Yoram Hazony

I, like the author, am a Zionist, which probably makes me a nationalist too. That makes us both somewhat out of step with the times; nationalism is regarded, at best as old and fuddy-duddy (which I may be), and at worst as illiberal and racist (which I definitely am not). So, a defense of nationalism by an intellect as penetrating and original as Hazony’s, was something definitely to be welcomed.

Hazony frames his argument as the choice between independent national states, which seek to show more rule themselves, and imperial states, whose purpose is to unite everyone under a single political regime. He cites the Hebrew Bible’s definition of the Israelite nation - as consisting of the 12 tribes living according to their own laws within the defined boundaries of the Land of Israel, and refraining from occupying the lands of other nations – as the inspiration for and archetype of the national state. He then invokes the Peace of Westfalia, the treaties that ended the 30-year war in 1650, as the point at which the Protestant nations – imbued with the spirit of the Hebrew Bible – established the principle that independent nation states would be free to run themselves as they saw fit, and would not be subject to the sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire. He regrets that, since 1945 this trend has reversed, with national states increasingly subordinated, either to transnational bodies like the UN and the EU, or to the competing imperial visions of the USA, communism and Islam. Nationalism is blamed for the horrors of two world wars in the last century, while the recent growth of populist and nationalist parties in Europe and the Brexit vote are all deplored as backward and unenlightened.

In making the case for the national state, the author rejects Locke’s concept of the “social contract”, whereby individuals consent to give up their freedom of action in return for the benefits of the protection of a state. Hazony sees the state as the end-point of a progression; from family to clan to tribe, all of which are bound together by ties of reciprocal loyalty. He thinks that the idea of consent – which theoretically can be withdrawn at any time at the discretion of the individual – is a weaker and less enduring basis for a nation than loyalty. The national state is the ideal political unit because it lies at the “conceptual midpoint” between two extremes; anarchy - loyalty to a local family or clan leader - and universal empire - loyalty to every human being. What defines this “midpoint”? A national state rules over many families and clans, whereas an empire rules over many nations; but a nation “possesses a quite distinctive character, having its own language, laws and religious traditions..” The exceptions to this definition are so numerous as to put its usefulness into question. For example, by the end of the 2nd century CE, the Roman empire consisted of people who all communicated in Latin, nominally worshiped the same deities, were subject to the same laws, and were all Roman citizens; and there had been emperors born in Spain, Africa and the Balkans. So, according to Hazony’s definition, the Roman empire was either a national state or in the process of becoming one. In contrast, the creation of the Italian national state in the mid 19th century, was actually an imperial venture by the house of Savoy, forcibly uniting entities that did not share a common language, had very diverse histories, and loyalties to different nations, such as Spain, France and Austria; and the cracks still show today. The Holy Roman Empire was originally an empire a tout court, which over the centuries progressively loosened into a series of semi-independent mini-states - duchies, counties, principalities, bishoprics, cities - all of which shared their Frankish law, their German language and – until the Reformation – their religion too. What and when was the “midpoint” here?

In the central chapters of the book, five “virtues” of nationalism are proposed; greater security from violence (compared to anarchy), disdain for imperial conquest, collective freedom and self-determination, a competitive political order, and a surer guarantee of individual liberties. These virtues are mostly argued from a theoretical point of view and, because of the problem of defining in practice exactly what is a national state, it is not difficult to find exceptions; for example, in order to explain why Germany failed on all five accounts, it perforce must be defined as an imperial state at the outset of either or both world wars. There is also a danger of tautology here; an appetite for imperial conquest – by definition – excludes a state from being defined as a national state. How then does the author include Japan among his examples of representatives “in recent generations” of free and independent nations?

The author next directs his ire against federalism. If a state is truly federal – meaning that the central government has the power to decide and implement policies that affect the constituent states – then it is, in effect, an imperial government. He cites the gradual erosion of states’ rights in the USA as a relatively benign example – as the states do all share a language, a common-law heritage and a history – of this process. Less benign is the case of the European Union, which he describes as a “German imperial state in all but name.” Its only saving grace is that it has declined to take care of its own defense, for fear of “German rearmament”, and remains a “protectorate” of the United States.

The “neutral state” - one in which is not premised on nationality, language, or religion, but on loyalty to state symbols, such as the constitution or the flag – has often been promoted as an ideal. The author demolishes this argument, both on theoretical grounds and with reference to the failure of the many artificial post-colonial states created in Africa and the Middle East. He points out that they inevitably dissolve into ethnic and religious conflict, unless or until one group gains the upper hand and suppresses all of the others. Only states in which the majority shares a language, a common history and religion are cohesive enough to allow the freedom of expression and participation of minority ethnic and religious groups. In making this point, the author has his own country of Israel - in which Arab Druze and Christian citizens of the state not only have the identical rights and responsibilities as Jewish citizens, but also enjoy complete freedom of religion - very much in mind.

The chapter on the right of national independence, in which the author discusses whether there is a universal right for any self-identifying group to have its own nation, strikes a discordant note with what has come before. In place of the aprioristic theoretical arguments that he has mostly used to make his case for nationalism, Hazony resorts here to a crude pragmatism. If the group in question has enough strength and resources to exert its independence; if it is in the interest of other national states to allow that group its own independent state, etc. Thus Israel was entitled to come into being as a state, to permit the self-determination of the Jews, but the Southern Confederate States of America were not entitled to theirs, because that would have resulted in “centuries of hostile competition” to the USA, and weakened both - like the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judah. The Kurds, on the other hand - because of their battlefield success and support for America’s war against radical Islam – deserve their state. The right to self-determination seems to depend on whom you are likely to support once you get your independence.

The author’s discussion of how a world of national states should be regulated – what he calls the “natural law of nations” – is one of the hardest to parse, because it is so theoretical. But even in theory, it raises a number of questions; for example, principle number two - non-interference in the internal affairs of other national states - can be suspended in order to prevent the rise of an imperial order; intervention would thus have been justified in the case of Napoleon’s France, Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Russia. Apart the questionable morality - or even feasibility – of intervening on this pretext, what is notable here is the omission of what is surely the most pressing justification for interference, which is to prevent the state in question from committing crimes against humanity. Perhaps Hazony believes that this is covered, in his idealized world of well-behaved nations, by the principle that obliges the national government to protect minority nations; unfortunately, we know only too well how that works in practice. There is also a principle of “parsimony in the establishment of independent states”, which sounds very much like the practice whereby a professional guild or trade union erects barriers to entry, in order to protect its monopoly – of national sovereignty, in this case.

In the last part of the book, Hazony presents a very strong analysis of why nationalism is now so unpopular. He does not try to defend all the policies and actions that national states take – not even Israel’s – but argues that wrong policies or actions do not constitute a case against nationalism per se, whereas the alternative – an imperial state – is constitutionally worse. Empires are premised on the concept of a universal truth or ideal, and therefore hate any group that refuses to believe in or go along with this. This was the basis of antisemitism in the universal (Catholic) church, and is the basis for Israel hatred in Europe; there – for fear of the nationalism that is blamed for the devastation of the continent in the last century – the idea of national statehood has been rejected in favor of the liberal imperialism of the EU. Finally, the author berates the implicit racism and dual standard of the liberal universalists; they reject nationalism among people supposedly of European origin - such as white South Africans, Americans or Jews - while encouraging it among people of the third world, and often turning a blind eye to its darker practices. The unstated assumption is that Europeans have reached a more enlightened stage of political maturity in which the rejection of nationalism in favor of liberal universalism is inevitable. Non-Europeans, on the other hand, still have to go through the nationalistic stage before they can be expected to adhere to the higher standard.

I think Hazony fails in his effort to make a convincing general case for nationalism. His arguments are too theoretical and dialectical, and fail to either adequately explain the world we find ourselves in today, or to prescribe what ideal world order we should aspire to. Where he does use real examples to support his arguments, he is frequently inconsistent; he cannot make up his mind, for example, whether the United States is an empire or a national state. He is also inconsistent in the way he parallels political and economic logic; he rejects the idea that economic globalization necessarily requires a corresponding international political integration, but frequently uses the idea of free enterprise to bolster the case for independent national states. A major lacuna is how he deals with the issue of minority rights, other than asserting rather blithely that they will be guaranteed in his preferred model of a national state. He questionably locates the source of Nazi Germany’s attempted extermination of Europe’s Jews in its “imperial” nature, rather than in its repugnant racist philosophy. Imperialism would no doubt be his explanation for China’s treatment of the Muslim Uigars or the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar – had he mentioned them.

Throughout the book, in addition to the author’s explicit use of Biblical Israel as the paradigm for modern national states, he both explicitly and implicitly frames many of his arguments as a general version of the case for the modern State of Israel. Given the Israel-hatred of BDS, much of the Muslim world and other anti-Semitic groups, to restate Israel’s case is certainly no bad thing; but it does not amount to a general proof of the virtue of nationalism. Perhaps there is no general case, and each one has to be considered on its specific merits? Perhaps I am not necessarily a nationalist after all? show less

Yoram Hazony offers an interpretation of the Hebrew Bible that may initially bother many religious people, but when they think about what he is saying, they may feel that they have gained a deeper understanding and appreciation of Scripture.

Hazony states that we should read “Hebrew Scriptures as works of reason or philosophy,” not as a document that must be accepted based on blind faith. It makes no difference whether one believes that Scripture was miraculously revealed or that it was show more composed by intelligent people, “we’ll get much further in understanding what these texts were intended to say to us if we read them as works of reason.” What is important is our duty to explore “how best to conduct the life of the nation and of the individual.”

He gives many examples that prove that the Hebrew Bible reflects natural law and that it teaches people to use their intelligence, think, seek truth, and not passively accept traditions. In fact, the Bible doesn’t present a single view of life. The Bible is composed of “often sharply conflicting texts.” It is an assembly of works “so readers could strive to understand the various perspectives embraced by [these views], and in so doing build up an understanding of their own.”

The Bible, Hazony emphasizes, extols the life of the shepherd over that of the farmer. Farmers and city dwellers are generally people who are stagnant, obey instructions, accept a way of life without questioning it and sticking to this life without personal growth; while shepherds are people on the move, always seeking to better themselves, thinkers. Biblical heroes such as Abel, Abraham, Jacob, Moses, David, and many others were shepherds. A shepherd is “disobedient, preoccupied with improving his own lot and that of his dependents, and willing to overturn the inherited order to achieve this end.” Like Abraham and Moses, thinkers defy the views of the leaders of their society and even dispute with God. Thinkers feel that “A state that does not serve the right kind of ethical purpose is for them no state, just as a god that does not serve this purpose is for them no god.” And the Bible is clear that God “loves those who disobey for the sake of what is right…when a man has used his freedom to wrestle with him and to prevail.”

The Bible holds “individuals and nations morally responsible for their actions even where they appear to have received no laws or commands from him of any kind.” Thus, for example, Cain is punished for murdering his brother, Noah’s generation is destroyed for their violence, and Sodom for its perversity, even though they were never commanded not to kill and to act properly. The “sheer quantity of such examples [shows that] God’s commands are either supplementary to, or themselves expressions of, a fundamental moral law that derives from the nature of things.” Biblical laws are a base that challenges people to build upon to create a better life.

While demonstrating that the Bible teaches that people are obliged to think, Hazony offers his readers much more, including an extensive investigation into the meaning of terms that most people accept without really understanding them, such as truth, faith, justice, amen, and reliability, and what it means to be human and to obey God. Readers will be especially intrigued by Hazony’s discussion on, if Scripture was not revealed by God, why does it say frequently “God said”? Among other things, Hazony shows that the ancient philosophers also ascribed their rational thoughts to a god. show less

This book is based on a very close reading of Megillat Esther; the kind of close reading which also produced the book by Rabbi David Fohrman, “The Queen You Thought You Knew”. By their close attention to the details of the Megilla text, and their creative “reading behind the lines”, both of these books produce a much richer and more nuanced story. In particular, both provide a unique illumination of the action following the second of Esther’s feasts and the fall of Haman. Instead show more of giving a huge rattle/boo/cheer as he is led off to his own gallows, and then wondering why it takes another three chapters to wrap up the story, we realize that the removal of Haman has solved very little, that king Ahasuerus has not become an ally of the Jews of Persia, and that the threat to the lives of the community still hangs as heavily over them as it did when Haman first cast his lots. Both books also provide an answer to the vexed question as to why Haman’s ten sons are hanged twice; but I am not providing any “spoiler” here; you will have to read the book to find out.

Unlike Rabbi Fohrman, whose interpretations have a more religious nature, Hazony is concerned to illuminate the politics of the situation. The author points out the contrast between Haman’s totalitarian regime and that depicted in the earlier chapters, where the king is open to the views of multiple royal counselors and aids. His analysis of the psychology of Ahasuerus – a man with a high need for control, but lacking sufficient intelligence to rule competently and rationally – provides a very convincing explanation for his appointment – following the Vashti fiasco - of Haman, who is given a mandate to rule in the king’s name with the powers of a dictator. Mordechai is also given the full treatment; a subtle strategist, who has patiently worked his way into the circles of power surrounding the king, and even allowed his ward Esther to be taken into the king’s harem, Mordechai’s instruction to Esther – not to reveal herself as a Jew – reflects his own strategy of concealment of his Jewish identity and of his agenda to protect and advance the interests of his community. The change of regime signaled by Haman’s appointment calls for a radical change of strategy; subtlety and concealment are no longer of avail, and Mordechai goes for a high-risk strategy of direct confrontation. There is no other explanation for his decision to refuse to bow down to Haman, as bowing the head to someone in authority is – in contrast to Mordechai’s declaration - nowhere forbidden by Jewish law.

Hazony traces the change in Esther’s relationship with the king. Her two feasts, with only the presence of Haman disturbing the intimacy of these occasions, are ingeniously designed to arouse the insecure king’ suspicion of a relationship between her and Haman. This too is a high risk strategy, but it pays off when Haman’s actions at the second feast confirm – in Ahasuerus’ mind – Haman’s intentions towards his favorite wife. The king’s reaction is motivated – not out of a concern for Esther’s religion or the impending fate of her community – but out of jealousy, his desire for her, and his fear of another very public marital fiasco. Following the removal of Haman, the king is now firmly in Esther’s power. Although he is unwilling or unable to reverse the decree against the Jewish community, as Mordechai and Esther make their plans for its defense, Ahasuerus has no choice but to grant them the authority necessary for its execution.

There is much more of this kind of analysis, and even if you don’t go along with all of it, it makes for for a very entertaining read. show less

I generally find it hard to get excited about non-fiction, but ever since I bought this book I've re-read it every year as the holiday of Purim approaches. It is a fascinating analysis of the book of Esther which makes the story come alive. Hazony's writing style is intellectual without being dry and his arguments are persuasive and passionate. Highly recommended for anyone with an interest in Bible, Jewish history, politics, or religion.