Mark Bowden (1) (1951–)

I was six years old when Iranian students raided the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Sixty-six hostages were taken in all. The planned three day protest turned into a 444 day nightmare. I cast my very first vote (albeit unofficial) for President Jimmy Carter that following year. I vaguely remember he wasn't the popular choice, but even then I had a tendency to want to fight for the underdog. I was completely oblivious to the events that surrounded his final year in office and what would be the last show more straw in what turned the majority of Americans against him at the polls.

The Iran Hostage Crisis became a pivotal moment in world history, especially for the United States. Americans would take to the streets in outrage while Iranians rallied in support of their fellow countrymen for taking on "the Great Satan". Iranians had good cause to be furious with the American government who had blatantly interfered with the leadership in Iran years before, knocking aside the Iranian people's favored leader for one the Americans felt served the U.S. interests better. The American favored shah was an oppressive and cruel leader. The tyrant was eventually overthrown and forced out of the country, leaving Iran in the middle of a revolution, different factions vying for power. When the shah was admitted into the U.S. for medical treatment, it was as if the Americans were flipping the Iranians the bird.

One particular group, a group of students calling themselves Muslim Students Following the Iman's Line wanted to make a statement and plotted to take over the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The sixty-six Americans hostages were all accused of being spies. In reality, only three of the hostages were CIA agents and none of them had viable contacts within Iran, and therefore, had not really been doing any spying at all. The turmoil in the country made that next to impossible. None of the evidence uncovered during the search of the embassy and the hostages living quarters supported the students assertions that the Americans wanted to assassinate the Ayatollah or take over their current government, and yet they persisted in their beliefs and acted accordingly.

Each of the hostages responded to captivity in their own ways; some were cooperative and tried to make friends with their captors, faith grew stronger for a couple, while others became rebellious and did what they could to torment their captors in their limited capacity. There were escape attempts and attempted suicides. It was a very difficult time for the hostages. Fourteen would be let go before the 444 days were up, leaving 52. Despite denials by the student captors of torture and that the hostages were treated well, that was not always the case. The hostages discovered that many of their captors were uneducated in terms of world events and were zealots to their cause.

The American government's decision to allow the shah into the U.S. had been the catalyst that sparked the takeover, but it fed flames that had already been simmering under the surface. The challenges the U.S. government faced in dealing with the situation seemed nearly insurmountable. The demands of Ayatollah Khomeini and the students were not ones the American government wanted to meet, and yet Carter and his administration were willing to make some concessions, even against their better judgment if it meant to return of the hostages. However, the leadership in Iran was unstable and the figureheads the U.S. government were trying to work with on a diplomatic level held no real power. Going in with force would most likely result in the death of the hostages, something the Carter administration wanted to avoid.

A rescue attempt was a long shot and a last resort. If anyone could do it, it would be the newly formed Delta Force, a unit of specially trained men, the best of the best. They trained for months, looking at all possibilities. Getting into and out of Iran, and most especially the land locked Tehran, would be one of the biggest hurdles. Those assigned to the mission knew that there would likely be causalities.

Mark Bowden set out to put the stories of both the captors and the hostages together for the book, Guests of the Ayatollah, as well as those in the military and government. Readers are also offered a glimpse at the reactions and thoughts of the families of the hostages. The author does an amazing job of piecing the crisis together and does so in a way that makes it accessible to the reader. Even knowing how the situation played out, I was still caught in the suspense of the moment as I read. Keeping the hostages straight was a bit of a challenge at first, but I eventually had a clear picture of who those featured in the book were.

I selected Guests of the Ayatollah as my pick for the 50 Books of Our Time Project not just because I had a copy sitting in my TBR collection, but also because of its relevance today. Today's Iran is under the control of some of the very people who were involved with the Iran Hostage Crisis thirty years ago. When the U.S. embassy in Tehran was overtaken by those Islamic students, it put events in motion that would solidify the fundamentalists' position in power. It gave Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers the ammunition they needed to step in and take the reins.

Not all the students were happy with the result. They went into the situation full of dreams of an Islamic utopia; strike down America and gain their freedom from Western oppression. They hadn't anticipated that their actions would unleash something much darker than they ever imagined. Not everyone feels that way, however. Some still believe in the current government of Iran and find comfort in the strict religious laws and controls.

The crisis in Tehran was not just limited to Iran. The cry of the people, the anger towards America, was felt by many in the Middle East. American foreign policy had not always been on the up and up and had offended many. This was the first time America faced off with militant Islam, especially in such a public setting. It was also one of the first times that television played a vital role shaping a major historical event.

Western influence is but a part of what the growing fundamentalist Islamic movement is fighting against, however. It is steeped in ideology and tradition, fighting against the inevitable change that comes with the passing of time and a world that is becoming more interconnected and dependent on each other.

For its part, the U.S. got a wakeup call from the experience.

Despite past transgressions by the American government, the taking of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the holding and treatment of the hostages was against the law and unethical. It was wrong, and it would come to have a negative impact on Iran in the long run. While the students and Iran celebrated a victory at the time and still try to portray it as such, more was lost than won by everyone during that crisis. The effects still reverberate today.

Earlier this year saw uprisings and protests in and outside of Iran which have not been seen in a long time. There are many people who are tired of the autocratic rule of the current ruler, Ali Khamenei, fed up with the oppression and direction their country has gone. Khamenei, just as his predecessors, uses his power to silence those who speak out against him. It is still too early to tell if the current outrage will be a catalyst for change or if, like previous attempts, it will be stamped out by those currently in power.

Guests of the Ayatollah deals with an event in history that is a defining moment for not only the United States, but also for Iran and other parts of the Middle East. Its impact is still being felt today. So, to answer My Friend Amy's question, yes, this is a book of our time.

The book is over 700 pages long and covers a lot of ground. Sometimes big books like this could do with a little extra editing, but I never felt that way with this one. I have kept my review of this book relatively short and spoiler free, leaving out many great discussion points. I highly recommend it to those who enjoy reading nonfiction and who want to understand and stay on top of current events. show less

“But there was blame enough for both sides. The storm of war blew flat all semblance of law, logic, and decency. To soldiers there was a kind of order - causes and lines to be defended, soldiers who were either friend or enemy - but to civilians it was just savagery”

You know, as a real deal principled Marxist (wink wink), I should be staunchly and vehemently against this sort of thing. The American War in Vietnam was a reprehensible blot on the already blot-ridden history of “Western show more Civilisation” (bearing in mind that nearly all of history is, of course, constituted almost wholly by blots - but we have been particularly naughty in this regard). Bowden does try his hand at bipartisanship, although it does seem that for large swathes of the narrative the soldiers from the Front are just portrayed as cannon fodder for our good ol’ boys (admittedly the battle scenes, the descriptions of clearing houses and city tactics were enthralling each and every time - whenever a Zippo or an Onto is whipped out you kinda go ‘oh shit it’s go time fellas’) . I’m amazed that in the postscript he has to mention that he has received a fair amount of criticism for trying to don such a perspective, as a great deal of emphasis is placed on the North Vietnamese’s barbarity and skill - there’s no justification for anything they do, aside from showing how they wanted to stretch out the battle to drain the US’ motivation to fight (attrition of the national will). Bowden goes with the age old ‘lions led by donkeys’ approach, with General Westmoreland being portrayed as the biggest, most negligent dipshit in the armed forces at that time (Khe Sanh forever à venir).

Taking a critical stance toward the American War as an established prerequisite (unjustified shitshow, as one source has it the US were ‘effective heirs to colonial authority’), you still have to take your hats off to the heroism shown by some of the American troops out there, at least within the context of Hue provided here. Medics and amateur teenage soldiers alike threw themselves down to retrieve their wounded and dying fellow men, often catching stray rounds to the head and neck and dying where they stood. Their sheer balls-to-the-wall will to dig in their heels and not retreat when faced with incredibly unfavourable odds, surrounded on all sides by overwhelming enemy forces, is truly admirable. I do think that particularity can transcend the universal, the universal here being an ideological lens through which to perceive and sift events (not to ascertain some always-already preformed, holistic meaning, but instead a principled method of analysis/organon that provides valid formulations which are authentically wrought from events as and when they unfold). What am I saying here in concrete terms? American soldiers participating in an unjust war did good things, and can indeed be worthy of veneration and respect. Barbarism abounded, but the good stood as an undercurrent, the wellspring of the ethical came up, as it always does. We do not denigrate our ideological commitments by recognising valour, or perhaps we do, and the particular, the concrete situation, easily trumps the importance of ideological consistency (hell I've been reading Levinas, give me a break).

I also think, and this must have occurred somewhere and I just haven’t done the necessary research, that there needs to be serious thought dedicated to why the nhan dan (’the people’) didn’t rise up and support the effort on behalf of the Viet Cong? It can’t just be marked down to false consciousness, and the population of Hue can’t be branded as vulgar reactionaries, class-traitors, anti-revolutionaries etc. etc. something fundamentally wrong occurred, a massive miscalculation. Bowden asserts that it came down to pure survival instinct, and admits that the fight in Hue did show a chink in the armour when it came to the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese regime - they now had to make a choice, and then history did its thing and wrote itself (what is Saigon called nowadays, I hear you proclaim - and I’m also aware that ‘chink in the armour’ probably isn’t the most appropriate metaphor given the context… tut tut tut). Anyway, that’s enough thinking from me. Shoutout to my dawg Ernie Cheatham, that fucker was as hard as nails (the principled commie and love of Shane Gillis semper fi fuck yeah attitude within me are currently at war, who knows who will win??).

The Americans should have just listened to good old Uncle Ho - this wasn’t a question of containment and communism, it was one of national self-determination against colonial oppression, a cause the US (if it can truly say with a straight face that it rallies behind the ideals of freedom, liberty and all of its derivatives) should have been a proponent of. Pretty great book. show less

While Max Hastings attempted to do the impossible and cover the entire 14 years plus of the American War in Indochina, Mark Bowden humbles himself before the historic edifice and accepts that a focus on Hue alone will convey all you need to know. He’s not far wrong.

Hue is in many ways a microcosm of the entire farcical episode. It contains incredible perseverence from both sides. From the Vietnamese fighting to liberate their country from control by a foreign power, it shows their show more dedication, courage and commitment in the face of overwhelming odds. For the US and South Vietnamese forces it shows dedication and courage in the face of overwhelming hubris, self-aggrandisement and prejudice. For both, it was fought in the face of overwhelming self-deception that their cause was in any way actually allied to the propaganda they spewed forth.

Hue had, until January 1968, escaped the conflict relatively unscathed. It was chosen by the Viet Cong because of its historical significance as a major target in the meticulously planned and executed Tet Offensive. They very nearly captured the entire city in 24 hours.

Crucially, however, they failed to completely eradicate two small bases belonging to the South Vietnamese and the US military despite having the forces to do so. It was from these two small bases that their enemies mounted campaign after campaign that eventually, after 31 days’ of fighting managed to drive them into retreat. By that point however, the US government had suffered such a pounding in its national press that their withdrawal from the entire conflict was inevitable.

The strength of Bowden’s work is the detail in the telling of individual stories. You follow people from both sides, civilian and military, young and old. You see what they suffered, you follow how they have suffered since and understand that they suffer still. Bowden builds the battle out of these intimate episodes and thus gives a perspective you never quite get from Hastings’ tome.

The book is an excellent read; don’t pick it up at bedtime if you’ve got to be up early the next day. I’d recommend a couple of things to supplement it: firstly, make sure you get yourself a good supply of photography from the web. The images in the book are good, but Hue provided some of the very best war photography including the not-to-be-missed works of Don McCullin. Secondly, when you get to the part where Walter Cronkite visits, it’s worth pausing to watch his documentary on YouTube. There aren’t many films which have been so influential in world politics as that one ultimately was.

If there’s a weakness in Bowden’s book it’s that it is balanced more heavily in the telling of the US story. This is inevitable not only because of the simple fact that it’s a tale in English, but from the fact that the vast majority of stories from the Viet Cong side are very hard to get hold of.

Despite this, in comparison to Hastings’ Vietnam, the reader gets far more insight into what the battle was like for the Viet Cong. This is essential to redress the balance in English literature of the US side of the story (critical or otherwise). As it was the Viet Cong who were the underdogs and the ones who had a legitimate cause, the fact that some, like veteran Nicholas Warr, condemn Bowden for this seems ludicrous to me.

That the ironically named Warr has the ability to correct any errors in his story by publishing on his own website only serves to illustrate the reason why Bowden’s telling of the socialist side of things is important. When those who fought with the Viet Cong do tell the truth of their experiences, even today they risk ostracism in a nation that has fought and died for its own choice of socialist ideals. Bowden admits as much in his epilogue. Vietnam chose national freedom over freedom of the individual. Warr’s vocal criticism only serves to illustrate the lack of genuine desire US forces had to actually liberate the voice of the individual Vietnamese from socialism. If he truly wants them to experience democracy, he would applaud any efforts to tell their own tale show less

It's almost exactly 50 years from the Tet Offensive, one of the most decisive and misunderstood campaigns in history. Tet was based on delusion on both sides. The Communist leadership believed that the people of South Vietnam were primed to join a general offensive and overthrow the puppet government. General Westmoreland and MACV were sure that the Communists were on the ropes, and that the key battle was at the remote firebase of Khe Sanh. On the Vietnamese New Year, Jan 30 1968, VC units show more backed by NVA regulars launched attacks across South Vietnam, showing that the Communists were capable of massive organized operations with exceptional operational security. Most of these assaults were repelled, but the city of Hue fell to the Communists, with small pockets of resistance around the MACV compound in the south of the city, and the ARVN headquarters in the northern parts of the 19th century citadel.

What followed could only be described as a fiasco on the American side. Marine companies were fed into the city piecemeal, and told to expect only light resistance. What they found were Communists fighters dug in, with ample supplies and reinforcements, willing to contest every block and building. Bad weather and restrictive rules of engagement prevent the Marines from using their artillery and air support at first, though by the end of the battle shells were falling freely, wrecking 80% of the city. The Marines hadn't done any urban combat since Seoul in 1950, but they relearned fast. M48 Patton tanks become mobile bunkers. The Ontos tank destroyer, armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles, would scoot out, demolish a building with a salvo, an retreat. Marines learned to 'walk through walls', avoiding doors and intersections by blasting holes in the buildings. Over 24 grueling days, they forced the Communist forces to retreat.

Both sides claimed victory, but the surest losers were the civilians of Hue. The Communists wasted no time setting up revolutionary tribunals and executing "enemies of the people". The Americans and South Vietnamese had no formal policies of execution, but their lavish use of firepower did not discriminate between fighting positions and refugees sheltering in bunkers. Suspicious GIs shot first and asked questions never, gunning down people searching for food or trying to cross the lines. Thousands of civilians were murdered by their supposed "liberators". Westmoreland's reputation, tarnished by Tet, was done in by the Battle of Hue and the Siege of Khe Sanh.

Bowden is a talented author, and he makes the action come alive again, putting you there with the Marines and the Vietnamese. This is the authoritative account of the Battle of Hue, and a required part of any Vietnam War book collection. show less