David Crist
Author of The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran
Works by David Crist
The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (2012) 285 copies, 7 reviews
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- Dr. David Crist currently serves as historian for the Federal Government. As an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, he saw first-hand the war against Al Qaeda and the confrontation with Iran. Crist served in the first Gulf War and two tours with elite special operations forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. He was part of the first U.S. military forces inside Afghanistan who overthrew the Taliban. In 2003, he personally witnessed the confrontation between American patrol boats and Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces off the Iraqi coast in one of the tensest incidents between the two nations in 20 years.
A Middle East scholar and recognized expert on Iran and defense issues, he is a frequent adviser to senior government and military officials on the Middle East. He received a B.A. from the University of Virginia and a master's and doctorate in Middle Eastern history from Florida State University. He lives in Potomac, Maryland.
http://thetwilightwar.com/author
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Reviews
This was an outstanding and informative read, presented with an almost savage clarity as well as a dry wit. The blatant lies, half truths, and obfuscations of theocrats on both sides - Saint Reagan, Bishop Rumsfeld, and Reverend Bush as well as Ayatollah Khomeini and and the like are brought into the light, and it’s pretty disappointing, if not surprising, to see the extent to which stupid Abrahamic religion tricks govern world and regional affairs. Crist also chronicles actual battles, show more both well known and less well known (at least to me); and he does all this in a very lively style. 4.5 stars, and highly recommended. show less
If there is anything like a primarily ideological adversary to modern US foreign policy, it is violent religious fundamentalism. This is most typified in their stormy relationship with Iran. They once were a bulwark ally in the region (after we propped the Shah up with a coup) but now we are each other's boogeymen. Here, Crist makes an incisive history of our complex and stormy confrontations.
Carter, we know, had a disastrous time. But Reagan made his share of mistakes, too. Most notably show more Iran-Contra and arms-for-hostages deals. His first policies were thinking of preventing Soviet control of Iran - which makes no sense in hindsight. Iran was a theocratic, fatalist, revolutionary, xenophobic state - hardly one to cooperate with the atheist Communists who had also invaded their neighbor, Afghanistan.
There was also the question of our involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Some officials in the Reagan administration balked at the idea of supporting Saddam, but they were ignored. And now we see trench warfare, chemical weapons and child soldiers.
The main goal of US policy was attempting to preserve the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and prevent tensions between their Peninsular Allies (Saudi Arabia mainly), but also Israel, which is another area onto itself.
Both Bushes were involved in dealing with Iran, as well. Bush II led his mad crusades and only succeeded in exacerbating the government. Clinton made temporary overtures, but his main priorities were East Africa, the Balkans, and his own Congress.
Obama first offered another olive branch with his Cairo speech, but it was quickly rebuffed by Iranian officials, thinking him to be another weak and feckless Carter. But as the Arab revolts boil around them and Obama orders drone strikes and harder sanctions, we can see his willingness to harden his stance. But unfortunately, it is entirely possible that the autocrats will continue to act in their interests, and let the Iranian people suffer, as seen with the sanctions of 1990s Iraq.
Crist has produced an astonishing analysis of this complex topic, and one that is essential for further understanding of this most volatile region. show less
Carter, we know, had a disastrous time. But Reagan made his share of mistakes, too. Most notably show more Iran-Contra and arms-for-hostages deals. His first policies were thinking of preventing Soviet control of Iran - which makes no sense in hindsight. Iran was a theocratic, fatalist, revolutionary, xenophobic state - hardly one to cooperate with the atheist Communists who had also invaded their neighbor, Afghanistan.
There was also the question of our involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Some officials in the Reagan administration balked at the idea of supporting Saddam, but they were ignored. And now we see trench warfare, chemical weapons and child soldiers.
The main goal of US policy was attempting to preserve the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and prevent tensions between their Peninsular Allies (Saudi Arabia mainly), but also Israel, which is another area onto itself.
Both Bushes were involved in dealing with Iran, as well. Bush II led his mad crusades and only succeeded in exacerbating the government. Clinton made temporary overtures, but his main priorities were East Africa, the Balkans, and his own Congress.
Obama first offered another olive branch with his Cairo speech, but it was quickly rebuffed by Iranian officials, thinking him to be another weak and feckless Carter. But as the Arab revolts boil around them and Obama orders drone strikes and harder sanctions, we can see his willingness to harden his stance. But unfortunately, it is entirely possible that the autocrats will continue to act in their interests, and let the Iranian people suffer, as seen with the sanctions of 1990s Iraq.
Crist has produced an astonishing analysis of this complex topic, and one that is essential for further understanding of this most volatile region. show less
The Twilight War ought to be required reading for everyone interested in contemporary events in the Middle East. Starting from the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Crist details the mistakes, mis-steps and rare successes of both the military and the politicians on both sides of the divide. Although I disagree with his conclusion (even Crist notes that the veterans of the Revolution in Iran are getting old, and a younger generation may have their own ideas on the conflict) it's easy to see how show more a war between Iran and the U.S. might break out, even if neither side wants such a fight. show less
The United States and Iran have been bitter enemies since the Iranian takeover of the American embassy in 1979. Few Americas are aware of how bitter the enmity has been. David Crist’s important new book, subtitled "The Secret History of America’s Thirty –Year Conflict with Iran," outlines the origins and background of the conflict and details the numerous military confrontations that have brought us to the brink of outright war several times. Crist is a Marine colonel whose father was show more a four-star Marine general in charge of the U.S. Central Command, the organization tasked with military operations in the Middle East. He has an excellent sense of military tactics and strategy, and describes battlefield and naval confrontations with an aura of authenticity.
Crist’s narrative begins in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah, and thus omits a discussion of American participation (via clandestine operations of the CIA) in the coup that overthrew the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the Shah in 1953. This omission is hard to justify; it is an important element in understanding the intense hatred of the United States that motivated Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many of the students who overran the American Embassy and precipitated the hostage crisis of Jimmy Carter’s presidency.
The United States was slow to recognize how implacable an enemy was the clerical regime in Iran (taking over after the Shah's overthrow) because the Americans were worried more about Soviet intervention than the rise of an unallied adversary. Nonetheless, the U.S. clearly sided with Iraq shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1981. The U.S. wanted to make sure oil kept flowing through the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, despite Iran’s efforts to prevent Iraq’s allies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, from using those waters to transport petroleum. For several years, the U.S. Navy confronted the Iranian navy (such as it was) in a nasty standoff that has become known as the “tanker war.”
The actual fighting between the U.S. and Iran has almost always been asymmetric: Iranian speedboats vs. U.S. Navy destroyers, cruisers, or air craft carriers or suicide bombers vs. traditional military. In recent years, Iranian armed and financed surrogates like Hezbollah and Shiite Iraqi insurgents have carried out terrorist attacks against American targets.
A few times in the past 30 years, the interests of the two adversaries coincided. The Iranians were somewhat helpful in both U.S. wars against Iraq, and they initially were helpful in the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. On the other hand, several incidents have almost resulted in outright war between the U.S. and Iran; Crist observed one such case himself in 2003.
A persistent theme of the book is that Iran is difficult to deal with because its government is so incompetent—it is never quite clear who (if anyone) is actually in charge. Crist sees this phenomenon as a potential cause of a “war of miscalculation.” Drawing upon hundreds of interviews and research into military archives, Crist reveals that there have been a number of “close calls” and he sees no prospect for better relations any time soon.
The author is especially critical of Ronald Reagan’s handling of Iran. He was too empathetic toward hostages held by Iranian surrogates, and found himself out-negotiated and bamboozled by the wily Persians. Crist is not especially favorable about Jimmy Carter either, although Mark Bowden, in Guests of the Ayatollah suggested that Carter was tougher than is generally known. Crist gives George W. Bush low marks for focusing on the moral iniquity of Iran, a position bound to do nothing but further alienation.
Crist ends his long and detailed account pessimistically. He suggests that Iran has become even more belligerent over time, and that the U.S. has not been sufficiently firm. He does not see much hope for avoiding an escalation of the “twilight” war with Iran unless the two sides begin to speak one another’s language, in all senses of the phrase.
Evaluation: Crist’s occasionally commits some common misuses of words. He confuses disinterest (impartiality) with lack of interest and he writes that Colin Powell is “precise in his verbiage,” which is a pretty good trick since verbiage means “an excess of words for the purpose.”
Crist emphasizes the military aspects of the confrontation somewhat more than the political aspects, which may account for his omission of a discussion of the effects of the 1953 CIA-backed overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh. Nevertheless, this book is full of insights about important aspects of the U.S.-Iran relationship, especially given the current tension over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And based on past history, it is extremely unlikely that the Iranians have told or will tell the truth about their nuclear program. This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the real state of affairs in today’s Middle East.
(JAB) show less
Crist’s narrative begins in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah, and thus omits a discussion of American participation (via clandestine operations of the CIA) in the coup that overthrew the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the Shah in 1953. This omission is hard to justify; it is an important element in understanding the intense hatred of the United States that motivated Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many of the students who overran the American Embassy and precipitated the hostage crisis of Jimmy Carter’s presidency.
The United States was slow to recognize how implacable an enemy was the clerical regime in Iran (taking over after the Shah's overthrow) because the Americans were worried more about Soviet intervention than the rise of an unallied adversary. Nonetheless, the U.S. clearly sided with Iraq shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1981. The U.S. wanted to make sure oil kept flowing through the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, despite Iran’s efforts to prevent Iraq’s allies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, from using those waters to transport petroleum. For several years, the U.S. Navy confronted the Iranian navy (such as it was) in a nasty standoff that has become known as the “tanker war.”
The actual fighting between the U.S. and Iran has almost always been asymmetric: Iranian speedboats vs. U.S. Navy destroyers, cruisers, or air craft carriers or suicide bombers vs. traditional military. In recent years, Iranian armed and financed surrogates like Hezbollah and Shiite Iraqi insurgents have carried out terrorist attacks against American targets.
A few times in the past 30 years, the interests of the two adversaries coincided. The Iranians were somewhat helpful in both U.S. wars against Iraq, and they initially were helpful in the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. On the other hand, several incidents have almost resulted in outright war between the U.S. and Iran; Crist observed one such case himself in 2003.
A persistent theme of the book is that Iran is difficult to deal with because its government is so incompetent—it is never quite clear who (if anyone) is actually in charge. Crist sees this phenomenon as a potential cause of a “war of miscalculation.” Drawing upon hundreds of interviews and research into military archives, Crist reveals that there have been a number of “close calls” and he sees no prospect for better relations any time soon.
The author is especially critical of Ronald Reagan’s handling of Iran. He was too empathetic toward hostages held by Iranian surrogates, and found himself out-negotiated and bamboozled by the wily Persians. Crist is not especially favorable about Jimmy Carter either, although Mark Bowden, in Guests of the Ayatollah suggested that Carter was tougher than is generally known. Crist gives George W. Bush low marks for focusing on the moral iniquity of Iran, a position bound to do nothing but further alienation.
Crist ends his long and detailed account pessimistically. He suggests that Iran has become even more belligerent over time, and that the U.S. has not been sufficiently firm. He does not see much hope for avoiding an escalation of the “twilight” war with Iran unless the two sides begin to speak one another’s language, in all senses of the phrase.
Evaluation: Crist’s occasionally commits some common misuses of words. He confuses disinterest (impartiality) with lack of interest and he writes that Colin Powell is “precise in his verbiage,” which is a pretty good trick since verbiage means “an excess of words for the purpose.”
Crist emphasizes the military aspects of the confrontation somewhat more than the political aspects, which may account for his omission of a discussion of the effects of the 1953 CIA-backed overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh. Nevertheless, this book is full of insights about important aspects of the U.S.-Iran relationship, especially given the current tension over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And based on past history, it is extremely unlikely that the Iranians have told or will tell the truth about their nuclear program. This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the real state of affairs in today’s Middle East.
(JAB) show less
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