, excerpts from fantasy memoirs, internal Soviet documents, etc. reads like a treatment for a big screen war movie.
Well, since it it looks like World War III already started, I thought it was finally time to take this prediction of a show more 1985 WWIII and see how well it matches up. Now, this is basically NATO vs. USSR, so in the post-Soviet world it cannot be an apples to apples comparison. We don't have Warsaw Pact nations (most are in NATO, now) and so no blitzkrieg across the Fulda Gap into Central Europe. Still, some similarities and dissimilarities are of interest to me. This war is over in a few weeks and basically starts with Russian expansionist African movements to me somewhat similar to the agitation in provinces of various nations of Central Asia seeking to foment separatism. Also, things go from chemical attacks from both sides to both sides skipping strategic nukes to each launching one city killer in over about ten days. Whoa! Things went from bad to worse fast in this vision!
One thing that does jive with where we are at is anti-tank and other potent man-portable armaments making wreckage out of armor directed from Moscow.
Also, this one imagines beams against space vehicles, etc. and of course misses the cyberwar.
One eerie bullseye is the neo-Nazi claims from the Kremlin:
From the outset the world was swamped with Soviet claims, flooding through every possible channel of communication, that this was no more than defensive action, to which the Warsaw Pact had been driven by neo-Nazi ambitions supported by capitalist imperialism. 'It has long been clear,' the announcement proclaimed,show less
'that the new Nazis are set on the reunification of Germany by force and the subsequent domination of Europe as an early step to world supremacy. The policy of "forward defense", which is self-evident military non sense if it does not mean action by the FRG east of the Demarcation Line, has never been more than a thin cloak for the firm intention to invade the GDR as a first move towards the dismemberment of the Warsaw Pact and the destruction of the USSR. The change of name from Vorwärtsverteidigung (Forward Defence) to Vornever teidigung (Frontal Defence) has done nothing to disguise the nakedness of an essentially aggressive policy. Plans for the invasion are now, in total authenticity,' as the announcement put it, 'in Soviet hands, and their authors will in time be brought to justice. Meanwhile, it has become abundantly clear that there is no time to lose in cutting out the Nazi canker. Otherwise all hope will vanish of a lasting peace in Europe.'
This is an odd but delightful book. General Hackett was an officer of some talents; commander of one of the paratrooper brigades at Arnhem and later NATO commander of the British Army of the Rhine, and these are his thoughts on military virtues and leadership in the guise of a history. As a history book, I can't recommend it all--aside from some very nice colour plates it is Eurocentric in the extreme, skipping from Sparta to Frederick the Great in about a dozen pages. His sociology of the show more development of the mass army and the modern nation-state is at a mere primer level.
Where this book shines is when Hackett gets personal, and you'll enjoy it to the extend that you enjoy cranky British ramblings. In short, Hackett sees the military as primarily a virtuous institution built around courage, duty, and loyalty. Leadership, the measure of men and the ability to transfer their faith onto a commander to become greater than the individual or the unit, is the supreme requirement of the officer, and one that is separate from the purely technical skills of logistics or tactics. Hackett has some weird and unPC quirks (class differences are essential to the success of the British army. The Wehrmacht was an honorable enemy.), but if you can put those aside, its a lot like having a cup of a tea with a soldier who's learned a lot of lessons the hard way. show less
Where this book shines is when Hackett gets personal, and you'll enjoy it to the extend that you enjoy cranky British ramblings. In short, Hackett sees the military as primarily a virtuous institution built around courage, duty, and loyalty. Leadership, the measure of men and the ability to transfer their faith onto a commander to become greater than the individual or the unit, is the supreme requirement of the officer, and one that is separate from the purely technical skills of logistics or tactics. Hackett has some weird and unPC quirks (class differences are essential to the success of the British army. The Wehrmacht was an honorable enemy.), but if you can put those aside, its a lot like having a cup of a tea with a soldier who's learned a lot of lessons the hard way. show less
Lists
Awards
You May Also Like
Associated Authors
Statistics
- Works
- 11
- Also by
- 9
- Members
- 1,610
- Popularity
- #16,004
- Rating
- 3.5
- Reviews
- 22
- ISBNs
- 62
- Languages
- 7
