Kenneth Macksey (1923–2005)

If you go by the title, I guarantee you will be scratching your head and try to figure out are you reading a book that by accident got the cover with the title in question.

Book is not analysis on why Germans lose at war - this is story of highest level of command of German army (from around unification, through 1800's, WW1 and finally WW2) and the way high command saw itself as a true political body that should actually run the country (or at least act as king-maker).

High level of country's show more militarization and pretty elite status of the army was driven by the very location of Germany in Europe, ever so good neighborly relations in Europe (which is same for every country that shares its border with also-very-trigger-happy neighbors, different one every couple of hundred miles) and need to finish the war as fast as possible to avoid catastrophic attrition. This is what Germany was known for until WW1 - relatively localized wars with one or (at maximum) two opponents (in the same direction), with aim to finish it fast.

So, to sum the book up (because, again, to underline - proper title would be History of German High Command) is that Germans paid the price other great nations paid when they chewed more than they can swallow - Alexander the Great and the Napoleon to name the few. They started very carefully and after successes started to believe their own might and invincibility (very similar to current West that spent 20 years chasing insurgents on open ground and they believe they can confront peer-opponent in direct combat like that - right....). Driven by this superiority complex, Germans just over extended themselves, committed disgusting crimes (yes, German Army too, oh yes) and then found themselves crushed and ruthlessly hunted and decimated while retreating to their home country.

Only thing that is different here is that Germans used start of Cold War to create the myth of their professionalism and quality in battle, myth that was supported unfortunately by (further west) Western Allies because they needed something to act as a barrier against the USSR (even in form of barren fields decimated by nuclear weapons if need be - but even for this that same nation needs to be ready to die to the last man so give them a myth).

Did they have more capable, and adaptive senior and junior officers - definitely at the beginning. This was truly advantage over more strict and inflexible French and Russian command chains and even rather rigid British socially-controlled officer corps. But against US and (to a degree) Canadians, I dont think so - these were initiative driven armies from the start (which together with ANZAC they proved in WW1). And lets be honest - adaptability and capability is something that gets (unfortunately very bloody) learned in the field of the battle. After few bloody battles each surviving army unit grows and does not forget the lessons learned (which is something West is [shockingly!] becoming aware in the East Europe these days).

I gotta say I expected something more but then again it is obvious my expectations were unrealistic. Why? Because story of German Army is story of Napoleon, Alexander the Great, Gustav Adolphus - people who created great armies but then just went over the cliff because they could not control themselves.

German's myth survived only due to the better propaganda machine.

Interesting book. If you disregard the title very good history of German High Command.

Recommended. show less

Within the realm of alternate history literature and scenarios, World War II is particularly prominent for fiction authors and historians to ponder on. In The Hitler Options: Alternate Decisions of WWII, ten military historians—which included book editor Kenneth Macksey—looked at scenarios which could have changed the course of the war towards the Third Reich and its Axis partners against the Allies or that the Allies could have decided to the detriment of the Nazis.

The scenarios ranged show more from the decision to invade England soon after the end of the Battle of France to the Axis securing the Mediterranean before turning to the Soviet Union to linking up with the Japanese to focusing on a jet fighter instead of a jet bomber. While eight of the scenario focused on decisions benefiting the Nazis, two focused on decisions the Western Allies could have made to fight the war differently. The two Allied focused scenarios, “Through the Soft Underbelly” and “Operation ARMAGGEDON”, were among best written in the book along with the Nazi focused “Operation SPINX”, “Operation WOTAN”, and “Operation GREENBRIER”.

While the five other scenarios were just as interesting, the style the author chose to write them undermined their overall effectiveness to some degree especially when compared those scenarios cited above as. Then ten scenarios came up a total of 216 pages, which came out to just barely 20 pages per scenario when excluding maps used for each. This short length for each scenario to be developed in my opinion hurt some of the less impressive scenarios and could have added depth to some of the best as well.

Overall The Hitler Decisions is a good book for those interested in alternate history, especially concentrated around World War II. Yet, there are some drawbacks with the relatively short length average of each piece that hurt some of the scenarios along with stylistic choices. show less

This book did not start well for me. Tightly bound, I do not like the fussy typeface and the use of the European number seven - 7 with a cross bar. Poor proof reading means there are already too many typographical errors in the first chapters.

Once I got over this disappointment, I then found another - more evidence of poor editing and proof reading. Some of the sentences are far too long, such that the reader has to go back over the same words having lost one's way - sentences that are six show more or seven lines long are not uncommon, it seems, for this writer!

Anyway, the first chapter, entitled Events Before 1940, was interesting. Trying to ignore long sentences, typeface and typesetting errors, I enjoyed the book and learned a fair amount. show less

A concise to the point account written by a repespected writer, like all the Ballantine books in this series.

As a Canadian I appreciate the respect he shows for the Canadian Corps often ignored even by people like John Keegan. I also respect that he points out that the battle and the failure to take advantage of the aftermath leave this battle over-rated by Canadians.

My one quibble is that accounts in this series of great American victories are written by Americans, and include all the chest show more puffing flag waving you would expect. The books about British victories, are written by Brits, and you can hear "Rule Britannia" in the background.

It would have been nice to see a Canadian write this or if the other battle books in the series receive a similar balanced, less nationalistic voice. show less