Evan Thomas

During the summer of 1945, US military leaders saw only two alternatives for ending the war in the Pacific: either mount a costly and bloody invasion of Japan, or deploy recently-developed atomic bombs to force the Japanese to surrender.

Author Evan Thomas reads the diaries and personal writings of three wartime decision-makers (US Secretary of War Henry Stimson, US Head of Strategic Bombing Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, and Japanese foreign minister Shigenori Togo) and concludes that they all did show more the best they could under extraordinarily difficult circumstances to save the maximum number of American and Japanese lives. In Thomas’s estimation, if the US hadn't dropped “the bomb” on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the military hardliners lurking behind the Japanese emperor’s Chrysanthemum Throne would have fought on until chaos, civil war, and even more deaths ensued.

Still, what horrible decisions to have to live with. Stimson and Spaatz were haunted by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the rest of their lives. Togo was sentenced to prison after a war-crimes trial, but he died, as Thomas stated in an interview with NPR, "satisfied that he had done all he could to bring peace."

I appreciated this thoughtful examination of the human cost of war. show less

This is an amazing psychological profile of Richard Nixon that looks at his childhood influences, his growth into an adult and his career in politics. The author shows the reader how Watergate was not just a fluke in his career, but the culmination of his weaknesses and the choices he made that led him to take steps that destroyed his presidency. It is a frightening look at a man who should never have been elected president, and was twice, with the largest majority in history for his second show more term, but who was so driven by his insecurities and fears that he engaged in conduct that was both immoral and illegal on a consistent basis. This is a wonderful and insightful look at history. show less

Many books have been written about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Evan Thomas, a journalist and historian, puts a fresh spin on the topic by focusing on three key figures involved in the events during the final months of the war. On the American side, the two people profiled are Harry Stimson, the Secretary of War, and General Carl Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific. The Japanese government official featured is Shigenori Togo, the country’s Foreign show more Minister. Based on extensive research, Thomas plums the diaries of these three men to present their thoughts as they wrestled to successfully bring the war to a close with a minimal loss of life on both sides.

Both Stimson and Spaatz are shown battling other American officials who wanted to drop the atomic bombs on Tokyo or other heavily populated cities in Japan. In the end, they helped steer the choices to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, smaller cities which also had key military installations. Togo, on the other hand, risked his own life by pushing for surrender, going against military leaders determined to fight until the bitter end. When Emperor Hirohito decided to go along with Togo, it proved to be a nail biter right up to the conclusion, with a number of the military trying to overturn the civilian government and seize the emperor as a prisoner.

The not well known behind-the-scenes maneuvering on each side makes for a fascinating read. Stimson’s diary reveals a man greatly troubled about the use of an atomic bomb, not only because of the heavy casualties it would cause, but also fearing such a weapon of mass destruction could result in the end of civilization itself. Togo is shown as a man determined to prevent the loss of Japanese lives, even if it meant surrendering and allowing an American occupation of the country. He did so knowing it was likely that he would be arrested for war crimes afterwards. Road To Surrender, published in 2023, does an excellent job of depicting the mindsets and emotions of numerous key figures in both countries and, in doing so, gives a nuanced account of the final days of WWII. show less

Dwight Eisenhower liked playing cards as much as he liked playing golf, but he was better at cards and one reason for that was his skill at bluffing. Evan Thomas explores how this particular skill carried over into his presidency in his 2012 biography “Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World.”

Having spent a career in the U.S. Army, culminating in his appointment as Supreme Commander in World War II and a military success that led to his election to the show more presidency in 1952, Eisenhower came to believe you shouldn’t fight wars unless you were fully committed to victory. Put another way, all or nothing.

Throughout the 1950s, the Cold War threatened to turn into a hot one. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons pointed at each other. Smaller wars threatened to break out everywhere, such as over the Suez Canal, and any small war could ignite a larger one.

What Ike knew, thanks to the U-2 flights and other espionage, was that the Soviets were bluffers, too. They didn’t have nearly the nuclear weaponry or the delivery capacity they pretended to have. But they could still be formidable in a conventional war. Ike’s bluff, in a nutshell, was all or nothing. There would be no small wars. If the Soviets wanted a fight, they would have to face American nukes. Would Eisenhower really have done it? Nobody really knows, but most important, Nikita Khrushchev didn’t know, and as a result, Thomas argues, the 1950s, for all their tension, were a relatively peaceful time. “The United States was blessed to be led by a man who understood the nature of war better than anyone else, and who had the patience and wisdom, as well as the cunning and guile, to keep the peace” he writes.

Presidents after Eisenhower, beginning with John F. Kennedy, have committed American troops to smaller wars, such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan, without being fully committed to victory. The consequences have not been pretty.

Thomas suggests that Ike bluffed not just the Soviets but the American people, as well. He pretended in public to be a low-key, slightly confused old man who would rather play golf than focus on the nation’s business. In truth the golf was a means of relieving the tension from his intense attention to affairs of state. Even today some historians still fall for the bluff and underestimate Eisenhower’s presidency, says Thomas. show less