William Taubman

This is a splendidly detailed and expertly researched biography, while still being eminently readable. It brings out the enormous strengths and exuberant humanity of its subject, as well as his fatal weaknesses, hypocrisies and explosive tendency to alienate those who politically could have been his allies, e.g. the intelligentsia. I am always sorry for him when I read accounts of his ouster, though (one minor flaw) the material on that is all at the beginning of the book, not in its show more chronological place in the narrative, so that when I went back to skim through it again after the penultimate chapter ended 10 days before the ouster, I felt a little less sorry for him, being able to understand how impossible he must have been to work with. The final chapter details the sorry and shabby treatment he and his family received following his ouster, including being immediately expunged from the media. I have read editions of Pravda from the day of his ouster onwards and he really does literally vanish from the Soviet political world in print, no personal mentions at all, even negative ones. There is no entry for him in editions of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia published afterwards. Perhaps the most apposite epitaph is Roy Medvedev's, though some qualification must be added: Khrushchev rehabilitated 20 million people sent to the Gulag under Stalin and this outweighs all his faults and mistakes, albeit that Khrushchev was himself complicit in many of these repressions. 5/5

Gorbachev: His Life and Times (1/9/22-13/9/22)

This is the second mammoth biography by this author of a Soviet leader I have read, after his even bigger tome on Khrushchev in 2007. Gorbachev of course has a massive claim to be one of the most significant statesmen of the second half of the 20th century, and is widely regarded as such certainly in western Europe and north America, though largely not in his own country. He was "the only politician in Russian history who, having full power in his hands, voluntarily opted to limit it and even risk losing it, in the name of principled moral values". This would in most countries endear him to many people, though not in Russia, which has never been able to develop a democratic tradition, where there is a many centuries long tradition of a preference for authoritarian rule by one man (or very occasionally woman, in the 18th century anyway).

This exhaustively well researched biography traces his early life in a peasant farming family in southern Russia and the formative influences of his father and maternal grandfather in particular, his going to Moscow University to study law, meeting his wife Raisa, and his early climbing up the party hierarchy, to reach the Politburo in 1979-80 before the age of 50, by some distance its younger member. Most of this long book understandably deals with the six years of his leadership from 1985-91, first as general secretary of the Communist Party and latterly also as President of the USSR, when the country started to break up under the influence of the numerous internal and external pressures, the economy declining further and further, even while his democratic reforms (glasnost) gave his fellow countrymen a freedom they had literally never experienced before and which many of them, to some extent, did not know how to use and did not thank him for.

Only the last of 19 chapters deals with the quarter century (and more) of his post Soviet life, his international efforts to promote his ideals, and the tragic relatively early death of his beloved Raisa from leukemia in 1999. The author concludes that "despite his flaws and his failure to achieve all his noble aims, he was a tragic hero who deserves our understanding and admiration", and I agree with this conclusion as, I suspect, would most readers. His recent death, which prompted my reading of this book, will, I feel, compel others to evaluate his life's work in a largely positive way.

My only minor criticism of this book would be the extensive quotes from so many observers, so that the descriptions of some meetings/summits feel almost as long in the reading as the events themselves. show less

This excellent biography is an attempt to answer the question "How did Gorbachev become Communist party boss despite the most rigorous imaginable arrangement of checks and guarantees designed to guard against someone like him?" (From the Introduction.) "What made him think he could transform a dictatorship into a democracy, a command economy into a market economy, a super-centralized unitary state into a genuine Soviet federation, and a cold war into a new world order based on the show more renunciation of force—all at the same time, and by what he called 'evolutionary' means?"

Taubman draws on extensive interviews, not just with Gorbachev but with his inner political circle—some of whom have since become his bitter critics. The book is deeply researched, vivid, and yes, wonky—there is a lot of arcane detail here, particularly about the governmental workings of the USSR, and you're expected to have gained your own familiarity with it and to follow along, with the help of a long "Cast of Characters" list at the beginning and a very short glossary at the end. One thing that surprised me, and that may annoy American readers with a Reaganesque mindset, is how little editorializing Taubman does regarding the many defects of the Soviet system. He presents the system as Gorbachev experienced it—as sometimes capricious, occasionally corrupt, and all too often cruel, yes, but also as a working culture that could be navigated, as can our own, by a smart striver with a talent for networking and a great deal of luck. It's important for Americans to remember that to a Russian, the Soviet system wasn't an exception to the usual rules of government. It was the norm, and from the perspective of those living in it, the American system was the one that seemed exotically foreign, corrupt, and a potential threat. To me, this is one of the book's great strengths, essential to understanding its subject.

If Taubman doesn't completely answer the questions he poses in the book's introduction, he comes as close as anyone is likely to. In any case, the scenes inside the Politburo as Gorbachev balances the factions and holds off the hard-liners while securing the support of key allies are fascinating. And for those seeking more domestic drama, the days in the dacha during the coup, with Raisa approaching a complete breakdown wondering if and when the family will be killed, are gripping. All in all, this is a book to be read slowly, digested, and learned from. show less

«Сирия «начала диктовать нам... За наши же деньги. И получается, мы проводим не свою, а сирийскую политику». «Мы должны убираться оттуда», — заявил Горбачев на заседании Политбюро 2 июня 1986 года. «Как бы не потерять время! — заметил он 13 ноября. — Происходит привыкание. Ну show more что ж, мол, идет война» (про Афганистан). Кто мог подумать, что биографию политика невозможно будет отложить, но описания дуэли с Ельциным и «шахматных партий» саммитов с американскими президентами захватывают. Чернобыль, Афганистан, ГКЧП, восстания сепаратистов, конец СССР — семилетка власти для Михаила Сергеевича выдалась насыщенной. Таубману, получившему Пулитцеровскую премию за биографию другого противоречивого лидера, Хрущева, вновь удалась превосходная работа. Отдельный плюс — выдающийся перевод. show less

I found the book, ultimately, rather boring, which is sad because K was not a boring man. I was also confused for about the first tbird of the book because I was constantly confused as to "when" I was. It took me that long to realize Taubman's biography was a mix of topical and chronological but with the emphasis on topical. Because of this, some events and conversations were covered more than once. In a book this long, that is irritating.

I felt I gained a better understand of the goals and show more efforts of the Soviet Union under K as well as a much better understanding of the US fear of communistic goals to take over smaller third world countries and the Soviet pledge to encourage rebellion wherever there was any dissent. I appreciated the irony that, toward the end of his life, he became almost a dissident but actually became a political criminal. And his son Sergei carried out the greatest irony of all:

"In 1991, Sergei Khurshchev (K's son) moved to Providence Rhode Island where he has since been a fellow at ... Brown University, teaching.... Sergei and his wife, Velentina, obtained American citizenship in 1999, an act that outraged many Russians. Even those who aren't nostalgic for communism are chagrined at how empty Nikita Khrushchev's boasts turned out to be. Khrushchev crowed that grandchildren of Americans he met would live under communism. Instead his own son is living under capitalism."

Asked if there was anything he regretted, Nikita Khrushchev said it was all the blood, that he was up to his elbows in blood.

One other thing struck me as I read was how similar in personality are Khrushchev and President Trump. For both, disagreement is defined as disloyalty. Like K, Trump will get an idea that he wants to implement some policy and refuses to listen to advisers explaining why that is impractical or inadvisable. He wants it, it will be done. Don't talk to him about compromise. Both tout pseudo science and fake science as real and important. And neither had/has a concept of decorum. One remembers the tale of K's banging his shoe on the table at the UN. Following that, he was proud he did it. As he was ousted from office, K's detractors pointed out that, after several years, he still saw it as something of valor rather than embarrassing for a world leader to do and harmful to the reputation of the nation. Of similar vein, Trump chiding on Twitter to North Korea's threats of nuclear attacks that "we have a bigger button". The world saw, with both events. What An Idiot. But the Soviet Union had an excuse -- Khruschev took over. Trump was elected.

Yet, ultimately, although K did many, many very harmful things to the Soviet Union, his move away from the horrors of Stalinism and his move toward reforms paved the way for the glastnost of Gorbachov. As much harm as he did to his country, he also did good. Will Trump be seen, historically, in the same way, despite his harm did he also do good and will the good outweigh the harm? With Khrushchev, it did not. show less