John Jordan (1)

A really excellent examination of the period when the Washington Naval Treaty was effective and the signatory powers all at least paid lip service to it. The important point of all this is that Jordan tries to put you in the diplomatic and economic perspective that called forth the treaty regime in the first place. Perhaps the single biggest problem was what the Washington & London treaties could not control for; the drive for prestige. Even if you've already read a shelf full of books on show more the subject I suspect that you'll learn something new; I know that I was wondering if I should even bother with this book at this relatively late date. show less

My initial response to this book, once I leafed through upon getting it out from the library, was that I might be disappointed; at least compared to "Warships after Washington." If nothing else, there is a lot of useful information on what the new limitations of the London Navel Treaty meant for the five major fleets of the time. Besides that though, Jordan offers the major insight that the real obstacle to the signatories producing viable warships is a conceptual block on the part of the show more command staffs of the relevant fleets.

Essentially, the responsible parties had an image of what a useful warship looked like and they were unwilling to sacrifice offensive weaponry in regards to coping with the increasing threat of aircraft and submarines; not to mention the reality that the line of battle was increasingly less relevant. While the Japanese were the worst offenders, the British and American fleets were also guilty of failing to restrain excessive weight in the effort to maintain weapon load-outs that were not viable.

Highly recommended. show less

"Warships After Washington" is yet another fine work by this French author. This work is a comparison/contrast analysis of what is arguably one of the first attempts at arms control in the modern era, and Jordan shines an unblinking eye at this largely American initiative and its consequences at the strategic, tactical, and shipbuilding levels in each of the five signatory nations: Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. Blamed by the first post WWII generation of show more American naval historians (men such as Samuel Eliot Morrison and the Belote brothers) for the crushing defeats suffered at the hands of the Japanese at the beginning of the Pacific War, the Washington Treaty has not been given a fair evaluation by the naval historian community until this book.

There is a lot to unpack from this book of only 338 pages. My copy is the 2015 soft cover version released by the U.S. Naval Institute; Seaforth released a hard cover printing in 2011. Jordan begins his work with the customary table of contents, followed by a brief preface, then a useful conversion table, as all of the navies discussed used different standards of measure that are extensively used in these pages. Jordan then includes an introduction giving a background to the Washington conference before beginning the first of 11 numbered chapters.

Chapter 1 investigates the navies of what would become the five contracting parties, while Chapter 2 looks at the post-World War I shipbuilding plans of the five countries, plans that would have quickly led to outlandish naval spending that four of the five parties would not have been able to afford. Chapter 3 describes the Washington Conference itself--the issues, the national stances, the personalities--and the subsequent negotiations. Chapter 4 evaluates which parties gained and which lost as a result of the Treaty.

Chapter 5 begins a sequence of the next five chapters dedicated to describing the Treaty's effect on specific ship types arranged roughly by size/importances. Chapter 5 addresses battleships, Chapter 6 cruisers, Chapter 7 aicraft carriers, Chapter 8 the so-called "super destroyers" such as the esploratori of the Italian Navy and the contre-torpilleurs of the French Navy, Chapter 9 destroyers, and Chapter 10 submarines. The chapter on cruisers is particularly important given the significant effort made by all of the contracting parties on this type of warship. Chapter 11 explains (and sets the stage for another book) the two naval limitation conferences held after Washington--Geneva in 1927 and London in 1930--where the five contracting parties attempted to correct their particular issues with the 1922 Treaty. Jordan then includes as Appendices 1 and 2 the text of both the Washington and London Treaties. There follows a brief bibliography, notes, and an index.

"Warships After Washington" is a well-researched and balanced account of a significant and naive post-WWI effort to eliminate causes of conflict between nations. Jordan shows not only why this effort was futile, but also how it exacerbated tensions between the Japanese on one hand and the British and the Americans on the other. Similarly the Mediterranean powers of Italy and France were not pacified by their standing in the Washington Treaty, also leading to increased tensions in that theater. Jordan also lays bare the historical biases held against future Axis powers Japan and Italy as they have always been labeled as cheats in the naval shipbuilding boom that came after Washington. That purported cheating supposedly led to crushing Allied defeats early in the Pacific War such as Java Sea and Savo Island. Jordan proves that all of the contracting parties cheated to some extent, just some did it more than others. Jordan also demonstrates the futility of such arms limitation agreements bereftof some means of verification.

A most enjoyable read! I look forward to getting "Warships After London". show less

Frankly, this is the best edition of this annual in awhile as Osprey/Bloomsbury has given the editorial team more pages to work with and they seem to have made good use of said pages. To me, the best articles related to the battle of the River Plate, whereas the battle is analyzed from the perspective of how the period U.S. and Royal navies would have war-gamed the engagement; followed up by a detailed examination of just what damage the "Graf Spee" took. Other stand-outs include show more examinations of the Danish training cruiser "Niels Iuel," the Japanese light cruiser "Oyodo," and Italian adventures in signal intelligence during the Fascist period. show less