Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008)

Published in 1996, 'The Clash of Civilizations' is a major book aiming at describing and predicting international relations post-Cold War era. In fact, expanding upon an article bearing the same title and that he wrote for 'Foreign Affairs' back in 1993, Samuel Huntington proposes here a new geopolitical paradigm, so as to understand (or at least try!) the world following the collapse of the Communist model.

'People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, show more customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity.'

To him indeed, the major mistake most analysts committed upon seeing the fall of the Soviet regime was to see, in the triumph of economical liberalism, the triumph, also, of Western values -that is, philosophical liberalism. He warns: if it's tempting to believe that the successful spread of English language or of global capitalism lead to a westernisation of the planet, what define whole groups of individuals, people beyond nations, are not the lingua franca they use, nor the goods they consume, but, something deeper and stronger: their cultural identities, the civilization to which they belong.

Trying to explain what make the essence of a civilisation, showing how elusive is the concept itself (as different civilisations have always been influencing each others, evolved over time, and are each subject to their own dynamism and internal conflicts and divisions) he manages to demonstrate that, nevertheless, they remain powerful factors forging strong identarian entities. In fact, listing eight civilisations as of nowadays (Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Latin American, African, Western), a list which has its own limitations and weaknesses as he, himself, is willing to admit, he affirms that the complex identities they each embody are way too complex to give way to the so-called universalism of western values. In other words: a world modernising itself (capitalism, science and technologies...) is not necessarily a world westernising itself, even if the ideologies which have allowed such modernisation in the first place have their roots in the Western world. He goes even further, by claiming that some civilisations can perfectly accept such modernisation while rejecting the Western model; a model they may deem 'arrogant, materialist, repressive, brutal and decadent', and, so, as a result, offer alternatives by drawing into the traditionalisms of other cultures.

'The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion […] but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.'

In depth, thorough, rich in predictions (some of a baffling accuracy, others far more dubious) and containing detailed analyses of what to expect in a world post-Cold War era, he manages in fact to explain the identarian crises of some countries (e.g. Australia, Russia, Turkey, Mexico...) while foreseeing, in opposition to a Western world he sees getting weaker and more and more isolated, both the economic awakening of Asian countries led by China, and, the growing dangers of a certain Muslim fanaticism.

The topic of Islam is contentious. This is, in fact, where this book becomes highly controversial.

Of course, the author acknowledges that Islamic culture is rich and varied; and that different countries have been attempting to gain an ideological control upon it, with varying degrees of success! His point, though, is that Islam, as a religion, not only remains such a powerful denominator that it can transcends nationalisms, but, also, that it can be abused (for a whole bunch of reasons he actually delves into here) for political gains. Should some of its more radical and violent trends succeed in doing so, we would actually obtain, according to him, nothing less but a whole civilisation at war -a global jihad.

Sure, it would be deeply naïve to ignore here the pattern which has been at play even back in the nineties, when this book was written. Indonesia, Malaysia, Kashmir, Palestine, Sudan, Egypt, Bosnia, Iran... Samuel Huntington has done here more than predicting the upcoming success of the radical Islamists that would hijack some Muslim cultures themselves. He showed, also, how bloody Muslim borders can be, serving ethnic and religious conflicts wherever the 'Islamic civilisation' 'clashes' with a different one. In fact, he simply had a look at the world around him to sustain his claim that future conflicts won't be of an economical order, but civilizational. Was he right?

Well, his thesis was and still is very controversial! Personally, I found the civilizational lines he draws somehow questionable. I also believe, unlike the author, that the conflicts involving Islam are of an ideological order and certainly not of a cultural one. In every case indeed -and they are many, I give him that!- it remains a certain trend of Islam at war against a certain view of the Western world (its values, mainly), certainly not a return to the Crusades! Having said that, Samuel Huntington knows how to argue for a valuable and relevant paradigm, even if it's a paradigm which has to be strongly nuanced on many aspects. If anything, I would encourage anyone interested to read it, not for what it claims, but for what it doesn't. Here's the typical example of a book which, indeed, has been so debated (by many who hadn't read it, clearly) that its core thesis has often been lost, when not plainly caricatured and twisted to the point of ridiculousness! In the end, think what you want of his naïve definition of what constitute a civilisation (an elusive concept, as he admits himself) and/ or reject (as I do) his view that the Islamic world is a unified block at war with others (I won't even touch upon his handling of immigration issues, way too light to be of any relevance) the thing is, he had warned against Interventionism (American especially) as its consequences would be absolutely catastrophic. He had also encouraged the Western world to defend its identity, especially when pitted against other civilisations becoming more dynamic both economically and culturally. Some of its writing were on the wall, after all...

Agree or don't, but here's a thought provoking read. show less

When Civilizations Clash

This book is as ambitious as its full title--The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order--is long. Published in 1997, its author, Samuel Huntington, lays out what he sees as the new alignment of the world in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the sudden disappearance of the communist block as the arch-foe of the NATO countries and their allies and client states.

The year was probably just enough time after the 50 years of tension to see the show more inklings of the new alignments coming. That the basic shape of the world today, its political blocks, its new tensions, largely conforms to Huntington's vision, owes a lot to this fact. At the same time, Huntington deserves props for the accuracy of his main prediction as well as a few subordinate ones.

I read this book as part of a dive into the (non-fictional) conservative literature corpus and I would put it near the top of what I've read so far in terms of understanding where many (most?) on the US right are coming from.

Culture matters

The foundation of the new international political order rests on the notion that absent any larger concerns groups, up to and including nations, will tend to gather culturally. To be clear, this is an utterly uncontroversial thing to say. No social scientist would disagree with it. There are of course always exceptions, both individuals and countries--it's called a tendency for a reason.

So, while on the one hand, this is obvious to the point of banality, on the other, we often don't accept it. It's probably also fair to say that in the specific context of the immediate post-Cold War world, more than a few people had a lot trouble accepting it and its implications.

Now, just because we acknowledge this outgrowth of our innate tribalism doesn't mean we shouldn't work to bridge these cultural divides. Human cultural differences and tendency to prefer the familiar isn't going anywhere soon, so we should always be aware that this work is difficult and frustrating and no matter how many bridges get built, more will always be needed.

This goes to the heart of a core conservative belief: that there are limitations on what we can achieve socially and we ought to be careful about how and how fast we try to create social change. In the more extreme forms of this we ought not to try at all; further down the scale, you find nationalist notions and, well, you don't need me to finish this extrapolation for you, do you? But regardless of where one sits on this social policy conservatism scale, you get certain corollaries, like suspicion (or stronger dislikes) of authority and big government.

The New Current World Order

Much of the middle part of the book is taken up by laying out the culture-based civilizations to come (as seen from 1997) and looking at the world today, Huntington was downright prescient: Western (Western Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, etc.), Asian (China and most of the far east, but NOT Japan), Islamic (countries that are majority Muslim of course), Latin (the Americas south of the US), and African (sub-Saharan Africa, basically).

One notable division of these civilizations is the presence of a core country, for example the US within Western, China within Asian. Conversely, there's no obvious core country in the Islamic civilization, at least not in the same way that China dominates and can put pressure on other Asian countries. Likewise, Latin America is in a strange situation: the obvious contender is Brazil, but its status is hampered by its linguistic isolation.

Swing States

Wondering about Japan? Well, it and a couple other countries--India and Russia--are single-country civilizations. And they have particular roles to play too. If you follow US elections, think swing states, basically.

After this, Huntington discusses the fault lines and conflicts that he sees arising. Again, there's nothing here that will surprise any observer from 2017, though some missed opportunities might be noted. He stresses the importance of the single-country civilizations for tipping balances of power, and astute 21st century readers will surely have noticed failure of the West and Russia to bridge their differences as a counter to Islam and/or China. (Blame goes on both sides in this, if you ask me, but such a discussion is outside the scope of this review.)

Riding Two Horses

Another thing he addresses are so-called conflicted countries (possibly not the word he used, I'm writing this two books after having read Clash and I'm too lazy to check). These are countries straddling two civilizations.

The best example is Turkey, teetering between the West and Islam. But another is Mexico, semi-Western and part of the NAFTA agreement, but still very Latin too. Huntington does not have much good to say about countries in this position in a world where things are aligned primarily along culture. And looking at the how things are going in Turkey today, it's hard to say he's wrong. In his estimation, the differences between Islamic and Western civilizations are too much to allow Turkey to make the jump (to say nothing of how the EU has been, shall we say, less than enthusiastic about it joining). Mexico, he conjectures, might manage it: Latin America was settled by Europeans too after all, so Mexico (and Latin America in general) should be an easier fit with the West.

Doom and Gloom

The end of the book is largely occupied with more conservative notions about culture and civilization. In particular, dire predictions about the fate of Western civilization and culture should it fail to remain cohesive and fail to keep at least one or two of Russian, India, and Japan as friends against Asia and to a lesser extent, Islam.

He also worries that if too many Latins settle in the US, it could become a conflicted country too.

Finally, there's a full-on doomsday scenario involving North Korea, which, while the details are way off, certainly seems relevant in general today.

Bottom Line

So, overall, I think it's a book worth reading regardless of your politics. Certainly, the basic ideas seem to accurately reflect the world today and as such constitute a useful model for understanding it. Like all models, it has its limitations though. And of course, there's no predicting monkey wrenches: Donald Trump, for example, probably has Huntington rolling over in his grave (and indeed, anyone who accepts Huntington's argument that the West needs to hang together and cultivate swing civilizations like Japan if it wants to preserve its Westernness ought to be alarmed by Trump). Putin too might be considered one, though the West certainly did it's share to agitate Russia over the last 20 years.

At least as important as its value as a way to view the world is the insight I see it giving on conservatism in the United States today. Many of the ideas in it are plain in what conservatives are concerned about and the policies they support. You may think the whole premise is BS but still gain an understanding of conservatives.

Finally, I should add that its well-written and its clear Huntington (a political scientist by education and trade) is well-informed. show less

This is a useful book that serves as a very solid foundation for understanding the topic... if you can get through it. Huntington is famous for his perspicacity, taking entire pages to say what could be adequately conveyed in a sentence, and though this was one of his earlier works, he does not disappoint in that regard. (You get used to it.)

Huntington has written good books. This is not one of them. He laments the decline of WASP ("English") and Christian influence in the USA (although, the near-WASPs JFK and the Roosevelts excepted, all US presidents so far were WASPs and the USA is a religious anomaly among the developed nations). In his search for villains, he identifies secularists (subsumed as leftists), Muslims and especially (poor) Mexican immigrants.

The problem starts with his insufficient definition of the American show more idea. On the one hand, his definition fails to exclude a good number of European protestant nations (if one discounts the influence of the Queen's language). On the other hand, his insistence on Christianism sends many a founding father overboard (Franklin, Jefferson). Huntington's view of America is casuistic (including and excluding earlier immigrant and black diversity at will).

The book never addresses its main internal contradiction that while the Mexicanos reduce the influence of English in certain parts of America, they contribute to the upkeep of Christianism, even if only in the form of Catholicism. Huntington never realizes that he is faced with the main trade-off of secularism: More development usually means less religious attitudes. The US is a huge, puzzling exception, a fact he notes and lauds but can not explain.

Apart from him not having fully thought through his argument, the book suffers from methological problems. While he cites numerous opinion surveys to advance his positions (often veiling a soft form of racism), he never seems to realize the internal contradiction, eg in one part of the book he laments the average Americans's ignorance of US history, in another part he attacks the (leftist) professors' disdain for ignorant Americans' positions. He cannot be in both camps at the same time.

Huntington is horrified by two languages spoken in the US, eg forms should not be offered in different languages (Why? As a good scientist, he should be interested in correct data.). Instead of lamenting it, a good scientist would have studied examples where two or more languages exist. A large country to the north or various European nations could have supplied ample data for study. Instead, his fears and biases drive his argumentation and crash this book. show less