Phillip Knightley (1929–2016)

This is one of the most shocking stories I’ve ever read. This biography shows how Philby went on to destroy British Intelligence as a governmental agency by the time he finally defected to the Soviet Union in 1963. The journalist author Knightly presents Philby very sympathetically. The book opens with Knightly interviewing Philby with almost complete deference. As the book progresses, Knightly becomes only slightly dubious as he realizes Philby is not being completely honest in his show more answers. By the book’s conclusion Knightly offers some mild criticisms as he lays out Philby’s rationale, not for treason, but for holding to his Communist belief system. Knightly says, “…treachery is an elastic concept and in Philby’s case has more to do with betrayal of his class interests than with betrayal of country.” (p. 262) Knightly goes on to say this his deception was necessary for his political beliefs. Aside from the uncritical assessment of Philby, Knightly has written an important book on the political context for Philby’s machinations. Knightly absolves Philby for being “a political animal,” albeit an abnormal one. This is an evasive judgment but one the author feels qualified to make. I as a reader do not accept it.
Philby’s conversation with Knightly often came to touch on his betrayal of agents who lost their lives. In specific cases Philby never accepts blame nor responsibility for them. Speaking generally he often times says that shedding blood for a political ideal was a virtue of sorts, something to be admired (p. 263). In the majority of the instances he falls back upon parallels with soldiers of war. This is a favorite of tactic of spies. They fancy themselves warriors of a different battlefield. Actually they are not. The Geneva Conventions make clear that only soldiers fall under its protections. Spies do not. For example, in 1944 Philby was said to have passed the names of German Catholic opposition leaders to his controller who had them all shot. The Albanian infiltrators (1951) were betrayed by Philby and he wondered why he was considered bloodthirsty when others were likewise ready “to contemplate bloodshed in the service of a political ideal.” Others may have contemplated it, but Philby carried it out. This is a not so subtle distinction that he was happy to gloss over. Philby said that he felt “very badly about it [betrayal to exceution]” “but then decent soldiers feel badly about the necessity of killing in wartime.” (p. 254) This again is a fallacy since Philby was not a soldier. Philby was involved in the taking of life, but not as a combatant. There is no honor in taking any life but at least the warrior on the battlefield knows that it is Kill! or Be Killed! No one was threatened by Philby but he had them secretly eliminated nonetheless. Essentially, Philby found the moral abyss within himself to place his personal responsibility for his duplicitous behavior. He wreaked violence upon others but not with his own hand. There is a kind of nobility (not glory) in meeting unjust violence with defensive force (basis of just war theory). Philby never claims he was resisting unjust force. He preferred to see himself in the work of supporting Communism (not Socialism) by subverting the Capitalist West. In his attempt to portray himself as outside of ethical condemnation as a Soviet agent, Philby was blind to see that he had been nothing more than foreign mercenary. Sadly for the British, he was the most destructive they had ever seen to be working against them. show less

In the early 1950s, two British intelligence agents defected to the Soviet Union, throwing suspicion on one of Britain's highest-placed intelligence officers, Kim Philby, whom many thought to have warned the defectors of their imminent arrest. But Philby was cleared, and it was not until several years later that he himself defected and the world learned the scope o the greatest disaster and embarrassment in the history of British national intelligence. Philby and the two other agents (Guy show more Burgess and Donald Maclean) had been fellow students at Cambridge and had there been recruited by the Soviets. Though each man was bedeviled by alcoholism, they all three rose to positions of prominence in the intelligence service, and all three cost England and the United States badly in terms of information and the lives of agents. This book, written not long after Philby's defection, was published before the full extent of the double-agent ring was known and the British government further humiliated. But it covers the lives of all three spies most effectively, and the story is richly detailed (despite the difficulties of researching the secret world of intelligence and counter-intelligence). This is a fascinating read. show less

This review is for the 1975 edition which covers the period from the Crimean War through Viet Nam. My son just purchased the 2004 edition which goes into Iraq. In effect, my son's edition adds about 4 additional chapters to update the book. This is a most interesting story. It informs the reader about the initial work of the war correspondents which included not only covering the war, but also participating in combat.

Of most importance is that the author discusses the relationship between show more the press, the military, and the government in presenting war to public at home. The role on censorship is covered in depth. I found it startling the extent to which the government and military used the press and were able influence how war was presented in a favorable light regardless of the actual situation. I am not naive. It just amazed me how the press corps could sell out to this extent to the military and government. This statement includes all nations, not just the US. Basically, not until the Viet Nam conflict did the press 'step up' to report what was actually going on. Unfortunately, this 'stepping up' created such a negative backlash that the nation over compensated to public opinion affecting national policy. I will not say any more, too personally involved in the situation.

I highly recommend this book for a valuable insight into the military, government, press combine. show less

Dull reading at first, but in the end it presented an impressive feel for the drudgery, callousness and injustices of war.